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1 Introduction 
This series of enterprise case studies grew out from a 1995-1996 research of tlle Ecoiloillic Transi- 
tion aiitl Integration Project of IIASA. This research program was called Illlpediillents t o  Exports 
in Small Transition Economies. It acknowledged the importa.nce of export developmeilt for the 
recovery of tlie ecoilomies of Central and Eastern Europe following their deep t,ransformational 
recession in 1990-1994. T h e  main goal of the study was a, systematic empirical analysis of the 
tlifl'erent liintls of impedilnents t o  exports in various small East European countries. 
Tlle project inclutled the  coordinated elabora.tion of country studies for seveu small tra.nsi- 
tioil econoillies (STEs)  and the  writing of three topical st,udies. Originally eight countries were 
selecteti: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lat,via, Romania, Slovalcia and Slovenia. 
'Tllp C'zech country study, however, despite all efforts, was not co~npleted successfully. Nevertlie- 
Icss. the  topical studies (one dealing with government efforts in support exports,  another with 
the iinpa.ct of FDI  on exports,  and the third analyzing impedinlents t,o recovery of S T E  exports 
t o  Russia) tool< int,o account also the  Czech experience. 
The  authors of the country studies and the  author of tlie topical study on Russia were 
i~ec~uestetl t o  base their work on 20 enterprise case studies ea.cli (eventually tlle Russian study 
tvas I~asetl 011 10 cases). Before the  s tar t  of the research a common scheme of the  enterprise 
case studies wa.s discussed and agreed upon with the  aut,liors a t  a worlishop in January 199.5 a t  
11-ASA. Laxenburg. After completing their work the aut,llors were asked t o  supplenleilt a short 
version of their case studies t o  their main text.  The  resea.rch results were discussed a.t a second 
norl<sllop a t  IIASA on the  Summer of 1995. It was found tha t  not oillg the  main studies were 
tvorth ~ ~ ~ t b l i s h i n g  but also the  underlying case studies. It was decided tha t ,  due t o  the  leilgth 
of the full text ,  t ~ v o  related publications would be arranged, one hook ma.de up  of the  country 
st,utlies and t,opical studies and another of tlle enterprise case studies. 
Tlle first book is being published by a commercial publisher: Cooper R. and GAcs, J. (Eds.) 
Tratle C;~.owtll ill Transition Econon~ies: Export Impediments for Central and Eastern Europe, 
Etl\vartl Elgar, Aldersliot (forthcoming in 1997). T h e  second publicatioll is the  present series of 
case st,udies publislled by IIASA which is a.vailable for readers of the Cooper and C46cs (1997) 
l>oolc 011 request a t  the cost of post and package. 
T h e  C'ooper and C46cs (1997) book is considered an independent volunle t ha t  can be read 
separately. ~vitlioat the acco~llpaiiyiiig case studies. The  interested reader, however, would learn 
Illore ahout the topic and the world of enterprises in the respective couiltries if he or  she reads 
some of tlie case studies either randomly or by systematic selection. Tlle case stutly publicatioll 
is obviously less compact and less analytical than tlie book with the  studies. It is a background 
material tliat probably nobody would read from cover t o  cover. Its readers are strongly advised 
to get aiicl reacl tlie Cooper aiid G6cs (1997) book with tlic country and topical studies. Never- 
tlleless, specialists of enterprise behavior or country specialists would probably be interested to  
leael soiiie of tlle elite1 piise case studies i11 tliemselves. 
Because tliis series of case studies are coilsidered an accoiilpai~yiiig inaterial to  the Cooper 
aiicl G6cs (1997) book, and because of limited space we do not repeat liere tlie assumptions 
antl metliotlological consideratioiis of tlie researcli project on Impedinlents to  Exports. That  
i\ coverecl in the Introduction and Summary cliapter of Cooper aiid C46cs (1997). I n  order to  
uiiclerstancl tlie. sometinies hidden, structure of the case studies, we reproduce Iiere, lio\vever, 
tlie coiiinio~i sclienie of tlie Setrip of the Enterprise Case Studies and the C'lieclilist of Questions 
tliat the autIior\ of the enterprise case studies were requested t o  use tvlieii preparing tlie cases. 
Despite tlie coiiii~~oii scheme that  was used the readers may find t l ~ e  case studies highly diverse 
i l l  respect to  lengtli, structure and content. This is due to  several reasons: partly to  differences 
ill access to  tlie enterprises and to  enterprise data in  the different countries; t o  differences in the 
tle\clopment of the individual econolnies; and due to  differences in the preferences and style of 
tlle autllors. Since tlie case study publication was intended to  be only an accompanying material 
the editor dicl not pus11 tlie autliors to  further complete and refine tlieir case studies and thus 
111ahi1ig tlie publication more lioinogenous. In fact, even language editing was ininimal, just to  
ellsure legibility. 
Access to  enterprise managers and eliterprise da ta  has become increasingly difficult in East 
('eiitral Europe i11 the course of econornic transition. Tlie autliors made strong efforts to  get 
leli,il,le. coilsistent aiid publisliable illforiliation from those enterprises tliat were the target of tlie 
xtutly. LIany times e ~ l t e r p ~  ise managers declined to give iiiforn~ation, especially if tlie enterprise 
\ \as not successful in the course of transformation or i11 its export performance. For this reason it 
is ol>vious tliat our sample has an unintended bias towards better performing enterprises. Several 
c.ilterlxises dicl not agree to  publish tlieir names: in these cases the autllors just gave numbers 
or abl>reviations for the identification of the individual firms (see the Bulgarian, Romanian and 
the Slovenia11 cases). Due to  teclinical reasons, the author of the Russia11 topical paper did not 
elahoiate \.erl)al case studies, but chose ten foreign trading companies ant1 hacl tlieir managers 
fllletl out n cluestio~inaire about the cliaracteristics of their tracle with the selectee1 East and 
('c.ntral European ecoiioniies. I11 the last cliapter tlie results of this survey are presented. 
2 Common Schemes Used for the Elaboration 
of the Case Studies 
(A) The Setup of the Enterprise Case Studies 
1. Selection o f  enterprises 
\\.'lien selecting tlie enterprises the following criteria is to  be used. (Of course, even these do not 
ensure tliat tlie saiilple will be represelitative.) 
Enterprises sliould be selected that  are currently (or were in 1990) lion-~narginal esporters 
(at  least 5% of output esported, some of tlie enterprises iiiore than 20%). 
Tliey are esporters of manufacturing products or services. Some of tlieni s1ioulcl esport 
their ow11 products or services, some of them are esporters for others. 
Bot,li esporters t,o western and former CMEA (USSR) rna.rkets should be selected. 
So111e new esporters sliould be selected. 
Botli s tate otvned and private firms should be investigated; small, inediunl and large firms. 
.At least one firiii slioultl be selected \vliicli operates outsicle the capital. 
At least two joint ventures or fully foreign owned companies should be selected. 
2 .  Conlnlodity orientation 
Gi\.ril their iinl~ortaiice in esports, it is advised that  producers/esporters of at least five of tlie 
follo\ving cominodity groups sliould be selected where possible: 
Llaiiufacture of clieiiiicals obtained from petroleum (petrocliemicals) aiid from coal (NACE 
252) 
Iron and steel industry, escluding integrated coke ovens (NAC:E 221) 
Manufacture and assembly of motor veliicles and manufacture of mot,or vehicle engines 
( N  .ACE 3.51) 
A~Ia,nufact~ure of tools a.nd finished inetal goods escept electrica,l equipment (NAClE 316) 
hlanufacture of electrical machinery (comprising electric motors, electricity generators, 
transfornlers, switches, switch gear and other basic elect,rical plant) (NAC:E 1342) 
Alanufacture of ready made clothing and accessories (NAC'E 4.53) 
Iinit,ting industry (NACE 436) 
hIanufact,ure of inass produced footwear (NACE 4.51) 
LIanufacture of wooclen furniture (NACE 467) 
Slaugl~tering. preparing and preserving of nieat (escluding hutcliers's tratle) (N.4CE 412) 
Processing ancl preserving of fruit and vegetables ( N A G  414) 
Tlie above 11 conlinodity groups made up 48'% of the C'EEC manufacturing esports to  EC' 
i n  1993. and 46'i/ri of the growth of C'EEC maliufacturilig esports to EC from 1988 to  1993. 
3. Standard information to  collect about the enterprises (see also check list below 
for details) 
3.1 Characteristics of the enterprise in 1990-1994: Size, date of birth and consecutive steps of 
transformation, ownership ancl organization, main products, maill markets, performance 
(out put. einployment , profit, indebtedness). 
i3.2 Esport orientation: traclitional or new; is esporting importance for the overall production 
al~cl profits of tlie firm; East orland iVest, target countries, direct esporting or through 
iiiediators, o\rn product or production for contract (subcontracting). products how mucli 
developecl for foreign marl<ets, characteristics of esport strategy in 1990-2000 (competition 
i n  price, cj uality, ternls of delivery, finance; own brand, accluired brand, 01. generic product; 
structure of nlarkets and mediators), assessment of competitive characteristics of products 
and tlie enterprise. 
3.:3 Domestic environment and exports: relation of domestic sales aiicl esport sales (similarly or 
coii~~>leii~entary of proclucts; comparative resource intensity, costs aiicl profitability), export 
financing and insurance (production pre-financing. esport revenue pre-financing, insurance 
against default or political risk), access to necessary inputs, tlie impact of government 
regulations, tlie relation to state administration. 
3. I Foreigii eiirironment and esports: relation to foreign customers, I~anks, competitors aiid 
otlier partners (subcontractors, license owners), nature of ~netliators (esclusive or compet- 
ing agents a t  home or abroad, joint ventures abroad, assembly shop abroad), the sjstem 
of collecting information on products and markets; foreign regulations inlpeding exports: 
~narl<et structure (of the foreign inarl<et), assessmeilt of risks and prospects in the different 
~na~.bets .  
(B) Suggested Checklist of Questions for the Enterprise Case Studies 
1. Background information 
( a )  Date of establishment 
( I ) )  Output capacity, delineated according to ma,in products 
(c)  Size of lal~or force 
( t l )  Estimated size of the capital stock 
(e)  Traditional 1narl;ets 
( f )  Total sales since 1990 
(g) Size of profit since 1990 
(11)  Le\.el of indebtedness 
2. Structure of ownership 
( a )  Steps of transformation from 1988-1995 
(h )  C'urrent structure of ownership 
3. Export orientation now and in retrospect (1988-1995) 
(21) How mr~cll of total sales are for export markets (in percentages)? 
(I)) To whom are you exporting (wliat kind of firms or organizations)? 
(c)  \$'here are exports going (by country and region)? 
(d )  Is esporting clone t.hroug11 direct contact or through mediators? 
(e)  Do yo11 export >.our own products or product on contract by your foreign partner (suh- 
contracting, out~vard processing, job work)? 
4. Production for export 
(a)  Is prod~iction oriented toward esport markets? If so how, and to  which niarltets? 
( I , )  Is there a compa,ny strategy which is ~>ushing for esports? If so then to ~vhicli marltets? 
(c) \\.'hat is tlie current coinpetitive strength of your products/your eiiterprise in foreign mar- 
kets and lio~v do you espect these advantages change in the nest five years? 
(d )  *Are products produced for export different in terms of input usage (or factor intensity) 
than those produced for the domestic market? 
(e)  \Yhat is tlie difference between the profitability of goods produced for tlie tlomestic market 
1,ersus those produced for the foreign market? 
( r )  Does production for tlie domestic market support exporting activities (tlirougli differences 
in cluality, complementary relations, cross-financing)? 
5. Domestic environment for exports 
( a )  Cliaracterize tlie tlonlestic environment for exports in  terms of export licenciiig, tlie tax 
systein, i~iceiitives for exports, availability of credit for exports, and availability of iiisur- 
aiice. 
( I , )  Are there i~npcdiments to  get the necessary inputs? Is there preferential treatment wlieli 
purcliasi~ig inputs for exports'? 
( c )  lYliat is tlie iinpact of goveriinieiit regulation on tlie clioice whether to  export or not, or 
for tlie clioice of product? 
jd) Do good relations nlitli s tate adlninistratioil help mucli when arranging export deals? 
6. The foreign environment for exports 
( a )  What is the relationship between your foreign customers, mediators, ancl your firm? 
( I ) )  \Yho are your coinpetitors abroad? 
(c)  How tlo you collect information about your foreigii markets? 
( e l )  -Are foreign rcgulatio~is impeding exports? If so liow (clirectl?. tlirougli tariffs aiicl quotas 
or illclirectly througl~ quality standards, dumping regulations, or health stanclards)? 
(e)  Ho\v ~iiucli do coiiditioiis of paynieilt by foreign partners affect your decision to  export? 
( f )  Ha1.e the Europe (Association) Agreements of your country (if  applicable) affected your 
clioice of iinports or your clioice of targeted markets? 
(g)  How is t lie marliet structure of foreign markets affecting your export performance? 
(11) Is j.our fir111 a joint venture or a fully foreign owiied company? If so, liow does >.our foreigii 
partner's presence affect: 
a .  )bur liiiaiicial situation? 
I,. \r7011r access to  foreign markets? 
c .  )bur access to  inputs, especially high technology illputs'? 
el,  Retraining firm ~vorkers with more efficient tecliniques'? 
3 BULGARIA 
Rumen Dobrinsky 
Centre for Ecorzonlic nlld Strategic Reserrrrh. S'o.fin 
and 
Ira Yaneva 
Bulgaria n-S l~a~l i sh  Cl1o nl ber of C'OIU rnerre, ,Yo.ficr 
Table 3.1 Profiles of the  conlpanies coverecl in tlie survey. 
Export/  
('om- Owner- Legal sales 
pan! Sector shipa s tatusb Sizec ratio ( % I )  Main markets 
B l  Tratle S SOE M 40-45 UI<, USA, Japan ,  Canada,  
Australia 
B2 hlecl~anical eng. S LLC M 65-70 Germany, Italy, C' reece 
Turkey, :\lgeria. Chile 
U3 Clothing S JSC L 9 5 Netlierlantls. U I i ,  Fra.nce, 
otlier EU 
B4 C'lothing S LLC M 6 5 Germany 
B5 Electrical eng. P P M 2 0 Russia, Polancl, hlacedonia 
B(i Trade S LLC S 60-75 Russia, Turkey, C;er~na~ij ,  
Czech Republic, Netherlands 
BT Tracle P LLC S 9 5 Russia, Italy, hIacedo11ia 
Albania 
I3S Tra.de P ( J V )  LLC S 100 Ballian countries 
I39 Tracle P LLC' S 100 Polancl, C'zecli Republic. 
Balliali countl.ies. [Iliraine, 
Slovakia, Hungary 
R l O  ('liemica1 ind. hI(P,S)  LLC' S 10 I~ id ia ,  Uliraine, Jorclan, 
Syria, Pv'lorocco, Italy 
I311 Timber ind. S LLCl M 8 0 Germany, other EU 
R12 hIec1ianica.l eng. S .JSC M 70 R.ussia, Ukraine, Albania, 
Macedonia, Iiazal<hstan 
U13 'I'estile incl. S .JsC' L 3-5-40 Ciermany, Italy, Greece, 
Syria, Hungary 
I314 hletal p~,oclucts S .lSC: L 2.5530 \ITest,ern Europe 
U15 Textile incl. s LLC' M 9 5 Ciermany, Italy 
D l h  Footwear incl. S .JSC' M 8 0 UIi.  C:anacla, USA, Russia, 
Ciermany. Arab countries 
BIT Clhelnical i ~ i d .  S JSC L 9 0 China., India, Romania 
Brazil, Greece, Turlcey, 
Macedonia 
B18 Tourism s JSC M 7 0 Germany, Italy, [TI\;, USA 
" S = State owned; P = Private; M = Mixed ownership; JV = Joint vent.ure nit,h Foreign participation. 
" .JSC' = Joint.-st,ock company; LLC = Limited liability company; SOE = Unincorporat.ed state-owned enterprise; 
P = Partnership. 
' I, = Large (>I000 employees: M = Medium-size (50-1000 employees); S = Small (<50 employees). 




Product r,,~.r (r~ic~irl c ~ p o r t  products): glass and ceramic products. illurninants, souvenirs, carpets, 
household articles, luggage, small wooden articles, toys. 
Pt rfornrnrrtt Dntc~: 
Number of employees (number) 110 
Net sales (mil. lev) 194.0 
Net sales (mil. USDI 7.02 
Lcg(r1 stntus: State-owned enterprise. No subsidiaries or stakes i11 otlier coinpanies. 
Ou,ncr..shilj: loo%, state-owned. 
Basic Profile 
B l  \\-as esta.blis11ed as a specializecl foreign tra.de coinpaiiy (t,ypical of tlie periocl of central 
planning) aiicl lias preservecl this profile. Since 1991 it develops it,s own \\larehouse distribution 
nct\\-orli: since 1992 it lias established its own network of retail outlets. One strategic goal of 
t l ~ e  coilipaiiy is to  expand tlie distribution network. 
B l  is i n  relatively goocl fillailcia1 state with traditioiial cloinestic aiicl foreign 1na.rliets. Tlialilis 
to  its long-tern1 I~usiness contacts, a t  present it has been a,l~le to  capture some lucrative assign- 
~iients such a,s t,lie exclusive represelltation of severa.1 interna.tiona1 brand iiailles i l l  Bulgaria. 
Recently, clue to  tlie financial squeeze on manufa,cturers, B1 lias iliade tlie ratlier unusual 
tlrcisioii to  pro\~icle finance to  a nunlber of its counterparts i11 order to  lieep tliein i11 operation. 
I'iitler tliis sclielne B1 pre-pays the value of tlie goods wliicli it exports after t.lie completion of 
the procluct cycle. 
Tlie coilipaiir lias an experienced nianagemeiit tea,ill wliicli lias been able to  lead successfully 
tluriiig tlie turbulent first pliase of transition. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,5'lr(rrt of' t.rljor3t.s irz totcrl sn.lt.s: 40-4.5%). 
AIIoirz t.cpor.t rrrnrktts: before 1990: USSR; curreiitl~l: UIi, ITSA, Ca,nada. Japa,n, Aust,ralia, 
.lorclan. 
B1 \\-as est.ahlis1ied as a specialized foreigii trade compa.ny a.nd still maintaii~s tliis profile. 
It is not a producer but a media.tor for a. number of Bu1garia.n n~a.iiufacturing producers on tlie 
rorcign nia.rliets. It cloes not envisage direct or indirect involvement in maiiufact~uriiig activity. 
The Doillestic Eilviroilillent for Exports 
.-\s a specializecl foreigii trade company, B1 reports tliat one of t,lie illail1 doiliestic obstacle to  its 
act,ivity is tlie lack of a systern of export insurance or export guarantees i11 Bulgaria. (a.s well a.s 
tlie lacli of ally stiinuli to  export).  At tlie same tiine, due to  tlie highly uncertain environment 
i n  tlie couutry. all exporters face serious risks. If tlie exporter is not able to  sliare soiue of these 
risks through a, system of export insurance, lie may be prolie to  cancel seine tra.nsactions. 
I11 tlie lat.esl years the volunle of B1 exports lias declined in spite of the fact tliat there are 
iiiarliets for t,lie tra,ditional export goods, tlie maiiufacturers lia,ve tlie capacity to  produce and 
tlie sales \\-oulcl Ile profitable for them. B1 coiisiders tliat one of tlie most serious problem for 
its local part,iiers (inaiiufa.cturers) is the financial squeeze. Many producers are indebted wit,h 
I>acl loans and tlie hanks are not willing to  extend new credit to  tliein; another problem is tlie 
r e v  high cost of credit. As a result, producers face shortage of working capital wliicli results 
in o u t l ~ u t  clecline. Besides, due to  tlie unstable political environment in the latest years, many 
tilt erprise inanagers feel great uncertainty about their positions in tlie future. As a consecluence, 
they avoicl rislcy ol>erations in general, and pay less attention to  long-term clecisions. 
B1 coiisiclers tliat tlie existing regulations also create obstacles to  exporters. The regulations 
rrlated to  VAT are especially appalling as the trade companies are obliged to  prepay tlie VAT on 
the exported coiiimodities wliile its reimbursement after tlie completion of tlie export operation 
usually talces place with substantial clelay. I11 tlie cases when tlie merchandise is subject to  
licei~silig or registration, there exist many bureaucratic obstacles and formalities. The procedures 
are slow, tlic institutions are inefficient and some officials are corrupt. 
B1 coiisiclers tliat most of tlie current obstacles to  exports are beyond its control: it has not 
taken any specifically clesigned measures to  alleviate such obstacles. 
The Foreign Eilviroillllellt for Exports 
A s  a traclitioiial foreign tracle company B1 has always operated in the coi~clitioiis of liigli compe- 
tition. As tlie range of exported products is quite diversified, B1 is iiot always able to  keep track 
of all its couipetitors: new coinpetitors emerge every day. Therefore tlie strategy to  avoid risky 
~ [ ~ e r a t i o n s  is follo\vecl. The main policy is to  maintain good relations ancl business confidence 
with its traclitioiial foreign clients. B1 maintains direct links with its clients abroad and does 
iiot relj. on mediators. 
B1 cloes 11ot claiin obstacles to  its trading practice steiniiiiiig froill foreign regulation. It 
follo\vs closely tlie s tate and prospects of its inaiii foreign niarkcts ancl maintains an information 
s steni n it11 marlceting clata. 
Company Code: B2 
Background Inforillation 
,S'rctor: llechanical engineering. 
Produrt r11i.r.: clesign ant1 nlanufacture of machinery for the estraction and preparation of ores, 
n~acl~inery for mines. nlachinery for tlie ceramic industry. foundries, etc. 
Pr r.fi,r.rucinrr d(itci: 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (mn. lev) 33.3 133.0 176.2 188.3 
Total equity (mn.  lev) 14.5 99.0 98.9 98.9 
N ~ l m l ~ e r  of employees (number) 640 579 
Total revenue (mn. lev) 33.2 4 1.9 25.8 38.7 
Net sales (mil. lev) 26.8 39.6 17.3 37.5 
Net sales (mn. USD) 1 .GO 1.70 0.64 0.69 
After t a s  profit (mil. lev) 0.4 -8.4 -40 ..5 -17.9 
L,e~.erage (commercial 
tlebt/total assets) (%) 26.0 11.9 16.4 10.4 
Lrg(i1 .\tutu.\: Linlitetl liability company (since 1992) ; before that  non-corporatize(1 state-o\vneti 
fiinl. No subsidiaries or stakes in  otlier companies. 
Oulrlr r.\hil;r: 100% state-o~vned. 
Basic Profile 
IHistorically B2 nas  establisl~ed as a typical socialist machine-builtli~~g iant oriented to  the 
C'hlEA (mainl!. IISSR) iuarliet. It has sis main production shops, a clesign unit ancl 40 ware- 
I ~ o ~ ~ x e s .  B2 is the sole producer of this type of ecluipment 011 the Balliaiis. After esperiencing 
wrious tlifficulties i l l  1991-1993, since 1994 the company has started to overcolne tlie transfor- 
 national cle[~ression 11y restructuring and reorientation to  nenF inatliets. The coinpany's strategy 
is to preserve its basic procluction profile. but also to  raise its cluality anel e s l ~ a i ~ t l  the services 
offered to clients (including maintenailce and spare parts). 
131 appears to  have come through its most difficult period of trailsition and to have relatively 
goocl future prospects. 
Export Orieiltation 
,S'It(irr of r .rl;ror.ts in totcil soles: 6.5-70%. 
IInirl c.rljothf ttrnr*kctb: before 1990: USSR; currently: Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, -Algeria, 
A lorocco, C'llile, Cuba. 
Tlie company is a direct esporter (no mediators). It esports its onrn products. 
Exports ale very important for B2 as the local rnarket is \ ley  small for its proclucts. After 
the collapse of tlie C'MEA and tlie loss of the ex-Soviet market, the company is marl<eting 
aggressively it5 products to otlier markets and especially in  the Balkans aiid i n  northern Africa. 
Productioil for Exports 
B'L esports I1ot11 finislied and semi-finished mecliailical eiigiiieeririg products of its ow11 design 
;11lt1 proclucts after the design of their clients (this is not typical outward processing, as B2 only 
"iml~orts" the clesign but uses its oivn inputs). 
rile clualit!r aiid the teclinological level of tlie export products is not different from those of 
the products sold on tlie local market. There is 110 difference in tlie input usage a ~ l d  tlie costs of 
output solel on the local and on foreign markets; the profitability of clolnestic sales and esports 
011 average is coml)arable. 
The Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
'rile lacl, of esport credits and/or export guarantees does not stimulate producers to export if 
they can inarhet their output domestically. 
B2 cloes not clainl serious impediments to its esports stemining from cloinestic regulation. 
The most 5erious intrusions of the state administration in the latest years has been the changing 
of enterprise managers. There are no impediments to  get the necessary inputs. 
The conlpany is facing domestic problems with the transportation of its esport products 
1vl1ic11 are bulky and require special treatment. The Bulgarian railroad nlonopoly is not flesible; 
it cloes not alnays meet the transportation requirements and causes delays. Sea shij~ments are 
also son~etimes tlelayed. I11 trying to  overcome these obstacles, B2 is re-designing the packaging 
of its merchandise with the goal to  be able to ship all its products in standarc1 containers. 
The Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
I n  general B2 reports good relations with its foreign customers. Lately it reports increased 
competition on the foreign ~narkets ,  in particular by manufacturers froin other central and 
eastcrn European count,ries. 
It consiclers that its ~ ~ ~ a r l i e t i n g  inforina.tion is insufficient but has not estahlishecl yet a, specia.1- 
izccl s!.stem for such information. The risks ancl the prospects of its foreign markets a.re assessed 
111ai11lj- I)y expert judgment. Due to  the high costs of and the prohlems relat,ed to transportation, 
the con1l)any places a special emphasis on the geogra.phic prosinlity of its foreign nlarkets and 
Sollows tlle strategy to  increase the esports to  the nea.rest markets. 
.As of tllc heginning of 1995, B2 does not cla.im ilnpedilrients to  esports stemming from 
foreign regulation. But a. new EU regulation, due to  enter into force in .June 199.5, is expected 
to create serious new obstacles to  the company's exports to ELi-member states. This regulation 
l.rclr~ir~s licensing of the esports of inachinerjr set in  motion by e1ectrica.l power. T l ~ e  liceilses 
i1rc espcctecl to t ~ e  quite espensive and will only be valid for three months: they will have to be 
I , P I I ~ ~ . P ~ ~  s ~lxiecluent,ly for every quarter. B2 considers the ne~v regulation as a highly restrictive 
( ~ ~ I I c I  protectionist) measure on the part of t . l~e EU as it is espectecl to raise the cost of esports 
and to rccluce the competitiveness of B2's products 011 EU nlarl;ets. 
Company Code: B3 
Background Ii~fori~lation 
E.stnblishcr1: 1947. 
,Sector: I~/lanufacture of ready-made clothing. 
Pl.oduct 111i.x: men's and ladies' suits, ladies' overcoats, nien's shirts, ladies' blouses, skirts, 
trousers. shorts. 
Pcrfot.ru/rrl~.r (l(rt(i: 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (mil. lev) 158.9 282.8 390.1 -579.7 
Total equity (mn. lev) 13.6 111.8 1.57.4 164.8 
Nuniher of einployees (number) 1443 1386 
Total re\.eiiue (mn. lev) 54.3 73.4 163.4 296.3 
Ket sales (mil. lev) 46.9 68.9 79.9 137.6 
Net sales (mil. USD) 2.82 2.9.5 2.89 2.54 
.After tax  profit (mn. lev) -8.3 -33.2 -5 1.8 -36.1 
Lel~erage (conimercial 
clellt/total assets) 81.5 -55.8 46.3 53..5 
Lcgnl slnlus: .Joint-stock conlpany (since 1993); before that lion-corporatized state-owned firm. 
No subsicliarie5 or stakes i11 other conipanies. 
O1rlt1e rshil~: loo'% state-owned. 
Basic Profile 
I3:3 is a specializecl producer of ready-made clotlling and i11 terms of size it is o ~ i c  of tlie largest 
i l l  Bulgaria. It lias 8 production shops, and a design unit wliicli is equipped ivitli sopliisticated 
tecli~iology. I11 tlic past, when tlie company was oriented to the CMEA nlarliets, most of B3's 
~xoclucts \\-ere of its ow11 design; now it is mostly outward processing. The conipany has large 
(i~ilierited fro111 tlie past) commercial debt which is now a serious financial bu~tlen. At present 
B:3 still tlocs iiot operate a t  fu l l  capacity and one of tlle reasons is the clifficult access to  I)ank 
creelit. I n  principle, if the econonlic environment i n  the country improves, B3 lias good chances 
to cxpancl its output. 
There ale a nuiiiber of manufacturers of ready made clothing in Bulgaria (B:3 is one of them) 
d ~ ~ c l  111o5t of tlienl have followed a similar strategy: to subcontract outivarcl processing traffic 
\ \  itli large \restern iilaiiufacturers or distributors of clotliing. Most of tlie Bulgarian clothing 
~iianufacturers are iiot competitors to each otlier as tliey usually are linked to a single (and 
cliff'erent) \<ester11 partner. Sucll a strategy, however, ma1;es the Bulgarian conlpanies rather 
\,uliierable to  eventual tlisruptions on tlieir single markets. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,Yltrrl-r of r.cl~orts it, lofnl hales: 95%. 
.\/rot, c.tSpori ~ttcrrkets: before 1990: USSR; currently: tlie Netherlands, UI<,  France and other 
Ell-nie~iiber states (almost all exports are directed to tlie ELI). 
B:3 exllorts read?. made clothing in  tlie form of finished products: 9-59 of tlie exports consists 
of' outivard proccssiilg traffic: the remaining part is own production. Tlie transactions are 
liegotiatecl directly with the foreign customers. 
Tlie conillany is exclusively export-oriented; it cannot survive without exports. Tlie local 
~narbet  is very limited (as compared to the capacity of the company); besides, local denialid is 
cl11ite clepressecl lately. 
Productioil for Exports 
Tlie qr~alit!. tlie input usage and the costs of the esport products is tlie same as those of the 
~>roclucts oltl on tlie local market; the profitability of domestic sales aucl esports is similar. 
Tlic. csport strategy relies on high coinpetitiveiiess based on quality, competitive prices based 
0 1 1  lo\\. costs (mainly labor), reliability of sl~ipments to  custoniers and hrantl name. B3 espects 
to  i n a i ~ ~ t a i ~ l  its competitive edge in  the future. 
The Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The ~ ~ i a i n  ~npetlin~ent to esports reported by B3 is the high cost of credit (the average nominal 
i~~ te res t  rates in conin~ercial credit in 1994 were above 90%). Due to  tlie tecli~~ological nature 
of the protluctio~~ cycle (with an average duration of 6 months), tlie company needs substantial 
a i i io~~n t s  of \\.orliing capital which it cannot afford a t  t l ~ e  current level of interest rates. This 
liiiiits tlie potential of the company to  produce and esport own production and is one of the 
reasons for the alnlost esclusive orientation towards outward processing (where the working 
capital recluireinents are lotver). B3 does not report other tloinestic impecliinents to  the supply 
of the necessary inputs or inlpediinents related to  goveri~ment regulations. 
Tlle Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
133 has e\tal>lishetl and inaintains good. long-term relations with a number of stable ant1 reliable 
t u\toiner\ froni EU-member countries ( the El1 is its main ~narliet now). The niain conipetitors 
on these niarliets are manufacturers from other central and eastern European countries as well 
a \  from soutli-east Asia. 
The conipaiijV is espancling its marlieting department al~icli collects information froin cata- 
logues ant1 otlier ~>ublications as well as fro111 visits abroad. 
The inost serious foreign inlpedi~nent to esports reported by B:3 are the cluantitative restric- 
tion\ (esport quotas) in the EU (on all ready niade clothes) and i n  northern Anlerica (on some 
t!.l>eq of clotlies). Some restrictions can be avoicletl through outwaitl processing. 
.Anotl~er seriorrs obstacle to B3's esports are tlie U N  sanctions against the Federal Republic 
ol \17rlgo\lavia (Serbia and Ivlontenegro) anci, i n  particular, the ban of transit trai~sportation 
through its territory. This causes delays in tlie t rans~~or ta t ion  a d raises its costs. 
Company Code: B4 
Background Illforlllatioll 
E.\t(iblishcd: 1928. 
,S'cctora: hJanufacture of ready-made clothing. 
Pl.oduct ru~,r: ladies' suits and overcoats, blouses, skirts, ladies' trousers, accessories. 
Pr tfor.ruor~cr tloto: 
1991 1992 199.3 1994 
Total asiets (mn. lev) 28.5 71.2 69.4 101.8 
Total equit! (mil. lev) r .,5 4.1 .O 44.0 44.4 " 
Numher of employees (number) 980 927 
Total revenue (mn. lev) 59.6 104.2 120.0 249.5 
Net sales (mn. lev) Fj4.7 103.4 119.0 244.6 
Ket sales (mn. USD) 3.28 4.43 4.30 4..52 
.After t a s  profit (mil. lev) .5.0 9.2 6.0 29..5 
Leverage (commercial 
clcbt/total assets) (%I 0.0 0 .O 1.4 0.0 
Lcgul *totus: Liinited liability company (since 1991); before that  lion-corporatizecl state-owned 
f i i  111. No subsidiaries or stakes in other companies. 
Ou,rlr rxhil~: 100'i: state-owned. 
Basic Profile 
B4 is another large proclucer of' ready-made clothing, specialized i n  ladies' garinei~ts. Its pro- 
t l l ~ c t i o ~ ~  facilities are located in a -5-storey building; apart from that it llas a 4-storey warehouse 
ant1 an atlniinistrative building. Similarly to  B3, B4 is "linked" to  one largc western client ( a  
( : e r ~ ~ ~ a n  co~npany) \vhich constitutes its maill market. A privatizatioii proceclure is unclerway 
\i it I1 the company management as one of the main bidders. 
Export Orientation 
,Shorr of c.rpor.t.\ it, total sales: (35%. 
A\Iolr~ c.rl)or.t rl~nrket.~: before 1990: USSR; currently: Germany. B4 esports only finished prod- 
~ ~ c t s  - rcacly made clothing - almost esclusively through outivard processing. No mediators 
i l l  csports. 
Productioil for Exports 
The qua1it.v ant1 technological level of the goods produced for esports is the sanie as of those 
~~rotlucecl for t lie local market; no difference in profitability on the two markets. 
The conipany achieves coinpetitiveness through quality (and price/quality ratio) and brand 
nanie. 
The Donlestic Ellviroillllent for Exports 
B I does not claim any serious domestic obstacles to esports steiiin~ing froill the iuacroeconomic 
e~~ i . i ro~ imen t  or regulation. The company is virtually debt free and is not affected by the high 
cost of credit. No inlpecliments to  the access to  the necessary inputs has bee11 reporteel. 
I34 suffers. l~onrever, from lack of marketing skills and esperience in operating in foreign 
marliets. .4ggressive aclvertising and niarlieting have been neglectetl. The main resulting problem 
ii t lie lack of cliversificatio~l i n  its esports which mal<es the firm vulnerable to  esternal shocks. 
The Foreign Eilviroilille~lt for Exports 
C'urrent l  B4's relations lvitl~ its foreigli clients are good and stable. They are based on long 
lasting past experience and niutual trust.  Tlie company's niaiii co1iipetitol.s 011 the export 
111arl<ets are iiianufacturers from other central atid eastern European countries a s  well as  from 
Bulgaria. B4's competitive edge is tlie price/quality ratio. 
B 1 co~~siclers tha t  its available information is not sufficient and tha t  it sliould develop fur- 
ther its n~arl;etiiig and managerial sliills which would enable t o  diversify its markets. It plans 
specialized training of its staff t o  improve perforniance. 
Tlie existing quantitative restrictions on textiles are obstacles t o  the further expansion of 
exl)orts t o  tlie ELI aiid nortllern America. 
Company Code: B5 
Background Iilforillatioil 
E.ht(rbli.~hf(l: 1990. 
,5'ccior.: hlanufacture of telecommunications equipment. 
Pr,otluct r11i.r: automatic teleplione esclianges, teleplione concentrators, peripherals, specialized 
teleplione systenls. 
Pc rfor-r~,(rrirc (l(rt(l: 
1994 
Number of employees (number) 6.5 
Profit is positive and growing 
Lcyrl .htcrt us: part ~iersliip. 
Ou,rit r,.hlril): loo%, privately owned. 
Basic Profile 
8.5 is onc of tlie few private Bulgarian manufacturers in tlie sector of telecommutlicatio~ls equip- 
iiient. I t  n:as established by a group of engineers a,nd tnana,gers ~vl io left a large state-owned 
conipany in tlie saliie branch. Tlie conipa.ny lias one shop-floor; it operates its 011~11 design unit. 
:Ill filial products are  of the company's own design. 
Since its establislinient B.5 has focused its a.cti\:ity in a. specific product niche: small teleplione 
csclia.nges suitable for small settlements. Thus far it is tlie sole manufacturer of these proclucts 
iii Bulgaria; tlie company 1ia.s been able t o  find esternal markets a,s well. At present B5 is 
n-ell positioneel on its markets but needs new investments in orcler t o  be able t o  preserve its 
conipet,itive aclvantages. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,Vlr(lrr o j  c.r.por.t\ 111 totnl .~clles: 'LO%, growing. 
.lIniri c.rpor.t r1irri~ket.s: Russia, Poland, Maceclonia. B.5 esports  finished products in the  form of 
teleco~nmunications equipment. Espor t s  are negotiated clirectly with tlie customers. 
B.5 considers esports  as  vital for its future espansion. It  follows tlie strategjr of boosting 
esports  to  tlie current markets and entering new markets (especially in northern Africa). 
Productioil for Exports 
U.3 is in essence an assembling company. It  uses as inputs high-tech imported components and 
nclcls \.alne in clesign and assembling. The  company products are allnost esclusively of custom- 
tailored design t o  reflect specific demand of different customers. Tliis leads t o  certain quality 
differences in tlie products for exports and for the domestic market (as  well a s  between products 
esportetl t o  tlilferent markets).  
B5 considers tha t  its co~npetitiveness is based on a favoral~le for their customers price/quality 
ratio. Tlie company strategy is t o  establish its brand name. 
The Doillestic Eilviroilillent for Exports 
I3.5'~ exports I l a ~ e  not I>een su l~ jec t  t o  governnient regulation. Tlie company lias not been a 
~,ccipient of esport stimuli either. It does not report inipedinients i n  getting tlie necessary 
i n l~u t s  (YO'% of the inputs are imported). 
Tlie nlain ol~stacle t o  the growth of esports  is tlie lack of financial resource t o  finance the 
(o11il)a11y'\ esl~ansion.  Since its establishment, B.5 lias not used banli crcdit and lias financed 
its gron tll esclusi\.ely through its own retained earnings. Bank credit is: 1) very costly for 
il~\,estment purl)oses; 2) difficult to access, especially for small private firllls which have little to 
off el, as collateral. 
.4ccortling to  B5. the state has done very little to stimulate small private manufacturing 
firms to gro\v ancl esport; the government should consicler certain preferential terms for new 
investment as well as sonle forms of export guarantees. 
The Foreigil Environment for Exports 
13.5 eva,luates its I>r~siness rela't'ions with its foreign clients as escellent. The company 11a.s found 
certa.in niches on the ma,rket,s where there is little competit,ion a t  the moment but this n1a.y 
cha,ng;e in the future. 
B.5 11;l.s est,a,l~lished two branches in Russia which operate as its tlistributors on the Russian 
tiiarliet. It plans to  espa,ncl its esports to  Russia a.nd to some of the fornier Soviet IJ~~ioii  states 
and to  enter some new markets in northern Africa. 
The company's sports lla,ve not been subject to  foreign government regula.tions. It uses its 
o\vn resources to collect a,nd process the necessary marlieting operations. 
I3.5 tloes not report a.ny serious foreign impetli~nents to  the growth of its exports. 
Company Code: B6 
Background I~lforillatio~l 
E.~tolrli.shccl: 1965. 
,5'~rtor: Tracle (greenhouse agricultural products). 
P/.oduct n1i.r: cut flowers, seeds, greenhouse technologies. 
Pcrforr71nrzcc ~lotn:  
1993 
Number of employees (number) 1.5 
Net sales (mn. lev) .55 
Net sales (mn. USD) 1.02 
Ciross profitability of sales (%) 1.5-20 
Ley11 .st~~t~l.\: Limitecl liability company (since 1994); before that  non-corporatized state-owned 
film. No sul>sicliaries or stakes i n  other companies. 
Oiilr1cr.\hlp: 100% state-owned. 
Basic Profile 
L3fj is an oKspriiig of t,he inonopolistic socialist foreign trade company i n  tlie I>ranch. During t,he 
first pl~ase of transition B6 managed to  preserve ancl espand its foreign business contacts. 
I n  this periocl B6 set in motion one substantial change i n  its b~isiness profile I>JI ui~dertaking 
il closer involveinent in t,he production process and has transformed itself from a purely trading 
companjr into a proclucing-and-trading firm. This is done by subcontracting the process of 
flower gron-ing to  ot,lier compa.nies under BG's trade mark. In this way BG is able to  supervise 
the ~xocluct,ion process and t,o monitor the quality. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
.Yhn/-t of c.rl~or.ts it1 totnl sclles: 60-7.5%). 
. \ I I I ~ I I  c.cpor.t n1c1rktt.s.: Russia., Turkey, Cierinany, the Netl~erlaiicls, Ukraine, tlie Czech Republic. 
'The coinpany esports greenhouse agricultural products and seeds. Procluce of better quality 
selectee1 for csports. The profital~ility of the esport market is lligl~er than tlia,t of t,lie donlest,ic 
inarket. 
Esports are considered vital for the company due to  its share in the sales ancl because of 
higher profitability. It,s policy is to  espand esports to  its current markets ancl enter new marlcets 
(Spain, Inclia. Slovakia.). 
B6 t,liinks that  its competitiveness is generated by the quality of the esported products, 
the goocl tecl~nological level as well as by its favora.ble price/quality ratio. Also, some of the 
protlucts are considered to  possess unique qualities which are not, matched by its competitors. 
The Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Bfi consiclers the cloillestic regulations on V,4T (requiring the prepayment of I'AT by esporting 
tlacle companies) as a serious impediment to  its esport activity. It results in raising the esport 
price ancl reclucing the coinpetitiveness on the foreign markets. 
The conipai1y fincls the esisting custoins and aclministrative proceclures rather bureaucratic 
;~i icl  tiine consuming. 
The Foreign Enviroilillellt for Exports 
'l'lrc main c o ~ ~ ~ p e t i t o r s  of BG on its foreign markets are exporters of siniilar produce fro111 other 
central ant1 eastern European countries as well as  other Bulgarian esporters.  The  company puts  
sul>staii~ial effort in collecting marketing information from publ ica t io~~s  ancl catalogues as well 
as  t lirougl~ personal contacts. 
Tlie EU protectionist nieasures in agriculture are an ol>stacle t o  the  expansion of the coin- 
lmny's exports t o  these markets. 
Company Code: B7 
E.~tcrbli.shcd: 1992. 
,5'tctor.: Trade. 
IJr.o(luct 1rzi.r: 1i1.e animals, fresh aiid processed meat, processed fruit aiid vegetables. 
Pt rfor.mor,ct (loto: 
1994 
Number of employees (number) 12 
Net sales (mn.lev) 110 
Net sales (mil. USD) 2.02 
Gross profitability of sales (96) 10-15 
Ltgal .stotu.s: Liinited liability company. 
Oo?rirr.shil): 100%1 privately owned. 
Basic Profile 
B; is a flexible aiid dynamic comiilercial company. It was established by a group of experienced 
~ l l c h  experts who capitalizecl 011 their long-term foreign busiiiess contacts. B7 has established 
;I netnorli of its own sales re~~resentatives i11 the countries mliicli are its iilaiil lilarliets. This 
enables tlie company to  have UII-to-date information 011 tlie marliet situation. to  work closely 
n i t  11 its clients and to  rilo~iitor its foreign operatioils. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,5'horr cJf t.rj)ort.h 111 toft11 .GCI/CS: 95'%. Tlie company operates almost exclrlsively 011 forcigil 
iilarliets: sales on tlie clonlestic inarliet are only occasional. 
Jlorrl c.rport 17iorX'~t.s: Russia. Italy, Macedonia, Albania. Tlie company is trying to  enter tlie 
iiiarliets of  soiiie EU-member states and of tlie USA. 
BT exports I)otli processed and fresh agricultural products, including meat ancl ineat prod- 
u c t \ ,  proce\se<l vegetables and fruits, etc. Tlie cristoillers are wholesale importers. The com- 
~>aiiy'\ coillpetitiveiiess results from a favorable price/quality ratio. 
The Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
\ h  riiau!. of tlie Brilgariaii food and agricultural producers have financial ~~rob lems ,  it is B7's 
practice to  offer sonle of tliein futures contracts. However, tlie high cost of and tlie difficult 
access to balili credit creates very serious obstacles to these operations of tlie coinpany. Tlie 
fiiiaiicial griclloclc i n  tlie couiitry iinpedes also all other activities of BY. 
BY coiisiclers that  tlie donlestic restrictions 011 tlie exports of food and agricultural products 
are still quite strong (and growing). Besides, the frequent changes in tlie foreign trade regulations 
i n  Bulgaria also l iai i i~~er tlie export activities of the company as they raise tlie risliiness of longer- 
term commitments. 
Tlie custoins procedures are very inefficieilt, bureaucratic and time-consuming which is a 
serious prol>lem for tlie exporters of perishable products. 
The Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
L37 is trying to  establish long-term relations with stable clients. At tlie s tart  of its activity tlie 
company operated 011 certain niches of some of its foreign marlcets (tlie foriner Soviet LJnion and 
tlie Balliaiis) but this iiiay cliange. 
Tlir lacli of  flesibility of payments, tlie obsolete ~~aymei i t  nstru~uelits alicl uiireliability of tlie 
pa!,iiiciits \ \ i t h  tlie otlier former socialist countries (partly due to tlie inefficielicy and uiireliability 
of tile banli\) are ol~stacles to  tlie espaiisio~i of exports to tliese couiitries (Bi' usually iiisists 
oil payiiie~its tlirough direct hard currency transfers when exporting to  these countries). Tlie 
r~nscttlecl iiitergover~-lmental debts with some of these countries create aclclitional obstacles. 




Prorluri rili.1.: flour. fodder, vegetable oil, fruit and vegetal~le preserves, ~~harmaceuticals, furni- 
ture. 
Pr r.fi,r*nlrrr~cc dtrtcr: 
1994 
Nuiilber of employees (number) 6 
Net sales ( m n .  lev) 4.5 
Net sales (nln. IJSD) 0.S3 
Gross profitability of sales (96) 5 
L r y l  .stcrirr.<: Limitecl liability company (joint venture). 
O~ilr~tr-51111): Pri\,ate; .50% Bulgarian and 50% foreign owned. BS has a stalie in  a joint-venture 
i l l  .4ll)ania. 
Basic Profile 
US is specific n.it.11 tlie fa,ct tha.t it is a mono-ma.rliet company: for the t.ime being it opera.tes 
exclusively on the Alba,niaii ina,rliet. Its niche their is based 011 the goocl business colita,cts 
i ~ n c l  011 tlie local clcnlaiicl for the exported goods. IHowever, t,llis export orientation ma.lies tlie 
coiiil>a.njr ~.ulnera.ble. Besides, tlie Ballian ma,rlicts are lliglily uncerta,in and insecure. Sl~ecial 
measures 1ia.1.e to  be undertaken for tlie security and the protection of tlie inerclianclise during 
transportation. BS is a,wa,re of these threats a,nd wea,linesses and is planning to  diversify its 
export orient~ation. 
Allother clirection of ~ t ra t~eg ic  diversification is the involvelllent i11 ma.nufa~cturing. Actually 
t,he joint-~renture i11 Albania, is a manufacturing firm producing food it,enis under BS's trade 
111a.rli. BS is planning to  expa,nd its manufa~cturing activities. 
Export Orientation 
,Slrcrr.c of c.rport.s ir, toter1 snl(s: 100'A. 
\I(/ r r r  r.rl)or3t rrrcrr.kr ts: t lie Ballian region; tlie company plans to start  ol>cratioiis i11 Russia as 
11cl1. KO 11lans to operate on the domestic market. 
BS exports only finished products (foods, furniture aiicl pharmaceuticals). Tlle customers 
are ~vllolesale i~nporters. Tlie company relies on competitive price/quality r a t '  10s. 
The Doi~lestic Eilviroilillellt for Exports 
The conll>any finds the doluestic environment unfavorable for exporters. There is no system 
of export insurance or export guarantees (even tliere are no plans to establish such systems). 
Tlie go~.ernnlent regulation does not provide any incentives or stinluli for the exporters; on tlie 
contrar!.. tliere are disincentives (for example, tlie export taxes levied on a number of goods). 
T l ~ e  xport regulations are very changeable and they cliange for the morsc. 
The Foreign Eilvirollllleilt for Exports 
US relies on stable foreign partners, i n  particular those related to its foreign co-owners. For tlie 
short period of its existence the colnpaily llas not encountered impediments to  exl~or ts  teiuming 
T ~ O I I I  foreign regulation. 
Company Code: B9 
l : . ~ l ( ~ b l i . ~ l ~ ~ ( l :  1990. 
,5'ctlor: Tratle. 
Pr.oduct r17r.r: agricultural products (grains, fresh and processetl fruit and vegetables). 
PC rfor'r~~(rrttt drttn: 
1994 
Number of employees (number) -5 
Total assets (mn. lev) 6.5 
Net sales (mn. lev) 80 
Net sales (mn .USD)  1.47 
Gross profitability of sales (g,) 7-8 
I,cgcrl .\tnt~~.s: Estal)lished as a partnership; in 1991 transformed into a lilnitetl liability company. 
O I I * I ) (  r.sllil): 100% privately owned. 
Basic Profile 
U9 is a typical s~llall  Bulgarian private company. It is mainly a trading company but it also has 
a small processing unit. B9 was established a t  the s ta r t  of the economic transformation and has 
grown motlerately since that  time. Its espansion into the European nlarliets is facing difficulties 
clue t o  the esisting restrictions on the imports of agricultural protlucts. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,5'/icrrr of tnl)or*t.< it7 tot(//  .cnles: 100%. 
.\Inin tn.1,or.t r1rtrrket.5: Polanrl, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Llliraine, 
t l ~ e  C'zech Republic, Slovakia. Hungary. The  plans for future esport  espansion include Switzer- 
I<intl allel Spain. 
T l ~ r  colnpany esports  niainly fresh and processed agricultural products. Tlie customers are 
11-l~olesale in~porters .  Colllpetitiveness is based on price/c]uality ratio. 
The Doillestic Eilviroilillent for Exports 
.is a sl~ecializecl esporter of agricultural products B9 finds the inefficiency. inflesibility and the 
1)ureaucratic at t i tude of the custoins and of other monitoring agencies (as  those of sanitary 
control) a s  one of the most serious obstacles t o  its activity. This is especially tlarnaging with 
regard t o  the shipments of perishable products. 
B9 suffers seriouslj fro111 the frequent changes in the Bulgarian esport  regulations ~vllich 
cause clisrul~tions ant1 so~netirnes direct losses in its operations. 
T11e local 11a11lis are quite inefficient and this often results in substantial delays in payments. 
This also holcls for tlie hanks in the other former socialist countries. 
The Foreign Environi~~ent for Exports 
'I'l~e liiain in11)ctliment t o  B9's exports are the restrictions on the imports of agricultural products 
in tht. E l i  ant1 also tariff ancl 11011-tariff restrictions on such imports in sonie central European 
countries. 
Company Code: B10 
E.stcrbli.sht(1: 1991. 
,5'ertor: hlanufacture of chemical products for agricultural purposes. 
Pr.otl(ict 111i.c: foliar suspension fertilizers and other bioteclinological products. 
Pc ~fo~.r,,cirrrc (Into: 
1994 
Nunlber of enlployees (number) 25 
Net sales (mn. lev) 15 
Net sales (mil. USD) 0.28 
Gross profitability of sales (%) 15-20 
Lcyil .stcitu.\: Limited liability company. 
Ou'11c r..slr ip: Alisecl: 60% private and 40% municipal. 
Basic Profile 
BlO was estal)lislied on the basis of a tecl~nological innovation: a very efficieiit tj,pe of natural 
aiicl ecologically clear bioteclinological foliar suspension fertilizers. Since its invention i11 1987 
the fertilizer has been patented i11 the UIi and B10 was established wit11 tlic purpose of the 
co~~~~~ierc ia l iza t io i i  of th s invention. 
'The conipaiiy has preserved its innovative profile and is continuing its R k D  activities in the 
ficld of I~iotecliiiologies. Up till iiow B10 has not been able to  espaiicl its activities to  their full 
potential mainly clue to  the difficulties in raising investment finance. Its market positioiis on 
t hr foreign inarkets (tlie (nost promising direction of expansion) are still weak. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,S'hnr.c of ccsl,orts 1 1 1  totnl scrles: 10%. 
.\ltrrr, c.rljort r~~crrktts: India, Ukraine, Jordan, Syria, Morocco, Italy, USA. 
.4lthougli the relative level of esports is not very liigh a t  present, the company coiisiders 
~ x p o i t s  as ~i 1,ital element of its strategy for the future. Tlie company has the capacity to  
inc~ease its o u t ~ ~ u t  substantially and will rely on the espansion of its foreign markets t o  do so. 
Productioil for Exports 
L310 is a sl~ecializecl nianufacturer of fertilizers of specific application. It esports them in finished 
01 semi-finisliecl form. 
The cluality. the input usage and the costs of the esport products is the same as those of 
the protlucts sold on the local market; however, tliere are differences in the packaging which 
is custom-tailored for the different markets. The export prices are liiglier tlian those on the 
tlolnestic niarket: however this does not necessarily lead to  higher profitability of exports due to  
t lie lags i11 [~aj.mcnts and the liig11 cost of credit. 
The competitiveness of the company is based on quality, competitive prices, custom-tailored 
s l ~ i ~ ~ m e n t s  ancl brand name. 
The Donlestic E~lviro~li l le~lt  for Exports 
:iccortling to  BlO, the high cost of credit, necessary for working capital and running costs, is 
tlie main impetliment t o  its activity and to  its esports. Due to  this, a t  present the company is 
f'orcecl to  operate below its capacity; the volunle of esports lias declined. 
I310 rel~orts  ollie difficulties in a.ccluiring tlie necessary input,s for t,lie various types of pack- 
a,ging rcquirecl by tlie cliffereilt foreign customers. 
Tlie compa.ny considers t11a.t its esperience in ol~erating in  foreign markets is insufficient and 
t,liat its ~nal~liet,iiig skills sliould be improved. Better a.dvertisiug, ta,ilored to  t,he specific foreign 
nia,rliets: is also considered essential. 
B10 does iiot report obstacles to exports result,ing from donlestic government regulation. 
The Foreign Enviroililleilt for Exports 
BI0  ~)el.fol.ms it,s esport operations eit'lier directly or through media.tors but has hatl problems 
\\.it11 some of it,s clients who t'urned out not to be very reliable. Its main competitors on the 
foreign iiiarliet,~ a,re German manufacturers of similar fertilizers. 
Tlie colnpa~iiy considers that  its access to information necessary for opera.t,ing 011 foreign 
iiiarliets is limited and this is a liindra,nce to  it,s operations. 
B10 tlocs iiot report obstacles t'o exports result,ing ftoni foreigii government regulations. 
Company Code: B11 
E.\f(~bli\hcd: 193.5. 
.Yrttor: Timber industry. 
Ptorlurt n1r.r: saw-logs, semi finished and finished wood products, joinery componeiits, wood 
 container^. to!,s. 
I>< tj'or17tf11tcr (l(lt[i: 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (inn. lev) 2.7 7.6 10.7 
Total equity (mn. lev) 1.1 4.7 4.7 
N u  111 ber of en1 ployees (number) 6 0 68 
Total re\.enne (mn. lev) 6.6 1 . 1  10.7 7 - 
Net sales (mn. lev) 5.8 6.S 10 5 .3  
Net sales (inn. USD) 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.1.5 
.After tax profit (11111. lev) 0.0 0.0 -1 ..5 
Lc~rerage (commercial 
clebt/total assets) 13.1 -5.0 0.0 
Lcgcrl .\tcrtll.\: Liinited liability company (since 1992); before that  subsidiary of a non-coiporatized 
state-o~vnetl firm. No subsidiaries or stakes in otlier companies. 
Ou*r?cr.\hllj: 1007') state-owned. 
Basic Profile 
U I I  is a traditioi~al timber nianufacturer. Historically it was established in a region of forest 
plantations. Tlie local resources, however, are partly depleted now and B11 has to  provide some 
of its supplies from otlier regions. 
I311 lias had serious difficulties i n  its market adaptation in tlie period of econonlic trans- 
formation. .A more flesible nianagement aiicl a more aggressive strategy towards the potential 
foreign marliets col~lcl enable tlie coiiipaiiy to improve its positioni~ig 011 the marliet. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,5hcrtr of r.rl~or-t.\ totcrl scrlcs: 80%. 
.lIntt/ r.ryor.t rr?ctrkrt.s: Germany and otlier ELI-member countries. 
The company is pretlo~ninantly export-oriented. The disbantling of tlie C:hlEA caused some 
reorie~~tation of its exports but B11 had been present on the western Europcan markets i n  tlie 
past. 
I311 exports finished and semi-finislied wood products of ow11 design and manufacture. 
Productioil for Exports 
The input usage. the factor intensity and tlie quality of tlie goods produced for exports are 
comparable to  those produced for tlie domestic market. There arc no significant differences i n  
t lie costs ant1 in t lie profitability. 
Tlie competitiveness 011 the foreign markets is achieved mainly through the prices; tlie quality 
is not a decisi~-e factor (in general, the quality of B l l ' s  products is considerecl inferior to  tlie 
aI,crage clt~alit! on tlie western European markets). 
The Doillestic Eilviroilmeilt for Exports 
I311 col~sitlers tlie Iligh cost of credit (necessary to cover tlie running costs) as one of tlie maill 
ol)stacles to  its performance and hence t o  its exports. Tlie company reports also some difficulties 
in tlie supplies of raw n~aterials. 
731 1 does not claim any serious obstacles to exports stemming from dolilestic regulations. 
The Foreign Ei~viroilmeilt for Exports 
hIost of tlie exports are direct shipments to  tratlitional foreign customers. Recently tlie company 
11as at te~nptet l  t o  perform additional exports tlirough mediators but they liave failed. B11 finds 
t liat it has to diversify its foreign markets but a t  present it lacks the liecessary marketing skills. 
It consitlers its marlieting information as insufficient too. At present, the company has given 
tlie highest priority t o  the task of gaining access to new foreign markets. 
Some of B l l ' s  traditional export products are a t  the end of their life cycle and the company 
\\.ill 11ave to  upgrade its product mix in order to preserve its foreign markets. 
Dl1 does not clainl ally serious obstacles to its exports stemming fro111 foreign regulations. 
Company Code: B12 
Background Illforlllatioll 
E.~tnblishcd: 1965. 
,S'tctor.: Mechanical engineering. 
Pr7otluct r1li.c: machinery for food processing, equipment for public catering establishments. 
Pc r-f'or.nzrr ncc dntn: 
199 1 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (mn. lev) 27.5 121.9 126.7 150.4 
Total equity (mn. lev) 18.7 109.9 109.9 109.9 
ru'umber of employees (number) 505 425 406 372 
Total revenue (mil. lev) 31.0 .54.8 5 (5 . :3 96.6 
Net sales (inn. lev) 27.8 49.9 49.1 92.2 
Net sales (inn. USD) 1.67 2.14 1.78 1.70 
.After t a s  profit (mn. lev) 0.9 1 .6 2 . 6  2.6 
Le\.erage (commercial 
tlel,t/total assets) (70)  13.7 3 . .5 7..5 11 .6 
L t p l  .<tntcc.<: Joint-stocli company (since 1993); before that  non-corporatized state-owned firm. 
So s~ll~sicliaries or stalies i n  other companies. 
C l w ~ ~ c  r-.<l~il~: 100% st ate-owned. 
Basic Profile 
R 12 is tlit. sole maiiufa~cturer of ecluipinent for public catering establisliineiits i n  Bulgaria. I11 the 
past it enjoyed a, monopolistic position but now this has cl~angetl due to  tlie import opportunities. 
B12 has st,ayed \\lit11 its traditional product illis which a t  present occupies the illiddle and lower 
range of t,lic ma,rliet whereas the highest segments are ta,ken over by high clua,lit,y imports. 
Due to  its a,verage clualit,y B12 is only able to esport to lo\\,-income foreign nla.rliets. The 
company \\-oultl neecl subst'antia,l investments in order to  upgrade its product ~ u i s  a,nd to compete 
s~~ccessf~~ll!.  both on the donlestic a.nd on tlie foreign rna,rliets. 
Export Orientation 
,?hrrir of' c.rl~cli-t.~ i n totnl .<(ilc.<: 70%). 
.\lrrii1 c.t.110i.t ru(r/.X.cts: Russia, Ukraine, Macedonia, Albania, Iiazalil~stan. 
The company is predonlinantly export-oriented. After the disl~anding of the C'MEA esports 
clropped but the conipany preserved its traditional esport orientation of its esports. 
B12 esports finished products of own design and manufacture. 
Production for Exports 
'The input usage, tlle factor intensity and the quality of the goods produceel for esports are 
coniparable to  those procluced for the donlestic market. There are no significant differences in 
the costs ant1 i n  the profitability. 
The conlpctitiveness on the foreign markets is acl~ieved by matching the quality recluirements 
of the custoniers at coillpetitive prices. 
The Doillestic Eilvironilleilt for Exports 
The 1;1cIi of esport crediting facilities ancl esport insurance is considered as t l ~ e  most serious 
clo~~icst ic illlpeclinlent to csports. 
The Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
'Ilic tilain export ~ ~ i a r k e t s  of B12 are featured by high political risks. Tliere a rc  also tecliliical 
tliflicultics in the  payments from the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
Company Code: B13 
E.~tcrbli.~l~cd: 191i9. 
Sector: Textile industry. 
Proclr~ct r~~i.c: ivorsted tops, worsted yarns, upholstery yarns, hand-knitting yarns. 
PC rfoi.r~~arzcr (10 to: 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (11111. lev) 90.7 479.1 ,537.7 5.52.9 
Total equity (mn. lev) 36.3 380.6 380.6 380.6 
N u  niber of eni~~loyees (number) 1361 130.5 
Total revenue (mn. lev) 145.1 237.1 303.2 ,509.1 
Net sales (mn. lev) 120.2 206.9 267.1 .50.5.8 
Set  sales (mn. USD) 7.22 8.86 9.66 9.33 
-Alter tax profit (mn. lev) 1.7 -.5.8 -17.4 -12.2 
- 
(%I) 29.3 12.9 tlcl~t/tot.al assets) 7..5 9.0 
L(!lcrl .~(crtu.\: .Joint-stoclt conipany (since 1991); before tliat lion-corporatizetl state-oiv~ied firm. 
No \ul>5itliaries or stakes i l l  other conipauies. 
Orryr~c r..\l)rl): 100(X, state-oii~~ned. 
Basic Profile 
1313 i5 a textile5 n ~ a ~ ~ u f a c t u r e r  specialized i n  some specific textiles items. It is tlie sole manu- 
lacture~ of iior5tetl jarlis i ~ i  Bulgaria and lias a substantial s l i a ~ e  of the local market in other 
~"'otlucts. 
Traditionally B13 n a s  oriented to  tlie Soviet niarltet a~icl after tlie disintegratior~ of t l ~ e  
('1IE:I i t  n a s  not ahle to  Fully re-orient its previous volume\ of export sales to other marltets. 
0 1 1 ~  ma j o ~  111ol1lem is tlie cluality of B13's products u~hich is still below the akelage i~lternational 
c l ~ ~ l l i t ~ .  i n  5pite of'sollle improvement in recent years. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,S/rtrrr of c.rl)or.ts in tot(//  snl t .~:  3.5-40%. 
.\lnir~ c.rl)or.t r~rnr.kct.\: before 1990: USSR; currently: C4er11iany, Italj.. Greece, IIungary, Syria. 
U13 exports 110th tlirectly and tlirough foreign mediators. Only fen. of tlie latter haxe esclu- 
sii e rights: most of tliem are competing. 
Es l~or t s  tlropped in tlie last several years (after tlie collapse of tlie ex-Soviet market).  Some 
reorientation of trade tool< place but B13 considers tliat the further export ex~>ansion would be 
crucial for its survival. Tlie main future orientation is towartls European niarltets. including 
c n t ~ y  i~r to  rle\v countries. Its export strategy is based on conlpetitive price/cjuality ratio. 
Productioil for Exports 
' r l ~ c  jl~alitjr and the tecli~iological evel of the export protlucts are similar to  tliose of tlie products 
.oltl 011 tlie local ~ i~ar l te t .  Tliere is no difference i n  tlie input usage and tlie costs of output sold 
on t lie local aucl on foreign marltets; the profitability of domestic sales ancl exports is rouglily tlie 
5alllc. B13 ~ i a l u a t e s  tlie quality of its products as "average E u l . o p ~ a ~ ~  quality" (n~liicli slioultl 
I)e interpretetl as tlie loikest i~ l ter~ia t io~ia l  cluality range). 
OX'% of tlie exports co~lsists of ourli production ant1 2% is outward processing. 
The Donlestic Ellvirolllllent for Exports 
1313 consitlers the high cost of credit as the most serious obstacle to  t l ~ e  spansion of its pro- 
tluction ancl esports. 
The company does not report problems in  the access to  inputs; 90%) of the inputs are of local 
origin. 
The  Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
1313 consitlers that  it is atlversely affected by the U N  sanctions against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Tlle company considers that  it suffers froin lack of 
~narlieting inforination and poor business contacts in its potential markets which prevents it 
from further esj>ansion. It plans to  espand its marketing department. 
The high transportation costs to  some of the distant markets in Europe place it in an 
u~lfavorahle situation as coillpared to  some of its competitors. 
Company Code: B14 
Background Illforlllatioll 
l?htriGli.hhrd: 1968. 
,Srttor: hla~iufacture of metal articles. 
P~.oduct 111i.r: rolled aluminium, aluminium joinery and liouseliold articles. 
Pt rforn~nncc clcltn: 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (inn. lev) 362.6 1801.1 1861.6 2048.7 
Total equity (mil. lev) 132.1 1.530.9 1488..5 1488.5 
Numl~er  of eniployees (number) 151.5 1396 
Total revenue (mn.  lev) 235.1 310.5 ,542.9 711.7 
Net sales (11111. lev) 195.2 286.6 464.6 632.1 
Net sales (inn. USD) 11.72 12.28 16.80 11.66 
l f ter  t a s  profit (inn. lev) 6.9 -33.8 -2.5.1 -1.1 
],everage (commercial 
debt / total  assets) (%'n) 8.2 9.4 9.2 17.6 
Lfgnl .htntu.h: Joint-stocli coinpaily (since 1992); before that  non-corporatized state-ownecl firm. 
Xo ~~il)sicliaiies or stalyes in other companies. 
( l i ( '~~~r .hh i l ) :  100% state-owned. 
Basic Profile 
Tlie compaiijr had been established with the primary goal to  operate on the tlomestic market.  It 
u5ctl t o  be a basic (iiionopolistic) supplier of inputs t o  a number of Bulgarian enterprises from 
tlie food processing. tobacco, pharniaceutical and armory industries. 
\\.'it11 the general recessioil in the Bulgarian industry since 1990, tlie clo~iiestic demand for 
the products of I314 decliiled substantially and it had t o  search for alternative ~iiarliets. 
Dl.! lias liacl a number of difficulties in recent years. It lias not been able t o  secure smooth 
51lpplies \\liicli. in turn,  leads t o  delays i11 its own cleliveries. 
Export Orieiltatioll 
,?hnr.t of' c.r.1)ort.h in  tot01 s n l ~ s :  25-30%. 
Jlni11 c.rport ~~~rir~kct.h: Germany and other western European countries. 
B1-1's esport  ex~>ansion started in the late 1980s and increased in the 199Os, driven mainly 
1)). the  sliri11l;ing of the clomestic market. B14 esports  only products of its own design and 
~nauufacture.  Tlie company esports  both directly and through mediators. 
B14 lias been trying t o  diversify both its product mi s  ancl its esports  relations through 
cooperation agreenients \\lit11 foreign busiiless partners. 
Productioil for Exports 
The products for the domestic market and for esports  are basically tlie same, using the same 
le~,el aiicl t jrpes of inputs. There are only differences resulting fro111 cr~stom-tailored design t o  
~iieet tlie specific r eq~~ i r emen t s  of some clients. 
The Doillestic Eilviroilillei~t for Exports 
TIie iliaill ol~stacles t o  esports  reported by B14 are related t o  tlie difficulties in tlie access t o  
some of t l ~ c  inputs (special types of lion-ferrous processed metals) and other intermediates. Tlie 
local procl~ctioii of tliese inputs is not sr~fficient wliile their import is subject t o  very high tariffs 
\vl~icli raise tlie production costs and redlice the competitiveness of tlie company. B14 is trying 
to c.stal)lisl~ lolig-tertn contractual relatiotis with solme of its sul~~>liers i l l  order t o  deal wit11 the 
sul>~>ly prol)lems. 
,4notl1cr reported clomestic obstacle to exports is tlie lack of export insural~ce or guaratitees. 
The Foreign Eilviroilnleilt for Exports 
No specific difficulties steni~iiing from foreign regulation or other impediments i n  tlie foreign 
c~li\~ironnient have been reported by B14. 
Company Code: B15 
Background Iilforillatioil 
l?.<tcrbli.<lifd: 1912. 
,Ycc.tor.: Textile industry. 
Pr*ocluct r,zi.r: linittecl articles for leisure and sports. 
Pc ,fir~r,,crl,cc clntcr: 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (mn. lev) 180.7 225.5 393.2 538.6 
Total equity (mn. lev) 44.5 44..5 117.1 117.1 
Number of eu~ployees (number) 927 793 
Total revellue (mn. lev) 67.6 105.0 115.5 191.3 
Net sales (mn. lev) 46.8 97.2 91.0 138.1 
Net sales (11111. USD) 2.81 4.16 3.29 2.55 
After tax profit (mn. lev) 0.0 2 8 . 4  -91.8 1 2 1 . 5  
I>e\*erage (commercial 
clel~t/total assets) (%I) 65.6 67.0 Fjl.4 34.2 
Lc,qcrl htcrtuh: Limitecl liability company (since 1991): hefore tha t  11011-corporatized state-owned 
hrin. No sul~sicliaries or stakes i n  other companies. 
Ou~r,cr~ah,l,: loo';/;, state-owned. 
Basic Profile 
I3 1.5 is a sl)ccializecl nianufacturer of knitted articles for leisure ancl sports. .AS lllany Bulgarian 
niaiiufacturelx. B15 experienced serious clifficulties in the period of transition mainly clue to  the 
loss or traclitioilal inarliets and the shrinking of cloillestic deinand. This resultetl i n  low capacity 
utilization aiid cleterioration of its fiilancial position. 
T l ~ a ~ ~ h s  to  the efforts of t l ~ e  company maiiagement, recently 1315 has been able to  establisli 
sollle new ancl prospective l~usiness contacts with important western partners (PUMA is one of 
t l ~ c ~ l l ) .  This is considered as an important step toivards the future revival of the company. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
.'ihnr.t of c.l.l,or'th in totcrl .scrles: 95%. 
\Icrrr, c.rpor.t ,ncrrl;~ts: before 1990: U S S R ;  currently: C~ermany, Italy and other western Euro- 
pean countries. 
I315 u\rtl to  be esclusively oriented to tlie es-Soviet marliet. There is only a marginal 
tlemantl for its p~.oclucts on the domestic marliet. After the disbanding of the C'hIEA it has 
trietl to  reorient some of its exports to  western Europe but these esports are still \\ell below tlie 
~xocl uction capacities. 
r-1s the conlpany had almost no previous direct business contacts with nestern European 
cu\tomer5 it esports mainly through mediators. 
Productioil for Exports 
B15 esports final products of own design and inanufacture. Currently the company puts the 
c .~~~l ) l~a \ i \  or1 custom-tailored clesign aiming to match specific requirements of its clients. 
The esport strategy relies on ~)rice/quaIity ratio and reliability of sliipn~ents to  customers. 
1315 consiclers that  t l ~ e  quality of its products meets ii~ternational ~ t a n d ~ ~ ~ ~ c l s .  
The Doillestic Eilviroilillent for Exports 
Tlie main 1)rol)lem for the company is the high cost of credit. B1.5 inherited from the past large 
clcl)ts uliicli it has to service now a t  very liigh rates wliicli creates a great financial burden for 
the conlpany. 
Another 0\)5tacle to its further export expansion is the lack of esperience to operate on 
nestern Eurol)ean nlarliets and insufficient business contacts on these nlarkets. 
The Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
B15 is putting efforts into the establislinient of long-term business relation with reliable and well 
l)o\itio~~etl foreign clients. 
No specific difficulties stemming from foreign regulation or otlier impediments in the foreign 
en\irontnent have been reported by B15. 
Company Code: B16 
E.<tribl~.~hcrl: 1940. 
,Vrrtor-: Footivear industry. 
Prorl~rrt 11rl.r: llleu's slloes, slippers and accessories. 
Pr rfbr.n,rrrrct dntn:  
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets (inn. lev) S8.5 237.1 297.9 245.S 
Total ecluity (mil. lev) 16.7 118.3 118.3 GS.1 
N u u ~ l ~ e r  of enlployees (number) 1784 794 
Total revenue (inn. lev) 146.6 208.6 286.8 497.7 
Net sales (mil. lev) 118.5 166.1 254.1 484.8 
Net sales (mil. USD) 7.11 7.12 9.19 8.94 
.\fter t a s  profit (mn. lev) -0.6 -3.1 -30.3 8.0 
Leverage (coin~~lercial 
tlebt/t otal assets) (%I 3.5.5 23.7 23.3 14.8 
Lrynl stntus: Joint-stock coiilpany (since 1994); BIG esists as a autonomou~ legal unit only since 
1994. Before tliat it was subsidiary of a larger company and tlie data for the periocl 1991-1993 
refer to tliat larger firin. 
Ou'rrr r*.ilr 111: 100'%, 5tate-ownetl. 
Basic Profile 
Bl(j is one of tlie largest Bulgarian manufacturers of ~nen's  sl~oes. It is a large-scale shoe 
n~anufacturer also by international stanclarcls: i n  1994 it ~nanufactured over 1 million pairs of 
sl10es. 
TIie coliil>aiiy lias relatively new and well maintainetl physical assets wliich enable it t o  
ilieet liigli clualitj, stanclarcls. .After the political changes i n  tlie country BIG espcrienced certain 
tlifficulties i11 iilarlieting its proclucts to ncw markets as it liad i ~ o t  bee11 a direct esporter in tlie 
past. 
Export Orientation 
,S'l~crrr of c.rl1or t.s ir, totcrl solcs: 80%. 
1lni11 r.rl)or-I rrrarkrts: before 1990: predominantly ChlEA; currently: UI<, Germany, USA. 
( ' a~~acla .  Russia. .Arab countries. 
BIO: is a tlirect esporter (no mediators). It has both traditional and iiew business contacts. 
:\ftcr tlie clisbanding of tlie CMEA BIG managed to  reorient a large share of its sales to  other 
~narliets. 
The company follows the strategy of diversification of its sales and of espansion of its dis- 
tril~utioii cliannels. Also it is attempting to  upgrade the average quality level of its protlucts so 
that it can reacli I>roacler marliet segments (traditionally it has bee11 oriented to  the low-medium 
incoiiie level segments). 
Productioil for Exports 
Bl(i is a large footwear iiianufacturer. At present there is no difference i n  tlie quality of products 
solcl on tlie tlonlestic and on the foreign markets. There is no difference in the input usage and 
tlie costs of output sold on tlie local and on foreign iiiarkets as ~vell as in tlie profitability. 
Bl(j's co~llpetitiveness is basecl on a pricelquality ratio wliicli is acceptable for its customers. 
The Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
l'lle higll cost of credit is reported as one of the major domestic impecliments to  tlie export 
c~spansion. B16 exports products of own design and manufacture ancl tlie protlr~ction cycle 
rccluires substantial working capital which is financed through banli credits. The  high interest 
rates raise the operating costs and reduce the c o n i p a n ~ , ' ~  competitiveness. 
Bl ( j  reports also difficulties in the supply of some tlomestically purchased inputs (due t o  
unreliabilit!r of the suppliers and often changing market conditions). 
Tlle Foreign Eilviroili~~eilt for Exports 
I316 coiisiders t ha t  its main clifficulty in operating in the foreign markets is the extremely high 
conipetition oil the European and on the American marliets. This high competition is exerting 
a constaiit downwards pressure on the export prices. The  company's main conlpetitors are  
Brazilian. Asian and other central and eastern European producers. B l 6  is trying penetrate 
ilr\\ marl\ets b ~ .  using a coinpreheilsive marketing information system and intensification of its 
I ~ ~ ~ s i n e s s  contacts \\lit11 potential clients. To do  this it is expanding its marlieting department  
a i~ t l  is i ~ ~ \ e s t i n g  iii its information system. 
The  company has a marketing department which collects information from catalogues and 
ot I~ci ~)ublications a s  well as from visits abroad. 
TIIP coinpany is also trying t o  diversify its suppliers by switching froin domestic t o  foreign 
suppliers in ordei t o  reduce the pressure due to  unreliability of local suppliers. 
Company Code: B17 
E.~ttrbl i .~hcd: 1967. 
,S'rrtor.: C'heniical industry. 
P~-orlrrr l  r1rr.r: nitrogen fertilizers (urea, ammonia), gases (technical and pure grade), liquified 
gases. gas inixtures. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total assets  tin. lev) 853.9 4108.6 4637.6 5.598.7 
Total equity (mn. lev) 198.7 2699.8 2699.8 2699.8 
Numl>er of e~nployees (number) 2244 2209 
Total revenue (mn. lev) 1831.9 281.5.6 2522.8 -5980.7 
Net sales (mn. lev) 1GGT.2 2781.9 2503.9 5866.8 
Net sales (mil. USD) 100.1 119.2 90.6 108.2 
.-\fter tax profit (mil. lev) 59.2 
I,e\.erage (coinii~ercial 
cIel>t/t,otal assets) (XI) 26.3 14.8 7.9 1.5.7 
Note: 1094 pi.ofit: 70.2 mn. lev. 
Lcgrrl h i t ~ t l ~ h :  Joint-stock coinpany (since 1993); before that non-corporatizecl state-owned firm. 
No sul>sicliaries or stalies i n  other companies. 
Ou11lr r..clr ip: 100'A state-ownccl. 
Basic Profile 
BIT is a large clieinical manufacturer specialized in nitrogen fertilizers and a number of by- 
proclucts. I t  is tlie sole producer in  tlie country of a nuniber of chemical proclucts. hlost of 
B l r q s  l>rotlucts are stanclard clien~icals which are readily marketal>le on the norlcl inarliet. Tlie 
coniI>anjr has follonecl a cautious policy of marl<et cliversification ant1 it has a relatively good 
\tancling on tlie international market. 
Export Orieiltation 
.5'11(1r.r of c.r/)orts ir, totcrl scrles: 90%. 
. \ l r r r r ,  r.rl)or-t rncrr.ktts: China, India, Brazil, Greece, Turkey, Maceclonia, Romania, etc. 
Bl; is preclonlinantly export oriented; the domestic market is too small for such a large man- 
ufacturer specialized in specific industrial chemicals. B l7  exports its products to  custonlers in 
( iO countries. Its exports traditionally have been diversified and the company clicl not experience 
5erious shocks after the elisintegration of the CMEA. 
The coml>any exports both directly and through mediators. 
Productioil for Exports 
I317 manufactures standard types of industrial chemicals which are identical for tlie domestic 
market ancl for exports. There is no difference in the prices either. 
The Donlestic Ellviroilillellt for Exports 
h l a n ~  of BIT'S fixed assets are quite old and obsolete. B17 considers that it Iias to renovate its 
~>iocluctive capacities in ortler to be competitive on the foreign marhets. I-Iowever, tlie coinI>any 
is iiot able to im~>lenient a la~ge-scale investment under tlie current interest rates in the country. 
Thc access to foreign iiivestnient funds is also hindered because of the high investment and credit 
rislis associatetl with Bulgaria. 
The supply of sonle inputs is provided from Russia on the basis of intergovernmental agree- 
~iients. Due to  bureaucratic and other obstacles sometimes there occur stoppages of these sup- 
plies. 
'Tra~isportation ~vithin Bulgaria ( to  the ports of shipment) is unreliable ancl sonletinles also 
causes probleuns and delays in exports. 
The Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
No specific clifficulties stemming from foreign regulation or other impediments in the foreign 
environnient Iiave been reported by B17. 
BIT is putting significant efforts into maintaining up-to-date marketing information system. 
Company Code: B18 
Backgrouild Information 
L' .~~e~blrsh~d: 1969. 
,S'tclor.: Tourism. 
Pr*oeIucl r r ~  i.c: liotel services (accommodation and catering). 
Pc rfor.rr1(rr1ce dcrtcr: 
1994 
Total assets (inn. lev) 123.1 
Total equity (mil. lev) 65.0 
Number of employees (number) 250 
Total revenue (inn. lev) 112.3 
Net sales (inn. lev) 110.2 
Net sales (mn.  USD) 2.03 
After tax profit (11111. lev) 3.5 
Leverage (commercial 
clebt/total assets 0.0 
Legctl .\tutu.\: Joint-stock company (since 1991); before t ha t  subsicliary of a non-corporatizecl 
st  att.-on.iiecl firni. 
Ou~r,cr..hlril~: loo%, state-owned; in preparation for privatization. 
Basic Profile 
RlS  is a coinpan> \vIiicli holcls and operates one hotel. The  hotel is very conveiiientl~. locatecl in 
a central tit!. district and traditionally it a t t racts  a large llulnber of foreign tourists. However, 
most of the pllysical assets are rather obsolete and the  liotel needs a serious renovation in order 
to  iuaintain its competitive positions. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
,Slrerr.c of c.zpc11~1.s in  tote11 .srrles: 70%. 
llnirr c.rl)or.t 11rcrrk(ts: Gcrrnany, Italy, VIi. USA. 
T l ~ e  coinI>any provicles a wide range of tourist services, tlie main being lodging and catering. 
It is iiiainly orientecl towarcls foreign customers (i.e., invisil~le esports) .  Tlie export activity is 
organizecl tliroligh mediators (operators) which supply a large share of tlie foreign orders. 
1315 is currently trying t o  diversify its export activity by seeking t o  regain some of its pre\ '  'lous 
eastern markets (eastern Europe) and by entering new markets (Spain, the far East) .  
Productioil for Exports 
BlS ~)roi.icles staiidardized types of tourist services. There is no difference in the quality of tlie 
~ ) ~ o c l r ~ c t s  su~~pliecl  t o  the  domestic and to  the foreign markets or in the cost structure of these 
~~roclucts .  
Tlierr is mine cross-subsidization between the different proclucts sold by the  company but  it 
is iiot rclated t o  their sales on different markets. 
The Doillestic Eilvironi~lei~t for Exports 
'rlie niost serious tlomestic inlpecliment t o  the groivtli of the company's exports is tlie credit 
c~.uncli. T h e  coii~l)aii~.'s fixed assets ( the building and its facilities) are in a bat1 shape aricl badly 
~ieetl ref111 l)isIinient in order t o  provide the quality of the  service required by foreign tourists. 
Honrl-er. i11 t l ~ c  urrent macroeconon~ic environnlent there are little chances of doing this. 
The clelayecl privatization also had a negative impact on B18's export performance. A 
vacuu~ii of power is felt in this period. There have bee11 numerous changes in the management 
ancl tlie nianagcrs have not been able to clevote sufficient attention to  strategic issues such as 
tlie espansion of tlie numher of foreign tourists. There is an obvious necessity for an internal 
~estrr~cturing of tlie company (a t  present it suffers froni escessive number of employees) but the 
~iialiage~nelit lias not been capable of doing this. 
The Foreign Environment for Exports 
B l S  puts an e~llpliasis on the improvement of its access to  business and ~ilarket information. It 
espancls its information network and the network of its foreign operators wliicli it considers as 
Ilccessary for its positioning on the foreign market. 
r-\s a response to tlie new market challenges, B18 is investing in the training of its employees 
and in  the improvement of its personnel management system. 
The co~i ipa~iy  cloes not report any impediments to esports stemming frolii foreign regulation. 
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T(~lli i i  Techiiicc~l l in i~,rrs i ty  
'Tal>le 4.1 l'rofiles of tlie companies covered by the case studies. 
Exports/ 
Number of sales 
( 'onlpany Sect,or Ownershipn employees ratio (9%)  hlain markets 
Lenll>i t u Clothing State JSC 610 4-1 Finland, Sweden, Germany 
Toncli Elec t,rical Privat,e JSC 1,100 90 Russia, Germany, China 
Elekt roollilia inachinery 
Elnor hIai.ke t P ~ i v a t e  JSC 5 3 40-50 Firllancl, Swetlen, Latvia, 
research Est. GO% Lit lluania 
Ua1t.i~ Tours Tourism Private JSC 30 23 Fil~land 
Nagu Tratle Private JSC 6 90 Germans 
Saku BI e\very Foocl Private JSC 194 10 Finland, USA, Latvia 
Est. 30% 
ELC'OTEQ Electronic Private JSC 4 00 100 Finland, Sweden, Germany 
Baltic ec1uipment Est . 40% 
Tarlion Electronic State JSC GOO PO Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
ecluilxnent Iiazalihst,an, Denmark 
Ecst i Tallclis hlecharlical Private JSC 1,020 80 Russia, Finlarid, Sweclen 
engineering Germany 
hRS-Juveel .Jewel~.y Private JSC 85 10 I:inlancl, Sweclen, Denmark 
E'aitle Piinla- Food P1.ivat.e JSC 350 5 0 Russia, Ckrinany, 
lioml>inaat S wi tzerlaild 
( 'il>us Food Private JSC 176 5 Latvia. Lithuania, Russia 
Pioneer hIet al Private JSC 345 90 USA. Germany 
p~.ocessi~lg Est. 3.1% 
Toost us- hIeclla~licaI Private JSC GOO 90 Russia, Latvia, Lit,huania 
aparaat. engineering 
Eht el Electrical State JSC 500 PO Russia. Ukraine, China 
illaclliilery 
I I I I I ~ ~ I I ~ ~  hlechanical Private JSC 300 70 Russia, C;er~nany, Fiillancl 
engineering 
l i l e~~len t  I ('lot hing JSC, pr. PO%,, 809 90 Finland, Sweclen, Germany 
state 20% 
Talli~lna Far- Pharma- JSC, pr. G i % ,  2 10 90 Russia, Latvia, Lith~iania, 
111aat \iat ehah ccuticals state 33% Poland, Hungary 
\.iisn~~i.k Furniture Private JSC 830 85 Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
Russia, Canada, US.4 
S~liarteil T~.atle Private JSC 100 15 Latvia. Russia 
"E'i.it.ate: JSC: = Joi11t.-stocli colnpany; State JSC = Estonian state holds 100% of shares in the company; Est. = 
E-tonian owners; Pr .  = Esto~i ia~ l  private owners. 
RAS' Lembitu (clothing industry) 
Se~reral cool)erati\:es witli niised output of consumer goods (including clothes, fa.ncy goods) were 
the 1)retlecessors of Lembitu in 1939p.54. The manufacturing enterprise (combina.te) Lernbitu was 
fornietl i n  tlie 1)rocess of centralization and rnerging of different snlall cooperatives in  19.59 and 
specializetl in sewing to  order services (mainly clothes). Subsequently, sewing workshops located 
i n  tlie aclministrat.ive centers of regional districts of Estonia were united with Lembitu in 1983. 
By then tlie enterprise included altogether 187 sewing workshops, 1.50 of tlieni loca.ted outside 
'l'allinn. Tlie number of employees ainountetl to 3900. 
.Ll11 economic experiment was introduced in 198.5. It consistetl mainly of worl<ing out differ- 
ent forms of contracting out work for individual and collective partners. Tlie firm's bouticlue 
~ v a s  set. up jointly with a firm froin Hungary in 1987. Products of Lembit,u but also clothes 
a ~ l t l  accessories fro111 Hungarian enterprises were sold i n  the shop. These contacts also lliade 
it l>ossihle to  sell consurner goods p repred  by Lelnbitu in Hungary. Self-financing and self- 
~i ia~iaging started in tlie framework of iniprovements introduced i11 tlie course of 'perestroika' 
i l l  1988. Several procluction a.nd service cooperatives were formed on tlie basis of Lembitu, the 
~)roduction units 1oca.ted in different otlier cities separated from tlie main firm. The number of 
eillployees clecreased ra.pidly. There were 1200 employees in 1991, 900 i n  1992, 7.50 in 1993 a.nd 
(ilO at t,lir entl of 1994. Share ca.pital was 500 000 krooiis a.t tlie end of 1994. Tlie turnover 
of Leiiibitu was 11.1 million kroons in 1992, 19.0 in 1993 ant1 29.6 i n  1994. The net profit was 
~.espectively 0.4, 0.96 a.nd 1.0 million kroons. 
Mass-sewing (sul)contra.cted sewing operations) was adtled to sewing-t,o-order senrice in 1990, 
~vliicli account.ed for 60%; of tlie turilover in 1994. Lenlbitu tool; a 2.7 million credit ~vhose residue 
n-as 2..5 million i n  199.5. I n  addition, short term credits aniounting to  0.37 iilillioii kroons were 
illatle use of. 
I,e~nl)itu was until no\v a state-owned enterprise and it is included into tlie list of privatization 
for ~vhicli offers liad to  be presented by June 1, 1995. A joint-stocl; company fornled by workers 
of Lemllit u is pa.rticipating in  the bidding process. Problelrls nrith tlie estinlation of tlie value 
of' assets were one of tlie reasons of delay of putting Lenibitu into tlie list of enterprises to  
I > p  ~)ri\.atizetl in tlie earlier rounds of public offerings. Also there have been problenis witli 
~~estitutioii. Tlie ~iiain builcling of Lenibitu is located in the olcl cit,y and [)art of tlie land under 
r l ~ c  I>uiltli~lg I>eloiigs to  an object of restitution clainled by the lieis of tlie fornler owner of 
another plot. This 1)rol>le111 was solvetl through compensation of the value of tliis I>a.rt to  tlie 
heir of llle fornler owner in privatization vouchers. 
Exports 
Switching o17el. to subcontracted work in 1990 brought along a rapid increase in  tlie share of 
exports in tlie structure of Leinbitu's output. Fillland accounts for 60%1. Sweden :30% and otlier 
countries (Deninark, Ciermany etc.) for 10 per cent of subcoiltracted work. The share of exports 
i l l  tlie total output was .54 per cent in 1993 and 44 per cent in 1994. The value of esports 
illcreased froin 9,6 nlillio~l kroons i n  1993 to  11.7 million kroons in  1994. but other coniponents 
of tlie total turnover increased more rapidly. Tlie received rental ~>a~,rnents nlade up 2 inillioil 
kroons in 1993 and .5 nlillio~i I;roo~is in 1994. 
The relat i~~ely cheap and efficient labor (average wage \\.as 1400 kroons in December 1994 in 
Lcnibitu) and exact inlplenlentatioii of tlie conditions fised i n  contracts were the main advantages 
i l l  conll>etit ion for subcontracts. 
The e ~ p o ~ t  strategy of Lenlbitu is to diniinish tlie share of subcontracting and to  increase 
tlie share of reacly-made clotlies by individual orders, but cliances to  realize tliis strategy will 
I)(. (leal after tlie results of privatization are announced. 
':it;; is an al~l~reviation for a joint-stock colnpany (aktsiaselts in Estonian). RAS is an al~l,reviation for a 
s l  i l t  c,  onnrcl joint -5t ock cotttr)atl~' (riigiaktsiaselts in Est.onian). State owned conlpanies mere transformed I~efore 
~~.ivatization illto join-stock conlpanies, 100% of shares of which belong to the st,at,e. 
'l'lle firm is using different strategies t o  promote production in domestic and foreign markets. 
Lcinbitu tries to be among those who serve individual custonlers aiicl to 11e a producer of lligll 
cluality. quite expensive products in the donlestic market. Mass production is performed in the 
es1)ol.t sector w l i e~e  the lower price mark-up is co~npensated by a larger lurnover. Lembitu has 
clirect conlacts wit11 Luhta OY, Rukka OY, and A. Fidrikson of Finland, Ciote David Teko AB, 
d ~ ~ d  Scarlett of Sweden, Cieorge Rech of France, Gela Fashion of Cierniany and otlier firms. Fairs 
are used the  higher quality production to  advertize and Lenlbitu tries t o  nlake its t~ade-marl< 
Illore lino~vn also with ready-niade clothes. 
Export of clothes has been realized mainly by subcontracting of several operations. One 
leason why export of clothes of Lembitu has been realized mainly by subcontracting has been 
i i i ~ l ~ o r t  barriers. Though Estonia has a free trade agreement with several countries, it has 
not been profitable to  sell there finished goods. Under the rules of origin t ha t  guarantees 
ese~npt ion  f r o n ~  customs tariffs (which could be as  high as  35 per cent) ,  only clothes produced 
froni niatelial manufactured in Estonia or in the partner c o u n t r ~ .  (Finland, Sweden, 11ut also 
Latvia alicl Lithuania) are exempt from this tax. Estoilia and the other mentioned states  do not 
procluce ~iiaterials of relevant quality, so these preferable conditions could be actually used. 
Low \\ages have been one inlportant factor proinoting exports but the company meets quite 
4t long conll~etitioii fro111 the otlier regions ivitl~ cheap labor (China, India).  The  otlier Baltic 
s tates  a le  also conipetitors in this field I~ecause the quality and price ratio of their products are 
close to  each otlier. 
AS Tondi Elektroonika (manufacture of electrical machinery) 
'I'l~e ciitcrl~rise was foundetl in 1960 and was named Hans Poogelmann Factory of Electro- 
Technical Equi l~ment  after an Estonian revolutionary. Tlie maill protlucts of Ilie enterprise 
ncrc  electrical parts from nliicli a large sliare was used in tlie military intlustry. Employment 
a~iiountecl t o  3.500 in the  micl-1980s. Nearly 100 per cent of tlie procluction n.as esported t o  tlie 
otlier rc.l>ul>lics of tlie Soi7iet Union. 
.After 1990 the  Eastern market has been shrinking drastically. At  the  encl o f  1994 the  
ciiter1)rise einplo\.ecl 1100 people. tlie production was on the  level of 20 per cent of what  i t  
hat1 Ixcn in tlie iiiicl-1980s. Tlie ou tput  was 8 million krooiis in 1992, 7 million kroons in 1993 
and 10 million l i rool i~ in 1994. The  enterprise did not make any profit in 1992, 1993 and 1994. 
I n  1994-1995 the  main products of the enterprise are  integral suritclies, ~nicrobloclis and hearing 
aids for people witli iinpairecl hearing. 
Tondi Electronic was privatized in February 1994 by the joint-stock company NIikrel AS 
Tornlet1 by eml>loyees of Tondi Electronic. Tlie selling price was 18 n~illion lir0011~; tlie new 
on llel tool< oi,er lial~ilities ivitli a total value of 10.5 million liroons and tool< tlie obligation t o  
i ~ ~ \ . e s t  into the enterprise 18 million kroons and lieep 1050 of the labor force. Tlie new owner 
paicl 20 per cent of tlie price after signing tlie contract; during tlie nest  10 years it will have t o  
coi.cr the  re~nainiiig SO per cent of tlie price by instalnie~its and interests (in 1994 tlie interest 
rate wa5 1.5%). 
.A large part of tlie profit goes t o  cover the  price of buy-out. Tlie tecliiiology of tlie enterprise 
i~cecls re]>lacenlent in t lie wliole production unit, it is not possible t o  innovate it with a step- by- 
\tell al>proacli of changing machine-tools t o  improve the  cluality of ~>rocluction. Tlie new oivner 
clicl not invest reinarkably, though, until the  summer 1995. 
Exports 
ill)l)rosin~ately 90'%, of t lie ou tput  was esportetl during the periotl 1092-94. The  CIS (niainly 
Russia) acco~iiits for S O  per cent,, Germany for 15 per cent and otlier countries (China)  for .5 
per cent of' tlie esports .  Market niclles in Western European and Far  East  countries are related 
t o  olcler type of inicroswitclies wliich are  no longer produced by large firms ancl which are  110 
longer l>rotectetl 1 ) ~  >a.tent,s. Nevertheless, these old-fashioned micros~vitches a.re required in large 
a~noun t s .  To~icli Electronic copied a.nd introduced into production several microswitches (in 1994 
Tour iiiicrosn-itches were introduced into production, introduction of furtlier 20 inic~~os~vitclies for 
the \Yestern mar1;et and 60 microswitches for tlie Eastern market was planned in 1995). Hearing 
aicls a re  soltl in Gcrniany ant1 are  well accepted for their low price and acceptable quality. 
'Tl~e sul~l>lj- of 1iiateria.l~ came mainly from Russia. a.nd Belarus. Silicon l>ouglit from Russia is 
c1ieal1c.r I>!. a Tactor of 2.5-3 than in the CITestern countries but tlie price is increasing very ra.pidly 
also i n  Russia. Raw nia.t,erials and senii-final products froill Ea.st are of lower quality tlla.11 their 
\Vestern counterparts;  moreover, tlie qua.lity parameters are  not tlie saine for every shipnient. 
Tlie enterprise introtluced its ow11 internal control system t o  inspect all inputs. The  nianageiiient 
of the enterprise considers t h a t  it is necessary t o  increase tlie sliare of \Vestern 1nateria.l~ in the  
future. One b~~s incs s  t rategy of tlie enterprise foresees a. combination of \\Testern and Eastern 
illputs t o  acIiie\.e competitiveness witli relatively cheap production wliicl~ meet,s the  required 
quality standarcls. An esa.mple of such a combination is hearing aids wliicli contain silicon from 
Russia 2nd se\.eral other units (microplione) from Germany. 
Tllc target of tlie 1iia.rketing strategy for nest  yea,rs is t o  acliieve an equal size of Eastern and 
\I+stel.ii espor t s  ancl t o  sell only 20 per cent of tlie prodnct,ioii i n  the CIS by 1999. However, t o  
acliieve t,liis goal tlie company lias t o  apply also I S 0  9000 stanclarcls a.nd ~er t~ i f ica tes  test,ifying 
I hat tlie t~c.cl~nical operations are on tlie required level. Now tlie company lias got a niche with 
its oltl-fhsliionetl products but  this strategy can not be reliable in future. 
.-It the I>eginiiiiig of tlie 1990s tlie conversion of Russian military industry 1va.s coilsidered t o  
ci\use increasing coml>etition in Tontli's market. However, tlie conversion was 1.a.t.1ier slow a.ncl 
To~ldi Elec t ro~~ic  has not met tough cornpetition of similar products i n  Russia. On the other 
I~and.  there are several companies in other East European countries which n ~ a ~ ~ u f a c t u r e  similar 
protlucts a t  the same cost level. 
Increasing the part of inputs imported from \Vestern countries mould be a prerequisite for es- 
pantling tile amount of products exported to  these countries, but presently the financial situation 
of the fir111 is not sound enough to  introduce this strategy. 
AS EMOR (market research company) 
EA'IOR. was founded as a private joint-stock company i n  1990. Several owners of tlie new 
conipa.ny had earlier worlied for the consulting unit of the Estonian Ministry of Light Industry 
hlainor. A joint venture wa.s formed in 1993 witli selling 40 per cent of the shares of AS EMOR 
to the Fiiiiiisli liolcling company MDC (Market Development Research Centre), wliicli owns also 
tlre Fiiiiiisli Ga.llup Institute. Close cooperatioli sta.rted with Finnisli Gallup already in 1992. 
The liiio\v-horn ailel general strategy of building up a set of services a.cquired from Finnisli Gallup 
xcre even iiiore iiiiporta.iit tliaii investnient made by tlie new partner into EMOR's sliare capital. 
Eh'IOR had -52 full time employees and about 2.50 interviewers i n  Estonia a t  the end of 1994. 
Its slia.re capit.al is 7.50 000 liroons. EMOR's turnover 1ia.s increased by 30-40 per cent every 
year. Tlie turnover wa.s 6 niillion l<roons in 1992, 10 million krooiis in 199:3 ancl 17 iiiillion Iiroons 
i11 1994. Total profit before tases was 400 000 i11 1994, before 1994 EMOR did not have any 
profit. EhlOR created also subsidiaries Baltic Media Facts and Baltic Marliet Facts in Estonia 
and Baltic h4arliet and Media Facts in Latvia and Lithuania. The conipa.ny collects a wide range 
of information about the Baltic market. EhilOR owns a part of tlie sliare capital of a.11 these 
s~~hsitlia.ries. EMOR is the largest market research company in the Baltics. 
Tlie economic activity of EMOR is divided into two groups, production aiid selling. Pro- 
tl~~ctioii covers panel resea.rcli, questionnaires for sole and multiple (repeated) interviews, social 
analysis ant1 report preparing block. Selling consists of product and advertisement tests, bra.nd 
tracliings, ol>inioii 1>olls1 ad polls. EhllOR is trying to  develop an icleology of informational 
]>rocluct, not, just to  work nlitli occasional orders and interviews. 
Banli cretlits 1ia.ve not heen used as a rule, some short-term cretlits were talien in 1994 to  
cover costs related to  several projects. 
EkIOR. prepa.res finislied reports but also makes fieldwork (intervie~vs etc.) for otlier marliet 
researcli conil>anies. Fillislied products ma.ke up a.pprosima.tely -50 per cent of the turnover, 
airother 50 per cent is subcoiitracting to otlier media. and market researcli companies. Maybe 
the most fa.mous product is EMOR's opinion polls but tliese give only 1-2 per cent of tlie 
revenues. 
Exports 
Tlie sliare of esport 1ia.s been between 40 aiid 50 per cent during the last three years. Finland's 
sliare i11 esport was Fj.576, Sweden had 3.5 per cent a.nd otlier countries (Latvia,. Lithuania) 20 
per cent i11 1994. 
C~ooperat,ioii wit.11 foreign firms and esport of products a.re organizetl in the following way: if 
nlarliet rcsearcll is inatle in Estonia, field worli is made by ETUIOR, statistical a.iialysis of da ta  and 
filial report is realized by EMOR or also in some cases by the foreign partner. Trust of the foreign 
partner is an important factor when distribution of functions is decided but sometimes there are 
specific prol>leins wliicli influence 011 the worlting process. I11 particular, powerful internationa.1 
corl>orations prefer signing esclusive contracts, wliicli means that the partner should not do 
siniilar research for anotlier firm working in the same market sector. For this rea.son EMOR not 
to  I>e restricted i11 clioosiiig clients for otlier projects, soinetimes prefers to malte just field work, 
nliich does not imply binding rela.tions witli the customer, ant1 tlie filial analysis is then ma.de 
I>>. tlie foreign partner (Finnish Ga.Ilup). 
Large \Vestern con~panies order similar market researcli in the all Baltic states. As EMOR 
al\va>,s uses the sanie metliods, no matter where they do their researcli, it gives the customer 
every possil>ility to compare different countries. EMOR orders field work from local firms a.nd 
\vrii,es a, filial report on the ba.sis of information received. Latvian and Litliuanian firms also 
order fielcl \\~orli wliicli should be done in Estonia by EMOR. EMOR gives more worli to  Latvia 
ant1 Litliuaiiia tliaii it receives from tliese countries. 
E3IOR's clients a.re ABB, Electrolux, Fazer, Felis, I<ellogg's, Masterfood, Nokia., Pliilips, 
Scli~11. The strategy is to  move witli tliese clients to  new a.reas. Tlie bloscow region, Uliraiiie, 
Polaiicl aiicl Belarus are target countries. EhlOR also acted as translator to  large Western 
compa.nies in aclvertisiiig aiitl testing their products for the Eastern ma.rket. 
111 1994 EhjIOR, 1ia.d soiiie probleiiis with its clients, whicli did not happen during previous 
!.ears. One reason iniglit be t1ia.t several \,Vestern companies esta.l>lished subsidiaries or represen- 
tations i n  Estonia and seine disturbance in distribution of functions occurred. R.epresenta,tives 
are making a.lso seine analytical work whicli before used to  be ordered from the marliet research 
company. 
EhIOR clicl not have big problems with foreign tra.de regulation. Oiie such case wa.s when 
:jOO Iig of c1iocola.te was transported from Finland to Estonia for testing i n  tlie framework of 
market resea.rc1i. Estonian customs law determines that no VAT should be imposed on these 
gootls. I11 this ca.se tlie authorities first requested VAT pa.ymeiits, but after some negotiations 
t l ~ c  usto~lis office gave the chocolate back and did not t a s  it. 
AS Baltic Tours (tourism) 
Tourisni \\.as state nionopoly in Estonia like in tlie whole Soviet lTniou until 1988. Three all- 
I11iioii tourist organizations were operating: Intourist. youth organizations tourist bureau Sput- 
~ i i l i  ant1 tlie tourist bureau of trade unions. Baltic Tours was actually tlie first joint venture 
irk t l ~ e  Esto~iian tourist business founded on April 3 ,  1989. Saaremaa's Developinelit Centre 
(consultancy fir111 registered 011 tlie largest Estonian island Saaremaa), OY Sally Line .4B and 
0 Y  Silja Lil~e AB registered in Finland were tlie partncrs founding Baltic Tours. Tlie share 
capital of Baltic Tours is 10.000 kroons. Baltic Tours had 10 employees in 1991 and 30 a t  tlie 
eiicl of 1994. I-ldditionally, tlie firm hires 50 persons by contract for part tiine job5. Tlie firm 
11a\ sul>sidiaries in  Saare~naa  nd Riga (Latvia). Baltic Tours is an official agent of tlie shipping 
company Silja Linc in  Estonia. The turnover of tlie firm was 0.2.5 million rubles in 1989, 0.75 
million rubles i n  1990, 1.65 million rubles in 1991, 6.67 million kroons in 1992, 20.4 niillion 
lir001is i n  1093 ancl 31.1 million kroons in 1994. 
Baltic Tours is tlie fifth among the 150 Estonian tourist firms by size and accounts for 7 per 
t r ~ i t  of tlie total turno~.er. Tlie largest firin Estravel holds approsinlately 15% of the market. 
l3nltic Tours ha\ at tlie same time 30 per cent of the incoming tourisill n~liicli is export of services 
[lorn tlie point of view o l  tlie balance of payments. Tlie net profit was 19 1 000 1;rooiis in 199-1. 
.A ~elatively sniall ailiount of tlie profit was relatetl to tlie accident with Finnish boat Silja Line 
i11 spring 1994. 
Tlie main services arc: 5elling of tickets of Silja Line, selling of traveling pacliages, liotel 
~c\crvations. air ticliets, visas, travel insurance. Tlie conlnlissioil of ticliets sold by Baltic Tours 
i\ 15 per cent (T..5-10 per cent of tliis revenue is paid to  intermediaries). Tlie conlinission of 
\elling air ticlicts i~ 9-10 per cent. 
Exports 
13altic 'I'ours serI.es outcoiniiig and incoming tourism. Incoming t,ourisni ea.rnetl 7.08 million 
I ~ Y O O I ~ S  i n  1994 or 23'x; of tlie turnover in 1994. I n  the early 1990s tlie sliare of inco~iiiiig t,ourisin 
ivas el.eli Iiiglier, amounting to  GO-70 per cent. 
Tlie ~iiain stra.tegy of promoting inconling tourism is selling pacliages of tourism services 
lilie transportation, catering, services of guides, organization of different recreation services for 
tourists sta~riiig in  Estonia for a longer time and Iioliday journeys. 
Tlie fir111 has a contra.ct witli tlie design firni L,lultlia AB, ~~rliicli includes consulting in  the 
fielcl of ~iiarlieting strategy and creation tlie firm's Baltic Tours' image. Ba.ltic Tours has applied 
f'or ancl is wait,ing for an I.4T.4 licence, which will malie selling air tickets easier and will secure 
access to lon price tickets of different air companies. 
.A contract nras nlatle ~vitli tlie largest Estoi1ia.n hotel-chain to  iml>rove liotel services. Tlie 
iiiost ~>roiiiisiiig aa.rea of export services is relatetl to  selling holitlay pa.clia.ges to  foreigners, inclutl- 
ing air or boat t.icliets, liotel services, travel insurance, a.nd various recreation services (hunting, 
fishing. visits to  national parlis, tourist farms). 
Estonia.. Latvia, ant1 Lithuania signed a visa agreement i n  June 199.5, which malies possible 
f'or tourists 1ia1:iiig a visa of tlie one Baltic country also to  visit others witliout applying for visas 
for tliese countries. Citizens of EU count,ries, USA, Cana.da and Central European countries do 
not ~ieecl a. visa to enter Estonia. A special t.a.sk is giving visa.s a t  tlie borders for tliose who did 
not arrange visas i11 tlieir liome country. Tourist firms are very much interested that  this could 
Ile a s  easy and as simple a.s possible. 
For 13altic Tours contracts with a Finnisli partner i11 incoming tourism are of great impor- 
tance. Tlie Fii~nisb sicle orga.nizes tourist groups, sliips for cruises ulliile services in  Tallinn and 
Estonia shoultl be offered by Ba,ltic Tours. Tlie agreement witli tlie Finnish ~>ar tner  determines 
rather exactly tlie frameurorli of tlie operation for the Estonian side. 011 the other hand, tliis 
cooperat ion has improved substantially the level of services offered by Baltic Tours and lielps 
;\ccluire international standards. 
L a t ~  ia. Lit liuania and tlie St .  Petersburg area are sometimes co~isitlerecl as  competitive areas 
for inconling tourism. A t  tlie same time, a cornrnon set of tourist services will illcrease tlie nuinber 
of tourists 11 110 want t o  visit different places during their journey to the coast of the Baltic sea. 
.A co~lsitleral~ly big problen~ for such arrangements is the difficulties a t  tlie Estonian-Russian 
I)ol.clcr aucl the not very successful cooperation with Russian partners.  
AS Nagu (trade) 
.loillt-~tocli company Nagu was founded by six persons in Tartu in 1993 to realize one business 
itlea - to  sell lioney and products tliereof to Germany. Tlie sllare capital of the firin is 1000 
l i r o o l i ~ . ~  Oiie founder of the firm worked in the 1980s as iilstructor of the Estonian Association of 
Bee-Iieepers, aiid was respoiisible for some shorter period also for international relationships of 
tlie association. fle fouiided in 1991 anotlier firm wliicli started to sell lioney in a small pavilion 
in Tartu. The l~usiiiess strategy of tliis firm became inixed because otlier partners preferred 
also tracle witli consumer goods and lend out money. A new firm Nagu AS was fouiided to  
colicelitrate l~usiiiess inaiiily on selling lioney and products tliereof. 
Tlie turnover of Nagu was 1.2 million kroons in 1994. It is necessary to  talie illto account tliat 
tracling and busiiiess in tliis field is seasonal, so tliis ecoiiomic result was acliieved practically 
cluring five nioiitlis. Most revenues were used to  expancl the firm. Marli-up of price for resold 
~~ro t luc t s  is a l~~~rox imate ly  40 per cent. The net profit of Nagu was 100 000 lir001is in 1994. 
Exl~or t  of pollen gives 90 per cent of the turnover of the firm. Honey, wax ailel several instruments 
for bee-lieeping are otlier items wliicli are traded by Nagu and give 10 per cent of the turnover. 
C'ontacts aiiiong the organizations of tlie Baltic bee-keepers iiilieritecl froin the Soviet period 
\\ere one iiiil~ortant factor \vliicli eiiabled to build up a chain of supplies without credits and 
\.arious guarantees. Nagu n~onopolized actually all export of polleii froin the Baltic republics. 
Exports 
The ou ii ~~rotluctioii of Nagu accounted for 0.3 per cent of its exports in 1994. The rest of the 
I uaclcd proclricts Lvas I~ouglit from otlier Estonian producers while re-export of products imported 
f'roiii Lataia antl Litliuania accounted for .50%. 
Rel~resentatives of Nagu estiinate tliat tliey get approxiniately one tenth of the value of the 
~)iocluct iiiacle from the inputs it trades. There is hope to  get a liiglier price in the future, but 
also prices of supplies are increasing. Several bee-keepers liave delllanded a liiglier price than 
Iias I~een fixecl in tlie contract Nagu has witli every supplier. Nagu refused until now to  raise 
tlie price antl rather not bought tlie product. After some time   no st bee-keepers agreecl with 
the initial coliclitions I~ecause a t  least presently it is not easy to  realize large amounts of such 
11roclucts i11 tlie Baltic republics. 
E5pecially at tlie I~eginning the firm had great probleins wit11 paying tlie 18 per cent VAT for 
~)ollen in i~~or te t l  fro111 Latvia aiid Litliuania (if a product is exported, tlie VAT ~vill be returned) 
,inti also the 0.5 per cent export tax. Now tlie firm has customs clocunients ~~io\ . i i ig that  tlie 
iniportecl [~ollen is to  be exported from Estoiiia and tliis probleiil clisappearecl. -4t present only 
the 2.50 l\roons tax for tenlporary entry for re-export is paid for every sl i i~~nient .  
Se\.eral firms liave tried to  find contacts in \irestern countries to  organize export of lioney 
, I I I ~ I  other proclucts related to bee-keeping. Sweden was the initial target country. Some contacts 
\\ere I~uilt up in 1992 when several Swedish businessmen visited Estonia and used services of 
Ii~inting tourisin. These people were interested in establisliing a wliolesale coinpaiiy in Estonia. 
.-Is they \\ere not interested in lioney, tliey made a busiiiess contact in Germany witli a firm which 
plocluces ~~liarmaceuticals from extracts witli lioney and products thereof. A sample of pollen 
\ \as sent ;111cl tlie C~eriiiaii firm accepted the quality. One of tlie sliareliolders of Nagu has its ow11 
apiarj in South Estonia aiicl thus one incentive for organizing tracliiig of lioney and products 
Li\ctirities of joint-stock companies and other firms with limited lial~ilit,y were regulated in 1993 when Nagu 
-4s \\as founrlecl. I I ~  a government decree. Minimal requirements t,o establish a joint-stock company were a t  least 
tn.0 &re-holclers a i d  GOO liroons (50 USD) of share capital. This paradoxically small aniount of money was 
inhc.r.ited from tlle tiirie when Est,oilia belonged to the ruble zone. High inflation decreased the real value of the 
rerluirecl capital. What, a peculiar economic situation could be created by this low capital ~.ecluirement could be 
rlc.scril,etl t,l1rougll the example of the largest privatization deal to date: this \\,as the purchase of the Viru hotel 
Sol 1-15 million lir0011~ (12 inillion USD), wit,h the investment guarantee of 4.5 iriillion liroons, by a two person 
owncrl joint-stock coilipany Harmaron AS with the share capital of 600 kroons. The deal was covered I I ~  financial 
gunrantees of Fiililisll I~anlis. 
tliereof \vas to  sell his own products. I-Iowever, a foreign partner was interestecl in getting large 
sl1iprnent5. Nagu has to  organize a cliain for purchasing pollen in  all tlie threc Baltic countries. 
l l t o g e t l ~ c ~  'LOO bee-keepers belonged to  the cliain i n  spring 199.5, half of them from Estonia, 
dncl tlie otlicr half fro111 Latvia and Litliuania. The average amount of pollen leceived from 
1,itliuaiiian bee-lieepers is larger tlian from bee-keepers in Estonia or Latvia. Natural conditions 
for bee-lteeping are better in Litliuania because the climate is warmer and the forest area is 
5maller tlian in Esto~iia or Latvia. 
Competition in this field is specific. Latvian and Lithuanian bee-lteepers triccl to establish 
contacts \\lit11 proclucers of plia~maceutical products in several \Vestern countries but without 
\uccess. One reason for this was the modest Itnowledge of foreign languages. Ivlarltet is fu l l  of 
cheap honey exported from Cliina and other developing countries. Only rather specific products 
can  l ~ c  realized \vith some profit. 
De\elopi~rg tlie payment scheme was the most complicated problem a t  tlie beginning of busi- 
Iless. Tlie own financial resources of the firm were very linlited, tlie only possible solution was 
to  I ) O I  lo\\ tlie first sliip~nent to  Germany from bee-keepers and pay tlie suppliers only after 
~ecc~v ing  payment fro111 the partner. Former personal contacts and support of some influential 
I~ee-lieepers i n  Lithuania made the first shipment possible. After tlle first successful at tempt 
the scheme startecl to  work. The two shareholders of Nagu, who are also tlie only en~ployees 
(<~ccounting services are renclered by a consulting firm), visit all apialies ancl gather pollen. A 
\\tcl\-long t ~ i p  to  Latvia and Lithuania is made once a month. When putting together a. new 
sllipment they also pay f o ~  tlie previous one. Products of different bee-keepers ale packed sep- 
drdtely \\it11 data ant1 infolmation indicated (period of gatheling, plants wliich here flowering 
etc.).  Tile C;erman partlie1 tests every packet. Pollell is transported to  Parnu port. Transporta- 
ti011 from Parnu by boat to Germany ancl i~lsurance of tlie freight is organizecl by a one-man 
\\ Iiolehale fill11 ill Parnu. 
Saku ~ l l e t e h a s e  AS (Saku Brewery Ltd.) 
Sa.liu Bre\vcry (Saliu is located 15 kilometers from Tallinn) is tlie largest a l ~ d  oldest brewery in 
Estonia founcletl in 1820. At the end of tlie 19th century it  wa.s the luges t  enterprise in Harju 
county. hlonopoly in supplying Tallinn witli beer was achieved in 1913. During tlie Soviet times 
Saliu Brewery wa.s a,lso the largest s tate owned enterprise in the brewery sector. 
Organizational changes a.nd restructuring started in 1991. A joint venture wa.s formed with 
the Balt,ic Beverage Holding AB. Half of tlie s1ia.res of tlie Baltic Beverage Holding AB belong 
to tlie S\veclisli company AB Pripps Bryggerier a.nd lia,lf to  tlie Finnish company OY Hartwa,ll 
:IB. Tlie sliare ca.pita1 of Saku Brewery Ltd., is SO million kroons. Initially 40 per cent of tlie 
s1ia.res of tlie joint venture belonged to tlie Estonian state and 60 per cent t,o tlie Baltic Beverage 
Holtling AB. Tlie foreign partner bought additionally 10 per cent of the sliares in Ja,nuary 1995. 
Tlie Estonian sta.te sold 20 per cent of tlie sliares for vouchers in April ancl May 199.5. One share 
\vit.li a face value of 10 kroons was sold for 25 voucher kroons. Shares were over-subscribed four 
t-imcs, tlic limit of 200 sliares per buyer wa.s used and within tliis limit every buyer got a quarter 
of t,lie sliares lie or slie liad subscribed. By June 1995, tlie Baltic Beverage Holding liad 70 per 
cent of tlie sliares, Est.onian private share-holders 20 per cent and tlie Estonian state 10 per cent 
of sliares. Tlic Balt,ic Bevera,ge Holding owns majority slia,res also in breweries in R.iga (Latvia), 
Panevezis (Lit 1iua.nia) and St. Petersburg (Russia). 
Tlie quality of beer producetl by Saku Brewery lias improved and new brands were introduced 
(luring tlie last tliree yea,rs. After large investments cluring tlie last four years (a.n estinla.ted 200 
liiillion liroons lias been invested), tlie potential capacity of productioll increa.sed to  40 million 
lilers per year. I-lowever tlie Estonian beer market lias been declining (total a.mount of beer 
collsumccl in Estonia wa,s 37 million liters in 1994). Saku Brewery producetl 20 nlillion liters 
l~eer  in 1992, 19.2 million liters in 1993 a.nd 24.6 million liters in 1994. Tlie firms sliare of beer 
~~roclucecl in Estonia increased from 3.5 per cent in 1993 to  5 3  per cent in 1994. Tlie total va.lue 
of 'out l~ut  \vas 100 niillion liroons in 1992, 140 million kroons in 1993 ant1 200 million liroons in 
1994 (at current prices). Tlie firm made S.2 million liroons losses in 1992, its net profit was 1..5 
~iiillion liroolis in 199:3 ant1 28.0 million kroons in 1994. Tlie residue of tlie creclits of banks was 
1.1; niillion liroons and lia,bilities to  tlie Baltic Beverage Holtling amounted to  2.0 million kroons 
a l  tlie clicl of 1994. Tax e~enipt~ioli ended in 1993 (according to  tlie inconie t a s  1a.w which was 
in force before 1991 firnis witli foreign capita.1 over 50000 USD were esempted from corporate 
incolne taxes tluring three years; tlie regulation continued to  be in force also a,fter January 1, 
190-L for tliose enterprises which got tlie tax exemption before that  date until tlie end of a period 
of three years. Tlie neiv tax la,w does not envisage ally specia.1 ta.x exempt,ion for firms with 
Sorcign capital). Tlie company employed 194 people a,t tlie end of 1994. 
Exports 
'I'lit first t,arget for t,lie business stra,tegy of Saku Brewery wa.s Estonian nia,rliet. Through joint, 
vcntures in Latvia., Lit1iua.nia and St. Petersburg tlie Baltic Beverage Holding trietl t.o get control 
over t,lie beer niarliet of tlie Baltic countries a,nd tlie St. Petersburg a,rca,. However, breweries in 
\vliicli the Balt,ic Bcvera.ge Holding holds a majority sliare have a sma.ller nlarliet sliare in otlier 
areas t.1ia.n in Estonia. 
Tlie sliare of exports in total turnover of Saku Brewery lias been approxima.tely .5 per cent. 
Beer was esport,etl in snlall amounts to  Russia, Lithuania and Latvia. Tlie difference of excise 
t.as on tlo~nestic beer a.nd on imported beer is large everywhere (also in Estonia tliis difference 
is eiglit-folcl). so export is not profitable. Some amount of beer is sold in tlie ta.s free sliops of 
I~oats traveling l>et\veen Tallinn a,nd otlier cities. Several salesmell emerged in Finla.nd but also 
i l l  tlie I;S.A \\.lie st.arted to  buy Est0nia.n beer for tlieir restaurants, pubs ancl reta.il sliops. 
Tlit clsport strategy of tlie firrii is built up step-by-step. The first stage is rela.tec1 to moving 
the prod r~ct ion of t lie I~rantl R.eva,l Luxus from Finla.nd to  Estonia,. I-Iartwall procluccs this beer 
I>y licence va,lid i n  Finla.nd a,nd it is a.lso sold now in Finland. Tlle next step will be to export 
some sma,ller a.mounts of other bra'nds to Sca.ndina.via,n cou~itries. All together Saku Brewery 
1)la.n~ to increa,se t'he slia,l.e of exports to 1.5-20 per cent. Russia, is a,lso a potential n~arket ,  but 
cust.oms t,a.riffs should be lower to promote this business. 
C'o~l~l)etitors of Saku Brewery a.re other c~rnpa~nies of different countries. The relatively c11ea.p 
and high clua,lity Czecl~ beer is not sold in the Ba.ltic countries but co111d become quite popular. 
Finla,l~cl's high taxes on inlported alcol~olic beverages are frequently mentioned a.s one obsta- 
cle to exporting beer to Finla'nd. 
ELCOTEQ Baltic AS (manufacture of electronical equipment) 
Ratlioelectronic company RET, wliicli could be regarded as tlie pretlecessor O F  ELCOTEQ Baltic, 
\ \as fountletl before the Second World War. First it produced mainly radiotubes and assembled 
ratlio sets. After the \\Tar RET was renamed to Punane RET (Retl RET).  The production of tlie 
enterprise started to increase rapidly, new investments were made. Punane RET was known in 
the Soviet lTnioii by its electron-voltameters and radiogramophones Estonia in the 1970s and i n  
tlie 1SSOs. Approxiniately '70 per cent of the output was exported. Two thirds of the exports 
uent to otlier republics of tlie Soviet Union, one third was exported mainly to East Europeail 
corintries (Poland, Hungary). The Tallinn Radio-Electronic Colistructioii Bureau nras developed 
on tlie tecliilological basis of Punane RET. The bureau worked out also main elements of the 
('D player to be produced in RET (the company dropped the word Punane, (red) from its name 
il l  1990). After tlie collapse of the CMEA and Soviet Union RET lost practically all its markets. 
Different tlepartments of the enterprise oriented first to simple operations of metal processing. 
.-lfter soiile period a large part of metal processing tools was sold to cover costs of heating, 
electricit!. and tax arrears. There were 2200 people working in tlie enterprise in 1988 but only 
500 were employecl in 1993. RET was included iiito the privatization list in 1993. The main 
cstal~lislimeiit~ of RET were locatecl in the central area of Tallinn city. Tliese large buildings 
coulcl l ~ e  rel~uilt into trading centers or office space. A11 investment group boliglit tliis part of 
RET. 
:l new estal~lishment of RET was built a t  the beginning of tlie 1980s a t  Lasnamae, a lieu1 
di5trict of tlnelling-houses of Tallinn. A new joint-stocli company was forinecl on the basis of 
tlie Lasnaniae establishment of RET in tlie privatization process. Tlie Finnish firill ELCOTEQ 
togetlier ~vitli a Finnish investment group Finnfuncl bought -51 per cent of tlie sliares and tlie Es- 
tonian state liept 49 per cent. ELCOTEQ owns four enterprises in Finland and tlie ne\v Estoiiiaii 
fi1111 ELC'OTEQ Baltic AS is coiiiiected uritli the tecliiiological cliaiii of these enterprises. 
111 Tallinn tlie assembly, tuning, loading ant1 testing are performed on tlie electronic parts. 
Tlie inaiii ~~roclucts of ELCOTEQ Baltic are electronic modules of video monitors, parts of 
iiiol~ile teleplioiies ant1 electronic blocks of sewing machines. 
Tlie iliain business itlea of sucli a teclinological sclieme is to use relatively cheap ant1 clualifiecl 
Estonian labor. Tliis is also profitable after subtracting trailsportation costs. ELCOTEQ Baltic 
hiretl a big portion of tlie einployees of RET. ELCOTEQ Baltic started to operate in 1993. At 
t l ~ c  ncl of 199-1 tlie enterprise employed 400 people. Tlie firin plans to increase tlie iiunlber of 
c~nil1lo~ee5 "11 t o  600 tluring tlie next two years. The firm does not neetl qualified engineers. but 
tccl~i~iciaiis a l~le  to control tlie parameters of tlie tecl~nological process are needed. Tlie output 
of' ELC'OTEQ Baltic \vas 8 million krooiis in 1994. If a reconstruction plan succeetls, the output 
i5 expected rise to 12-13 million kroons in 199.5. 
Electronic iilotlules were asseinbled by liand until summer 1995. Tlie firill planned to iii- 
trotluce autoinatic production line during the second half of 199.5. Tliis is expected to  increase 
productivity substantially. 
Exports 
l-Iunclretl per cent of tlie production of ELCOTEQ Baltic is exported. Parts of video monitors 
ant1 iiiol~ile telephones are exported to Finland. Electronic blocks for se\ving inacliines are 
exportetl to Sneden, some part also to Germany. Export to Finland accounts for 80 per cent of 
the total export ant1 output of tlie firm, Sweclen's sliare is 1.5 per cent ant1 Geriiiaiiy's sliare is 
5 per cent. 
.4 gootl location for transportation linkages was one reason why ELCOTEQ bouglit tlie build- 
ing at  Lasiiaiilae ant1 introtluced tlie Tallinn factory iiito its production cliain. All techiiological 
~ l i ~ ~ c l ~ i i i e r ~ .  in the l~uilclings were sold as a scrap metal and new technology was introduced. 
Every inorniiig a truck is transported by ferry from Helsinki to Tallinn (the clistance between 
tlie t\vo cities is approxinlately 70 kilometers). Tlie same evening a trucli with parts which have 
]):'st the teclinological cycle in Tallinn goes back to Finland. Such an operative transportation 
scl\enie worl;s t1ianl;s to very good cooperation with customs offices in Tallinn ant1 Helsinki. 
Tlie teclinological sche~ne and all necessary special tools are supplied by tlie contractor. He 
gives also tools for testing the production. When the contract is fulfilled, all tlie equipment is 
returnetl to  the contractor. 
-4 certificate confirming adequacy of production to I S 0  9002 standards will be given over 
to ELCOTEQ Baltic in November 199.5 according to the espectations of representatives of 
tlie firln. 'This certificate will ease opening new mar1;ets ant1 will give more intlepentlence for 
5ul1contracting different operations and products. 
RAS Tarkon (manufacture of electronical equipment) 
12AS Tarli011 is located in Tartu. Tartu Teleplione Factory founded in 1932 \\,as a ~)redecessor of 
R."I Tarlion, which was transformed to  Tartu Fa.ctory of Control Appxa tus  a t  tlie beginning 
of t,lie 19rjOs. The main products of the factory were control apparatus for aeroplanes (so called 
I~lacli l~oses) .  St,ate orders of the Russian military industry were fulfilled even i n  1993 ~vlien 
Est,onia was i n  its tliircl year of independence and the \\,ithdra\val of Soviet troops from the Ba.ltic 
count.rics was set,tled (luring tlie nest months. Tlie production of control appara,tus stopped only 
i 11 Septenil)er 1994. Tliis a,ppa,ratus was produced for older types of planes, tlie nianufacturing 
or similar appa,ratus for Inore lnodern planes was moved fro111 Tartu a.lrea.dy a.t the beginning of 
tlie 1980s. ,411otlier more i~ilportant product of tlie fa.ctory is conlpact \:oltameters, li110wn as 
'I'artu t,esters. Inputs for testers were imported froln Russia (St. Petershr~rg). 
The nunil)er of people employed in the factory dinlinislied substantially during tlie la,st five 
years. Tliere \\-ere 2000 e~nployees in 1990 and GOO in  1995. Tlie total output has decrea.sed by 
a factor of five. Tlie output declined also in 1992 and 1993, but a, dramatic clecline occurred 
i n  1994 n.hen orclers of Russian aeropla.ne manufacturing co~npanies stopped. Tlie total output 
\\-as 4  nill lion 1ir001is i n  1994, t a s  arrears and other liabilities were 1.2 million kroons in  May 
199.5. 
T l ~ c  ollective of e~nployees has a. leasing contra.ct witli tlie representati\re of the state,  tlie 
:\linist.ry of  Econoniy fro111 1991. The enterprise should be privatized in 1995. 
Tlie t,eclinology used in  the enterprise was wor1;ed out by an applied institute of teclinology of 
tlie all-lTnion hlinistry of Apparatus hlanufacturing 1ndust.ry. Not all tec1i1iologica.l blueprints, 
scllc31nes a~icl ot.l~er informa,tion on tlie products a,re a,vaila.ble now for representa.tives of Tarkon. 
'['his con~l~licates innovation of production a.nd after some periocl a new data base, reorientation 
to\\-arc1 \Z'est.ern cluality s t a~~da . rds  a ~ ~ d  materials \\.ill be necessary. 
Exports 
'Parkon esported SO per cent of its production i n  1991-9.5. The ma,in article of exports wa.s c o ~ ~ t r o l  
apparatus (I)l;lcl; l~oses)  for olcler types of Russia,n a.eroplanes. Tliere \\!as some liope tha t  this 
t!.l)c of  I~lacli boses woulcl be taken into use also i n  subivay trains and a.lso 011 solne bus-lines. Tliis 
plan (lid not realize. As Russia stopped giving orders all exports ancl output cleclined rapidly. 
No\\- t . 1 1 ~  111ain export. itel11 is a compact tester for measuring voltage, strength a~icl volu~ne of 
the clect.ric cr~rl.ent. Testers a,re esported to  Russia, Ukraine, Belarus ancl 1ia.za.l;listan. A new 
clesign is ~ ~ e e d e d  to esport testers to  Western Eur0pea.n countries. A nenl design in turn requires 
;I ~lc\\- 1)ress to  niauufacture plastic. The enterprise does not have fina.ncia1 resources for such 
invest nients. 
AIanagers of Ta,rl;on foresaw tlie breali in the orders from tlie CIS ancl started to 100li for 
roreign co~it,acts with severa,l West European enterprises a,lready in 1993. Tlie enterprise has a, 
ratlie1 goocl teclinologica.l base for manufacturing different non-ferrous metals. One adva,ntage of 
t l ~ e  nterprise is t.liat it lias a special control service for ~nilitary ecluipnient (so called 'voennaya, 
pric~nlia') \vl~icli guarantees tlie required technical level of production. Alt~hough tlie nu~nber of 
\\.o~'lie~.s ancl engineers clecrea.sed substantially during tlie la.st five years, t,lle enterprise still 1ia.s 
ellougll skillet1 \\-orliers t80 restore the tec11nologica.l process. 
Tlie situation in the enterprise seems to  be quite co~nplicated also I>eca.use of the (niissing) 
foreign language sliills of tlie mana.gers and constructors. Tliey a.re i n  principle very ea.ger 
to co-operate 1vitl1 \Vestern partners but estima.te tlie present technical level of tlie enterprise 
too liigl~ a ~ ~ d  a.re not ready to  accept organizationa,l methods, attit.udes a~icl values of Western 
cnt repreneursliip. 
Sul~contracting to  IVestern firms is considered to  be tlie only possible wa,y out from tlie 
present col~~plicatecl situation. There is a contract with one Danisli proclucer of bicycles. Tarlion 
111.ot111ce for t l ~ e  Danisli partner parts from titanium ~,liicli niust I)e strong and light. Tlie share 
ol' tlle ( 'IS i n  esports is 80 per cent, Denma.rli accounts for 10 per cent a,nd Finla,nd, S~veden and 
I'oland for another 10 per cent. Colnpctitors with similar production are  several East  European 
countries, first of all Polalid and Hungary. 
Eesti Talleksi AS (manufacture and assembly of motor vehicles 
and engines for motor vehicles) 
Ee5ti Tallel,\i AS cle~ eloped from tlie Talliiiii Escavator Building Factorj.. Tlie latter was founded 
i l l  IO(jO. It5 main output was special excavators for ameliorative worlis anel tlieir parts. The 
factor) exported practicallj 100 per cent of its production. Tlie target countlies for exports \\.ere 
other re~)iil~Iics of tlie Soviet Union, several Asian and African countries (Iran, Congo, Egypt, 
S!-iia etc.) .  Exporting and service of exported escavators was organized and coordinated by tlie 
ccntral foreign tracle organization for export of inacliinery of tlie Soviet Union. I11 1988 there 
were 1600 eiiiployees i n  the enterprise. Engines for excavators were imported mainly from Minsk 
(Belarus), other parts from Russia. 
Privatization of tlie enterprise started in 1991. Tallinn Excavator Building Factory was 
included into tlie list of enterplises to  be privatized by the so called experimental piivatization 
to tlie wor1,ing collective for cash. However, a very strong conflict emerged between two groups 
of potential onrners, botli of tliem consisting of employees of tlie e1iterl)rise. Tlie business plan 
of tlie group leael by tlie financial director of the enterprise was preferred by tlie Agency of State 
Property. n liicli was responsible for privatization in 1991. Another group mas led by tlie general 
tliiector of tlie enterprise. Several legal proceedings followed because tlie privatization law made 
it po5sible to  present two different applications. From tlie legal point of view, tlie definition of 
n lien tlie privatization process started exactly was tlie cluestion. Different interpretations of tliis 
1)aragrapli gave to tlie group led by tlie general director an opportunity to  a p p l ~ .  for cliangiiig 
tlie soliltion of accepted by tlie Agenc! of State Propert!. Several court proceedings followed 
for t ~ v o  years aiicl finally tlie initial solution reinained valid but the enterprise lost all potential 
in\restors. 
Eesti Tallelisi A4S was fornled as a result of privatization. Actually it function5 like a holding 
coliipany of l r  5maller companies. All production departments were reorganizecl into joint- 
~ t o c l i  coliipanies. Eesti Tallelis liolds soiile part of the shares in evely new joint-stock company 
nhicli einergecl fro111 tlie Talliiiii Excavator Building Factory. Its nlaili role is rilanaging tlie 
fillancia1 i5sues. Eesti Tallelis is responsible also for book-heeping of the subsicliaries located 
i n  Tallinn. Ecsti Talleks organizes also trading of production and distributes orders between 
t lie sul,sitliaries. Tlie inail1 output of Eesti Talleks is macliines for peat processing (hl6isaliiila 
1)1~1nt iiial\e> peat pressing macliines, Paide plant manufactures peat blocks harvesting macliines). 
excavators (proclricecl in h/I6isakiila), hydro-cylinders and hydro-distributors, repairs of liydro- 
tlist~ibrrtioll ancl clividers, cliroming work (plant in Viljandi), containers. loading mechanisms for 
C \ t o ~ ~ i , \ ~ l  siiiall ports. several metal coiistructioiis (made in Tallinn). Several subsidiaries liave 
~c~l,r~ilt f o ~  1 1 1 ~ 1  pioductioii clepartments into shops and wareliouses. Repairs liave an important 
5lla1e in tlie turnover as well. 
The tr~rnover of tlie Eesti Tallelis was 1.5 rllillioii I<rooiis in 1992, 30 million l\roons i n  1993 
ancl 90 n~illion lilooiis in 1994. Altogether 1020 people were \vorliing in Eesti Talleks a t  the end 
of 1094. Ecsti Tallelis lias a subsidiary Ross Talleks in  Ve1ihij.e Luki. Russia. 
Exports 
,Approsinia.tely SO per cent of tlie output wa.s exported in 1994. Subcontracting to JVestern firms 
is tlie ~iiaiii \Yay t,o get orders. A contractor lias a licence of the product and controls tlie clua,lity 
of tliffereiit operations. Tlie cluality of welding is tlie most critica,l issue for proclucts of Eesti 
Tallelis. .At. t.he same t,ime, tlie situation in general is not so coniplica.tec1 i n  this ent.erprise as in 
other Estonian eiiterprises like those manufacturing electronic equiplne~lt. I11 tliis industry it is 
~)ossil>le to  change some machine-tools only, there is no need to replace tlie whole technology a t  
1 lie saiile tiiiie. This makes invest~nent problems ea,sier to  solve. 
Sul,coiitracted products are tota,lly exported and these accountecl for 60 per cent of tlie total 
\.aluc of exp0rt.s i l l  1994. Half of subcontractiiig wa.s done for tlie Russian compa.ny Ross Ta,lleks 
(:30 per cent of t.ota,l exports), another half of subcontracted work was done for Finnish firms. 
C'onta.inera a,ccount for 30 per cent of the exports and a.re exported rna,inly to  Finland, but 
snialler aniounts have been exported a,lso to  Sweden and Germany. IYIiile excavators are niainly 
exportecl to  tlie CIS, co~~ta, iners a,nd several rneta,l constructions a.re esported witliout esception 
to PVestern countries. 
Eesti Ta,llelis ha,s tried to  reintroduce contacts with former trading partners i n  Asia a.nd 
.Africa but. \\:itliout success. The former relationships were based very much on a,dvanta,ges of 
I~arter; under tlie new conditions it is very co~nplicated to  sell escava,tors i n  these countries. 
Products of Ecsti Tallelis are metal-intensive, so tlie price of importecl niet.a.1 is a critica.1 issue. 
llntil 1994 meta.1 i~iiportecl from Russia wa.s 2-3 times cheaper t1ia.n simila,r metal fro111 Western 
Ellrope. hletal i~nported from Russia, ha,s va.rying qua,lity parameters but for la,rge metal products 
~nacle by Eesti Ta,lleks this is not a problem. Special steel for niore complicated constructions 
tvas bought. fro111 Finla.nd. Metal trading firms from tlie Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Roma,nia 
are also represented in Estonia. Their products are relatively cheap and competitive by quality. 
Severa.1 firms which esport rehtively c11ea.p metal also produce from this meta,l similar products 
as Eesti Tallelis a,nd a.ccordingly, they are competitors for the company. 
During the la,st t.wo yea.rs Switzerla,nd, Austria and Benelris countries lia,ve been a ta.rget for 
export of clifferent ~iieclianisms. Co-operation ~vitli Ross Talleks ~nalies possible closer conta.cts 
\vit!i Russian marliet and solves custom problems wit11 Russia. 
AS ARS- Juveel (jewelry) 
.4S ARS-Juveel was founded in 1946. A jemelr manufacturer. I~owever. 11ad been working in 
the sanie I>uiltling fioin tlie begirlning of the 20th century. Tlie output of ARS-Juveel consists of 
jcweliy (silver, golcl, brass, copper, nickel), badges, medals and decorations. Jewelry of gold and 
5i l~er  is iiiaiiufactured by designs of Estonian metal artists. Badges and medals are manufactured 
by custonieis' orders and sometimes they also offer tlie design. Tlie firin lias its o\vn shop in  the 
old city of Tallinn. 
.-IRS-JUI-eel belongs to the Estoiiiaii Association of Artists. Tlie financial situatioli of tlie 
firiii n a5 \ e l  critical in  1994 and a new esecutive director was appointed in December 1994. Tlie 
( I~aotic sit uation characteristic of a11 enterprise without clear owiiersl~ip relations ivas clominating 
t l ~ e  fiinl. S e ~ e r a l  employees used the company as their ow11 to  make proclucts. Tlie control over 
iiil)ut use was also rather weak. 
Tlie output of tlie company was 4.6 million kroons in 1994. I11 1993 tlie output was 5.5 millioii 
I,rooiis ancl i n  1092 7 niillion kroons. Tlie share capital of the company is 2.50 000 kroons. A 
100 000 hroons piofit was reported in 1992, there was no profit in 1993 aiid 1994. Tliere were 85 
eiiiployee~ in tlie coiiipany a t  tlie end of 1994. The nuniber of employed people lias been rather 
stable in recent years. 
Tax arrears and other liabilities were 600 000 kroons a t  the begiiiiiiiig of tlie year, I ~ u t  tlie 
new management started to  iii~estigate actively for new opportunities to  sell proclucts ant1 also 
(list il)linc I~ecaiiie stricter. A new contlol system and a pair of scales nrere I~ouglit to  iileasure 
illore cxactlj. tlie coii~uinption of precious metals. 
Baclges and iiietlals accounted for one third of tlie production. The! nrere niacle I>y orclers of 
customers, iiiainl> Estonian state institutions. 
Exports 
.4pprosi1iia.t.ely 10 per cent of the production wa.s exported. Half of the espolts  went to  Finland, 
:JO per cent to Sweden, 10 per cent to  Denmark. France, Russia. ancl Germany accounted for 
t l ~ c  r t ~ n ~ a i ~ ~ i i i g  10 per ceiit of tlie exports. Badges and nieclals ordered by different organizations 
have  bee^^ t l ~ e  inain export articles. 
Pron~otioii of exports is t,he nlaiii strategy for t,he enterprise to survive. Subcontracting is 
oite possil~le way to iinprove tlie fi1iancia.l situation of tlie firm. Tliis metliocl of coopera.tion witli 
foreign partilers lias not been used in  ARS-Juveel yet. But this is consiclerecl as an intermediate 
strategy for short t,erm to  improve the financial situa.tioii and to  accumulate some resources for 
iiecessary investn~ents. 
Lilie in otlier places of tlie fornier Soviet Ui~ion gold jewelry in Estonia lias a lower content of 
golcl (1-1 carats) than in other countries (16 or 18 carats). Tliis creates complications in  trading. 
Several persons in  Finland started to  act as salesmen for tlie Estonian company. Some 
of then1 n.ere first of all orientated to  short term I>usiiiess making use of poor information 
a i ~ t l  clrialifications of Estonian producers to  get very high profits for the iiit,eriiiecliation. Yet 
so~lic. ~ ~ e o p l e  tlicl very good work a.nd introcluced long-term contacts with sellers in Scandinavia. 
C'ontact,~ with galleries or boutiques should be better organize(1: until now ii~eet~ings witli theses 
I)uyers were casual. 
\\.'est,ern mass-procluction of custoill jewelry is very cheap and it is not possible to  be suc- 
cessful i l l  tliis inarket sector. Subcontracts of different foreign firms is tlie nest step considered 
necessary to improve tlie financial position of the company. 
Special fairs aiid exhibitions are market places where ARS-Juveel pla.ns to  introduce its 
proclucts. First visits aiid first contacts have been made to  tliis direction. 
One source of problems seems to be lack of information on tlie level of the coinpaiiy but 
also i n  tlie Estoiiia.n Cliainber of Commerce and tlie Estonia.11 Association of .4rtists as to  ho\v 
to  tr;~(lc jewelry. A11 attempt was made witli a small collectioii to  trade i n  France. Bollticlues 
tlitl 11ot acccpt the jewelry for tlie 1iallma.rk impriiited in Estonia and aslieel for tlie hallmark 
iiiipri~itecl i l l  Frallce. T h e  required lialln~ark was possible t o  get,  in principle, but  five weeks of 
naitiiig t i u ~ e  n a s  iequired. 011 the  other hand, also Estonian bouticlues a le  asking foreign firms 
for. llallnla~ A i ~ l l p ~ i n t c d  in Estonia. It  is not too espensive t o  buy a lialliiiarli in France ant1 the 
price of jenelry norrld cover this additional cost. 
Estoiiiaii jewelry was ratlier popular in Russia and also now the manager of tlle company 
is lool\ing for restoration of former relationships. There could be a potential ~narke t  because a 
lie\\ upper class has emerged who would demand tliese prodncts. 
Ratlicr i~i iportant  for Ars-Juveel is the trade off between the quality ant1 price of inputs. 
('ol)l>cr ant1 enamel received from Russia are of poor qoality. Tlle company iniported sucli 
i n l~u t s  iiiainly from Finland where they are on average 30 per cent more espensive. 
Different precious stones (gems) have been offered by several sales persons a t  a ratlier rea- 
sonable price but the company lias not bought them from Eastern salesmen and has preferred 
to  irl~port them fro111 Finland. Tliere is a plan to  iiitrodr~ce a joint venture or just a co-operation 
nil11 a s i ~ l ~ i l a r  Russian firm. This will create a possibility to  get controlled cheaper inputs ant1 
to cs1101 t a t  lower cost avoiding liigll custolns tariffs. 
Especial1 je~velry froin Polaiicl co~npetes  \\lit11 tllose items which are produced and are 
~>lannecl t o  be by Ars-Juteel (silver, gold with amber) .  
AS Paide Piimakombinaat (dairy products, manufacture of food 
products) 
1';licle Plaiit of Dairy Products (Paide Piimakombinaat) was founded in 1963 i l l  Tiiri town, central 
])art of Estonia. in 1963 by coiiiiectiiig several sinall creameries. All protluction establishnients 
nere ii~ovetl to  Paitle town (centre of Jarva county) in 1979. Tlie plant was includetl t o  the list of 
state-owned enterprises t o  be privatized in 1993. Tlie joint-stock company Paicle Piimatoostus 
(Paicle Dairy Iiidu5try) bought 51 per cent of sliares of the Paitle Plant of Dairy I'roducts only 
i l l  0ctot)er 1994. Tlie other 49 per cent of shares is owned by tlie s ta te  and will be sold for 
\.or~cliers t o  public. 
T l ~ c  protluctioii tlepartineiits of Paide Plant of Dairy Products were constructed during the 
second half of 1970s. Tlie plant used techiiological equipment produced in Czechoslovakia. A 
cheese-nialiing departinent was equipped with Swedish machinery in 1980. Output  of production 
n a s  102 niillioii ltroons in 1992, 173 million liroons in 1993 and 233 million kroons in 1994. Tlie 
plant liacl ilet profit of 6.7 million kroon in 1992, 1.5 million kroons in 1993 and made 6.4 million 
ILioons losses in 1994. hIaiil reason for losses in 1993 was tlie retluctioii fro111 revenues those 
IIii! ii~eiit\ nlricli could not be collected. Another reason foi these losses was valuation of assets 
for privatization and clarification of tlie accounting balance of the coliipaiiy for this purpose. 
Tlie co~iipany's ow11 sliort term liabilities were 14.3 million I<roons a t  tlie end of 1994 from \vliicli 
4 iiiillioii krooiis were sliort term credits and 3.5 million kroons accounted liabilities t o  suppliers 
of milk. 2.50 people are employed i n  tlie company. 
Tlie coiiil>aiiy ~>rotluces milk, butter,  cheese, mill<-powder, cream. curds. Seivages of Paide 
town are refined b j  the company ant1 hot water for heating a liousiiig district is distril~uted by 
I lie conipany in addition t o  the nzaiii activities. 
Exports 
Tlie coiiipaiiy esportetl 50 per cent of production in 1994. Earlier tlie sliare of exports was 
even liigl~er. A41>l>rosii~la.tely 90 per cent of products wa.s esportetl t o  Russia. especially t o  tlie 
S t .  Pet,ersburg area (cheese, butter,  milk powder). Soine sma.11 sliipinents of illill<-l>owder were 
cs[)ortecl t o  C;trina.ny a.nd Switzerland. 
.A verj. big problem for esports  is tlie decision of the Russian goveri~rnent o  increase customs 
tariffs. Russia cloubled custom tariffs for couiitries wliicli (lo not enjoy tlie s ta tus  of a inost favored 
 atio ion t reat i i~ent .  This blocks especially the esport  of fooclstnffs. T l ~ e  Russian government's 
tleci~ce of hIay 6, 199.5 iiltrocluced new customs tariffs for iniported goods, but for several goods 
and ser\.ices I~igli tariffs liad been introduced already earlier. Some of ne\v tariffs started t o  come 
illto effect fro111 Oct,ol>er 1, 1995, but for inost of goods new custonis tariffs were introduced 
already froill July 1, 1995. I11 this decree several groups of products are regulated wliicli have 
ail iiiil>ortaiit. sliare in tlie Estonian export. For butter exported froill Estonia. the new custonls 
tariff is. for esample, 40 per cent, for inilk powder 20 per cent, etc. At  tlie saiile time Estonia 
cloes not impose custonis ta.riffs on a.gricultura1 products a t  all; if they are importecl to  Estonia, 
t , l~ey are only object. of 200 Iiroons lump-sum procedure tax  for a shipment and tlie 18 per cent 
\--IT. 
Tlie coinl>aiiy lias long term contacts with partners in the  CIS but has not got long term 
contracts LL-it11 them. It would be a fair set up it risk related t o  economic cIa.mages caused by 
ul~espectetl behavior either government could be divided on tlie basis of conditions fised in a. 
cont.ra.ct I>et,weeii tlie two t,rade-partners. 
Tlie co l~~pai iy ' s  strategy of promoting esports foresees improi:iiig of design of packing of da.iry 
proclucts. Tliere were introduced also some new tec1iiiologica.l equipinelits for pasteurizsiQQing 
ant1 separating of 111ill< a.nd for producing of milk-po~vder in 1990s. But i11 general, several other 
ctlui l ) l ~ ~ e n t s  are old and need replacement. 
hlill<-potvtler was an important esport iten1 of Estonian plants of dairy products a t  the 
I~eginning of 1990 and to  promote this production investments were niade also by Paide plant. 
'l'l~is is one item for which European Union quota is very small ant1 as a consequence, the 
~clcvant Estonian enterprises suffer heavily. I n  this field the free trade agreement worsened the 
situation. During 9 months of 1994 by estimation of Estonian Idinistry of Economy Estolliall 
(lair? plants esportetl all together 19,273 tons of milk-powder of which lS,OSS was esported to  
tlie EU countries. Originally, irnport quota of milk powder for Estonia for the whole 1995 was 
1.000 tons. Subsequently, here lias been successful negotiations I>et~~reen Estoniail Alinistry of 
Foleigii .Affairs and the EU Agricultural Co~~irnission and the quota was inc~.ease(l. 
AS Cibus (confectionery, food processing) 
.AS C'i1,us \\as foriiided in 1913 and was one of 18 confectioneries in Parnu (West Estonia). 
No\v Cibus is tlie largest producer of confectionery, bread and otlier siinilar products in  this 
area. C'ibus \vas privatized to  the joint-stock company Parnu Leib, wliicli \vas formed mainly by 
cmplojrees of Cibus. AS Parnu Leib bought 66.6 per cent of tlie shares, 3i3.4 per cent belongs to  
tlie Estonian state. 
The share capital of AS Cibus is 1 million kroons. At tlie end of 1994 tlie company had 
l;(j elnployees. Its output mras 14.1 million kroons in 1992, 31.9 million liroons i n  1993 and 39.5 
iliillioii liroons in 1994. Tlie net profit was 1.6 million kroons i n  1992, 1.4 nlillion liroons in 1993 
ancl 1.0 million kroons in 1994. Short-term liabilities of Cibus accounted for 1.2 million kroons 
at the encl of 1991. 
C'il>us is located very close to  the centre of Parnu. Tlie fir111 has wareliouses for flour and a 
refrigerating ~vareliouse for several other products used in I~aliing (eggs, butter etc.). For finislied 
prot l~cts  t l ~ e  coinpaiiy has two warehouses. All tliese units are located 011 one premises. Cibus 
is ~ e ~ ~ t i ~ i g  lane1 from the municipality. 
Tlie I)asic proclucts of Cibus like blacli and white breacl and confectionerji are consunled 
~iiainly in the town ant1 county of Parnu. Pastry is sold also in otlier areas of Estonia. Roasted 
nieal misture (national Estonian meal) ant1 dry kvass were the main esport articles but are 
coiisuiiiecl also tlomestically. 
:\l>prosiiiiately 90 per cent of the productio~l is sold directly to retail s l~ops,  10 per cent is 
soltl to  iiiteriiietliates. Cibus has two shops in Parnu. A large sliare of grated wliite bread is 
solcl hy direct contracts to tlle fish and meat industries. 
Exports 
4ltogether .5 per cent of the production was exported in 1994. One third of esports went to 
Lat\ ia  anel Litliuania, 40 per cent to  Russia and 20 per cent to  Uliraine in 1994. I n  1992 and 
19q.3 tlie share of esports was high accounting for 10 per cent. 
C'il)us used to  esport large amounts of dry kvass to  the otlier republics of tlie Soviet Union. 
No\\ this product is not exported to  this region. This is one reason wliy the sliare of esports 
have cliiiiinislietl during last two years because dry kvass is the main article of esport.  Also liigli 
c   st on is tariffs iiitrotluced by Russia is one reason wliy tlie esports of tlie company are sinaller 
~ io i i .  Tlle contacts with wllolesale and retail films in Russia and Ukraine are still maintained, 
smallel aillount of pastry is sold there. 
C'ibus int roduced contacts with wliolesale fii ms i n  Sweden and Gernia~~!. Some small 
,~nlounts of l~lacli bread, roasted meal mixture and confectionery are sold in these countries. 
Sneclen becaine a neiv llome approsinlately for 70 000 Estonians after the Second LTTorld War 
i\ 11o esc;\pecl avoiding the Soviet occupation. They founded several bakeries tha t  produced blacli 
I)~catl. nliicli is iiot very common in  Sweden and Germany. Most of tliese bakeries have closed 
clou n 11). lion and esport of black bread mainly to  Estonian consumers i l l  tliese countries llas 
I~ecoiiie one business idea of Cibus. 
The esport strategy of Cibus foresees widening tlie contacts wit11 Russia. Uhraine, Latvia 
ai~cl Lit l lna~~ia.  .Also smaller sliipmeiits of products to  Scandina\jian cou~~t r i e s  and C:ermany are 
plaiinetl. 
blain co~npetitors of Cil>us are Latvian and Lithuanian similar conlpanies. Also. tlie mar- 
Iiet of confectionery is highly competitive in Estonia and tliis is anotlier reason wliy Estonian 
con~panies ale looliing for export opportunities. 
Lihe seieial otlier Estonian companies producing mainly for donlestic marliet Cibus is not 
s,~tisfiecl with the situation that  the domestic market is not protected a t  all against imports of 
 confectioner^'. Oiie reason why protectionistic iiieasures supporting the home niarliet have not 
I~eeii useel is tha t  local production and consuinptioi~ relations were not legally regulated enougli 
( the custollls valuation law will be introduced only from January 1, 1996; antimonopoly and 
,111t itlumping laws were also laclting). 
Olle aclclitional reason to  export is seasonal variation of coiisuniption at Parnu. Parnu is a 
5ummel. resort wit11 its beach ancl hotels. The number of consumers in sumiiier time is a t  least 
t n o  times larger then a t  winter. This is one more reason why Cibus is producing several lmore 
~uistures ancl other preservable protlucts. 
AS Pioneer (manufacture of tools and other finished metal 
goods) 
Pio~leer was foullcled in 196.5. Large investments were made in tlie 1970s and 1980s, therefore 
the enterprise was one of the best equipped ones i n  Estonia. The main products of Pioneer are 
fistures. poivcler metallurgy products, aluminium casting, plastic casting. I11 1958 the number 
of people i\rorl;ing for the enterprise was 3.50. The production was sold mainly to  Russia (SO per 
cent was esportecl). 
Tlle ivor1;er's collective formed a joint stock company STS and made a leasing contract 
ivitli tlie Estonian Ministry of Economy in 1990. In March 1994 Pioneer was privatized to  
the joint \.eiiture ITnited Auto Radiators Eesti AS where 67 per cent of the shares belongs to  
rc[)resentati\es of tlie USA car industry and 33 per cent to Estonian joint stoclc company STS. 
The purcllasing price of tlie assets of tlie company was 21.5 ~iiillion liroons. I11 addition, tlle 
nenr owner took over 1.2 million kroons of liabilities of Pioneer, gave an investment guarantee to 
invest illto Pioneer 5.3 million kroons during the nest three years and keep jobs of 1.58 people. 
Tllere were 24.5 employees in the company a t  the end of 1994. 
The share capital of tlie company is 1.9 million kroons. Tlie output was 10 million 1;rooiis 
i l l  1994. Tliere was a 10 per cent increase of procluction in 1994 ancl 5 per cent illcrease in 1993. 
During 1990-92 the production decreased approsinlately by 30 per cent. 
Exports 
Tl1;1111,3 to  the esisti~ig quite unique equip~ne~i t  the company mallaged to  gain access to  \Irestern 
111arhets. Pioneer does not have problems with meeting I S 0  9000 and IS0  9002 staildards and 
the Inai~age~nent espects tliat Pioneer will get a respective certificate in 1995. 
Pioneer succeeclecl in creating contacts nlitli the USA car industry (tlie General hlotors) and 
~liost procluced estrusion moulds for plastics are esported to  the factories of General hlotors. 
l l ~ l ~ r o s i ~ n a t e l y  90 per cent of the output is esported, in 1994 70 per cent of espol ts \vent to tlie 
ITS.4. 
Since tlie summer of 1995 Pioneer seemed to  inailage quite \\-ell altllough tlle company tool; 
quite a I~ig. 21 million 1;roons loan from two Estoiiiaii coinmercial I~a~il is .  A5 tlie company 
liatl a solicl foreign partner and market for products, the banl;s were ready to  c ~ e d i t  Pioneer. 
lTo\v~\er, a conflict emerged between the Estonian and the American owners. The Estonian 
~)a i tne i  clitl not accept tlie leading role of the foreign partner wliicli tlie latter had thanks its 
1,lrger i~~ves tn le~ l t  a11c1 larger sliare in the stock capital of the company. The Estonian owner 
~lccrisctl the foreigli partner for paying a price for the products of Pioneer tha t  is several times 
l o \ \ ~ r  than tlie price paicl for products of foreigli conipanies tliat produce similar products. Also 
tlle E\toniaii onTiier started to  look for other fo re ig~~  partners. As a respon\e, t l ~ e  American 
p . \ r tu~r  stopped investing into the company and accordingly Pioneer was not able to  pay the 
plil~cipal sum and interests on loans. The Estonian partner reorielitateel itself to  tlie German 
company C~esellscliaft fiir Industrievertretuiig GmbH, which participated also ~vitli tender when 
Pioneer \vas privatized, but the American partner was preferred by tlie Privatization Agency. 
No\v the German company was ready to  substitute the American partner and cover sollle part 
of the lial~ilitie\. .At tlie same time, as Pioneer was bougl~t on installment, regular payments 
to the Privatization Agency also stopped and it was ready to  abolish the old sales contract. I n  
.July 1995 a 1)anl;ruptcy procedure was initiated by the owners of the company. During this 
1)1uceclure tlie assets of tlie coinpany will be sold to  cover tlie liabilities. Tlie Estoriia~i alicl 
Ger~nan coml~aiiies are ready to  buy the assets to restart tlie company but tliere are also other 
potential 1111yei\. Tlie I>anl<ruptcy process is colitinuing still in October 199.5. 
Pioneer i\ an esainple lion. the conipany with the good ecluipmeilt ancl solid esport partner 
C C I I I  fail if o\vilersliil~ relations arc not accepted by the partners. Tliere is a niche 011 1iiarl;et for 
pl.oduct,s t,lia.t Pioneer is producing a.nd a new c o ~ u p a . ~ ~ y  will certainly enierge on tlie ruins of tlie 
old one. 
AS Toostusaparaat (manufacture of industrial instruments) 
.IS Toostu,aparaat was founded i n  1960 and was among the enterprises administered by the 
all-['~rion -Ap~>aratus Building Ministry. I n  1958 the enterprise had 1500 eniployees. Most inputs 
\\ere iml>ortecl from tlie otlier regions of the Soviet Union, production was also mainly esported. 
The tecliiiologj~ used in the enterprise was worked out by tlie applied institute of teclinology 
of the all-Union Ministry of Apparatus Building Industry. Tlie tecliiiological blueprints, schemes 
ailel other ii~formation on tlie products are not available to representatives of Toostusal>araat. 
This coml>licates innovation of production. .4fter soine periocl a new data  base, reorientation 
towartl \Vestern quality standards and materials is necessary. 
Toostusaparaat was privatized in 1994 to  tlie joint-stock company formed by euiployees of 
t l ~ e  nterprise. Tlie purchasing price paid for the company was 17 million ltroons. 
The output \ \as  .5 million kroons in 1994, with only 600 people employed. I n  comparison 
\\it11 1990, tlie output liad declined by half by 1993, but i n  199-1 there was a 10 per cent growth. 
.At tlie sanie t i ~ n e  Toostusaparaat retained all production departments aiicl the inain tra- 
tlitional procluct - control iiistruineiits for measuring amor~nts of consumecl fluid - is still 
1" otlucecl. 
Exports 
The coiiipa.iiy esports 90 per cent of the production. Target couiit,ries for esports are Russia 
( S O  per cent of total e spor t .~ ) ,  otlier member countries of the CIS (10 per cent), La.tvia a.nd 
L.it1iuaiiia (10 per cent). 
The ~iiaiiagenieiit of the coliipany is convinced tlia,t tlie Eastern marl;et is important and 
s l ~ o ~ ~ l c l  be retainetl. Also Litliuania, Latvia and Pola.nd are consicleretl to  be potential ma.rliets. 
'I'l~ere have been soiile contacts with representatives of Western firins hut no real co-operation 
l ~ a s  been int.roclucecl. 
The situation in the enterprise seems to be complicated also because of the (missing) foreign 
lallguage sliills of the inaiiagers a,nd constructors. They a,re in principle interested to co-operate 
\\-it11 \Vestern l>a.rtners but estiinate the present teclinical level of the enterprise liigli and are 
[lot read!. to accept organizational methods, attitudes and values of Western entrepreneurs. 
Toostusaparaa,t plans to  continue production of control instrunleiit,s for mea.suring anlou~lts  
of consuiiiecl fluit l ;  liowever, t o  get new orders tlie design of the product needs to  be inodernized. 
]jig11 custonis ta,riffs introduced by Russia are a. factor influencing seriously the economic 
rcsults of ~>rotluction. The company is using contacts with otlier sources fro111 the ClIS to  
tliniinisli the economic tlamage these tariffs cause. 
I n  the iiial.l;et of tlie C'IS tlie production of Toostusaparaat does not have strong conipetitors 
so far. Iiiiportetl \LTestern models of similar instruments are more espensive. On the otlier ha.nd, 
relatively low wages (1.500 liroons per month) and cheap inputs iinported inainly fro111 Russia 
l;eel> protluction costs low arid so products ca.n be sold a t  low price. Of course, such strategy 
cannot continr~e forever. \Ya.ges a.re increasing, as are the price of electricity a,nd heating costs. 
'111~ conipany lias t a s  arrears of 0..5 million ltrooiis a.nd investments are needed to  improve t,he 
tl~sign and cluality of products. 
Estel RAS (manufacture of electrical machinery) 
Tlie enterprise was founded in 19.58. In the 1980s it was calleti Tallinn Electro-technical Factory 
5ul)ol.tlinated t o  tlie all-Union ministry. The  nu~nber  of employees was 3700 in 1988. 
Tlie colilpany is still state-owned but tlie joint-stock colllpany formed by enlployees of tlie 
r ~ c t o r y  lias a leasing contract with the hlinistry of Economy. 
During tlie period 1990--94 production declined by a factor of 4. There were 800 employees 
at tlie entl of 1994, but tliat nuniber is expected t o  decrease to  500 during 1995. Tlie total 
output n as 5 niillion lcroons in 1994, tlie main products are electricity transformers, high voltage 
converters and semiconductors. 
Estel Iiad been orie of tlie largest companies in Estonia and tliis is also one reason why tliis 
company was adjusting to tlie new conditions so slowly. 
Exports 
.4~>1>roximately SO per cent of the production was exported in 1994. Tlie CIS is the main market 
for prodttcts accounting for 70 per cent of the exports. One co~i t rac t  is witli China, liigli voltage 
converters are exported t o  tliis country. Clii~ia accounted for 10 per cent of tlie exports in 1994. 
The  company lias agencies in China and Egypt. Tliese niarhets a le  important for future trading. 
Estel is one example of the co~npanies which in tlie f o ~ m e r  Soviet l11iio1l nere  very closely 
li~llcetl to  each otlier tlirough the chain of producers of electrical machinery items ant1 which did 
11ot lnanngc to  reorient their products to  otlier markets wliile the Eastern co~i tac ts  collapsetl. 
Tlie conipany still sells in the old markets a certain amount of l>roduction but  this is several 
t i~i ies  snlaller than it was in tlie 1980s. 
'The expectation dominating i n  the company is tliat economic ant1 political relations with 
Ru5sia nil1 I>e nor~nalized. At  tlie same time, while payment problems continue and several 
managers of tlie company still hope tha t  these relations between enterprises will be resclieduled 
I>! 5tate age~icies of both countries. T h e  s ta te  of relationships bet\veen Estonia and Russia leaves 
a I at  11el 51nall chance for such solution. 
Tlic colnpaliy started negotiations also with the international corporation ABB. For Estel 
the ~ i ~ a i i i  ta lget  is t o  become a subcontractor f o ~  the ABB ant1 use its licence t o  have access t o  
European nla~leets. However, Poland is a strong competitor in this field: ABR has created in 
Polantl niore than 10 joint ventures with partly similar production as  Estel RAS. I n  competition 
for 5ubcontracts witli firms in Poland and in other East European countries the geographical 
location is a tlisidvantage for Estonia. C'rucial factors in tliis competition will be the relationship 
I~etween co5ts and quality, and also how fast co~i t rac ts  will be fulfilled. 
Tlie niarl\et of the  C'IS is not solvent, and the former nionopolistic l>osition on the  Russian 
~i~arlcet  call never be regained. Now also high custorns tariffs are  bloching access t o  this marhet. 
A4ccess to  \Yest E u ~ o p e a n  market is possible only by subcontracting of several teclinological 
operations. 
AS Ilmarine (manufacture of tools and other finished 
metal goods) 
Ilmarine is one of t,lie oltlest engineering enterprises is Estonia founded in 1883. In the 1930s 
the main ~>rotluction article of Ilmarine was soot hlowers. T h e  enterprise was a monopolistic 
~>~.o t l~ lcer  of this equipn~ent  in the Soviet Union. Ilmarine was producing also oil and gas burners, 
reservoirs antl several metal constructions. There were 1400 employees in the  factory in 1938. 
I111ring: the periotl 1990-94 einployment clecliiiecl to  500 people. 
The  conlpaily was inclueled into the privatization list in 1993. Tlie clepart,meilt producing 
soot hlowers was bought by Bergen~a,nn company from Germany a,s a stock of a,ssets for 2 
~iiillion liroons with invest,ment commitment of 1.5 million kroons ancl a promise t o  ma.intai11 
eniployment of 5S people. 
Tlie joint-stock company Ilmera formed by employees of Ilmarine bought other departments  
for S ~ i i i l l i o ~ ~  liroo~ls wit11 investment requirement of 4 million kroons and guaranteecl employment 
of 300 people. 
AS Ilinariiie coi~tinries proclucing oil and gas burners, reservoirs, cooliing stoves and some 
other cousuiner goocls. T h e  output  of llmarine was G million liroons in 1991. This numl>er can 
not I>e compa.recl with output  figures of earlier years because a new AS I l~narine coilsists only 
of oiie part of the former fa.ctory. The  output  of the whole Ilmariile clecli~lecl by 30 per cent in 
1!192 ancl 11y 10 per cent in 1993. There nias no further decline in 1991. 
Exports 
I11 1994 tlie coinpany esported 70 per cent of its production. Approsilllately half of the  espor t s  
neiit t o  Russia in 1994. Another 30 per cent was tlie share of Cierinany ancl 'LO per cent the share 
of Finlantl. Tlie maill esport  articles to  the \Vestern countries are several metal constructions. 
Quality stanclards have been an ol>stacle for company esperts.  For procluction with very 
strong safety regulations ant1 co~lditioiis (high pressure pumps, lifting ~nechanisms like cranes) 
special relationslii~>s ant1 consultatious with foreign authorities or private companies, a s  well as  
follo~v-r111 i~~spec t ions  were necessary. Es to~i ia  has relatively goocl relations with a relevant Ger- 
riiaii organization of [velcler-operations. Tliis organization first trainecl two Estonian specialists 
in Gerinany a~icl ater fiiia~~cecl a project wliicli i~itroclr~cecl a special centre in the Lilleliiila School 
of Alechanics. Now Ilinarine has a special certificate of this C;erman organization testifying tha t  
t l ~ c  \\eltler-operations have been clone by nrorliers l i a v i ~ ~ g  the recluirecl classification, tlie technical 
contlitions in the enterprise satisfy Cierinan requirements, ancl the materials, coiltrol systein and 
srrper\ isio~i meet quality stanclards. This certificate has been very iml~or tan t  o  get orclers from 
(;ernla11 enterprises. 
AIacliinery and ecluipinent for more ordinary work (machinery used in agriculture), not con- 
~~ectec l  n itli very strong safety requirements are not coiltrolletl so strictly. It  is enough if a 
rel)iesentative of the contractor makes a general observatio~l on the cjuality of production and 
accepts it. 
Tlie esport strategy of llinarine foresees promotion of \Vestern exports. -4s the protluction 
of Ilmarine is not very unique, the former clients in the CIS fountl nebv suppliers antl these 
ortlers are not available any more. So, even when the eco~lo~nic  relationships betbveen Estonia 
a~i t l  Russia will be better,  it will be rather coinplicated for the company t o  restore tlie former 
~na rhe t  in Russia. .4dclitional source of problems is t ha t  for solile products Estonian prices are 
higher tliaii Russian prices I>ecause wages and some other costs are higher in Estonia than in 
11 ussia. 
011 the other hand, in comparison witli the Western companies relatii.ely low wages and 
c l i e a ~ ~  input3 iniported mainly from Russia lieep procluction costs low aiicl so products can be 
\ o l c l  i l l  \\'e\tern ~ i ~ a r l i c t s  a t relatively low price. Increasing prices of electricity ant1 heating 
t l in i i i i i \h  thi3 aclbantage rather quickly, though. 
AS Klementi (clothing industry) 
Tlie preclecessor of Iilementi was Osta. a,n underwear producing fa,ctory fou~idecl in 194.5. Vil- 
Iielmine Iilenienti Clothes Factory, named after an Estonian revolutionary, was founded on the 
Imsis of Osta. i n  19.50. As a result of uniting several enterprises tlie Clothes Combinate Iilen~enti 
wa,s forniecl i n  1970. New buildings were constructed in tlie Tallinn suburb of Wlustamae ~vhere 
tlie combina.te wa,s located since 1973. At the end of the 1980s the combinate enlployed 1500 
people. The state-oivned joint-stock company Iilementi was formed in  1992. In 1994 80 per 
cent of tlie s1ia.res of lilelne~lti were bought by the joint-stock colnpany Iilenienti Iiaubandus 
(Iilenlenti Tra,ding) formed by the eniployees of the company, 20 per cent of the shares will be 
solcl t,o public in 199.5. Tlie neiv owners decided to hold tlie name of the compa.ny, because it 
souuds gootl a.nd has become to be a well known trade-mark in Estonia. 
Several units of Klementi located in other cities of Estonia ivere separated from the niain 
company. T l ~ e  s1ia.re capital of I<lementi ivas 18.75 million liroons a t  the encl of 1995. Tlie 
company employed 809 people in 199.5. Among the producers of clotliing in Estonia, I<lementi 
was tlie la.rgest by tlie number of enlployed people a.nd second by t,lie va,lrle of turnover. The 
1 IIrno\:er of t.lie company wa,s 45.1 million kroons in 1993 a.nd 45.G ~uillion liroons in 1994. During 
t.lie first lia,lf of 199.5 the turnover ivas 32.7 million kroons and a 40 per cent growth is expected 
for t,lie wliole 1995 in colllparison with 1994. The company made 5.1 million liroons losses i n  
1993 ancl 2.1 million Iiroons losses in 1994 but during the first half of 199Fj it had profits before 
ta,xes 2.7 million liroons. The efficiency of the production is directly linked to the privatization 
of t.he conlpany in 1994. The effect of tliis act seems to be two-sicled: first, the private owners 
111ad~ t l ~ e  compa,ny \vorl; nlore effectively and, second, as the buyers of the compa.ny were its 
emplo):ees, they were not interested in liolding the profitability of the compa,n); too I~igli before 
priva,t.izat,ion because tlie sales price had a direct linkage to profitability. 
The production of Iilenienti consisted of two parts: 1) subco~itra.cting for foreign firms; 2) 
own production. hla,ss-se~ving operations are subcontra,cted. The own product's are several 
collections of men's a,nd women's overcoa,ts wliicli are sold under five tra.clemar1is. Also the 
conlpany sta.rtec1 to procluce worl;ing clothes in 1994. 
Exports 
:\l>proxima.t,ely 90 per cent of the production wa,s exported in 199-1 a,ncl 199.5. Subcontract- 
ing liia,lics up .50 per cent of the value of turnover a.nd is rea,lized totally to  foreign firms of 
Fi~llancl. S\\.eclen and C;erlua.ny. At the sa,nle time by estimations of the representatives of tlie 
company subcontra,cting hires SO per cent of the technologica,l ca,pacities. So tlie profitability 
or subcontracting is substantia,lly lower than own products. From own product,ion 7.5 per cent 
is export,etl: nia,inly to Finland, Sweden, La,tvia and Lit1iua.nia. Sale of finished products is 
organized by age~it~s in Finla,nd a,nd Sweden. In Latvia and Lithuania tlie conlpany has direct 
conta,cts \vitli retail sellers. 
One of the ma,in problenis of exports is related to the short periods of contracts. The company 
has n1a.inly one yea.r contracts; only for production of working clotlies to Finland is there a three 
!-ear contract.. For the rule of origin of goods Iclementi has to use woven materials imported 
f ro~n t,lie ELI countries to esport finished products to tliese countries a,t preferentia,l ternis. This 
111a,lies tlie cost of ~iiateria,ls rather high. ,At tlie moment Iile~uenti could corilpellsate tliis with its 
relatively  lo\^ la,bor costs ( the a.verage wa,ge is 2000 kroons in the co~npany).  On the otlier hancl, 
the finisliecl goods a.re sold rather cliea,ply in tlie Scandinavia.n countries now a,nd profitability 
of exports depends on the potelitia,l of the company to ma,ke its trade-marks lllore well-known. 
This \voulcl help get l~iglier prices and in this way to compensate the increasing costs of 1a.bor. 
Iilellle~iti lia,s introdrlced coiitacts with a,gents of big Scanclina,via.n u~liolesa.le chains. Most 
of tracling contra,cts are rea,lized through these people. On the otlier hand, this lneans that  
tlie colnpallIr has to esport so called free-label goods. The seller of tliese goods uses its own 
triiclemark for selling the procluction of Iilementi. 
Tlie iiialiagers of the company do not appreciate too inrlcli contacts introduced a t  trade fairs. 
The particil>ation in fairs is very expensive and not very serious trading takes place there. They 
believe that tracle fairs are more important for tlie companies which are interesteci in  advertiziiig 
t licir traclemarli. 
Tlie managers of the company also complaiiled that trade witli Russia is restricted by the 
high custoins tariffs. On the other hand, the compaiiy is selling n1ol.e goods to Latvia and 
Lithuania no~v tlien it clid last year. One part of tliese goods is re-esportecl by Latvian and 
Lithuanian I\-holesale colnpanies to Russia. 
The companies of Latvia, Litliuailia and Russia are not strong competitors of Iilementi in 
s~lliiig ready-iiiacle clothes but they coulcl take over part of subcontracting because their labor 
costs are lower (especially in Lithuania). 
Tallinna Farmaat sitehas AS (pharmaceuticals) 
ThC predecessor of tlie company was tlie laboratory Epliag founcled in 1914. Eplrag moved 
into the I)uilclings where Tallinna Farmaatsiatehas is located now i n  1936. After tlre Second 
\Yorlcl IVar tlie enterprise produced several types of medicines in tlie form of tablets, ampullae 
ancl sa11.e unguent. The main groups of medicines produced in tlie 1990s are analgeticums and 
a~rtiflogisticuiiis, antiinflammatory rlieans and hypertensive drugs. 
Two thircls of tlie sliares of tlie company were sold to  the private joint-stock company Mag- 
nu111 Phariila. One tlrird of the shares is held by tlie Estonian state. Tlie conipany employed 
210 people i n  199-1. The turnover of the conipany was 12.5 million kroons in 1992, 40.7 million 
kroons in 1993 ancl 100.5 million kroolis in 1994. The profit after taxes was 2.3 million liroons 
i11 1992, 3.1 ~rrillioii l<rooiis ill 1993 and 16.3 million kroons i n  199-1. Tlle share capital of the 
compaiiy was 10..5 inillion 1,roons in August 1995. 
The fir111 sees as its strategy the iiitroduction of new production lines for produciiig drugs i n  
a~iip\~llae.  Another new line is needed for tlie production of tablets. They also need acquiring 
the C;oocl I~laiic~facturiiig Practice standard which is a precondition of getting registered as 
a proclucer aiicl exporter of niedicines i11 foreign countries. Reconstructioi~ of l~uiltlings and 
~ ,c l , lac~~uent  of iiiachinery could be necessary for tliis reason. To malte access to  fi~iaiices required 
for tliese iir~~estiiieiits. tlie company asked tlie representatives of the bani< \vhicIr credits Tallinna 
Farniaatsiatehas, to be represented in the board of hIagnum Pliarma. the coiiil~aiiy which owns 
Talliiiiia Farinaatsiatelias. 
Exports 
Tlie s1ia.r~ of  exports accounted for 90 per cent of production in tlie 1990s. Russia got 6.5 per cent, 
of' tlie exports i n  1994. More importa,nt export part,ners are also other CIS countries aild Latvia 
a n t l  Litliuairia. The iria~nufacture of products introcl~iced in the 1980s is a,cceptecl by Russia. 
I~ecause it is i11 accortlance witli tlie CiOST (tlie unified system of stairdards of the foriner Soviet 
I -~i ion) .  New proclucts need additiona,l registra,tion in order to  be exported t,o tlie CIS. Tlie 
export. t,o Latvia alicl Litliua.nia is supported by tlie a~greenient between tlre Ba,ltic states wliicli 
estal~lishecl a siiiil~lifiecl order for registra,tioii of pha~rniaceuticals proclucecl in these states. 
Foreig~r specia,lists visiting tlie compa.ny i n  June 199.5 founcl that  approximately .50 per cent of 
the procluct~ion is 011 the level of quality standa,rds of I S 0  9000. 011 tlie ba.sis of tliis estimat,ion the 
illallagers of tlie colrrpa,iiy hope that  big iirvestinents a.re not needed to  procluce proclucts wliicli 
col~ld be accepted a.t lea,st by clients in tlie other East Europea,n count,ries. NIaiil investments 
slioulcl be tloiie into 1abora.tories of the company and for introcluctioii of tlie new quality coiitrol 
syst,ein. 
llIa,i~i l~robleiil for tlie compa,ny is packing of the products. Tlie compa,ny is importing all 
illaterials for ~~acliilig from Fiiila.nc1. This is ra,tlier costly a.nd it tliiiiiiiislies tlie efficiency of 
1,rotluct ion. 
hlaiiagers of t,lre company compla~iii that Estonian governinelit iiistitutioiis (lo not support. 
tlieir activities. This was mentioned in relation to  teclinical assista,iice necessary for a.pplying 
for officia.1 a,ppreciation of quality of products, and to  fillailcia1 support for export a.ctivities. 
Tlie tecllnologp a,~id production machinery employed now in tlie company and the lac]< of 
t lie Goocl Alauufact~uring Practice standard allows the firm t o  export to  tlie Western countries 
oiil!. sonie iiiedica,l drugs. One example is Viprosal, tlie salve unguent used to  warm up muscles, 
ali~eacly regist,erecl i n  several Central Eur0pea.u couiltries (Pola,nd a.nd Hunga,ry) and prepared 
for regist,ra,tioii i11 Italy a,iid Greece. Tlie technical improvement will make it ~~oss ib le  t o  apply 
t l r c .  Clootl hla~~ufact 'uriug Pra,ctice standard. However, tlie com~~lica~tecl ~~rocedure  of registration 
of elrugs ivas forecasted to  be a inajor problem for exports to  the \Vest,. 
011 t,he other lia.iic1, t,lie representatives of t,lie company irientioiied tlia,t the!; l i d  problems 
also \\-it11 exl~or ts  to  Ea,sterir countries. Tlrey are not satisfied \vit,li t.lie lia,bit of Easterii clients 
11ot to  pay on tinie. However, it also was nientioned that during the last months the liabilities 
of tlie Eastern partners liad diminished. 
Paradosically, t lie introduction of new products siniultaneously improves and worsens the 
esport capal~ilities of tlie conipany. New products are necessary for access to  \Vestern markets. 
Fol tracle nitli Russia they mean, however, that tlie new proclucts do not automatically cor- 
responcl to the old colnmon standards. They sliould pass the long process of examination and 
registration to  get a licence for being sold in Russia. 
.A new 20 per cent customs tariffs was introclucetl by Russia for pliarniaceutical imports 
f io~ii  Estonia since July 1, 1995. As Latvian and Lituanian companies do not have to  pay 
t llii customs tariff clue to niost favored nations treatment between tlicse countries and Russia, 
E5tonian production I>ecame less competitive i n  Russia. 
In general. the management of Tallinna Farmaatsiatelias is optimistic and argues that  tlie 
market of pharmaceuticals is rather solid for long tern1 activities and invest~nents to  expand 
esportr sliould be efficient. However, these expectatioiis are based on tlie optimistic forecast 
that relationships with tlie CIS would improve due to  closer general economic and political 
cooper a t '  lon. 
AS Viisnurk (furniture) 
.AS \'iisnurk wa.s for~nded in 1958 as a, result of merging severa,l wootl-processing cooperatives 
i n  Pa,rntr, a city 130 km south of the capital Ta,llinn. Furniture lia,s been tlie main product of 
tlie ent.erprise from the very beginning. Skis started t o  be a new product in the 1960s. Tlie 
protluct,ion unit for processing fiberboard was introduced in the  1970s. Tliese three items have 
Ixen domina,ting among the production of the enterprise. 
\'iisnurk \\.as inclutled into tlie list of enterl~rises to  be priva,tizecl in 1993. The  process 
I,eca.me ra.ther painful for the compa,ny because tlie main bidders were two groups of employees of 
\'iisnurl;. The  offer of tlie joint-stock company VAN Holding was preferred by the  Privatization 
.Agency and subsequently several managers of the other group left the company. Tlie sales 
contract \\la,s signed in March 1995. The  new owner took over also a substantial part of the 
lial~ilities of tlie company arilounting t o  37 million kroons. Tlie compa.ny employed 830 people 
a t  the encl of 1994. Tlie nunlber of workers declined in comparison with the 1980s when the 
employment \\ia.s 1200, but this decline was not so slia,rp a.s in several other companies of the 
cit,y. The  turnover of the company was 113 million kroons in 1994, which wa.s 10 per cent lower 
t ha,n in 1993. For 1995 tlie nenr management Iiopes t o  increase output  up t o  140 million kroons. 
?'lie sha,re capital of the company is 20 million kroons. 
Sliis a,ccount for 50 per cent of tlie output .  Fibreboa.rd accounts for 22 per cent of the 
pl.oduction a.nd tlie share of furniture is approximately a,s high. The  production of skis ant1 
fibreboartl increa.sec1 last year but the production of furniture ha,s declined more than half in 
comparison with earlier years. Viisnurk produces also 1.5 per cent of the  tliernlal energy of the  
city of Parnu.  This fielcl of production has been important for processing a t  otlier units of the 
conipa,ny ant1 t.11e new owner started t o  invest especia,lly into tlie reconst~ructiou of the thermal 
energy proclucing unit of the company. 
Exports 
\-iisnurk is second a.mong tlie Estonia,n enterprises in this industry by output ,  but 11a.s the  largest 
share of exports (especially tha,nks t o  the export of skis). The  con1pa.n): exported 8.5 per cent 
of its production in 1994. From the produced skis 99 per cent wa,s exported. Warm wea.ther in 
Est,onia during tlle last \{linters was an  important rea,son for tlie high sha.re of export of skis. 
.-Ilso a high share, 90 per cent, of fibreboard and 60 per cent of furniture was exported. 
-At, thc same t.ilne only 15 per cent of tlie skis were sold under tlie own tra.dema.rk of Visu. 
'Tlie rest \\-as SOICI uncler tra,denlarks of Finnish firms Peltonen, .Ja,rvinen, Iiarhu: the Frencli fir111 
Rossip;noli, etc. Its un1;nown tra.demark is a big problem for Viisnt~rl;, beca.use selling skis uncler 
1ratlen1arl;s of otlier firms means tha t  the compa.ny loses sometimes even more tha,n .5O per cent. 
of the price. Skis are  exported to  Finland, Sweden, Norway, USA and Canada.. One big but 
u ~ ~ a ~ . o i d a b l e  risk faced in producing skis is related to  clianges in weather conditions of different 
years. Rela,ti\lely \ira,rm winters in Sca,ndinavia during the la.st years diminished the demand a.nd 
forced the conipany to  look for markets in Nortli America,. 
From the exported furniture 30 per cent went t o  Finland, 25 per cent to  Russia and 20 per 
cent to  Latvia a,nd Lithuania. Russia has been a target country for export of furniture but the  
high customs t,ariffs (since July 1, 199.5, the ta.riff for furniture imported from Estonia t o  Russia 
is as  high as  60 per cent) emerged as  a sizable impediment. Ne\~ertheless, the company continues 
exporting to  Russia. This export does not bring profits but tlie stra.tegy of the cornpa,ny is based 
on t hc assumpt'ion t.1ia.t the relation between the two countries will become wa,rnler and then it 
is import.ant t,o have a worked out  access t o  the big Russia.n market. 
ITlira,ine \ \as  seen a,s a,notIier possible market for Estonian furniture. Estonia lias a free 
tra,de agreeliient wit.11 {Iliraine. T h e  unstable monetary environment, of U'kra,ine has been a n~a, in 
ol)stacle t,o t,his tra,tle. Barter tra.ding is a possible solution as  refrigera.tors a,nd otlier household 
appliances could Ile imported from Ukraine for tlie furniture sold. Viisnurk is not interested in 
organizing such a barter trading; accordingly, tliere is a need for a go\7ern1nent agency which 
could arrange such transactions. 
.Another problem with tlie export of furniture to  tlie CIS is related t o  differences in taste. 
Dark furniture is preferred in  these countries. The wliite wooden furniture, which is popular 
anioilg the consumers in Scandinavian countries, is not widely accepted in tlie CIS. 
AS Smart en (wholesale) 
Sn~a,rten \va,s founded in 1993 by three Estonia~n young persons (two of tliem were then students 
of t.he Tallinn Teclinica,l University). The sha,re capital of tlie company was 1.3 million kroons. 
The t,urnover of Sinarten was 30 million kroons in 1993, 130 million kroons in 1994 and for 
199.5 the expected turnover is 300 million kroons. The profit before ta,xes was 2..5 million liroons 
in 1994 and it. is expected to  grow up to 4 millio~l kroon in 199.5. The company started with 
10 l~eople e~iiployecl in 1993, in 1994 the number wa.s 70 and in 199.5 100 people. Smarten is 
I > > ,  turnover the second largest company in  Estonia,, but a.mong the priva,te \\rholesalers it is the 
largest. The Union of Cooperatives wliicli is a successor of the pre-Second \lTorld LVa,r and Soviet 
t,ime coopera.tives was still lea,ding wl~olesales by voluine of trade in 1994. 
As the structure of tra,ding in Estonia is only emerging, the roles of different agents a.re not as 
specializecl as in Llrestern countries. Smarten is specialized mostly in trading of food products in 
\vliicl~ it a,ct,s as an ordinary wl~olesaler. On the other hand, Smarten functions as a distributor 
on tlie 1iia.rliet of industrid goods. Sniarten as a distributor contracts witli tlle US company 
Procter k Ga~nble  for selling washing powder in Estonia (Tide, for example), which excludes 
selling of simi1a.r products of other companies. Tlie competition a.mong companies in  wholesale 
is t,ouglier tlia,n in retail sale, as the executive director of Smarten estima.tes. Tlie compa,ny a,lso 
tries t,o lia,ve a liiilia,ge t,o reta,il sa,le partners. Sinarten owns fully t,\\~o shol>s ancl 1ia.s some part 
of slia,res in several reta,il-sa,le firms. 
Exports 
During the last two years the share of export (actually nia,inly re-exports) 1ia.s been on average 
1.5 per cent of the t,urnover. Ma,in trading pa.rtners are in La,tvia., but a pa.rt of products are also 
re-exportetl from Latvia to  R.ussia. 
Smart.en also introduced a subsidia.ry i n  La,tvia, but 1ia.d to close it clo\vn in  199.5. The 
~>rol>lems \\.ere related to undefined responsibilities of loca,l sta,ff in Latvia,. Snla.rten recognizes 
t , l~a t  hey fa,ilecl i n  tlieir first attempt a t  Latvia,, but a,fter some prepa.ra.tions they a,re planning 
a new project tliere. No\v tliey try to  find people i n  Estonia a,nd to  prepa,re tliem for activities 
i l l  Lat.via.. 
.Another business stra,tegy of Smarten is to go to  the CIS \\lit11 Estonian big coinpa,nies lilie 
Paulig-Est,onia. (a. subsicliary of tlie Finnisli coffee company), Iialev (sweets), Livilio (proclucer of 
alcoliolic I~everages). However, a t  tlie ~noment lie customs ta,riffs of Russia for imported goods 
from Estonia are too liigli for such business. 
Tlie pa~' t . i iersi i~ La.tvia liave been private agents, who transfer the goods to reta.il sellers 
aiicl also sell tlieiil on tlie market. Tlie representative of Smarten admits tlla,t seemingly sonle 
of tlieir La,t\iia,n partners a,re active i n  smuggling these gootls into tlie CIS \vitliout paying any 
ct~stoms tariffs. 
The export is very much related to  booms of buying different a.rticles in La,tvia a,iid Russia. 
Tliere \\.as a boo111 in coffee sales. Latvians liave been al\\la,ys litlo\\~li a,s tlie big consumers of 
illstant coffee. No\v ordinary ground coffee from Sweden a.nd Finland seems to be more popular. 
.Also \vasliiiig ponltler 1ia.s been sold i n  big ainounts during a sliort time. Before C11ristma.s there 
is a, big boom of sweets. Soine of these booms of trading could be forecasted, but several otliers 
have a sporatlic cllara,cter. This complicates the activities of the company. 
One probleln of re-export is related to  payments of VAT on importecl goods tlia,t the company 
1ia.s to pa,y Ilefore re-selling the goods to Latvia. At the moment there is a rule in tra.ding with 
client,s that tliey [lay lialf of the VAT to Smarten in advance for the whole shipment. La.ter 
S~nart,en \ \ r i l l  returli tliis payment. This scheme 1ia.s been working relatively \\.ell with La,tvian 
~>art,iiers Ilt~t it 1ia.s been impossible to  introduce it with partners from tlie CIS. On tlie otlier 
lia~~cl. trading in La.tvia, a,nd a,lso in the CIS gives Smarten larger profits because the amount of 
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Table 5.1 Profiles of the companies covered in  tlie survey. 
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" D P  = Dolniliant pri\,ate o\vnersliip; J V  = Joint venture; MBO = Manageinent I>u>.-out; hIRP = Employee share 
I I I I > . - ~ I I  t 1xogl.aiu. 
"OPT = O ~ ~ t \ v a r d  processing traffic. 
' Prrn~anen t  staff plus leased I~lue collar staff. 
RINGA Meat Processing Co.  
Tlic colllpany lias three pla.nt,s? tha t  rnade HUF 8 b i l l io~~ sales revenue i l l  190-1. I t  was restruc- 
t ured into a joint stocli cornpany in 1993, and is 100% owned by tlie State  Property h~lanagement 
.Agency (SP.4). As RINC:A was unable t o  repay the debts tliat it raisecl for export promotion 
a,nd partly clisbursed by the World Bank, in Dece~nber 1993 the company was involved in the 
acceleratecl clel~t consolidation program. Tlie outstanding burden of tlie company, esceeding 
H l J F  100 million, \va,s assigned t o  tlie SPA by the creditor (tlie Hungxian  Foreign Trade Bank). 
Hence tlie colnpany, besides being fully owned by the SPA, was also mortgaged for the SPA. 
Such ~nor tgage  prevents obtaining further credits and gradua,lly ma.kes impossible tlie fina,ncial 
~nana,genient of tlie company. 
Preser~tly (in tlie nliddle of 199Fj) the ma.intenance of solvency is a clay-to-clay problem of 
t11e colllpany: RINGA is la,te witli payments and all its  effort,^ a,rc oriented towa.rcls avoiding a 
I)ankrupt,cy procedure which would seriously harm its market value. 
Tl1e conipa.ny's esports  represent 50% of tlie total output ,  ra.nging a,t USD 26-27 milliori 
over the recent years. Its   no st ilnporta.nt niarltets are: USA (lia,ni exports),  EU - primarily 
Fra,nce, C~erlnany, Sl>a,in, Greece a,nd Sweden. Espor t  profitability varies a,round 0 and if tlie 
export sul>sicly systenl does not improve, their exports may collapse. Accorcling to  the view of 
con111a11y nia,na,gers, the esport  subsidy rates are low a,nd declining; in fa,ct si~bsiclies stimula,te 
the esp0rt.s of l~roducts  witli low level of processing. They also believe, tliat tlie rea,l a,pl)recia.tion 
of'tlie Hungarian currency is also responsible for the low profital~ility of export,s. 
In the clo~ilestic ma.rliet a. continuous decline in tlie sales volunic lias been recorcled over the 
rrcent yea.rs, t.lie same is envisa.ged for 199.5 and for tlie medium term. Demand lias clropped 
j)ri~iia,rily for carcass mea,t, while in the field of meat proclucts a s t a , g n a t i o ~ ~  is observed. Besicles 
tlie t l ec l i~~e  of tlie purchasing power of tlie consumers tlie reason for the clemand clrop is a.lso 
tlie specific con~petitive situation. Ringa. Mea.t Processing C!o. is running under EU confornl 
I~~.giene/en\:iron~nent protectio~i sta.nda.rds and this, quite understa,ndably, increa.ses its prices. 
S~iialler egional meat processing conlpanies, placing their products solely in the clolliestic nlarliet 
or ~ ~ c r h a , p s  esporting to  Ea,stern Europe ba,sed on occa.siona,l licences, do  not have such a,dditional 
costs in t,lieir cost struct,urc. So they can offer lower prices than RINGA, preventing tlie firm 
fronl I~eing co~upet,it.i\re in the clomestic ca.rcass meat market. 
Tlie lirni's view is, tliat its procluct portfolio basica,lly va,rics accorcling t o  the  c1ia.ngcs in tlie 
sul~sidy system. 
RI;"\JC;II\ callnot fully utilize its existing ca,pa.city. Tlie ca.ttle sla~ughterliouse is operating a.t 
1 0 %  ca j~ac i t~ . ,  while tlie pig sla~ugliterhouses a,re running a,t .50 t.o 60%) capa,city loatling. Compa.ny 
Ina,llagt>rs think t.hat tlie unclerlying rea,son is partly tlie shortage of live stock, ancl partly tlie 
retluction of esports  due t o  the lacli of a,ppropriate sul~sidies. Tlie sta,ff level is 1,600, 100 less 
t l ~ a n  RINC;.4 ha,d in 1990. 
Laying off people is a continuor~s process, in 199.5 tlie envisage a staff reduction by about  150 
clnployees. rVl~it,e-col1a.r staff level is a t  the  possible minin~ntu, hence the present sta.ff release 
will a.ffect really tlie blue-colla,rs, t ha t  is again related t o  the low ca.pacity utiliza,tion. A general 
pra,ct>ice is to  scncl people on forced holiday. By mid-February ~uost.  of the employees had to  
utilize lia,lf of tlieir annual holidays. 
It'itli a.11 t l~ose  nlea,sures, tlie financial mana,gernent of tlie firm slio\vecl a. minimum 2%) profit 
in 1994. They are trying to  cut  tlieir costs ancl improve profits primarily via procluctivity, energy 
saving anel saving on telephone costs. Because of postponecl upgracling/niaintemce, fa,cilities 
are olcl ancl worn, I~ence no savings ca.n be made on ma.intenance costs. So the  one possibility 
left for tlie fir111 is la,ying off people. In general, RINC;A espects a,ny improvement in its financial 
position o ~ l y  via an improved subsidy system. 
111 spite or tlie ra,tlier distressing fut'ure, it must ma.lte i~~ves tmen t s  o  mainta,in esisting 
r~~ar l ie t s  ancl export. levels. Currently RINGA espects t o  obta,in a paclragirig machine line ba,setl 
~ I I  a lea,se contra,ct. 
For t llc inist alien exchange rate policy, bad subsidy system, excessive interest rates and the 
5lio1t age of finance the firm lloltls the government's econoillic policy responsible for this situation. 
GALLICOOP Co. 
(~;:\LLIC!OOP C'o. wa,s set up in 1992. Its predecessor was a coopera.t,ive t,liat was transformed 
illto a. limited liability company, ra.ising equity by 30-30% of the sliares to a foreign a,nd a 
tloinestic compa.ny. Its ~na,in profile is processing turkey. 
Both tlie domestic and export sa.les are dynamically growing due to tlie fact tliat turkey 
consum~>tion lias increa.sed in  tlie Hungarian a.nd Western European marliets, followi~~g tlie 
general treiitl of healthy nutrition. 
Domestic sa,les in  1992 aiiiounted to I-11!F 720 nlillio~~ and in 1994 they a,cl]ieved HUF 1,300 
n~illion. Over tlie conling yea,rs, tlie productio~i volume may iilcrea,se by another 10 to 1.5%. Tlie 
coiisun~ption of turkey i11 tlie domestic marliet 1ia.s increa,sed not just. because of tlie change in 
t,lie public perception, but also because its price is Inore a,dvantageous tlia,ii tliat of the pork, for 
insta.iice. Tlie breatless and legless carcass, a,s well a.s tlie giblets a,re perceived especially low 
price ~rot lucts ,  but tliose ca.n be pla,ced only i11 tlie domestic market. Tlie higher value pa.rts 
are ~iiost,ly exportetl. Also the level of processing is being raised, further processing tlie raw 
iiia,terial iiit,o sausages and fillings for tlie domestic niarket. Tlie tinie needetl for a, turkey to 
grow suitalde for sla.ugl~teriiig is 1ia.lf-yea.r, cornpared to tlie G weeks, recluiretl for a, cliiclieii. Tlie 
full procluction process (from tlie fa'rming up to tlie processing) is highly ca.pital intensive, tlia,t 
lias a iiioderatiiig effect on a,ny intentions of potential conipetitors to enter tlie ina,rket. 
Tlie l>roportio~~ of clomestic/esport sales ha,s I)een mostly FjO/FjO: and it is espec,ted to stabilize 
a,lso a.t tliis pro~)ortioii i11 tlie future. Tlie main export ma,rliet,s a,re C;erniany, Austria. Slovenia, 
Fra,iice. I11 tlie ca,se of turliey tlie price of Soutli American exports do not achieve dumping 
levels in  tlie Euro1)ea.n markets, as in the case of Broiler cliiclieii; altliougli Bra,zilia,ii esports 
elljoy preferentia,l t,ariff rates in tlie Eli. A coinpet,itive adva~ita,ge of Hungarian exporters is that  
they ca,ii sr~pl)l\.. pre-cooletl turkey m a t  which can be solcl i11 the Western Europea.11 markets 
for a.iiotlier R t,o 10 cla,ys, if stored a.t a 0-4OC tenipera,ture. No 0i:ersea.s producer can use tliis 
a,clvanta.ge. r-\iiotlier important advantage of GALLIC!OOP's exports, is its attractive prices. 
Profitabilit,y is a.11 important niot,ivation of exports. 
Over 199:3-1994 tlie pla.nt achieved a .5% profit before ta.s over tlie sa,les revenues. This 
profit,a,l)ilit~- call be sust a.ined also i n  tlie long term. 
Tlie total processing capacity of GALLICOOP is 24,000 to~~s /yea r .  I n  1992 tlie compa,ny 
ivas running a,t 40'5, capacity, in 1994 at  GOC% capacity utilization. Tlie major ol)sta,cle to the 
full r~t,iliza,t,ioii of the esistiiig capacity is the feeder industry whose prod~ictio~i is la,ggiiig behind 
t urliey procluction. Due to lack of fiiia.ncirig, tliis problem ca~nnot be resolved i11 a rapid manner. 
The processing fxilities are new a,nd modern. Should tlie feeder i~idustry capa.city be able to  
cspai~cl at a fa,ster rate: the opportunity for espa,iiding esports could be exploited. 
Tlie iiia,iii c1ia.iige i n  tlie product structure is the growt,li of tlie level of processing, but in tlie 
future it needs solile new investment. A niodern pacliaging ma,cliine line will also be needed, in 
order t,o espa.nd tlie scope of ready to cook products. 
Blue-col1a.r staff - some 300 people - ha,s been suppliecl for yea,rs lion- by a,n esternal 
coinpany. This firm acts a.s a. "buffer", always sending in people for tlie production a,ccording to  
the real neecls. Hence, the full tinie staff a t  the compa.ny is only a,bout 120 people, distribut,ed 
across office. feed iliisi~ig pla,nt, nia~inteiia~nce shop and further processi~ig pla,nt. Only a small 
increa,se of e~ii[~loymeiit s espected due to tlie expansion of the production. 
70%. of a,ll costs is made up of raw material ( that  is turliey) buying-up. It may have a price 
raising effect.. if tlie coillpet~itioii offers liigher prices for the turkey, which is amilable i11 tlie 
r~larliet o11ly ill a limitecl volume. Cost cuts can be achieved primarily by feed mixing ant1 by 
~rl~graclii~p; t'lie feecl niising fa,cilit'y. Further specific cost reduction could be a,cliieved by better 
(.a pacity utiliza.tioii. 
Do~iiest,ic lebt amounts presently to  HUF 400 million for current assets and HUF 70 million 
I'oi il~\~estliieiit. projects, but the cornpamy does not ~visli to iiicrea,se tliose, beca,use of tlie high 
interest rat,e. Develol>ment projects are mostly fina.nced usiiig ow11 resources sucli a s  <leprecia,tion 
ant1 pl.ofit,s. T h e  compa,ny does not intend t o  obtain international credit. 
The  companjr cla.ims tha t  the feeder industry should be fina.ncetl by ba.nks, ra,tlier than by 
t.lle processing plants. For instance, in Isra.el the turkey farmers obtain credit directly fro111 the 
I>a.nks. 
T l ~ e  inanagers believe tl1a.t for the co~isolida~tioil of the market interest ra.tes a,nd taxes should 
I>e reducecl a.nd a dra,stic elimination of the black ecoilorny is required. 
In  the export markets tlie major obstacle is while Bra.zi1 is a,llowed t o  transport into the EII 
(i.000 tons of turkey with 110 duty a t  all, Hungarian exporters ha.ve t o  fa,ce, besiclcs the c u s t o ~ n s  
tluty, a 17% surcharge. (At  the same time, a.11 inputs in Hungary sucli as the energy, feed, etc., 
are a1,ailable a t  world market prices.) A special problem is, tha t  for the breed eggs ancl breeding 
stock the  same duty is imposed, as on normal eggs for ea.ting (i.e., 30%!). On tlie other hand, 
the breecl eggs corlld be produced in the H u n g a r k  farins instea,d of importing, but it would 
require governinent support.  
Komiiromi Mezogazdasiigi Rt . (Agricultural Ltd.) 
'The fernier liomdromi S ta te  Farm wa,s t,ransformed to  a shareholder compa,ny i n  1993. Tlie 
ec1uil.y capital aniounts t o  835 million of HUF.  This company belongs t o  the  24 ~ n e m t ~ e r  g oup 
of'st,ate fa , r~ns  tha t  will remain under s ta te  governa,nce, I~ecause the compa.ny is a la,rge supplier 
of seecls and breeding stock. Tlie conlpa.ny lost a third of its territory in land restitution, and 
its industria,l a,nd construction a.ctivity was a,lso shut down. 
Tlie conipany cultivates wheat,  ba,rley, pea, musta,rd, sugar-beet and corn for feeding of the  
aninlals: ancl gra,pes for wines. T h e  livestock consists of pigs and ca,ttle. The  compa.ny runs a 
slaughter-liouse, prima.rily t,o slaughter its own stock, but a,lso a,nimals from farmers and froni 
abroacl are bought for sla,ughtering. Exports cover wine, meat-products ancl seeds. 
T l ~ e  total turnover in  1994 amounted to  2.3 bn HUF. Exports accounted for 8% of the 
turnover. T h e  volume of exports is much less than in the former years, mainly due to  reduced 
territory a.ncl a,ctivity of t he  fa.rm and ba,d weather, not because of lack of dema.nd. 
I u  1959-1990 the conlpa,ny exported frozen ldf-pigs to  the  Soviet LTnion and Yugoslavia. 
These co~it,acts ceased t o  exist in 1991-1992, and new markets had t o  be found. Current exports 
are nlade r ~ p  of processetl n1ea.t products to  Sweden (30Sj of total exports),  wines (3.5%,), seeds and 
live an i~nals  t o  Germany. Tlie company implemented a new, modern technology for p r e p r i n g  
n-ines n.liic1~ opened a large ma.rket for their products. There is a perception of invigorating 
tle~ilancl in ClIS countries, but the lack of slaughter-pigs and cattle prevent the company to  
psl>and its e s p o r t , ~ .  T h e  end of the Yugoslavian war would open new markets for n1ea.t products. 
Clompany niana.gers a,rgue tha t  bulk production is not competitive in western marliets. Prod- 
ucts of inte11sii.e cultivation technologies can be sold a.t reasona.ble prices. 
Parallel n.it,h the reduction of activities, the number of employees cleclined from 1,600 to  817. 
T l ~ c  lis~nissal of a,nother 30 ~vorl<ers i also planned. 
' r l ~ c  colnpany invested into nloderniza,tion of production technology i l l  n ine  processing, and 
replaced t,lie cle~~leted cluipment in cultivation and in stock-breeding. .4ltliougli t,he sla,ughtering 
ca,pacity is utilized up t o  50%, investments llad t o  be made into a pacl;a.ging machine. All these 
i~~r:estments aim at. preventing the decline of tlie current level of production, not a t  expanding 
capacit,ies. 
Tlie compa.ny faces persistent liquidity crises. Investments are financed from subsidized 
creclits proviclecl 11y the Ministry of Agriculture. Tlle rnana,gers consider the int,erest on working 
capita,l crec1it)s t,oo I~igh, especially in tlie ca,se of a,gricultural production where the  a,sset turnover 
is s lo~vrr  than i l l  industria,l activities. 
T l ~ e  co111pa,1iy made losses until 1993, then they turned to  snlall positive results. 
'I'11e 11~a11a,gers do not t h i n k  t1ia.t the  devalua.tion of the currency can promote exports, because 
i t  also increases t,he prices of imported components. They nlould prefer one, larger devaluation 
than a series of small ones, because in this ca.se t,liey could prepare cost coniparison on the basis 
of fixed esc11a.11ge rates. 
The  ma,~iagers of the  company consider agricultural export promotion subsidies biased to- 
nartls low qua,lity proclucts. They hope improvement in t,lieir ma.rket position due to  the es- 
tablisl~nient of the Councils Agricult,ura.l Products,  tha t ,  a.ccording t o  their hopes, would limit 
clo~nestic and import competition. 
Gyiiri Keksz-6s Ostyagygr (Biscuits and WafHes Company) 
Tlie conilIa.ny produces cereal products, ca.ndies, a.nd sna,cks. In all t,lie three product lines 
t,lie conipa,iiy has a. clominating role in Hungary. FVitli loiig tradition in proclucing sweets tlie 
conrpa,iiy was I>ouglit out by a multinational company in tlie early 1990s. It is currently organized 
as a,ii a,ffilia.te of United Biscuits. The technology transfer and know liow provided by tlie parent 
coinpany ensure tlie. high quality of their products. 
Tlie I ~ r ~ l l i  of their ~~roclucts is solcl on tlie domestic market, tlie sl~a,re of esports is 6-7%. 
'I'l~e kinds of proclucts proclucetl by the cornpaiiy a.re producecl i n  every country; t,liis imposes a 
coiist,raint 011 expa.ncling tlie revenues from exports. 
Sales tlccliliecl in the domestic market i11 tlie period of 1992-1994, a~ltliougli tlie contraction 
\\.as snla,ller than tlie decline of overall domestic tlemand. Due to the improving quality of its 
~>~.oclucts a,iitl to its pricing strategy tlie company could increase its marliet share. Coiilpared to 
the quality, tlie products of Gyiiri lieksz are cheaper t1ia.n competing  product,^. 
In 1995 t,he coiiipa,ny expects a growth in total turnover, ina,inly i n  exports. Biscuits a,nd 
st~a,cl<s a.re esport.ed to the Ea,stern countries, pa,rticula,rly to CEFTA a,ntl CIS countries. Candies 
are sold on Swiss a,nd Holla,iid markets. Demand is perceived to recover in t.he Ea,stern marltets. 
Tlrc 11a,rent coui]Ia,iiy ~.estricted esports to Pola,nd, where it 1ia.s another a,ffilia,te; exports of 
s l i ;~~l is  a,ucl I~iscuits to \'Iiest,erii Europe a.re also proliibitecl, because they try avoicl iiit,eriia,l 
co~npetitioii. 
The 1)i.ocluct liire lia,s clianged. Siia'ck productioi~ wa.s started a,iitl tlie coiiil>a.ny I~ecame tlie 
largest procl~icer in Hunga,ry. Biscuits keep their importance, whereas cauclies a,nd wa.ffles are 
Inosi~ig grountl. 
Tlie net incollie of tlie company is 10% of the tota,l turnover, altliougli pr0fit.s before taxes 
\\-ere nega,tive i n  1994 clue to selling a pla,nt well below its price i11 t,lie I~oolis. 
I-Iaving one pla,nt solcl, tliey fully utilize tlieir mpacities. Tile conipa,ny e~llploys 1100 ~vorl<ers. 
Efficieiic!. \\-a,s improveel in production by implementi~ig cost a,ncl qua,lity sta.nda.rds. The price 
of' inputs co~ilcl I>e reclucecl clue to t'lie marliet power of the pa,rent conlpa,n!r. 
Tlie pliysica,l capital stock can be clia,racterized a,s up to tla,te pa.rtly clue to the slow teclino- 
logical tlevelopment i11 this bra.ncli, partly clue to the large investments tlia,t were implemented 
in the last yea.rs. New ma.chinery to produce snacks 1va.s itistalled ant1 i11 biscuit-production 
tlle ecluipineiit 1va.s modernized to nlatcli tlie quality requirements. Escl~rsively from internal 
resources are usecl for investiiients, ba~nk loa,iis for investment purposes are considered to be 
Ilazarclous. 
'Tlie conipaiiy ~voulcl appreciate tlie implementation of liiglier agricult,ura,l tariffs a.ccording 
to tlie Urugua,y Round, i1istea.d of the application of quotas. Tlie compa,ny considers preferential 
iiiil>ort c1uota.s for CEFTA and EU member countries too large. Gyorgi Iielisz was a,dverseljl 
afrcctetl I)!. tlie change in export subsidies for sna.ck products. S1ia.cli esport enjoyed a 30%, 
sul~siclization i11 1993, ancl that  induced an export expansion, but the subsitlization wa,s ca.ncelled 
i ~ r  1994. 
Tlie bla,cli cconoiny was indicated a.s tlie nia,in impedime~it to increase sa,les on tlie clo~nestic 
iiia,rket. T l ~ e  coml>any is liit by smuggled products, a.nd by products conling from tleveloping 
count'ries. Tliesc products a.re made in Europe, but bought by a coilipa,iiy from a tleveloping 
couiit~ry \\-it11 tlie support of EU, and resold in Hungary. 
ZA-KO Clothing Factory Co. 
Zalaegerszeg Cllothing Factory wa,s transformed into a joint stock corpora,tion in 1990. Its equity 
rvas raised via a USD 2.7 million direct foreign investment a,nd is presently operating as a joint 
venture. The company produces ready-made garments, men's suits and ladies' costumes. Based 
on the t,otal turnover, in 1994 it was positioned as the 43rd largest esporter in Hungary with its 
ITSD '27.5 n~illion esport sa.les revenue. 
Over the 19SOs ZA-IiO placed half of its production in the domestic ~na.rliet, '25%, went to  
t l ~ e  Soviet marliet and the rest to the Western markets. Simila.rly to  the ~najori ty of clothing 
firnls, t,lie compa,ny lia.d to ~vr i te  off a significa,nt ma,rket loss clue to the colla.pse of tlie Soviet 
marliet and tlie shrinking cloniestic market demand. Thanks to its rela.tively flexible a.djusting 
capability a,ntl existing good relationship in the traditional job-work esport area, tlle company 
was able to  survive tlie change in sales pattern without a significa.nt fall in its activity. I11 1993 
90'x, of its net sales revenues were made up of exports and, within that ,  90% came from job-work 
activities. I11 1994 tlle volume of exports were increased by a furtlier 9%, wliile in 199.5 a further 
1.5 t,o 17% increase is envisaged. The cornpany supplies customers world-wide. 
T l ~ e  tlo~nestic market has shrunk due to the deteriora.tion of the overall sta.ndard of living. 
Tlie output volume of ZA-IiO for the cloniestic market has beell reduced every year. A future 
expansion of tlle tlolnestic market would not affect tlie export potential, beca.use the existing 
cal~acity exceeds by far the demand in the domestic market. However, the so-ca,lled global 
ir111)ort cluot,a system, \vhicIi is in use in Hungary for consulner goods, does not provide sufficient 
l~rotection for the doniestic market of indigenous garment producers. Also "blacli iniports" tend 
to  11e high, rvitll dul~ious origin/quality, but wit11 a low price. 
Tlie "price" of shifting market orientation was to  change hatcli sizes: instead of tlie earlier 
400 to  500 t1iousa.nd units batch size the present average is 20 thousand units, but \vitli a 
11l11c1i n1ol.e tlemantling quality. Tra,ditionally, tlie company's products \\.ere positioned i n  tlie 
~narlietplace as lnetliuln quality/price category ones. Due to t,he high la,bor intensity of the 
present p rod~rc t ,~ ,  lio\vever, it is becoming increasingly difficult for tlle compa.ny to get tlie 
i~~creas i~ ig  rva.ge costs plus tlie increasing cost of other inputs (such as energy, transport,  etc.) 
acceptetl l ~ y  t,lie customers in tlle prices. I n  spite of the increasing labor intensit~l, tlie sta.ff of tlle 
r.olnpanp was reduced from 2,000 to 1,800, i.e., by 10%. Tlie direct foreign investlnent allowed 
Z.4-IiO to  sul>st.ant.ially upgrade its machinery a.nd equipment. Following this illlprovement GO% 
of the n~acliine park I>eca~ne less than 5 yea.rs old. The number of existing competitors ant1 nerrr 
Eastern entrants present a lilllita,tion to  the espansion of exl~orts. Tlie lilajor tlisadvantage of 
Z.4-IiO in t,llis eclging competition is its high wage cost. Tlie Eastern colllpetitors offer 20 to  
.50'X lon-er prices for jell-work. Hence, the increase in exports is really due to  the combina.tion 
of an active niarliet policy of the firm and the adva,ntageous impa,ct of tlie devaluation of tlie 
local currency. 
Due to  tlie edging E a t e r n  competition, the products of ZA-IiO a.re pushed downwards to  
loiver price marliet segments. Dolnestic customers are not willing to  accept liiglier prices. 
The liianagers see new business opportunities for their own non-OPT products as well. The 
1iiai11 ol~stacles are tlie lack of do~riestic inputs, and tlie lack of rvorliing capital. Tlie company 
is not licll~id enough to  buy the necessary inputs on its onrn account. 
HUNOSTYL Clothing/Trading Co. Ltd. 
'L'l~c legal preclccessor of the coinpany was the Clothing Cooperative of tlie Bac5-Iiishun county 
co~llicil; then it ivas transferred to  the Charmeuse Conlpaily in 1974, along with all assets, 
111achinery anel ecluipment, products and customers. The present company was broken off the 
('liarmeuse Company in 1991, when it bought back the buildings, earlier passecl over to  the 
palent as an i n  liincl contribution. The present ownersliip structure is the following: 48% man- 
agenlent and employee, 26% Tricotes and 26% Hungarocoop (both foreign trading companies). 
Following privatization the company spun off some of its loss making plants, either by selling 
those out or tllrough liquidation. Preseiltly the registered centre is a t  Iiisliui~f&legyl~bza, and 
they also have facilities a t  Tiszak&cske, Bugac and Tomork&ny. The staff was cut by 100 people 
to  tlle present level of 2.50. Tlie sale of facilities contributed to  the present decling@ing trend 
i l l  t l~eil l~roduction. (1994 sales revenues were 23% lower t l ~ a n  in 1992.) The share of esports 
alicl donlesiic sales, liorvever, did not really change: exports have been about twice the donlestic 
sales. 9.5% of the output is job-work: men's and ladies' clothes - suits, jachets, blazers and 
.],arts near.  hlajor markets are Germany, France, Finland, Austria. Earlier the second largest 
ru5toiiier nas  Canacla, but the Canadian customer left Hunostyl for a rllirainian partner who 
ofteis loner \\age Ilased charges. 
S o  significant inarket and product structure changes liave happened a t  Hunostyl, except for 
the loss of the inentioiled Canadian customer. Tlle coinpany cannot chailge its business from 
jo11-~ork agreeinents, because tlie don~estic production of testile fabric nearly colnpletely ceased 
to  esist, anel whatever was left is not suitable froill quality and fashion points of view. The same 
i5 t i  ue for the sportswear items nlanufactured for the domestic market. 
Along \ \ i l l ]  the recluctioi~ of tlie nunlber of its sites, the coinpany's protluctioii capacity 
\\ax a150 retlucetl. but tlle solcl out maclliiiery and ecluipment was so outdatetl and woril do\vn, 
that the conll>aiiy's esisting inarkets could not liave been servicecl fro111 those anyway. The re- 
purcl~ase of the builtlings a t  the central site, ho~vever, completely eshaustetl the financial sources 
of tlie company. \Vlien the payment for the legal ~~reclecessor - tlie Cliarnleuse Co. - shall be 
accompli~liecl. tlie coillpaiiy mill liave to  implement a continuous lipgracling [~rogramme of its 
~iiacllinery ancl ecluipment in order to maintai~i its competitiveness and to  protect its esisting 
1nalliet5 f10111 the eclging competition represented by tlle lower price Romanian, Ul<rainian and 
17,is Eastern coinpaiiies. 
Basecl on its inarliet opportunities, Hunostyl could double its esports. However, such capacity 
cxpan~ion has a liniitation of labor availability. Should the firm I>e capable of increasing its 
])ie5ent 250 staff to  ,500, the esistiilg maclline capacities could be loaded for two shifts. Yet 
tlie f i i i i i  is unal~le to  recruit a sufficient number of apt  employees, in spite of tlie help of tlie 
local lahoi office and of the fact, that  the compaily is located in a region suf ler i~~g from a bad 
~~n~rnl~lo,vineii t  problenl. 
Tlie sanle way as earlier, the company is training its own skillecl people, but only a fraction of 
5 ~ 1 ~ 1 1  trained people stays with tlie company. A large number of ne\v business and black business 
cheat nlitli tlieir tases and offer higher wages in cash than Hunostyl is capable of paying. (Such 
I)lacli IIr~sinesses do not pay Social Security contributions either, geuerating a further aclvantage 
f o ~  tliemselves and a long term disad\antage for their enlployees, who do not understand tlie 
con5ecluences.) 
Tlie availability of labor is also subject to the agricultural environment: in the spring season 
the nuinber of people '.retiring" for liealtli reasoils is so high tliat in hlarcll the wor1;ers of two 
\itch are ju5t sent for a forced holiday, rather than operating the plant a t  a clear loss. 
\\.'itllin tlie esisting staff a streamlining was implemented by re-trailling the \vliite-collar 
people. for instance to skilled sewing operators. Hence the adininistrative staff could be reduced 
I ) \  - IO( ,x .  
I11 order t.o further reduce costs, an internal privatization is being impleniented. The sites 
are transfornietl into independent limited liability companies, hence motivating them to  illanage 
(,heir I~usiness in a more efficient manner. 
Also t,lie '26%) and 26% sliares of Tricotex a.nd Hungarocoop is planned t o  be purchased. 
.+is current.ly Tricot,ex is fa,cing a. licluidation procedure, Hunostyl hopes tha,t it can negotiate 
a,ii a,clva,ntageous price. Huiiostyl plans to ca,rry out itself tlie job-work related foreign trading 
act.ivit,ies. for \~liicli prepa.rations were made in clue time. 
l!pgracli~ig t,lie fa.cilities cannot be postponed any longer. Yet the company is una,ble to  obtain 
clomestic credit a t  acceptable interest rates. It has to seek credit from Italian and German banks 
\.ia t,lie iiivolveiiient of its i1iternationa.l customers. Hunostyl a,lso co~iducted negotia.tions with 
tlie ecluipiiient ~iianufacturers on installnient payment schemes or a joint proposal with them for 
internationa,l credit. Tlie continued and unknown schedule of deva,lua~tion of tlie local currency 
makes any medium tern1 pla.nning difficult. 
T l ~ e  firm could not implement its modernization progra,nl using ~videly publicized Italian and 
.Japa.nese government credit fa,cilities because, a,ccording to  tlie view of tlie ma.na.gers, tlie local 
c.o~iimercial banI;s were counter-motiva.ted by tlie low interest nlargiii a.nd did not further tlie 
r~(iliza.tion of tliese credit lines to  tlie necessary esteiit. 
Int.erests a,iid I,anliing costs, pa,id by tlie company in 1994, esceed H U F  17 million. Tliis 
mea.ns. t,lia,t they could geiiera,te significant reserves if just. ban1;ing costs a.nd interest charges 
n,oulcl be reduced si~iiply by cutting tlie tinie a cash transfer is made. Accordingly, tlie company 
I,c~lieves that I>anliing processes should be substa~iitially strea,mlined. 
A significant cost factor is that  the customs inspection of the incoming raw inaterial a,nd 
tlie out,going finished goods ta,kes place in  tlie Iiecsken~tit Customs Office premises 3.5 l;m away. 
The aclclitioiia~l cost of transport, fuel a,nd tlie stand by t,ime for tlie truclis is very high. Tlie 
coiiipa,iiy 11otv plans to esta,blisli a local customs inspection a,rea,. 
I11 tlie view of tlie firm, the continuous deva,luatioii of tlie Hunga,rian currency is a weal; tool 
ol' stiiiiulati~lg esports beca,use their customers a.re most a,ware of such escIia,nge ra.te c1ia.nges. 
Every year tlie price raising negotiations end with refusal of the initia.tive of the Hunga,rian firm 
I,eca.use the custoiners alwa,ys claim t1ia.t tlie increase of tlie esclia~~ige rate change slioulcl be 
c ~ ~ ~ o u g l i  to cover cost increa,ses. Tlie managers of tlie colnpaiiy assert tlia,t a preferential interest 
cl~arge 011 current asset credits would be much more efficient for tlie stimula.tion of esports tlia,ii 
t lie tlcvaluation of [,lie local currency. 
SAL-KON Clothing Factory Co. 
S:\L-IiON Clo., the earlier Sa,lg6tarjdn Clotliiiig Fa,ctory, in 1994 I~ecame a. olvned 100% by 
~)riva,te persons, who obta,iiied their shares using "Esistence" credit, tlie preferentiaI primtization 
creclit, available for priva,te persons to  establish or buy out  sma,ll enterprises. Tlie equity of the 
firm is HUF 137 illillion ( I JSD 1.4 million). In 1994 its sales revenues amouiitecl t o  I-ILIF 380 
inillio~i (I iSD 3.8 inillion); some 15% of tha t  was made in tlie domestic nia.rket, while 85% came 
l'ron~ esports .  A bulk of tlie esports  is made up of job-work. The  product profile is made up  
of sl<irt,s, ~ ~ a ~ i i t ~ a l o o ~ i s ,  blazers, rea.dy-made dresses, productio~i of specia.1 t,estiles ancl technical 
test,ile proclucts, primarily for defence a i d  police purposes (sabreta.clies a,iicl braking parachutes 
for hI1G fighter a,eroplanes). 
Over the 1992-1991 period its domestic sales declined, especia,lly i l l  tlie field of defence/police 
supply. C.~lot,liiiig sales remained stabilized albeit a t  a. low level. I11 199.5 SAL-IiON envisa.ges 
a furt,lier reduction in tlie domestic sales. As opposed t o  tlia.t, a robust increase lias occurred 
i l l  esport,s, and tliis is espected t o  be iiiainta,ined also in 199.5. Prima.ry export markets a.re: 
Fra,iice, ITS-4. Italy, Germany and the UIi.  
T h e  I>roduct,/inarket structure has cha,nged. To expand its product poltfolio, tlie firm started 
~ ~ r o d u c i n g  a.lso rea,dy-macle bla,zers. Tlie share of export ma,rkets 11a.s increased; n!ithin esports  
S~viss esport,s clecreasecl and French, USA and Ita,lia.ii esport,s increased. 
The  profits in the 1992-1993 period were still negative. Following tlie l~riva,tiza.tion, however, 
tlle conipany achieved a. turn-around into significant profitability, ~vit'li a HUF 1..5-2%) profit over 
sales reveilues. In 199.5 it  will be able. t o  illaiiita~iii tliis level only wit11 sheer luck, due  t o  the 
ra pic11 y increasing energy prices. From 1996 on, however, ina.nagers expect profit iinproving 
again. A forcing rea.son behincl this is tliat the owners must repay their "Esistence" credits. 
O\.er t,lie 1 s t .  year the company invested a HUF 20 iiiillio~l equiva,lent. I t  purchased gra,ding 
i~~acl i inery t,o espa.ncl t,he esistiiig protluct portfolio with new products such a,s bla.zet-s. Thanks  
t,o sucli investments, productivity lias increased; since staff level also increased the production 
output  increa.sed a.t a inucl~ higher rate.  SAL-ICON still lias escessive capacity, wliicl~ is utilized 
nlien it, is 1iecessa.ry for the orders, otherwise they are regarcled as  stantl-by. I11 tlie textile 
i ~ ~ t l u s t r y  subsector. 1v1~ic.l~ is a, strongly fashion oriented one, it is obvious, t l iat no such thing 
~ s i s t , s  a,s 100%) capacity utilization. 
St,a,ff levels are sta.bilizec1 around 5.50 employees, distributed a.cross t'liree sites. 40 employees 
a,re co i i i~~~u t i i i g  fro111 Slovakia, bemuse 110 sufficient number of skillecl people could be recruited 
i l l  t,lle releva.nt region of Hungary. For the sake of cost recluction tlie ina,na.ge~nent tries to  
r;~,t ' io~~alize ellerg): costs and wa.ges, primarily through tlie inlplenle~itatioii of work organization 
Inc:as;;ures. \\.'age ma.na.genient ainls a t  improving wage levels, but. only part of t,lie prodrictivity 
yield is ut,ilizecl for sucli purpose thus reducing tlie specific wage per unit of sales revenue. 
For tlie clevelopment project only own resources were used, but the conlpany obta~iiiecl current 
asset creclit from a domestic ba.nk. SAL-ICON does not wa.nt t o  raise credits clisbursed in foreign 
cllrreucy beca,use of tlie clevaluation risk. 
.4s fa,r a,s tlie rna.naget-s can judge tlie econonlic policy of tlie C:overninent, they liold a s  a 
grieva,nce. tliat black econonly is "legalized". I11 adclition. slow a.nd burea.ucratic customs as- 
sessnient ant1 ta.s procedures cause a lot of losses t o  tlie company. f i t  tlie biggest probleiii 
in their ~riew is ca.used by tlie high interest rates. Tliey regard tlie escliange rate  policy basi- 
call!. mista.keii i.e., the  policy of real appreciation ii1stea.d of strengthening conlpetitiveness of 
Hu~~gar i a~ i i  esport  l>roducts. Due t o  the  clevaluatioii rates falling beliind t'lie procluctio~i costs 
e s ~ o r t  l~rofit'a,bility tlecrea,ses. Espor t s  are n n d e  not because it is a grea,t I>usiness, but be- 
muse  tlie coinpany corilcl not reinforce its position in tlie domestic ma,rl<et. They believe, tliat 
t'racle liberaliza~t~ioii wa.s t.oo fa,st a.nd went too far. Hungarian import clr~otas were definecl t,oo 
I)roa.tl. T l ~ e y  l<now prececlents in other countries, tliat quotas for import froin Hungary were 
rctlucecl: t . l~a,t  l i a~~pei ied  i11 Germany, where job-work qu0ta.s were reduced ~vliich hurt Hunga.riaii 
S I I  I)coi~t~ract~ors. 
Tlie firni is ~~n l iappy  witli the level of skilled worl<er/vocational training. It is believed, 
ihat iiincli niore inoney and attention should be spent on vocational training. Due to the 
I~atl situatioii, tlie f 1-111 cannot recruit sufficient skilled labor in tlie Salgotarjiii region, where 
ot liern-ise ~~iici~~ployiiieiit  s extremely Iiigli. 
GLOVITA Glove Factory 
C;LO\'IT.\ was set up in 1929, it was transformed into joint stock coinpa.ny in 1991. Presently 
i t  lia,s C;eriilall a i d  Freiicli owners, witli some inanagenleilt ownersliip involved. Its product 
port,folio includes knitted gloves, work safety and sports gloves, glove linings made of textile or 
linit,ted fa,bric. The production output is some 7 million a.nd 300 t11ousa.nds pa,irs of gloves, but 
only a, snia,ll pa.rt of this would be qualified a.s so-called fasliioii gloves. During the COMECON 
1.eal.s :3.5Y1 of t,lie out,put were fa,shion gloves, which a,re the highest value and inost a,ttractive 
 product,^ in tlieir procluct range. This share has been reduced by now to only lo%,, while the 
ot,lier 90% is ~nainly ina,de up of work safety gloves. There are a great number of different types 
nit,llin this product segment, pending upon the different industrial demands, but they produce 
sucli gloves also for the agriculture. 
I11 1994 the firm's sa.les revenues achieved H U F  434 million. I n  spite of loosing the COME- 
C:ON demand, its exports are constantly growing, achieving 4.5% of tlie output. Tlie major 
~lla,rliet,s a,re the respective countries of the two foreign owners, i.e., C;erinany and France, but 
t,hey a,lso nia.l;e sales into t,lie Sca.11dinavia.n countries. 
Domest,ic dema.iid lieep decreasing. The main reasons hel~ind tliis a,re the a.ppearance of the 
coillpetitors a.nd tlie edging import competition. Tlie coiupa.ny it,self also cont.ributed t,o the loss 
of its 1iia.rliets. In orcler to cut its costs, it sold out tlie oldest a.nd most worn out nla,chines. 
Tlie private ent,repreneurs, who bought these machines, iiow produce a,lso gloves. hence the firm 
nia,iiagetl to crea.te a low cost competition to its products. By now this move is regarded as a 
very bad stra.tegy. Ma,iia.gers assert tl1a.t the tools of nla,rket protection a,re insufficient. Tlie firm 
lilio~vs a,bout specific cases, when full truckloads of gloves a,re smuggled into tlie country with 
forget1 declara,tion, a.voitliiig the payment of VAT and customs duty. 
It is very tlifficult for GLOVITA to understand, how coilles tha,t Chinese sliops a,re selling 
the rea,dy gloves a.t a price for ~vhich the firm ca.nnot obt,aiii even the ya.rii? Tlie conipa.iiy nro~iltl 
lilie to see the use of anti-dumping actions or duty raises i n  the ca.se of thin, cottoil nlorli gloves. 
Iiiiports from Pa,liistail a,re less expensive, i n  spite of the better clua,lity cotton, but not because 
of lo~ver \\.ages ant1 gootl supply, but due to the hea,vy export subsidy policy of the Pa.liista.iii 
gal-ernmeilt. 
111 1994. this fir111, that  ea.rlier wa,s nia.liing losses, the profit before ta,x was 6 to 8%. 
Production is strongly seasona.1, due to  the nature of tlie product. Capa,city utiliza,tion a,t 
present is SO%;, ull~ich is rega.rded a good ra.tio in the fashion business. \Vhen selling some of tlie 
~nachinery t,he compa.ny also reduced staff (in a friendly way, i.e., utiliziilg fluctua.tion, retirement, 
ant1 subsequent.ly no replacement of those). Tlie present sta.ff is 300. The inailagemelit is 
. . 
alrnlllg a.t cost cuts by implementing production strea~mlini~~g mea,sures. Retlucing the iluinber 
of unnecessary t.ra,nsport, the level of stocli holding a,ild implenlentiilg orgailizatioila,l measures, 
are part of tliese measures. 
The management does not see scope for further growth. I11 tlle lacli of olvil resources they ileecl 
to ol,tj:i,in I>a,nli credits. Once (in the early 90s) already a developme~lt project ma.s impleniented 
using ba,nli credit, but as GLOVITA was unable to repay t,he credit, the new fa,cility had to be 
soltl out. 
ELEGANT Fashion Clothing Co. 
'l'l~e legal l~rcdecessor of ELEGANT was the Iioml6 facility of the "1st of May" Clothing Factory, 
tliat was set u p  back i n  1968. The transformation into a joint stock corporation took place on 
.January 1, 1990. The sliare of tlie USA partner was 30%, while that  of the earlier domestic 
on licr 70% of the equity capital. Initially the domestic sliareholders were exclusively state owned 
elitelp~ises, later on. Iio\vever, private persons and ( ~ a r t l y )  private companies took over this part 
of the on nersliil~. Tlie H U F  19.5  nill lion equity capital of the joint stock company is rather low, 
toml~aretl to  tlie l~roduction output value; to clate it lias remained a t  t l ~ e  salile level. 
Since its setting up, tlie company produces a definite product, nan~ely men's wool overcoats, 
11 liicli i n  domestic production has no competitors. Due to  this fact, tlie cornpany cloesn't envisage 
ally substantial changes, albeit it started to produce sonle additional products (such as woollerl 
I>lazers, coats, etc.).  Iiowever, tlie share of those within tlie total production output is and will 
remain negligible, compared to  that  of the core product. 
-4lreacly before transformed illto a joint stock company, ELEGANT mainly produced for the 
\Testern market. Tlie company's export activity is nearly exclusively job-work, including the 
\upl~l\i of trimniings. Of tlie total sales volunie, doniestic sales represent lo%), and exports 90%) 
\it~cc, Froni tlic very beginning, external 1nar1;ets were concentrated to  two countries: the [IS 
,11itI tlie (TI\; tlie former represents 70% and tlic latter :30% of total exports. 
\\'hen the transforn~ation into a joint stock company happened, an organization operating 
l~ncler extremely I~acl financial co~lditions was taken over. Ever since the company was turned 
a~ount l  into a profitable one. I11 1994 a 5-7% profit before tax was achieved over the total 
\ales leve~lues ancl the present aim is to  maintain this level. Achieving tliis goal is supported 
11) t l ~ e  fact that  tlie Iionil6 region suffers from an extremely bad unemployment situation and 
ELEC;.-INT is in a nlo~iopolistic position as an employer there. 
Tlie colnpany lias never had unutilized capacities. The product portfolio lias been expanded 
to tlic niinimum extent, as discussed above, to fit the demands of customers. 9S%: of the output 
i \  l~rinie cluality. that is ~eadily accepted by the foreign customer. Some 2% of tlie production is 
o111). that  they 1la1.e to keep in stock, clue to  seasonality. T1ianl;s to  tlie very strictlj co~itrolled 
l~rotluction practically 110 reject is produced. 
The number of e~nployees has not changed much since the transformation (presently :311 
1)eople). Due to  tlie labor positioll of the city and its vicinity the fluctuation rate is very high, 
piinlarily aniong semi-skilled labor; tlie number of skilled staff tencls to be rather stabilized. ,4 
\ignihca~it fact01 in tliis fluctuatio~i is, that tlie wage paying capability of tlie company is lathel 
limitetl. 
Tlie conlpanp sees no scope for reducing production costs any further. it is believed, that  all 
liidtle~i resources have been fully utilized in tliis field. Energy consumption was recl uced to tlie 
possil>le niiniinum level, the telephone use is checked via counters and the routing of the use of 
their flcet 11 as st rea~nlined. 
For a futurc espa~ision/moder~lizatiori the managers plan to  utilize partly own resources and 
~ ~ a r t l !  tlomestic creclit. I11 tlie course of negotiations witli the foreign partners they coulcl not 
a c h i ~ ~ e  success as yet concerning tlie i~ ivo lve~~ie~ i t  of direct foreign investment. 
I11 the ~ n e a ~ ~ t i m e ,  th  econon~ic environment for the foreign partners lias changed. T l ~ c  foreign 
partners have al\vays exploited their advantageous position as the main buyers of the products, 
I~u t  no\\. all involved parties feel that  tlie deterioratio~i of tlie general econo~nic conditions is 
subs ta~i t ia l l  undermining their further cooperation. 
ELIT Clothing Factory Co. 
ELIT Clot,lii~ig Factory ivas tra,nsformed into a joint venture in 1993. British investors obta.ined 
29y) of tlie slia,res via an initia,l equity ra,ise, then obtained by now a tota.1 of 6.5% by implementing 
a, seco~itl equity raise. Tlie company produces ready-made ga,rments, mainly men's suits. 
LIntil 1986 10%) of tlie total output wa,s placed in tlie domestic ma,rket, 30% in the soviet 
market ancl 60'8, was Western exports. Tlie collapse of tlie soviet market caused tlie tota.1 ceasing 
of' exports into that region, and the compa,ny's production clecreased Ily 25%). Ho\vever, as tlie 
lion's share of t,lieir production already \va,s oriented to tlie West, tliis fact didn't undermine the 
exist,ence of the conipany. By tlie 1994 year tlie export turnover grew to more, than the double 
of [,hat in 1992 (LISD 19 million). Presently the exports represent 90%) of the total output, and 
-r( :  ,.,Ai of the net sales revenues. 95% of such exports consists of job-work, nia.inly for Dutch, 
13rit,isli, Anlerica,n, French, Belgian and Swiss customers. For the year 199.5 a further gro~vth of 
t l ~ e  xport sales is envisaged. 
111 the period of 1992 1994 domestic sales revenues i~icrea,sed from HUF 194 million (USD 
;I.,? niillion) t,o H1.IF 368 million (USD 3.7 million). The growth in the domestic sales revenues, 
Iio\\-ever, was not co~iipletely due to the increase of sales volume. I n  1993 there wa,s a HUF 116 
111illio11, \\-liile in 1994 a. HUF 84 million sales revenue niade on activities, other than the sales of 
~)l.otlucts ucli as t , l~e sale of old machinery, rental/lease fees, sale of assets. Over 199.5, liowe\~er, 
the \~olunie of clo~~iestic sales sliall also increa,se. Thanks to the implementation of development 
project,s, t,he high clr~a,lity products can be a,lso better positioned in tlie tlo~nestic market. 
Tlie equity raise, made by the foreign partner, ena,bled tlie company to implement develop- 
nie~it  project,^, that  increased protluctivity via   nod ern technology and production engineering. 
Since the iniplenienta,tion of those the ready-made garments are produced i n  one, uniform qual- 
ity as opposed to the ea,rlier attitude (i.e., qualit,y for tlo~nestic or esport sales). Tlie company 
l~a,s iniplenientetl a,sset clevelopment projects in  tlie value of GBP 1.5 niillion, a i d  also an process 
integratetl cluality a,ssurance system was implementeel guaranteeing the quality of the products. 
7 7 1 11e D e s i g ~ ~  Department, t1ia.t wa.s only a dream one yea,r a,go, wa,s again set up, while tlie pen- 
etration of niarliets a.nd the formulation of agent net,urork is supported by t,lie British partners. 
Sucli support is int,endetl to be used for the penetration of new, mainly tlie US, nla,rliets with 
on.11 111.antl protlucts. 
Over the 1993 year tIia,t is in the clevelopment period the fir111 \vas a loss nialier - HUF 70 
nlillion - b r ~ t  i l l  1994 tliey ~nanaged to malie a HUF 20 million profit. 
Presentl\. the company is running a t  a one-shift production ra.te, but ill t,l~is liift tlie ca,pa,city 
is full!. utilizetl. Tlie Britisli partners upgraded and meclianizetl tlie protlr~ct,ion process via an 
eclr~ity raise and? ivlien restructuring the production, the exist,ing sta.ff of 1 , G G 1  nra,s reclucecl to 
1,400 people i.e.. by some 25%. Tliis process, however, is still in progress, tliey plan a further 
LO'% retluction in sta,ff reduction. Due to the restructuring, liowever, tlie company faces a la.ck 
of la.bor, because they find it hard to recruit labor for a. second shift, although ma,rliet demands 
\vould support tlie espa,nsion of their production. All 4 fact,ories of tlie compa,ny a.re loca,ted in 
rura,l areas, but - i n  spite of the high unenlployrnent rate a,nd tlie fa.ct,, that ea,rlier the fa,ctory 
\\as running at t\vo shifts - people in tlie region are not willing underta.ke a secontl sliift. 
The iniport cont'ent,~ of tlie inputs have increa.sed over t,ime. Domestic fabric ca,n be used 
only for the garnients to be pla,ced in tlie clomestic ~narket .  A problem in tliis field is, that  
there is 1ia.rtlly an indigenous textile manufa,cturer, tliat is able to supply a. gua,rant,eed even 
qr~a.lity fabric even a,fter two years. Tlie Richard's company, tliat is a,ble to provide sucli even 
clr~ality. is not capable of adjusting to tlie volume needs of the company. In  order t,o improve 
tlieii. profital,ilit!;, tlre colnpany now is trying to penet,rate the US nia,rliet \vith own non O P T  
~)rotluct's.. Tliis. lionever, induce a large increa.se in tlie necessa,ry \vorliing ca,pita,l to  cover tlie 
i~uport  hill. 
Tllc. sources of fina,nce of tlie company are partly made up of do~llestic creclit, but obta.ined 
i l l  t r r n ~ s  of foreig~i escliange. Tlie need for credit 1ia.s increa.sed to a significa,nt extent: froin 
lISD 'L  nill lion to  a present USD 3.G million. The interest rate of such credit is libor +2%,. that  
is f ~ ~ r t l i e r  nor.seliecl by tlie devaluations of the local currency. 
AGORA Industrial, Trading and Service Co.  Ltd. 
Tlie firill was founcleci on January 1, 1988 as a local council onrnetl organization. Tlie basic 
i~iission wa.s to provide jobs for people with reduced work ca.pabilities. It rema.ined a local 
authority owned facility until March 31, 1993. Since 1993, the 100% owner is the Sta'te Property 
hlaiiagement Agency (SPA). Privatization has come up several times, but - due to the nature 
of its mission and original objectives - it would be very difficult to implement a,nd ca.rry on 
nit11 tlie sa,me opera.tion of the firm. Basically tlie c,ompany is a non-profit organiza,t,ioii, yet it 
ha,s production and even exports, tha,t generate profit. Also due to tlie na,ture of the business, 
I)~lclgetary subsidies Ila.ve a decisive impact on its operation. According to the practice so far 
t l ~ e  subsidies cover 30% of its costs. 
Over the recent years the market structure of the firm has significa~ntly changed. Earlier it 
sold the bulk of its output (bed linen, bed sheets) to large donlestic trading companies (such 
as ROLTES, S I ~ A L . ~ ,  etc.), partly as job-work, pa,rtly as ow11 products. The elimination or 
ii~solveiicy of t,liese customers made the firm to cooperate and link its domestic sales to several 
s~iialler firms. inost,ly concentra'ted to the Baranya county. 
\Vhel~ the coinpany first started exporting tlie major customers were Cierman firms. I11 
1904 it got in touch with Canadia,n, French a,nd Italia,n firms. Such esport relationsl~ip usua.lly 
nlcalls either ow11 material b a e d  job-work, or a clear sale of capacity, because they a,re made 
to tlo job-n~orli due to the relative shorta,ge of capital and the continuously raising input prices. 
_\lain esl)ort products are leisure dresses, thermal-coats, etc. The firm ma,nagetl to penetrate 
the C~a,iia.diaii ma,rliet lvith golf gloves tha,t "pushed out" the ea,rlier Bong-Iiong and Taiwan 
s~ l~>~>l ie r s  [lased on better quality and price. All foreign customers a're paying reliably on time. 
Earlier s4CiOR.4 l ~ a d  iiiucl~ problem with the solvency a.nd paying willingness of its domestic 
customers. 
Uefore s~r:itcliing over to  job-work, and even a.fter that ,  tlie firm has einployed sub-contra,ctors 
\vl~enever it. a large order, but due to quality problems the connections had to be stopped. 
The procluction espalision was recently inotivated by t,lle nlarltet demantl for golf gloves. New 
111ac11inery was purc,l~a,secl a,ncl now, excluding a,ny sub-contra.ctors, AGORA is a,ble to fully meet 
tlie clemand of tlie foreign (Ca.nadian) marltet, both in terms of qua,ntity a, i~d cluality. 
AAny furt l~er esl~a.nsion of the production is subject t,o the estent of tlie mentioned budgetary 
s1111sitlj.. For t l ~ e  moment it seems t11a.t the esisting contlitions allow even some espansion of 
the niarliet~s. Due to switching to job-work the number of 11011 ma.rketa,ble products 11a.s been 
reclucecl to a negligible level. The fair and strictly controlled rela~tionship with the commissioning 
customer 111alies sure, tl1a.t ha.rdly ally scrap occurs in the production. 
T l ~ e  nature of the firm limits the potential for sta,ff retluction (i.e., tllc fa.ct, that  the firm 
cnlploys people with reduced work ca.pabilities). In sonie a,ctivit,ies AG0R.A lia,s to enlploy a 
l ~ i g l ~  numl~er of seriously liandicapped people, but i n  soine areas it can employ more capable 
labor. I n  1992 their st& was 300, in 1994 370 people. 
It would be clifficult to iinpleinent cost cuts i n  the production of the company, hence sucll 
Ilirasures are usua,lly implemented in the admiiiistra,tion field such introduction of computers. 
'Tl~c lii~liing of the ma,infra,me computer to tlie individual work stations is in progress. 
.Also the fa.ct, that  last year and tliis year less ow11 inaterial wa,s used, contributes to the 
relative reduction of costs. Tlie underlying reason is tlie increased price of domestic input 
materials. a , i~d t,l~a.t the German partner is inucli better positioned in its purchases. ACiORA4 
cannot compete i n  this field, because it is small, it can only buy small batches, and anyway, it 
does not 11ai.e tlie necessary market know-how. Thc only esception is tlie golf glove production 
Sor the C'a~iatl ia ,~~ ma.rltet. 
-4 further cost cut'ting iiiea,sure was, that  the replacement of a,ll their petrol engine truclts 
\vitli diesel engine fitted r o d  vehicles. 
T l ~ e  profit,a,bility of procluction should be viewed keeping in ini~itl the specia.1 posit,ion of the 
firill. Suc.11 hpecial positioil means, that  tlie compa.ny pays the sanle ta.ses a,s a,ny other business, 
~ v i t l i  tlie excey>tion of the corporate profit tax. Corporate profit tax is being paid only if the 
firni pays out dividends. 
Tlie future plan of tlie firm is to keep tlie earlier source of finance, i.e., tlie so called Re- 
l~al>ilitation F u n c l ,  promised by tlie Ministry of Welfare. In  1993 tlie aniount received this way 
was H U F  .5 niillion. The firm had some negotiations with tlie foreign partner about a potential 
direct investment. but the foreign partner's reaction was negative. 
Tile J6,szl)er'cny Leliel Refrigerator Factory wa.s bought by tlie Sn~eclisli Electrolus firm i11 1991. 
Tlie S~vedisli partner obtained 100% of tlie sliares of this HUF 3 billion ecluity company. Elec- 
trolus is t,lie seconcl largest refrigerator manufacturer in Europe, liaviiig 18%) of tlic nlarliet. 
Prior to privatization, tlie product portfolio of tlie Hungarian company a,lso inclucled products 
ot.lier t l ia~i  refrigera.tors, such as a.utomotive coolers, soda wa.ter making equipment, radiators, 
et,c. -After privatization Electrolus eliminated a.ll non-core activities. At  the same time, lio~vever, 
it also inil)lemented a large clevelopment project to create an individual procluct portfolio for 
t,lieir Hunga,riau factory. The Jbszber6ny facility is currently specia,lizing i n  .50 liter a.nd sina,ller 
capacity refrigerators and through this concentration they [visli to become a worlcl leader. It is 
espectecl, tlia,t LEHEL-Electrolus sliall supply one-third of the worlcl market demand. 
I11 1991 the conipa~ny's sa.les revenues ai~iount,ed to BUF 12 billion, which by 1994 esceeded 
H1JF 17 billion. 
I n  spite o f  tlie sharp coinpetition, the firni's products niainta,ined ancl eve11 increased their 
share i11 tlie domestic niarket. I11 tlie refrigerator market tlie sliare of the fir111 increa.secl from 
tlie GSv ill 1991 to 87% i n  1994, wliile i n  tlie market of deep freezers tlie ina,rliet sliare in  1994 
\vas 73'3,. 
Prcsently .50% of tlie total output is esported via the distribution lletivorli of Electrolus, 
I ~ u t  t,lie pla,n is to  increase tliis s1ia.re to 60%. Esports are dynamically growing; in 1993 they 
aniouiited to 1TSD GO ~iiillioii a'nd i n  1994 tliey achieved USD 76.5 million. !Vith this volume 
of csports tlic company beca~ile tlie 16th largest esporter in  Hunga,ry. The present a,im of 
tllc ~ila~la.gemeiit s tlia,t, based on its traclitioiial connections, L,ehel slioultl increa,se its ma.rliet 
~~enetrat,ioii into tlie es-CME.4 countries. 
Since it,s establislimeiit~, the company wa,s al\va,ys profita.ble. Profits before ta.s a,mount to 
soiiie .5-(j'X, of the sales revenues. 111 1994, due to the compa.ny's participation of the government's 
csport esl)anding development project, the governiiient grantecl a five yea,r esemptioii froin tlie 
corporate profit ta,s, ancl for a further five years the company is espectetl to pay only 40% of its 
profit t,a.s. 
Since pri\ratization, tlie productivity of tlie company doubled. One of the main sources of 
this clevelopiiient nras sta,ff recluction. Also a very strict cost mailageinelit 1va.s implementecl. .4t 
r~lie saliie time, sonle HUF 3 billion nra.s spent over tlie recent tliree years for tlie procurement, of 
rlc ln .  ~iiacliines. .A ffurt.lier HUF 2.6 billion shall be iiivestecl for environiiienta~l purposes, a,lthougli 
1 I~is is not to bc coverecl fro111 interi1a.l sources of fina.iice. 40% of tlie purc1ia.se price was reta,ined 
I)!, Elect.rolus to cover environinental lhbilities, origina,ting from before tlie privatization. 
The conipa~iiy filialices its development using equity ra.ise, reta,iiietl earnings aiicl tlie issue of 
I~oncls. It issued short and long term bonds i11 1994 in  tlie value of HUF 1.2 billion, ancl sold 
those for la,rge investors. 
Ganz Ansaldo Villamossdgi Rt . (Electrical Engineering 
Company) 
Ga,nz Ansaldo was founded as a. joint venture in 1991. 49% of the equity capital was provided 
in kind by the Hungarian partner Ganz Electrical Engineering Company. Those premises of the 
Hungarian partner that  were not incorporated in the new joint venture are under liquidation 
procedure. From 1991 the Italian partner Ansaldo raised equity capital twice, and increa.sed its 
slla,re froin 51%, to 82%. Main products are high tension transformers for power stations, turbo 
generators, and engines for electric locomotives. 
Formerly, the Hungarian company used to be a large exporter of electrical engineering  rod- 
ucts with a sales pattern oriented towards the markets of CMEA and developing countries, 
althougl~ Western sales were also significant. On the domestic market the company produced 
electric components of power stations for the Hungarian Electricity Company. The company ex- 
ported its products under the coordination of Transelektro, a foreign trade company specialized 
in higll tellsion electric engineering products. Ganz successfully participated also in  projects for 
i~~stalla,tion power pla,nts in the developing countries. 
Since the time tlle company came under foreign ownership control total production declined 
to a 11a.lf. The drop of sales wa,s more pronounced on the domestic markets, while exports declined 
inore modestly. Consequently, the share of exports rose from 40%) (before privatization) to 60%. 
Both the shriilliage of domestic market and increa.sing import competition contributed to  the 
tleclining clonlestic sales. Employees of the company bla.me tlle new foreign nla,nagernent for 
tlestroying the traditionally good contacts with the most important donlestic customer of their 
products. This was reflected in the fact that  the Hungarian Electricity Company (responsible 
for power genera,tion and distribution in Hungary) turned to buy imported products froin their 
illa,jor compet,itor, Siemens. 
The partner compa.ny Ansaldo fell short of expectations concerning marketing of the Hungar- 
ian  products. On tlle contrary. Priva.tization brought considerable restructuring of tlle product 
line. The share of upmarket products is declining, while sub-contra,cting for Ansaldo has a. 
growing importa,nce. The company 11a.s lost most of its traditional external lna,rliets in CMEA 
countries a,nd western ma,rkets, while countries of the Third World kept their inlport,a,nce. Poor 
perfornla,nce of the compa.ny persuaded the management to  revise its market strategy. They start  
to penetra.te the foriller CMEA markets again. On the domestic market they try to strengthen 
tlieir ma,rliet position by lobbying for public orders. 
The coinpa.ny wa,s loss-maker both in 1993 and 1994. The operating result is better, although 
it could brea,k even if tlle production level was twice as high as it is. The losses are covered by 
credits of t,lie parent coinpany disbursed in foreign exchange. Credits were capitalized a t  the 
eild of the yea,r. 
The Italian partner is seemed to be interested in large scale losses. It tries to threaten the 
Hu11ga.ria.n government by closing the company, if the government does not provide enhanced 
nla,rliet protection and subsidies for infrastructure investments. 011 the other 1ia.1ld strategy of 
ma~liing losses let the Italian partner buy out the Hungarian stake. The company can utilize half 
of its ca.pa.c.ities. 
Interna~tional quality standards ( IS0 9001) were implemented a t  the end of 1994, a prereq- 
uisit,e for export expansion on the Western markets. The management intends to modernize the 
production t~ecllnology, while tlle product line remains the same. 
In 1991 the coinpany employed 2600 workers, but out of this 1000 11a.s been dismissed. A lot 
of highly c~ua,lified workers were seduced by newly founded foreign compa.nies. Ganz Ansaldo 
now I1a.s to employ foreign guest workers from Poland and Ukraine. The compa,ny mana.gement 
tlccided to lilove tlie conipany out of the capital (it is located in a residential area), but, they 
will face laclc of skilled workers in the new location (90 kin from the capital). 
BORSODCHEM Co. 
This firm 1ia.s been one of tlie 12 enterprises wliicli were selected for special t reatment  by the gov- 
crnment. These t,welve conlpanies are considered as  extremely important from the point of view 
of' p roduc t io~~  culture, employment etc. In 1993, within the framework of a crisis management 
l>rograiiliile, a. substantia,l pa.rt of tlie firm's debts were consolidated (i.e., writ,ten off). Such 
crisis illaiiageriieilt ca.11 be now regarded successful in tlie sense, t ha t  the 1994 year was already 
closed ~vitli  a positive ca.sh flow, and in 199551996 tlie compa.ny is a.bout t o  be privatized. It is 
procluciiig clifferent c l ~ e i ~ ~ i c a l s  a'nd plastics materials. 111 1994 it was the 11th largest Huiigaria,n 
esporter ~vitli  it,s esport  of USD 115 million. 
Borsotlchem places its products in tlie internatio11a.l chemicals markets, competing against 
iiiostly niultinationa.1 firms a.nd simi1a.r profile companies of tlie ex-socialist countries both in tlie 
clomestic aiicl international markets. 
Ea.rlier tlie company processed inputs imported from tlie Soviet Union, a i d  the  proclucts were 
placecl in tlie tlomestic and Western export markets. At the end of 1990 the company sold the 
LID1 pla,iit (processing tlie main component of polyurethane), which was also designed t o  process 
a,niline importecl from tlie Soviet Union. Tlie crisis of the compa.ny was ca.usetl partly by the 
substa.iitial price increase of raw materials and the large debt  tliey incurred, when implementing 
tlie last clevelopment project. This wa.s toppled over 1992/93 by the falling dema.nd for chemicals. 
[n 1994 t,lie conipany achieved a peak in esports.  Tlle ba,sis for tha,t wa,s t.lie prosperity 
i n  I)otli tlie do~nest ic  and international markets. With changes in the  market s t ructure for 
cl~einicals ancl processed plastics, a furtlier 15 t o  20% esport  growth is forecasted for t,lie year 
199.5. Besicles such increase of tlie production and esport  volunies, lion~ever, a substa,ntial price 
increase is a,lso espected to  occur in the domestic and esport  marliets compa,red to  1994. 
Doiiiestic sales shall further increase in tlie field of pla,stics raw materials, hence tlie esport  
voluiiie inily fa.11 ba,ck because of the limitations in available production ca,pacities. I11 tlie 
ca,se of chloritle a,llta,li products - due to  tlie recession of the  aluminium processiilg industry 
a,iicl pa,rticularly tlia,t of the Hungarian aluminium industry - a significantly lower domestic 
sales alicl higher esports  are  envisaged. In the field of such proclucts, however, tlie specific 
t ~ ~ a ~ ~ s p o r t i n g  costs tend t o  be high. Increases of tlie transporting costs a,ild energy prices a,re 
esl,ect,ed t o  erotle tlie a.dvantages of the vigorous external denlalid or inay even totally out,n~a.tch 
t,liose in sollie ma.rltets. I11 the ca.se of so  called bulk products, produced and marketed in la,rge 
volumes, profita,l~ility is varying widely as prices tend to follow momentary snlaller variations i11 
t,lie balance of supply a.nd demand by extreme variation. At enterprise level a sillall profitability 
increa,se is envisaged. Tlie estent  of profita.bility is greatly tlepending upon the cllaiige i11 energy 
prices. 
Tlie esl>a,nsion of esports  for Borsodchem Co. is hindered by its supply of raw inaterials a.nd 
t,lie lack of procluction capacity, tlia,t is due  t o  past failures of implementing developmeilt projects. 
13orsoclclie1n Co.  is operating a t  a high capacity utilization level. The  liey uncertainty factor is 
tliat tlie l~roduct ion of tlie Hungarian chemical industry is hectic and uneven: ba.sic chemicals 
are ~iiissing from tlie iiiarket (such cllemicals are: ethylene, a,niline, formaldeliyde, metha.no1, 
soft,eners. plastics processing a,uxiliary materials, etc.). The traclitional domestic suppliers ha,ve 
I~een gra,dually divested hence increasing the import content of the end products continuously. 
111 1994 tlie volume of imported raw materials achieved USD 70 million. Tlie supply was 
mostly origina.tiiig from tlie clieinical plants of es-socialist countries, soinetiilles through agents. 
Free t,ra.cle a,rea agreements do  not represent special advantages as far as  the product groups 
of t,he compa,iiy are concerned, on the contra.ry, tliey are rather disa.dvantageous. Tlie rea,son 
is. tlia,t while inlports a,re practically completely liberalized, esports  t o  bot,li EU a i d  CEFTA 
regions are still protected with the possibility of imposing duties or effectively applying those. 
TAURUS Truck Tyre Co. Ltd. 
Taurus Trucli Tyre Clo. Ltd. was crea,ted by one of tlie divisions of TAURIIS Co. becoming 
inclepenclent. The original company produced different rubber products. Main product segments 
were truck a.nd fa.rm tyres, which represented more than half of sales revenues. 
Before 1989 TAURUS used to have a monopoly position in tlie Hungarian market. It exported 
some 60X, of its output to  a.dvanced and developing countries, using its own dealer network. 
( j O %  of its teclinical rubber products wa.s esported into tlie CMEA countries. I11 that period tlie 
increase of export revenues was the major aim, so even loss making exports coulcl be financed 
usiiig tlie revenues generated in the domestic market. At the late 80s TAURUS impleinented 
a, major clevelol>ment project using a PVorld Bank loan to  meet the increasing dema,nd in the 
Russian niarliet. 
I n  19S9-1990 a lot. of imported products appeared in tlie doniestic market TAURUS lost is 
uloiiopoly posit.ion and had to  face an unexpectedly slia,rp competition. The Eastern marliets 
colla,l>sed anti even in the rest of the marketplace a recession wa,s experienced in tlie rubber 
inelustry. Fro111 1989 the sales revenues of the fir111 gradually clecrea.sed, but the existing interest 
charges and repayment commitment of the existing debts pulled clown the company into an 
in~possible financial position. 
In order to  inaiiltain the operating capability of tlie company, the governme~lt involved it in 
its 1093 clebt,or consolidation program. HUF 8,3 billion debt to  banks wa.s written down, the 
tax and cl~stoms cluty arrears were re-scheduled. As the result of such crisis nianagement, the 
loss was reclucecl i n  1993 to  half and i n  1994 the company was break even. 
I11 190-1 thr  co~npa,ny's exports amounted to USD 33-34 million, and with this amount it, 
\\-as tlie :35tli largest exporter that year in Hungary. Exports made up -58% of the total sales 
rpvenues. Over 1994 exports further increased by some 30%1, but it still clicl not a.chieve its 
origina.1 level. I n  199:3 the firm started to  upgrade its sales policy, with the initial step being 
~xpor t , s  wit,li low profit content scrutinized to be made more profitable or t,o be stopped. As a 
rrs~ll t ,  ~ l i c  oml>any retrea.t,ed from few niarkets, penetrated new ones, lvliile i n  the existing ones 
ilcn dist~il>ution channels a,re investigated. Also the product mix 1va.s streamlined, so now the 
coinl>any produces higher value products with longer life, better wear resistance and a better 
fit to  the environnlent.a.1 standards. An advantageous coincidence was i n  1993, tl1a.t a boo111 
occurrecl both in the clomestic and international markets. I11 the worlcl inarlcet the upswing wa,s 
clue to tlie increase i n  a.utomotive output, the large number of roacl veliicles in the roa,cls, the 
\,i \ . icl  I~.ucl<ing activity in transporting goods. 
The reason of t,he doinestic market prosperity was, tliat starting from the second half of 
1994, folio\\-ing the request of TAURUS, an import quota \vas imposed on Russian and other 
C'IS country imports of tyres, linliting the number of units of tyres to 40 tliousand. This import 
limit,a.tioii made its effect already in  the second half of the yew, demand increased for local 
~>roducts. T l ~ e  iinported tyres do not meet the Hunga.ria,n standard specifications, they have 
a \.el.): sliort life, so their inlports are disadvantageous also from tlie environmental point of 
i.iew. Tlie present market share of TAURlJS is 53% in the domestic truck tyre segment, which 
rel>resents a substantial increase compared to  the 44% in 1994. Tlie objective for the company 
is to  achiei-e a CiO'%, ma.rket share. 
Tlir cornpan!. argues, t1ia.t one of the factors tliat reduced domestic sa.les wa,s the recession 
in  t lie donlest,ic road vehicle production. 
The increase of tlonlestic sales would be desirable, also because this marl<et. is the most 
profitable one. I n  the export. markets profitability is Iligllly va,rying, some nlarliets a.1.e even loss 
~naliers. Iiisteacl of retreating from such inarkets the firm tries to  fincl a.lternative distribution 
chau~~c l s .  find a better product structure a.nd adjust to  the special dellland in a flexible manner. 
Sales al~roacl are carried out via TAURUS brand dealers, with whom the firm lia,s special 
colitracts. Xearly in  every export market exclusive contracts were granted to  one or two deal- 
ers. However. in  Italy, Spa.in and Portugal distribution ta,kes place via a car service networl< 
nliicll requires punctuality in order to  keep their delivery tleadlines. I n  the traditional markets 
tratlitional tlistribution cl~annels  are still maintained such as  importers, wholesalers or other 
trading organisations. At  the procurement end, the firm generally buys inputs directly from 
the manufacturers, with the exception of natural rubber which being a commodity can only be 
11urc11ast.d via brokers. 
.4 characteristic feature of rubber processing costs is the high material content (some 60%). 
The  ~i iajori ty of the raw materials has t o  be imported. 70% of the material purcllases is direct 
imports, SO'%, is bougllt from domestic sources (such as carbon black, special textiles, nletal 
coml~onents ,  e tc . ) .  The  import content of sucli Hungarian product is also so high, tha t  they 
could well I>e regarded as  straight imports. 
Taurus Truck Tyre Ltd. finds financing one of its biggest problem, because tlie raw materials 
must be bought in advance. T h e  company did not feel the effect of the big devaluation of March 
109.5 because imports and exports represented almost completely the sanie value. 
Richter Gedeon Vegykszeti Gy5r (Pharmaceutical Company) 
Richter C4edeon (RG) is the largest pliarmaceutical firm in Hungary. It ivas founded in 1929. It 
is orga,nized as a sha,reholder company. From the total equity capital (17.6 bn HUF) the State 
I'ropert,y hIanagenlent Agency (SPA) holds 62.3% of the shares, 4.8% is owned by the workers, 
t,lle reina,incl~r is belonging to  other owners. In 1994 tlie equity ca.pita,l was ra,ised by selling 
shares to  doiiiest,ic and foreign investors. 
1Iain products of the company are human drugs. R C  also produces cosmetics, veterinary 
~)rotlucts a,nd a,gl.ocl~emicals, but these products account only for 5% of the total output .  
I n  1990 tot,a,l turnover amounted to  17 bn HUF, 20% was sold on doinestic market, 40% was 
esportetl to  Western ma,rkets, and the remainder to the CWIEA. After the collapse of the CMEA 
RG exports suffered a grea,t decline. But their position on dorriestic market was maintained, 
ailtl from 1993 Ea,stern sales also recovered. In 1994 the total turnover amounted to 21-22 bn 
HUF, lSiXI higher t.ha,n i n  1993. Domestic sales accounted for one third of the total turnover. In 
exports CIS and the Baltic states account for 41%, Japan 9%, Poland 9%!, Czech Republic 5%, 
Ira,il 4%,, US 4'X), UI< 2%, Slovaliia 2%, France 2%. RG hopes to  ma,intaiii the current level of 
sales on 110th the tlomestic and esport nmrkets, but enhanced competition impedes expansion. 
Officials estimated tha t  in the 1980s the firm ha,d had about 15% of the Soviet market for 
l,liarmaceutica~ls. Sales to  tlie USSR started to  decline in 1989 from 250 inillion t,ransferable 
rul~le to 90 million. Turning t o  dollar payments the sales dropped to  30 million USD (30 inillion 
t,ransferal>le ruble), because prices were settled a,t low level. Despite this clrop RG made the 
decision to  remain in tlie Soviet (later post-Soviet) market. Froni 1991 to  1994 sa,les to  the 
C'IS countries doubled ( to  a,pp. 60 nlillioii USD). RG set up its own distribution network with 
consignatory xva.rel~o~ises. The company invested 200 million HUF into the C'IS distribution 
~letnorli.  RG is fa,cing increasing coinpetition on CIS markets. 1ndia.n companies and large 
iiiultina,tiona~l coml~anies can provide preferentia,l payment conditions t o  custon~ers. RG a.pplies 
for governmenta.l assistance to  keep its marliet position in this huge poteiltial market. 
The net. incoine of the compa,ny was continuously positive in the la,st five yea.rs. In  1994 it 
enjoyecl a 100% corporate ta,x reba,te which increased net profits coiisidera~bly. 
'The domest,ic product line has been reduced. RC; passed the procluction of several huma,n 
tlr~igs to si~ia,ller new co~npa.nies. The range of tlie export products was also squeezed, rna,inly 
tluc to t,lle cha.11ge i n  tlie system social insurance in Poland. On the other ha,ncl new products 
\yere int,roduced as well. 
C'urrently RG can utilize 64% of the capacities. The ca.pa,cities to  produce ready to sell 
~,roducLs a,re fully utilized, b ~ ~ t  these can produce products t1ia.t meet only Ea,stern quality 
rec(uireinents. ILG can not expand its sales to  the West froill rea.dy to  sell products until the 
tlecessary n~odernization is a,ccomplished. 
111 1991 RG employed 5,654 workers; this number declined to  4623 in 1994. RG closed several 
sillaller p l a ~ ~ t s ,  t,he plant producing cosmetics was sold to  Colgate. On the other ha,nd, the sta,ff 
of the marlieting a,nd sa,les departments is growing. 
The conipany st,a,rted a la'rge investment project in  1994 t o  upgra,de the technology of pro- 
t l~~ct ion .  On t l ~ c  basis of this project RG they got ta.s rebate: 100'X i n  the first five yea.rs, and 
60%, in the follo~ving five years. 
They would like to  see effective for government asistance in rnarketing on Ea,stern markets. 
HUNGUARD FLOAT Ltd. 
Hu~~gua , r t l  F oat C:o. Ltd. wa's set rip a t  Oroshbza in 1991 a,s a Luselnbourg-Iiunga,ria,n joint 
vcnture. Tlie core product is floa,t glass, used mai~ily i n  buses a,s windsl~ields, and in construction 
projects. 
In 1994, 73% of tlie total production output  was exported, wliile tlie rest rema,i~ied in tlie 
tloiiiestic ma,rl<et. Clompared to the ea'rlier figures, tlie slia,re of domestic sales increa.sed by 2 t o  
:?%, over 1991. From t,lie Hl rF  3.8 billion aniiua.1 turnover i11 1992-1993 doniestic sa.les revenues 
increa,sed in 1994 to  HUF 3.8 billion. In 1995, the sales revenues may increase by some 30 t o  
:3.5%,, ca,lculated a t  current prices, due t o  the increased demand in the auto~notive/constructio~~ 
n~a,rl<et.s. H111igua.l.d mana.ged to  expand its domestic sales by sonie 30% in 1994, due t o  the 
conrpetitor, t,lie Sa.lg6tarj6.n Slieet Glass Factory, closing down its protluction. 
hia.jor export ma.rliets a.re Gerrtiany, Poland, Italy, Belgium, the UII;. Tlie export niarl<ets are 
co~ i s t a~ l t l y  changing. Greece wa,s recently lost, Ita,ly's share is slirinliing because in Israel a fIoa,t 
gla,ss factory st,a,rted operating, a,nd maritime transport costs tend to  be inore adva,ntageous. 
.Aiiot~lier gla.ss factory is being built in Poland, hence the d e ~ n a ~ l d  from t1ia.t market shall also be 
retlucetl. The  floa,t gla,ss qua.Iity of Oroshbza is equivalent t o  (or better than)  tlmt of tlie other 
fa,ct,ories in \Yest,ern Europe, tlie prices a,re also tlie same, lience in penetrating a new ma,rl<et, 
t.he decisive fa,ctors a,re distance and transport cost,s. 
T l ~ e  fa,ctory is running a t  a 24-hour round tlie clock utilization; s i i~ce it wa,s started up 
t 11c l i i l i ~  wa,s iicver stopped. The  3 shifts, week-end and liolidays therefore a.re fully utilized. 
The  tota,l a,va,ilable capacity is 3.50 tons/da.y, a.nd it is fully loadetl. \Vitliin t,lie tot,al productioil 
capacity (~vl~ic l i  ca,iinot be furtlier expa,nded a,s far a,s the total t,onna.ge is concerned) tlie product 
structure is I>eing now clia.nged in favor of 2 mm thicli glass. The  rea,son is, t,lia.t there is increasing 
tlcliia,i~d for t,liis protluct (for autoillotive or picture fra,~ning purposes), a.nd hence a higher sales 
revenue ca.n be a,cliievecl on the same volumes production. So tlie ta,ctics of the fir111 is, t ha t  it 
slrifts t,he emphasis t o  products with more specific profit content ivitliin tlie existing portfolio. 
Tlie coinl>a,lry also does tlie edge grinding of the produced sheet gla,ss, t o  inake the product more 
attractive. 
The  protluction ca,pacity is given a,nd it  is fully utilized. No ca,pa,city needs to be spun off. 
111 1991 I-Iunguard Float. Ltd. wa,s started up witli esactly tlie same staff level a.s t ha t  of tlie 
L~uxeii~l~ourg parent company. Tlie staff level ha,s ba,sically shbilized arou~itl  327 people, ~vhich 
i~icrea,setl t o  a sma,ll extent la,st yea.r, clue to introducing a. higher degree of processing. 
AIai~ufacturii~g gla,ss is a. capital i~l te~isive activity, and the rela,tively high sa.les revenue of 
sollie HUE: 5 I,illion is achieved by the firm witli a. small ~runi l~er  of eniployees. T h e  yieltl is a.t it,s 
peak, specific costs ca.nnot be reduced any further. The  price of ra,w materials. i~~clutlii lg sa.iid, 
Iias recently increased by 25%), beca,use of the higher tra.nsport costs (tra,nsporting tlie sa,nd froin 
tlie Trans-Daiiubian region t o  tlie site costs as much, a.s tlie sa,~id itself). Tlie key cost fa.ctors 
at the firm, therefore, are energy and transport costs. Overall a, srnall saving ca,il be a.chieved 
I)? a inore strea,mlined orga,niza,tion of raw/auxiliary materia,] purclia,ses. 
Ever s i ~ ~ c e  its esistence, tlie firrti lias been a loss maker, which is a. pa,ra,dos, because its 
casli flo~v ha,s I>eeii continuously positive since 1993. According t o  the view of the  mana.ging 
clirect,or. t , l~is  is caused by the Hunga,ria.n Act On Accounting, because tlie registered capita.] 
1n11st I)e recordetl in tlie Balance Sheet a,t the HUF GcS/USD eschange ra,te, prevailing a t  the 
time of tlie foundation. wliile the esistiiig foreign currency credit, received every month fro111 
tlie parent conlpany, 1ia.s t,o be revalued in HUE: every inoiith according t,o tlie ongoing currency 
tle~.aluat ions. 111 1995, however, tlie owner sha,ll convert its credit irito capital. Sources of fina.nce 
lria,~. he equity ra.ise ant1 internationa,l credit, but oiily for purposes of investments in fixed assets. 
Csepel Metalwork 
T l ~ c  i i~ediun~ size coinpaiiy produces semi-finislied copper products ancl steelba.nds. Fornlerly the 
coliipaii): I)elonged to tlie Csepel conglomera,te, a big vertica,lly integrated state-ownecl company. 
Rest ruct uring of the Csepel Metalwork was impeded by the problems of tlie separation from 
tlie coiigloiiierate. Firstly, tlie State Property .Agency (SPA) intendecl to printize tlie whole 
conglomera,te i11 one block. Tlie separation process started in 1991 when tliese privatization 
efforts liacl failed. As a consecluence of the debate over propert,y rights, tlie distribution of debt 
aiicl ho~v to sliare coininon public utilities, tlie independent joint-stock compa.ny was founded 
as 1at.e as i11 1993. At present it is owned by the SP.4. As the company was unable to repay 
its inlierited debt it wa.s involved in the debt consolidation program of tlie government, in 1994. 
HlIF TO inillion debt wa.s cancelled, and other 200 million was rescheduled. 
In tlie period of 1989-93 total turnover of the company decreased from HUF 12 billion 
(ITSD 200 million) to HLTF 7.5 billion (USD 83 million). Tlie decrease was pa,rtly due to the 
clrop of doinest,ic de~nand in 1992 (more than 50% in real terms). h~loreover, libera,lizatioii 
of tlic iniports of copper created competition. Before liberalization took pla.ce, the company 
enjoytrcl a monopolistic position 011 the domestic market (89% li~a,rliet share). Currently new 
Eastern entra,iits elistribute highly subsidized copper products on the Huilga,rian ma,rket. De- 
spite slia,rl>-eclged conipetition tlie nlana,gement expected the recovery of domestic sales in 199.5. 
Tlieir forecat wa.s lmsed on the increa.sing denland by their main customers (h,II<hl-Siemens, 
Tungsram-General Electric). Tlie 1a.tter con~panies were sold to foreign investors and t,he new 
~ ~ ~ a i i a ~ g e ~ n e ~ i t s  iniplemented new product lines favoring ~iieta,l parts froin Csepel hleta.lworli. 
hlitigatiiig t,he effects of decreasing domestic demand tlie company increa,secl its esport a,c- 
ti\-it!.. Tlie share of esports in total production increased from 20% i n  1989 to FjOXl in 1993. The 
c o i ~ ~ l > a . i i ~ ~  sells lmrts for ~nacliinery a,nd semi-finished nletal products to la.rge clistributors and 
fiiia,l consuiners i n  cleveloped countries. Although Csepel Metalwork tries to esta.blisl1 long-term 
coo]>eration nrit,li foreign partners their product portfolio varies according to t.lie frecjuent sliifts 
i n  cleii~aiid. I11 1991 tlie company esperiencecl a booiii in esports. It iiicreasetl its sa,les by 20%) 
and a furt.lier 7-8% esports groivth wa,s forecasted for 1995. Tlie basis for that  \vas the recovery 
or i~rte~.natioiial niarliets. For a marginal supplier on the world mar1;et (they provide 0.2%, of the 
total norltl ~>rocluctioii) a slight increase in total dema.nd opens la,rge opportunities, because it 
can a,cljust to the special dema.nds in a more flexible ma.nner than large tra.ditional suppliers. 
During t.he tra,nsition period the coinpany also ina.de a.cljustmeiit efforts. It sold a plant 
/>rot1 ucing elect,rocles to a Swedish investor, and introduced new products as plastic coated copper 
\\.ires for tlie const~ruction industry. The compa.ny also signed a sub-contra~ct~ing arrangement in 
1 ilirailie. 
:\s a result of declining productioil the level of capacity utiliza.tion is low. La.ying off people 
is a cont.inuous process. In the period of 1989-1993 tlie iiuinber of enlployees declined froiii 
2.120 to 1.300. At tlie same time the conipany faces a specific sliorta.ge on the la.bor market: it 
finds it ha,rd to  recruit rinskilled labor for met,allurgical work. The last investment project of the 
colnl>a.n was finishecl i n  1986. Strengthening its ina,rl<et position cvould require technological 
cle~,elopinciit, but tlie lac]< of financial sources prevent investments. 
Due t,o t.lie lo\\ level of capacity utilization the company illalies losses. With regard t.o 
~>rofitability. the domestic inarket is the best, but tlie increa,sing energy prices a,nd s l ~ a r p  compe- 
tit,ion deteriorate profitability. The profitability of esport is highly va.rying, although the product 
struct,urc is i~ilproviiig arid the recovery 011 metallurgical ~na,rkets allows for a, sliglit price in- 
crease. Nevertheless. tlie high share of material costs (75'%) restrains significa,nt improvement 
i l l  profi ta llility. 
l'lie Irecessa,rJr ra,w imterials lmve to be imported: tlie con~pa,ny buys copper from Pola.nd 
aiicl Russia, zinc from Sweden and Poland and other alloys froin Western Europea,n countries. 
I~rcrea,sing uncert,ainty regarding former Eastern European vendors encoura,ges the coiupa,ny to 
contract ~vit,ll internieclia,ries instead of contra.cting directly with producers. Tlie compa,ny would 
\\-elcome governniental assistance to maintain cliea,p Ea.stern imports, e.g., 1,ilatera.l tra,de a.ncl 
creclit iiisura,iice agreenients with Russia and I\aza~lista.ii. 
Expailsion of tlie procluction implies higher imports. The compa.ny must pa.y for raw nia- 
teria,ls in  aclvailce and this requires new credit lines. Tlie liigli interest ra.tes chargecl by ba,nlis 
significa,ntly deteriorate the profitability of Csepel Metalwork. The managers of tlie conipany 
calls for subsiclizecl working capital credits, they consider it as tlie   no st effective export promo- 
I ion measure. 
Tlie EL! agreenieiit facilitated marliet. penetration of tlie companyl altliougli tlie profits Iiad 
to be slla.recl xitli foreign pa.rtners. Tlie managers of tlie conipany consider that existing iniport 
reg~ilation is ra,tlier clisaclvantageous. Higli tariffs are levied on their imported inputs which are 
not available 011 the doinestic markets. At tlie same time the market of their final products 
is fully lillera,lized. Tlie CEFTA agreement is especially disadvanta,geous for the company, a.nd 
t,liey ca,ll for a, renegotiation of tlie tariff regulation. 
GARDENIA Lace Curtain CO. 
C;..\R.DENI.~ is t ~ i e  la,rgest 1-1u1igarian curtain manufacturer. ~ t s  a,nnual sales revenue a~nounts  to 
EILTF 2.1 llillion by nianufacturing the following product profiles: curtains, textile products and 
reacly-~ua,cle procluct,~. The firm wa,s privatized i n  1992 by selling sliares to domestic a,rltI foreign 
investors. Its sliares are listed on tlie stock markets. Presently it lia,s a majority international 
(a,niong others Austrian) ownership. The 90 years old, but modern teclinology fa.ctory employs 
6.50 people. 
Sollie ($5 t,o 70% of C~ARDENIA'S sales are esports. Tlie export ma,rliets require gra,dua.lly 
aiid cont~iiiuously increasing volumes. Esports a,re nla,de to 32 countries. Recently, prices could 
Ge increased I>y 3%). The profitability of the company is .appropriate. GARDENIA does not 
int,encl to ope11 up new markets, because the mana.gers believe they are i n  a.11 nlarliets a.lrea,dy, 
t,liat. ~voulcl count. -4 illost recent development is, that  the company started t'o esport into 
Slo\.al;ia and to Poland. According to the long term plan, the compa,ny wishes to  become one 
of tlie first tliree leader curtain factories in Europe by tlie year 2000. Their major rrla,rkets 
are: C:eriiiany, France, tlie Scaiidinavia~i countries, UI< and the above mentioned two CEFTA 
couiitries. 
De~na,ncl for curt,aiii products is shrillking in the clomestic ma,rket. 
For 1995 a,iicl for the 1996-1998 period a stagnating sa,les volume is foreca,sted for the domestic 
market. i-\ccording t.o tlie compa.ny sta,gnation a i d  fa,ll in tliis ~iiarliet is clue to tlie general fall 
i n  the l)~~rcliasi~lg power, but a.lso to the sudden increase of i~iiports. It is true, t,lia.t in the 
fielcl of c ~ , A R D ~ ? N I . ~ ' s  product segiiients imports arc subject to licence, hut cr~rtain test,iles are 
~x.a,ct~ically alrea,cly trea.ted as liberalized products. A/loreover, tlie importers t'end to sa,ve ITAT 
i111tl duty I>urclens I,? stat,ing lower t l ia~i  real values i11 their invoices. 
Tlie company lias been able to increase its domestic sales because tlie deva.luation of tlie 
cr.lrreuc\: niade i~iiport,s nlore espensive, and because the other significant tlomestic coinpetitor 
i11s0 started esporting a i d  reduced its supply on tlie doniest,ic marliet. 
I n  order to furt,lier increase clomestic sa,les, tlie compa.ny aims a,t finding connections witli 
large Iiotel-chain cle\lelopment projects, rather than targeting individual consrllners a,s customers. 
T l ~ e  conipany's product mix coiltains 5,000 items. Developments a,re i~nplemented on a. 
coiitiiiuous Ilasis. It is t,lie first in Hungary ancl the only one in Europe of t,lie testile plants. 
that has i l l  place a clua.lit,y a.ssurance systenl complying witli the IS0  91 st,andarcl specifications. 
I n  the suinmer of 199-4 GARDENIA received a. reward for tlia.t, financecl jointly 11y the PHARE 
Progra~iime aiicl t.he Na.tioiia.1 Coininittee for Teclinica~l Uevelopilient (OMFB). 
No escess ca,pacities or outdated machinery exists a t  the company. GARDENIA continuously 
i~iipleiiient.ed cleveloprneiit projects, ma,iiitainiiig a high tecli~iologica~l staildarcl for its fixed a,ssets. 
'Thcse projects pa.rtly \\-ere financed by subsidizecl esport promotion creclits provided by tlie 
go\-ern nien t . 
iiiiportant source of finance for such developments was tlie Esport Promotion Project 
pro\riding investment credit a.t a subsidized rate. Any furtlier production espansioii requires 
a,n iiirrest~iiient for expa~nsion i n  the facilities. Presently 1.52 liours are ivorl;ed a week, that  is 
Ililrcl to illcrease because of the ~na,intena,nce rec1uirements involved. I n  order to espa.nd esport 
capacities, tlie compa.ny is now planning a significant construction project a,nd the repla.cement 
or tlie esist,ing piicliaging n~a,cliine lines wit11 tiew ones. 
Staff levels are increasing. I11 1984 the number of employees wa,s 500, while in 1994 650. 
Tlle uiiclerl!ri~~g rea.son for tliis expansion is t1ia.t both production a,nd esports increa.sed a.nd 
act.i\.it-ies organizeel ea.rlier i n  a sub-contra.ctiiig arra.ngemeiit such as gra,cling a.nd cutting, were 
i ~ i t  egratecl int,o the company's ow11 a,ctivity. Wage costs represent therefore a significant a,inount 
\\.itlii~i the cost ~ t ruc t~ure .  Wherever possible, tlie company repla.ces labor with machines to help 
cost recl~~ct~ioii. Further savings are aimed at  via better process engineering, trying to find a,n 
ol)t.iiiiuni distribution between jobs inside tlie company and subcoiitra~cting. The ma,na.genient 
feels sorile reserves still liidclen in their stock nla~~agemeiit.  \lia.ge costs will increase again, 
I~ r ra r~se  blr~e-collar einployees need to be recruited for the esl>anded production. Other cost 
i t en~s  are attemptecl to  be managed in the most rational manner. 
' f l~e  colnpany \vishes to  improve its profits, ~>lanning for 199.5 sollie HIIF 200 million profit 
Iwfore tax. By 2000 - as the company's long term plan spans until that  year - the managers 
\vish to clouble, treble or quadruple the present profits. 
tlliiio~~g tlle significant sources of finance the firm envisages direct foreign investment via 
selling sl~ares held in GARDENIA raising tlie equity capital, and the involvement of other 
onn sources. They also plan to  obtain credit. The comI)any still cloesn't lino\v, whether sncli 
credit should come from domestic or i~lteriiatioiial sources, but due to  tlie continuous currency 
cle\aluations they \voultl like to  avoid foreign currency credits. 
BONSA Shoe Ltd. 
Tlie coiill>aiiy wa.s set up in 1990, its legal predecessor was the Boiiyh6d Shoe Cooperative. The 
colnpany got into to~icli with the German Salan~aiider company, a i d  since 1993 tliey 1ia.ve a con- 
tract based co-operation agreement, renewed every year. According to the contract, Salamander 
is the esclusive l>uyer of the products of the company. The ownership structure of tlie limited 
li;\l)ility compa.iiy is a,s follows: 69% of the sha.res is owned by the earlier Shoe Coopera,tive and 
:Sl'X. beloligs to Sa,laiiia~nder. 
Siiice its setting u p ,  BONSA provides job-work against tlie firm orders of Sa,la.niantler. Hence 
tlic!; 1ia.ve no domestic sa,les since 1993, because Salamander talies over even tlie rejects or scrap 
protluction. 
The iiiit,ial capacity was 900-1,000 pa,irs of shoes per day, but through a coiitinuous develop- 
iiieiit it wa,s iiicrea.sed to the present daily 2,400-2,600 pa,irs output. The firm's present contract 
is valid until 1998, lience no change is expected to happen until tliat date. Considering, that  
t.lie coopera,tioil has sa,tisfied both pa,rtners so far, and provided tliat no tlraniatic changes shall 
occur (in the eco~lon~ic coiiditions and regula~tioiis), the contract shall be renewed again. 
No clia.nges 11a,ve happened in tlie product portfolio, only style a.nd type clia~iges are imple- 
t~icntctl. \vliicli a,re necessary to follow inarket trends and fa,sliioii cha.iiges. The firm cloes not 
cspect cliaiiges i n  the product mis in the foreseeable future. The reason beliiild tlieir production 
tlevelopinent ma.s the increasing purchase demand of the foreign partner. Due to the nature of 
,iol>-worli the production voluille is always defined by tlie market demand, hence no substantia,l 
rsl>ansion is eiivisa,ged. As tecli~iological discipline is strictly ohservecl a,t the company, there is 
only a ~niiiiniuni scrap. 
The firni ~vislies to expand its present capacity. In 1995 the sewing rooill capa.city is to be 
cs[)aiitled in a joint structure with the German pa,rtner. Tlie espected value of the production is 
soiile HlTF 60 inillion. The a.greement is, tliat tlie Huiigariaii pa,rtner sliall develop the building, 
~vhilc Sa.lamaiicler sliall provide the necessxy ~na.cliines. Tlie partners p1a.n to involve capital in 
1 his tlevelol>meiit project and sliall a,iin a.t providing own finance, a,voidi~ig doillest,ic credit. 
Siiice t,lie setting lip of the joint venture a gradual restructuring of the nrorli-force has talien 
place. Practically this iilea,iit, that  people were re-tra,iiied to be trailsferred from the adniinis- 
trative staff to the production, hence sliifting the emphasis to tlie blue-collar stalf. They see, 
l~owever, no scope for a.ny cost reduction this yea,r, because in spite of tlie strictest ra,tionalization 
ineasures they ca,iiiiot offset the infla.tion based cost increases. 
C'onsitlering tlie costs, the firm feels it a real t1irea.t tlia,t, maybe not in the short term, 
tlic C;cl.ina.ii 11artner sliall illove on to tlie East and sliall sea.rc1i for a coopera,tioii potential 
in likraine or R.ussia. Esperience shows, that the Western coinpaiiies gradually tnove tlieir 
pt~otluction facilit,ies to the E a t .  
111 199-1 t , l~e firm's profit before t a s  wa.s very good, it woulcl I>e difficult to surpa.ss that in 
1995. ,411 increase is expected according to  tlie ra,te of infla.tion. 
By iia,ture, jell-work is ~ n a d e  advantageous by the continuous deva,luation of the local cur- 
re i ic~~.  
The esperieiice dra,wii froin this several yea,rs cooperatioii is, t1ia.t the sta,te a.dministration 
sliol~ld provitlc inore support to the involvemelit of direct foreign investment. As a,n example, 
tlic riianagers of tlie firm mentioned, that  at  the time of co~iclllding tlie cooperatioii agreement 
i l l  1993, t,lie joint venture enjoyed a 10-year ta,s holiday. This was cancelled in 199.5. Ture, the 
t a s  iml~osecl since the11 is a.lso preferential. 
Kecskem4t Parquet Co.  Ltd. 
' I ' l ~ t  I iecsl<em~t Parquet Co. wasone factory within the Building Carpentry a,ntl Wood Processing 
Enterprise. It \\.as privatized in 1992 via the employee buyout scheme a,nd it was transformed 
into a, li~llitetl lia.bility company. 
Besicles such change in  the ownership, a significant cha.nge occurred in 1992 a,lso in the 
structure of tlomestic and export markets. This was the year when the traditional custonlers 
, , 
sucli a,s the county chain of "Tiiz6pv companies and the netlvorli of AFESZ organiza.tions got 
into a tlifficult financial position, hence tlie orders fell back to  only a fraction of lv1ia.t they I d  
usetl to be. 
St.at.e sponsoretl a,nd co-operative housing were drama,tica,lly reduced, the large construction 
companies went I~ankrupt and were liquidated or were split into sillall busiilesses that  were short 
of capita.1. For these rea.sons the earlier shares of markets in sa,les - 80% domest.ic and 20% 
esports - had to  be changed. In fact, it was turned around and in the 1992-1993 period 80% 
of' tlie ~>rocluction wa.s esported and the rest was placed in the domestic market. Major esport 
~narliets were C;ermany, Finland, S p i n ,  and Egypt. 
For 199.5 some 10-15%) growth of t'lie domestic sales was forecasted. 
Tlie firm's product portfolio 11a.s not changed, it still manufa.ctures tlie traditional range 
froill senii-finished parquet down t o  lacquered wood pa,nels. Changes in tlie internal proportions 
hap11en from time t,o time, t,hough, a.s required by tlie interior desig~i fa,shion ant1 market de- 
ma,ncls. .As there is still cleniand for the traditional range of ~ n r q u e t  lie tlie firill ma.nufa~ctures 
no sul>st~antial cha~nge is envisaged in tlie product mis. 
I n  the ma,rket structure, liouever, the changes in solvent clomestic clcnia.iieI may cause a shift 
t llc coitlpa,ny wishes t,o maintain it's old international customers a.nd providing them with on 
ti~iie tlelivery and l~igli qua.lity goods. 
O\:er t l ~ e  la.st tliree yea,rs the company wa,s profitable, its profit before t a s  amounted to  
10-12'%, of t l ~ e  sales revenues. 
The 1iecsliemi.t Pa.rquet Co. presently is running a t  a 1.2 shift ca.pacity loading, alt,Iiough 
2 f l i l l  shifts \\-oulcl ma.ke it niore cost efficient,. This ha,s two liinit~ations. One 1imita.tion is the 
i~,apacity es~>aiisioii i~eetled for the drying plant. There is not sufficient fina,ncing for this purpose. 
T l ~ c  onllIany could obtain credit from its account holding bank, with an interest clia,rge of :32%,, 
l111t sucli l ~ i g l ~  ra.t,e cannot be covered by tlie operat,ions. 
'I'lie other liinita~tion is t,he availability of suita.ble labor. The company ca,n offer a monthly 
HUF 2.5 tl~ousa.nd for semi-skilled people, but tliat is simply not a.ccepted by tlie labor market. 
tiii~ce t,he customers refuse to  accept any price rises, no significant \va.ge improvements can be 
i~~i~>leinentecl eit. ier. La,bor could be replacecl by mechanization to  some est,ent. but in the lack 
of finance it is i~n~>ossible. 
To cut. costs, tlie compa,ny developed wa,ste recycling methods over the last three years. The 
result. is. t,lla,t ~>ract~ically it lias no waste that  could not be processed into some kind of useful 
fii~al protluct (such as sawdust, briquette, fuel for tlieir own l~oiler plant, children's toys, etc.).  
.4nother prol>len~ for the 1iecskemi.t Parquet Co. is the shortage of current assets. The 
compa~ny iiiust obtain short term credit, but the high interest cha,rges significa,ntly clet,eriora.te 
~>rofita,l~ility. I n  order t o  resolve such problems the conipany tried t'o fiiitl a fina,ncia,l invest,or 
partner but tlic interna~tional candidates all want,ed to  obtain more than tlie 30% of the shares 
offered by the company. 
I n  spite of its high esports, the Iiecskeinkt Parquet Co. does not rega.rd the devalua,tion 
policy an efficient esport proinotion t,ool. The foreign partners are well a.wa,re of tlie eschange 
rate changes and refuse price rise proposals. .4t the saine time key ra.n materials tlia,t are EU 
conform must I>c iinportecl such a,s the forma,ldehyde free lacquers a.nd grinding mat,erials, t,heir 
rising cost cluc to  cle\laluations a,re not easy t,o pa,ss over on the custoniers. 
:\ccortling t o  t,lie view of tlie nlana,gers of the firm a new esport credit line sliould be devel- 
o p ~ < l  1.0 mit,iga.te t.11e int.erest burtleiis of esporters in financing current a,sset.s. Tlie Hunga,rian 
11,111liing sj.stern ~voulcl also find it advantageous, if the fiila~lcially sou~itl ocal companies did not 
ircccl to seek credit outside the country. 
The hecskem4t Parquet Co. would also welcome if severe control measures were introduced 
against L~orkers employed in  the black economy; this would help thein t o  attract the suitably 
sliilled people. 
GRABOPLAST Ltd. 
C:ral~oplast was transfornletl into a joint stock company in 1990. Before tlie tral~sformation 
t llc. c:cjuity of t.hc compa.ny amounted to  HUF 1300 niillion. The Austrian Credita.nsta,lt Bank 
raised t , l~c equity up to HUF 2000 million, a,nd the sha.res of the cornpa,ny were launcl~ed a t  
tlie Buclapest Stock Excliange. At present the shares of the company are tra,cletl on the stock 
eschange ancl distril~uted among appr. 4,000 owners. Most of them a,re private agents, liowever 
financial institutions a,nd investment conlpanies a.lso ha.ve sta.kes. 
Gral~opla,st is t.he la,rgest producer of artificial lea,ther in Centra,l Eastern Europe. Its prod- 
11ct portfolio ranges from a,rtificial leather for construction purposes (carpets, wall papers and 
iiisula,ting materials), to artificial lea,ther for clotliing apparels and upholstery. The cornpa.ny 
enjo!rs a close-to-nloiiopolistic position on the domestic market. 
The artificia,l leather industry can be chxacterised by la.rge demancl fluctuations. The de- 
mantl for protlucts for construction purposes ha,s been growing continuously, while the demand 
Troll1 t,he clothing a,ncl shoe industries exhibit a decrea,sing trend. Sa.les for proclucers of lea.ther 
nrt,icles (Imgs, otc.) shotv an upwa,rd trencl! but upholstery is a,lso in a downturn. After :ears 
of tleclining sales for the car inclustry the conipany expects an upwa,rtl turn. a.s they signed a 
long-tern1 coiltract with Suzuki, the Japanese multinational compa,ny which ma.~iufa.ctures cars 
also i n  Hunga,ry. 
Irnt,il 1991 62% of total output of Grahopla.st was sold on tile clomest'ic liia.rliet! 20%) was 
csportccl t,o IVest,ern Europe a,nd 18%) to the CRIEA countries. T l ~ e  most important Western 
liiarliet~s were: Geriiia~ny, Austria, the Netherlands a,ncl France. I n  (.:h,IEl-l tra,de the company 
hacl special export cluota,s. After 1991 tlie tra,ditiona,l tratle linlis of the coinpa,ny collal~sed and 
csports into the countries of the former Soviet Union t,emporarily cea,setl. Exports to other 
('ent,ral Eastern Eurol~ean countries, however, were maintainecl. I11 the periocl of 1991-1994 
tlonic~stic deniantl also clecrea.sed from USD 37 million to USD 2.5 illillion anel no substa.ntia,l 
expansion is envisaged for t,lie following -5 years. 
Since 109:3 tlie conipa.ny has experienced an invigora,ting denia~nd in tlie CIS countries and 
i n  the  Baltic sta.t,es. I n  1994 the revenues from exports increa,sed by 17'%, a,licl a.mounted t,o 
IvSD 20 million. On the basis of tlie prosperity occurring i n  E a t e r n  ma,rliets a further growth of 
cxports n.a,s expectecl in 199.5. I11 1995 exports representeel more tlla,n half of the total revenues 
of tlie conil)any. a.ncl a third of its production was solcl on Eastern marliets. 
'4s a consecluence of shrinking domestic and Eastern dema,nd i n  1990 the compa,ny lllacle losses 
a,~icl fa,ced a liquidity crisis. The tough situat,ion wa,s resolveel by the restructuring of the colnpa,ny. 
.As a first step del~t. was rescllecluled to  maintain continuous opera,tion of t,he conipa.ny. Nest, 
('~.etdit,anst,alt raisetl t,lle ecluity of the company I>y HUF 600 million. A professional consult~ing 
c.olllpaiiy facilit,a.tecl the reorga~nization of the activity of the companv. The performance of 
t,llc I\-orliers is no\\1 cva~lua~tecl a,ccorcling to efficiency norms, a,nd the promotion system is also 
basetl on these norn~s. As a result, per ca,pita output amounts t,o USD 40 thousa.ncl. which is 
compa~.a.ble to \vestern standards. 
111 1990 t,he ~iumber of employees wa,s 1890, and it declined 11y 8-10% in every year until 
199-1, \vlieii it reacllecl its bottom with 1,000 employees. The reduction of labor force was most 
int,ense aillong the aclministra.tive sta,ff. To a.chieve a, growing ca,pa,cit): utilization a,n increa.se of 
c~~iployment is espect.ec1 in the following years. I11 1995 .50 new niorliers \\-ere hired. 
Clonsolic1a.tion of the position of the company is reflected in the fa,ct tliat the company turned 
~xofital)le i11 1994. A further increase in profitability is expected in the nest .5 yea.rs. 
7'11(. fact,ory is running at  a 24-hour utilization i n  3 shifts, althougli procluction is stopped 
for tlic \\-eel;-encls. In case of soille production bottleiieclis tlie introtluction of 6 or 7 days 
ol>erat,ioii is uiicler consideration. No excess ca,pacities exist a,t tlie company I>eca,use a.11 outclated 
iiiacliinery were sold in India and Pakistan. Any further production expansion \\.ill require 
i i iv~stnie~it  llto new facilities. The compa.ny intends to enlarge its existing procluct. portfolio 
: r ~ ~ t l  introclucc 4 nlet,er wide PVC floors used to cover la,rge fields. This kincl of PVC floors 
is facing gro~viiig deniantl. The managers of the company wish to penetrate this segment of 
I he doniestic ~narliet and get bacl< from foreign suppliers. I11 order to  expand its capacities, 
tlic company is now planning to acquire companies in Eastern European countries, probably 
i l l  Bulgaria and Rornania. C4raboplast would export its modern tecl~nologies, sales promotion 
niethotls and new designs, and try to  conquer new markets. Acquisitions will be financed from 
laising equity capital. This plan is supported by the institutional investors who hold large stakes 
i l l  tlie company. T l ~ e  nianagement rules out the possibility of debt fiiiancing, because the interest 
lates are liiglier than tlie company could accept. 
Both the illailageinelit of tlie company and the large institutional sliareholtlers try to avoid 
plofessional investors obtaining majority stake i11 the company. At present t h e  are threatened 
1)). a western conipany pursuing a very aggressive business policy. 
The management considers cheap, low quality imports as the nlaiil obstacle to Graboplast's 
clolilestic espansion. Tliey suspect, that most of these products are smuggled into the country 
ni th forged declaration, avoiding i11 this way the payment of customs duty aiitl VAT. Simulta- 
neousl~., large nir~ltiiiationals attempt to  penetrate the do~nestic market witli tenlporary cut-offs 
i11 prices. 
RICO Textile Co.  
This compa~ny was tra,nsformed into a joint stock corporation i n  1992. The distribution of the 
sl~ares is as follo~vs: a 50.1% majority is owned by externa.1 private persons, 8% by the Employee 
Sl~are  O~vnership Program (ESOP), 7.5% by managers, 9.1%) by the local authority and 25% 
I)!. the Fund of National Socia,l Insurance. RICO ha,s two main product segments: health 
care products (bandages) and hygiene products. Ea.rlier it enjoyed a pra.ctica,lly monopolistic 
posit,ion in  the domestic market, but dong  wit 11 the politica,l system change this wa,s elirninatecl. 
Ne~v do~llest,ic entra,nts and libera,lized imports created a. sharp competition. The company's 
ina,rl<et. position was a.lso a,ffected by the restructuring of the trade sector. Hungaropha,rma, 
\vhicl~ pro\,icled marketing i n  the earlier times, was disintegrated a,nd instead tlie company had 
t,o elevelop clirect conta,cts with its customers. RICO has three market segments: hospita,ls, 
~)lla,rina,cies a,ilcl retail genera,l stores. Due to a,ll these factors: the output of the company 
clroppecl by half over the 1991-1994 period. 
Earlier the exports of the company were negligible, representing only 3%) of their total output. 
(This was ma,inly made up of cotton-wool supplied to Ita,ly.) Recently, however, exports have 
bee11 growing, in they 1994 represented 7% of the total production and in 199.5 the envisaged 
])rol)ortion is 9%. The prime aim is to  penetrate tlie CIS markets. 
Of t l ~ e  int.erna,tiona~l ma,rkets the coinpany regards the CIS countries as its na,Lura.l ta,rget. The 
rra,son behincl is pa,rtly the fact, that its products are not the most a,dvanced ones. The contacts 
\vit,h C'IS ~);rrtners were not initiated by tlie company itself, but by intermeclia,te organizations. 
RICO a,lso a i ~ n s  a.t entering the sa.les network of the large Hungarian esport-import compa,ny of 
sanit.a.r!; proclucts. Medimpes. RICO's long term strategic p1a.n is to rst,a.l)lish onln sa.les network. 
I-Io~vever, RIC'O cloes not have tlie necessary finance a,t lia.nd, a,nd it ~voulcl also 11eec1 to increase 
its t.urnover. 
.Apa,rt froin smaller upgra,ding projects, tlie company does not intend to change its procluction 
~ t ruc t ,~ i re .  r-1 stra,tegic objective is tha t ,  besides their own products, they would also market tlie 
proclucts of thircl producers. They purchase mainly hygiene products from Western markets, 
ma.rlieting t.hose partly i n  the Eastern a.nd partly in  domestic ma,rl<ets. The role of this activity 
shall hc strengthened in tlle future. 
The com1)any upgra,ded it's production facilities. Implementing a HlTF 200 million project 
01-er 1991-1992. R,IClO introduced GnlP (Ciood h/Ianufacturiiig Pra,ctice for hIecliciiia1 Products) 
i l l  tlleir procluction process, hence they now fully meet the I~ygiene recluire~nents prevailing i11 the 
IZlI. Tliis fact has increa,sed the production costs of some proclucts by a,l>out 15 to  20(;;'cl, ~vliicli the 
coinl>any is una,l)le to incorpomte into its sales prices. Coniplia~nce wit11 CihllP is C O I I I ~ U I S O ~ ~  i n  
~ilost \\.'est,erii countries, but not in Hungary yet. Because of this, RICO lia,s I>ecome loss makers 
in tliese procluct.~, since competitors not implementing CiMP offer lower prices. T l ~ e y  cla.im that  
it \voald I>e a proper a,pproach if the applica.tion of GMP would be a basic requirement in t,he 
ca.sc of pul,lic purchases in Hungary. 
Capacity utiliza.tion a,t the compa.ny is 50 to 60%). Altliough some products a,re ra,ther inferior, 
they can be still successfully marketed in tlie CIS countries a.nd i n  the donlestic marketplace. 
111 1991 t,he 1iuinl)er of employees was 650. The present staff is 510. Ea,rlier priva.te persons and 
coopera,t,ives \Yere enlployed a.s sub-contractors; recently all these were hid off. 
In t,he fielcl of raw material imports, the compaliy sees a,n opportunity i n  esta,l>lishing direct 
conta,cts with t.lie vendors, instead of going through a,gents. The sources of suppljl are: China, 
Intlia,, Austria! CIS. By a t.emporary reduction of its production the compa,ny will be able to 
~,etluce its I,anl<ing costs, a.nd .also a.ims at  reducing its credit requirements. 
111 sl>it,c of t,lle low capacity utilization, the compa.ny is profitable. Major pa,rt of the profits 
is useel to cover clevelopment projects and to reduce credits. I11 1993 no clividends were pa.id 
out. rather ea,rnings were reta.ined. I11 1994 a1rea.dy dividends were paid. The a,nnua,l spendings 
on tlcvelol>inents a,nd paying back credits is HUF 60 to 100 million, a,lthougli in 1994 no such 
s])encliiigs occurred. To support its imports, the company obtains foreign currency credits; froin 
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JSC,  lease with 
redemption 
S ta te  compa.ny 
JSC,  lease with 
redemption 
S ta te  company 
J S C  
JSC  (S '29%) 
J V ,  LLC: (S  6 7 % )  
Sta te  company 
JSC  (S 30%) 
JSC  
Sta te  company 
Sta te  cornpany 
LLC:, lease with 
retlemption 
State  conipa.ny 
S ta te  company 
JV,  LLC (S 14%) 
\LrE (68),  
Lithuania (1.5) 
WE (.58.6), C.3S (2.3) 
\VE (68),  CIS (10) 
\VE (90) 
Former CIS 
CIS (40),  Baltics (14) 
FSIJ  ( ~ 2 ~ 5 )  
FSIJ  (71.8). C'EE (11.3) 
CIS (100) 
C'IS (45.4),  Baltics 
(11.7).  \VE (28.2) 
LYE (15)  
CIS (84.2); Baltics, 
clevel. countries (15.8) 
\VE (T1.8), FSU (19) 
Teleco~ll~llr~~lications Sta te  company FSLJ (90) 
C~llemicals (plastics) J S C  Total espor t s  (10) 
h/leclicines S ta te  company FSU (64.8); iVE, 
Poland (19.2) 
" JS(' = .Joirlt-stock company (private); LLC = Lirnit.ed liability company; JL' = Joint venture; S+% = Latvian 
stale share of fixed asset,s. 
"(-'EE = Central and Eastern Europe; CIS = Corn~non\vealth of Independent Stat,es; FSLT = C1S + Baltics 
( L i t l ~ ~ ~ a r ~ i a .  Est.011ia); W E  = Western Europe. 
Latvijas Finieris (Woodworking Industry) 
Background I~lforillatioil 
0 1 / 1 1  oj' ( . ~ t ( r h l i . ~ l l ~ ~ ~ t ) i t :  Tlie oldest of 3 enterprises now forming Latvijas Finieris (LF) was 
estal)lisliecl in 1893; in 1975 tlie 3 enterprises were merged. Now "LE' is the largest plywood 
exporter in Latvia. 
,Size of' labor /"or.rt: 1700. 
,5'/:c oj' tht ctrpitnl .stork: Ls 6 m. 
Pr~o(10ct.s ~ , , o n ~ r f i ~ r t l ~ r ~ O :  ( i n  %, of sales) plywood slieets 7.5%; sl~aped and glued components 
(press elements) 20%: finished furniture components. ready for assembly 5%. 
Orltpnt nrid .sc~lts (1.990-1994): In the 1970s company produced 100,000 cub.m of products per 
[.ear. De\.elopnient during 1990-1994 is represented in the table I~elow: 
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995, est. 
Output ( i l l  tliousancls of cub. in) 30 4 0 5.5 G O  - 
Sales ( i n  n~illion Ls) - 9 14 18 2 0 
Prwfits: C'o~iipany llas liigll profits (about 20%). 
Debts: "LF" has only old debts. As regartis government budget, it is one of few enterprises 
nliicl~ settle their lial~ilities with the budget on time. Company has sufficie~itly large claim on 
c ~ ~ ~ t o i l i e r s  (sonie are unrecoverable, wllicll appeared in tlle first years of transition; some are 
current claims: conipany receives payment for production within 30-60 days after delivery). 
,S'lr~uctrrrc 01 ous12c7.ship: I u  1992 it transformed from state enterprise into joint stock company 
nit li 200 sharel~olders. Redemption of state assets took 3 years. Company lias foreign partner, 
l111t for s o n ~ e  reasons it does not advertise its presence. 
Export Orielltatioil 
Traclitionally colilpany bouglit 213 of needed raw materials in Russia; the same part of finisl~ed 
l)r(~clucts was solcl in Russia. However, since Latvia regained its intlependence in 1991, relations 
tvitli Russia nere brolien. During 1990-1994 tlie conipany gradually reoriented its activities from 
FSIT ~narliet to  western ~iiarkets. Tliis trend is reflected in tlie table below: 
in 'A of total sales 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Latvia 4 8 6 7 3 9 S 9 
Eastern countries 45 9 9 -5 1 
\\'estern Europe 7 24 5 2 8 3 9 0 
C'urrently .50',71 of plynrood export is sold to  one customer in the U I i .  20'% is sold in Ger- 
I I I ; I I I ~ :  2;-2S'X is exported to  Scandinavian states, tlie Netherlands, Belgiuni, France, Italy and 
Polancl. Tlle rest (about 2-396) is sold in other Baltic States and CIS. First contacts with foreign 
partners nere establislied in  all possible ways: some with tlie assistance of Association "Latvijas 
liolis" nliicli, in turn. cooperates with LDA; sonie tlirougli catalogues; some a t  tlie international 
ts1iil)itions in Hallover and I<oln. Sometimes foreign partners found tlie company themselves. 
Sow colnpany lias well developed net of agents in major countries of 1;Vestern Europe where 
company's foreign partner played a positive role. 
Production for Export 
('o~iil)an! ~~ianufactures both standard products developed by its own designers. and non- 
sl andarcl proclucts. using drawings or samples provided by customers. Since 1991 conipany 
steaclilg increases assortment of production maliing more e~npliasis on manufacture of products 
nit11 higher value added than tlie traditional plyivood slieets (such as curved press elements and 
f ~ ~ ~ i s l i e d  furniture parts). 
Till no~v coinpany succeeded in esporti~ig to tlie West, as it could offer a bit lower prices 
;~ncl apl>rosilllately the same quality of nianufactures as western producers. Howe~,er, producers 
of Belarus, offer a bit worse products for much lower prices. As a result, if current exchange 
rate policy continue, company will face serious competition, especially taking into accouiit tlie 
tenclenc). of costs to increase. 
Tlie 0 1 1 1 ~  technical problem of "LF" is that company still lias grinders with 4 rolls, while in 
the west 8-roll grinders are employed. Ilowever, the state of general equipment is not so bad, 
coinl)arecl to Latvian standards. 
Earlier it was nlore profitable to esport production than to sell in  cloiiiestic market. Now, 
with appreciation of tlie Lat, this price difference does not esist anyinore. 
Dolllestic Environlllent for Exports 
Pos i t i re  n.<pert.s: (1) assistance of association "Latvijas kol<s" ("Latvian treefi3) a t  initial stage 
of estal)lisliing coiltacts with foreign partners; conclusion of FTA with EU. 
.\cgntillc n.sycct.<: ( I )  exchange rate policies; (2) high credit rates which force company to avoid 
taliilig cretlits. if possible. Short term neecls (for instance purchase of raw materials) are often 
fii~ancecl fro111 clelaying p a ~ n ~ e n t s  of dividends to shareholders: (3)  clue to ins~ifficiently good 
~~cl~itioiis I)et\vceii Latvia and Russia coi~~paiiy has very difficult situation i n  getting ran- iiiaterials, 
;is L,atvian forestrjr can hardly provide needed amount of wooel; (4)  lack of accredited certification 
lal)oratoi.ies in Latvia. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
..LF" succeedetl to crea,te a lot of stable conta,cts abr0a.d (in LVestern Europe) tl1a.t will allow to 
increa,se out put also in future. C:oinpa,iiy produces quite staiiclartl ra.nge of products ancl it does 
not face as serious problems of ma.rket access as furniture producers. Competition from tlie East 
does not, affect seriously company's operations a,broad, a.s CIS producers very often cannot meet 
~rc~ctlctl cl~la,lity of procluctioii a.ncl tlelivery t,erms. However, in future conlpetition ina,y become 
slronger. 
"[t ,s I I I V I I I ~ > C ~ S  arc more t,llan 20 of the largest wooduor1;ing and furniture ente1.1,rises of Latvia. 
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MGbelu serviss (Furniture industry) 
Background Illformatioil 
E.5tcibli~hcd: in 1975 as a factory nianufacturing furniture for children and school. 
,Cizr oj'lobor. force: about 300 (in 1992 it was 650). 
,Ci:t of the crrpitnl stock: '21,500 Ls. 
l'ro(1urt.s nlat2ujcictllrccl: Cots (the major item sold); school, kindergarten furniture: office furni- 
lure; ~pliolster!~ furniture. 
Output (1.9.90-1.994): During 1990-1993 dilninislied by 50%; in 1994 stabilized; i n  199,5 could 
illcrease. Iii 199.5 only 40%) of capacities are employed. 
,Sales (19.94): about 1.1 m Ls. 
PI-ofits: C o r n p a n  operates without profits as it lost about 0.5 111 Ls cluring 1992-1994 on ex- 
ports to  Russia (causes of this were currency reforms in 1992-93; payment defaults: exchange 
rate fluctuatioi~s). Due to seasonal nature of demand for school furniture, conlpany had t o  take 
11igl1 interest credits for production, paying '7% per nionth. 
Dcbt: Company lias sufficient debt to tlie budget. In 1994 it paid only 4% of the calculated sum 
of taxes. 
,Ctrortlirt of ouyrzcr.sIlil): Since 1992 - private joint stock colilpany leasing state assets. 
Export Orientation 
Traclilionally (till 1990) company served only Latvian market, supplying all scllools aiicl liinder- 
gartens \\it11 furniture. Since 1991 110 lieu1 school or kindergarten was I~uilt; cxistiiig schools and 
I,inclergartens liacl too little financial resources for buying new furniture. As a result, colnpaily 
Iiacl to  fiiicl alternative outlets for its production as well as to  expand assortment. I n  1991 CIS 
share coiistitrlted 30% of total sales; that  year coiiipany began t o  export also to  the \Vest (O.,5% 
of sales). Folloning difficulties caused by transition fall in purchasing power of the population 
sales cli~iiiiii~liecl i l  tlie local market. Situation of sales for 1993-1994 is revealed in tlie table 
Latvia CIS EU 
1993 20% .50% 30% 
1994 30% 0 %  30%) 
hlaii!. contacts with CIS partners were established through annual furniture exhibitions in 
I'sI~ov. Some parttiers sought the contacts with the company themselves. Export partners 
i l l  Russia are primarily regional autliorities dealing with provision of schools. Contacts with 
C~c~.iiia,n pa.rt,ners were esta.blis1ied tlia.nks to co~npany's president's personal relations. Very large 
assistance i n  the first !.ears of transition came from Association "Latvijas lioks". Information was 
clistributecl by Latvian Clianlber of Trade, while LDA provided assistance in arranging export 
relatecl tlocumentation. Company's prospectuses were distributed tlirougli Latvian embassies 
al~roatl.  For three years company had orders from a German partner. Company exported up to  
1.000 cots a month. I n  the last quarter of 1993 this cooperation ceased because partners could not 
come to  agreement regarding price. "MGbelu serviss" could not accept 3.5$ price per cot taking 
illto account that costs reached GO$ per unit due to  sharp rise of prices of sawn timber. The same 
1ial)pened nit11 exports t o  the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweclen. However, coillpany 
liiaintainecl good contacts with partners i n  Europe and hopes to resume active cooperation with 
tlieni as it is cloubtful whether they will find any enterprise that  will offer cheaper furniture of 
the same clualit!.. No~v, a t  least for time being, company lias t o  concentrate on CIS markets. 
Productioil for Export 
During last three !ears coinpany expanded its assortment by approximately 30%) t o  increase its 
coliil~etiti~.eness i l l  both domestic and foreign markets. I11 the western marl<et inost demanded 
I>rca,iiie coml>a,ny's massive wood manufactures (traditionally conipa,ny proclucetl only standard 
fu~.nit.ure from chip I~oarcl plates). As regards Ea te rn  iiiarl<et, posit,ive fa,ctors for expa,r~sioii 
\yere coi~~pany 's  al>ilit,y to supply full ra,nge of scliool furniture starting with simple chairs for 
~)upils a,l~tl encling witli furniture sets for director's room. None of Kussia,'~ enterprises lias a.t its 
clisl)osal sucl~ rich a,ssortment. Tlie other advantage of tlie conlpaiiy ill the Russian market is 
I~et.t.er exterior of its furniture compared witli Russian analogues, thanks to imports of decora.tive 
ele~lients from R'estern Europe. Tliese a,dvantages allow coinpa.ny to compete wit11 Russian 
proclucers. clespit,e the price tlisa~clva.ntage (customs duty a.nd VAT a.mount to G2%, ~vliicli were 
a,clcled t,o liiglie~ costs in La,tvia and transporta,tion expenses). .\l~.eacly in 1993 company lias 
reacl~ecl average \Vestern European level of quality tlia,t allowed Europea.11 producers to sell tlie 
c o l ~ ~ p a i ~ y ' s  f u r ~ ~ i t u r e  under their own brands. One of tlie advantages of tlie company is that  tlie 
a\.erage a,ge of it,s protluction equipment is not so high, 1.5 years (some equipment wa,s bought 
in  1991). 
Doillestic Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
Po.si(iur rr.spfcts: Activities of LDA a ~ ~ d  LCTC. These activities slioulcl be further cleveloped. 
i\.cyatil,e ccslmts: ( 1 ~ )  Absence of Latvian trading houses abroacl. This Itind of governnieiit 
s11pl)ort to ~nanufacturers could be more effective tIia,n a.riy direct a,id; (2) Exchange rate policies: 
furniture n~anufa~cturers arere the lllost a.ffected through exchange rate developments a.s tliey 
I)a.setl t,lirir product,ioi~ on doniestic ra,w material; (3) High credit rates: clue to sea~soiia,l cleinaiicl 
for scliool furiiiture compa,iiji has to ta.l<e this high interest creclits; (4) LTnfa.ir distribution of 
ii~te~~nat,iona.l credits: conlpa,ny did not get credit for renewing its kilning a.nd sa,nding ecluipment 
e\.en a f t , e ~  [)osit,ive report of tlie hlinistry of Economy on compa,ny's business pla,n: (5) Inactivit,j~ 
of I..at ~ . ian  Export C'rediting Coinpa,ny. 
Foreign Environnlent for Exports 
I n  sales to CIS large problenis c o ~ ~ l d  arise due to unstable rela.tions between Russia, and Latvia. 
:\ccorcling to co~npai~y 's  ma.na.gement tliey lia,ve to pa,y double cr~stonls cluties when exl~orting 
to Russia,, iiot~~~:it,list,a.iidiiig most favored nations status granted by R.ussia to Latvia in 1994. 
Furtl~ermore, Russian companies ~ieed annua,lly renewed licenses wlien t.liey t,o import furniture 
illto Russia. I11 the future company can face increa.sing competitioii in the Russia,ii market as it 
11as vt.1.y large furl~iture industry. 
:\s i,ega~.cls \Vestern ma.rkets, a lot of money and time is needed to get qua,lity certifica,tes. 
Ho\\.e\,er. the la,rgest problems a,re caused by overprocluction in tlie \Vest a.nd difficulties in 
f i~~diug OIVLI i~iclie in Europe. Foreign investments inflow into tlie company is 1ia.mpered 11y 
u~~settlecl land o~vnersliip problems and overpriced sta.te a,ssets. 
Vidzeme (Furniture Industry) 
E.~itrbli.sh~tI: 1921. 
.5'r:r of Itrbor. folre: 132. 
, 5 ' 1 3  of tllc rtipitnl .<tack: 6,713 Ls. 
I'r.ot1uct.s r?,nr?trfcrrtuwd: Company specializes ill producing cliairs: 40% - standarcl range of 
tlomestic dining chairs; 40%) - baby cliairs; 5% - sllaped plywootl anel spintlle l>acl< chairs; 
1-1'2 - t urnetl conlponent parts.  
Orriptrt (1.990-95): During last years ou tput  sharply decreased, and 1 1 0 ~ ~  only 10%) of capacities 
are ~lsecl. 111 1994, 28,576 cliairs were produced (in 1990 about  300,000 items). 1994 can be 
characterized as  a year of stabilization. 
,Ynles: in 1990-1992 NA as  tlie enterprise was part of a big furniture production association 
"Riga", in 1993 Ls 312,400; in 1994 Ls 399,500. 
PI-ofits: in 1993 :32,1T4 Ls, in 1994 42,321 Ls. 
Dtbl.\: 150.224 Ls (mainly t o  the  budget; i11 1994 company paid only 50'Xl of calculated t a s  
~)aynients: claims on custoiners are  27,.543 Ls. 
,5't1.ucttrrr of ocrrzcr..shil>: Since 1992, after t l ~ e  collapse of ~>rocluction association "Itiga", \'idzeme 
is an intlepenclent enterprise still owned by tlie s ta te .  
Export Orieiltatioil 
l 'l~e conipany traclitionally depended on the  USSR market until tlie independence of Latvia, with 
onl! about 127% of sales being esported t o  Hungary and Yugoslavia. Since 1991 tlie company 
llacl t o  find alternative markets. In 1993 distribution of company's sales l>y different regions was 
;is fo1lon.s: 
Latvia Russia Cierniany Azerbaijan Netherlands D e n ~ n a r k  Chnada Finland 
4 1 0 . 4  6.9% .5.9% 5.0% 4. G'AI 1 ..5% 1 .OX 
In 199.4 the slia,re of espor t  sales continued t o  gro\tT a,nd by Janua,ry 199.5 it lias reached 40%) 
of' total sales. During 1994 company increa,sed its orientation t o  Western ma,rkets. 'The main 
reason was t,lie decrease of company's competitiveness in Russia. clue t o  continuous a.pprecia.tion 
of t lie L,at.. Espor t s  t o  Azerbaijan were stopped due t o  bitter esperience of 1993 urhen Azerba.ijan 
part.ner tlitl not settle i ts liabilities with the company. Currently company's production is rna,inly 
esported t.o ELI nia,rket (Finland, Dennla,rk, Norwa,y, and C;erma,ny); small portions of ou tput  
;i,rc csportecl also t o  Ca,nada, Israel and Japan.  Company's main partners a,broad a.re wllolesale 
organizatious n.it,h n-liicl~ company lla,s direct contacts. However, some of conta.ct persons a.broad 
a1.e f ~ ~ r n i t u r e  protlucers. C!onlpaily 1la.s i ts owl1 designer and only selcloinly a re  drawings of foreign 
])art  ~ i e r s  used. 
Productioil for Export 
.At l>~.esei~t tlie efforts of tlie mana,gernent are  concentrated on espantling espor t s  in t he  West. 
.-\t t l ~ e  sa,nle time it recognizes t ha t  with tlie current assortnlent it is clifficult t o  acquire s table  
position in Europe. During the  la.st 10 y e u s  assortmeilt pra.cticaIly ura.s not changed (escept 
for one new a.itd rea,lly good clia,ir model), orlly color performance of upholstery was varied. To 
;I large estent  the rea,son wa.s tlie lack of modern equipment. Very la,rge share of equipment 
rcn i ;~ i~~et l  front the 1940s ancl 1950s, a,nd many conlplica,ted curved or twistetl deta,ils sirnply 
cannot hc ~lianuf'actured due  to  technical linlitations. In such a situa,t'ion coinpany's current 
itrlviint~a~ges, t,liat enIia,iice sa,les abroad,  are: (1) the use of pine saw-timber, contra,ry t o  use of 
c.lrip I~oa,rtl plates by maiiy other La.tvian furniture enterprises (most demantletl a re  conlpa.iiy's 
I>al>y clia,irs as  well as  chairs without upllolstery for kitchen or sulumer houses); (2 )  low prices (for 
tlie t i n ~ e  I~ciiig co~npa,ny's products can satisfy only low-income layer of popula.tion). There is no 
tlilference I~ctweeii n~a~nufactures produced for loca,l or foreign markets in terms of inputs usage, 
Ilonrever, cluality control is a bit stricter for exported goods, beca,use in foreign ma.rkets even 
small fa,ilure can be very costly. As regards price, it is niuch more profitable to sell procluction 
i l l  tlic local ma,rliet. Company does not malie profits on exports. Currently the export is 
inlport,ant only because it helps company to nla,inta,in working places. Company needs la,rge 
ca,pit,a,l investments i n  kilns and the finishi~ig process that! together with further development 
of marketing functions, would enable the con1pa.ny to offer a, more ~nicldle market, less price 
sensitive range of products. 
Dolllestic Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
Positioe (~.spects: a.ssistance of association "Latvijas koks" (made up of the 20 la.rgest dornestic 
noocl\vorl;ing a.nd furniture enterprises) at  the initial stage of establishing contacts with foreign 
partners. 
 gatit^ it^ rrsyccts: (1) Exchange rate policies; (2) High credit ra.tes that  a,re prohibitive even for 
short-t,ime fina.ncing. La.st yea,r company lost one order from Gerrna.ny simply beca,use it 11a.d 
lrot e~~ollglr working ca,pita,l to fulfi l l  it. As regards long-term investnients, company prepared a 
c.o~n~>reIreiisi\.c business plan to get low-interest loan of $150,000 from a. .Japanese bank. However, 
neither a,ny commercia~l bank, nor tlie government found it possible t,o gua.ra,ntee it. At the 
same tilne, g1rara.ntces for huge credits are proviclecl to far less relia.ble firms. (3)  i2l1sence of 
govern~iieiit sul'port to export'ers. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
:Is tlie ~na,in ol~stacle to exports unfa,vorable pa,yments conclitions has to be ~nentioned. Pra,ct,i- 
call!. no custonler agrees to pay i n  a,dvance, which poses a lot of problems pa,rt,icularly because 
of' shortages of working ca.pital. lTsually clients pay the bill 30-45 days after delivery. Another 
~>rol>lenl is t.lia,t the compa.ny has to rely on the honesty of its pa,rtners since it 11a.s not enough re- 
sources to i~~it,ia,t,e la,\vsuit abroa,d. Recently company had a negative experience with customers 
i l l  :Izcrl~a,ijan aucl Clanacla ~vliich defaulted. 
Juglas manufakt lira (Textile Industry) 
Background Information 
E.\ltrbli.51lcd: i11 1911; till 1993 - one of 7 enterprises forming large production association "Rigas 
nianufalit6ra". 
, S i x  of' Inbor. fbrre: 230. 
, S i x  of' tllr ccrl~ltcrl slork: .52,800 Ls. 
PI-0duct.s r,ronuf(/rtur-ed: Ring spun cotton yarn (50-54 Nm);  open-encl cotton yarn (S-28 Nni). 
Tlic coliipaiiy is tlie iiiost modern cotton spinning illill in Latvia. 
(Jutljt~l (1.990-95): Diniinished from 3000 tons in 1990 t o  1299 tons in 1993. In 199.5 50% of 
ca1)acities are employed. 
Tur.r?o~cr (1 994): 1,691,000 Ls. 
1'r.qfits: 111 1994-199.5 company operates practically witliout profits. Reasons for this are  large 
clepreciation decluctions aiid maintenance of premises (including 11011-employccl o ~ ~ e s ) ,  as  well as 
tlie real appreciation of tlie national currency and tlie fall of tlie value of tlie US dollar against 
ol l ~ c r  liarcl currencies. 
/11dtblt(117~.\.\: C'oillpaiiy lias only small clebt to  tlie electricity conipaiiy. Tlie positive aspect 
is tha t  conipaiiy lias 01~11 boiler-house. As many otlier conipaiiies .luglas inanufalitu~ira (JhtI) 
I ~ a s   inr recoverable clainls on customers from 1992-1993 because of collapse of tlie LJSSR and 
cleterioration of relations between Russia and Lat l  ia. 
,Str.r/r(llr.c of' oulrrf~:.;hil): ".I hl" lias been a private joint stock company since .June 1993 ancl leases 
its filcilitie5 fro111 tlie State .  Its reclemption agreenient does not include the lancl nrliich belongs 
to  tlie local governinent. 
Export Orie~ltatioil 
'Sraditioiially conipany oorked only for highly developecl net of cloiilcstic testile enterprises 
('..\uroraq'. '~Lenta",  "Sarkanais rits" etc.). Due t o  decline in Latvian testile industry company 
I~acl to  seek for foreign outlets for its production. During 1993-1994 coinpany's ~rianagemeiit 
iiii~cle significant efforts establishing new contacts. I11 1994 sales distribution was as  follows: 
La.Lvia Cesn1a.n~ Lithuania. Belgium France Others 
Tlie ~iiokt sigiiificaiit company's esport  partner is S\vitzerlancl's mediator company "Reniey" 
n hich 11ak consignnient \vareliouse in C:erniany. Otliei partners abroacl a l c  testile enterprises. 
Initicill~. contacts uere establislied thanks t o  own efforts (offers by fas; ads in catalogues). Now in 
iiio5t caws  p o t ~ n t i a l  partners contact "JhI" themselves. In this field consiclerable support  coines 
f ~ o ~ i i  first p a ~ t n e r s  wliicli recomlnend company's production to  others. IIp to  now company 
tlitl not t a l x  part  in any international eshibition. As company manufactures \.Pry s tandard 
~ )~o t l r~c t ion .  it cloes not receive any sample from abroad; it receiles only prescriptions of needed 
tccl~nical paraiileters of j arn. 
Productioil for Export 
C'o i i i pa i~~~  lias 5trong intention to espand its export pelforinaiice in \Vc<tern marliets. Till now 
coiiipany t l i c l  not consider possibility of exporting to CIS as it lias enough stable contracts i11 the 
\\.'e\t, taliing illto account limitations 011 working capital aiid raw materials. .4notlier problem 
i5 that 11105t of Kuskia's linitting enterprises stopped tlieil operations a t  least f o ~  tlie time being. 
('liireiit competitive strengtlis of tlie enterprise are: (1) a bit lower price of yarn. tlian e.g., 
arn fiorn Paltistan; (2) high quality (higher than Indian yarns); lower transportation costs for 
i~npor te rs  in Europe. A s  regards price, rise of input prices arid gradual increase of nages can 
Il5e 111) tliis aclvantage in tlie conling years. High quality of yarn \vas acliievecl to  a large estent  
tlr~c to cllange of equipment. Company lias -5 years old C4ernian equipment t l ~ a t ,  according to 
T,ilt\.iali stautlartls, is vcry good. Positive aspect is stability and high c1ualification of staff. 
I'rocluction. that  is exported, doesn't differ from productio~l soltl i ~ i  tlie local inarket, neither 
i11 teriiis of tl~iality, 11or in terms of price. 
Domestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
liisufficiently good relations between Latvia and former Soviet republics of Central Asia. 
iiot\vitI~stantli~~g LIFN agreements with them: it  is very clifficult to obtain licenses needed 
for exporting of cotton from these republics, that  leads to shortages of raw materials i n  
Latvia. Further~nore, this cotton is iiiiported througli Russia ~vllich callses additional 
~~robleiiis.  taking into account the disorder in  Russia's customs system. Recently company 
I~egan to  iinport cotton from the same republics through Switzerland. 
Escliange rate policy is unfavorable for exports. 
Alonet.ary policy; tlespite tight policies company has quite rea.1 ol~port,unity t.o get interest- 
free loan froin EBRD. 
Delays in refuiidi~lg VAT on raw materials (cotton) plus 1% import cluty, I\-hich has t o  be 
paitl on imported cotton, leads to  problems witli wor1;ing capital. 
Lacl; of government support to  esporters i11 orga.nizing exhibitions. 
Foreign Ellvirollilleilt for Exports 
C'o1iil)anj. lias succeeded i n  establisliing ne\v contacts wit,l~ foreign ineclia.tors, ant1 some of them 
sceeiii to 1)econie stable. A~iiong them the best, contacts are witli '.Renia.yl' a,nd Lithua.nian 
producers of knittetl garments. Business relations ~vit,li Fra,ncr and Belgiuiil a,rc very irregula,r; 
pa,yinriits se t t le~~ient  is usua,lly prolonged, sometimes by 4 ~nontlis; penalty pay~i~eii ts  a,re not 
paitl. .As a rcsult, company is forcecl to take short-term credits nrith high interest a.nd to a,void, 
if ~>ossil>lc. ontracts with these enterprises. 
'l'lie latest iiifor~nation on clia,nges in foreign ~narliets are obtained from clients a,nd ca,ta.logues 
ant1 t,he coinpany t.ries, if possible, to  a.djust to tliese cha.nges in terms of teclinical pa.raineters, 
price ant1 tlest,ii~at,ion country. 
.4n1o11g t.lie ma.in competitor countries textile coinpa~iies froin Paliistan, India a.ncl Turkey 
\\.ere nlentionetl. C'ompetit,ion from R,ussia is not da.ngerous for the nea,rest future, notwit,listand- 
i iig csistencr of very large Russian enterprises: most of tlleni have very ol~solete <luipment wliicli 
11ia1;es it iml>ossible t,o Ii~eet \vestern quality s tandxds;  niost Russia,~i c o ~ ~ ~ p e t , i t o r s  pra,ctically 
htoppetl operations. 
Due to free tra.de a,greements there a.re no formal barriers to  company's exports either in 
\I'est,ern Europe or in Lithuania. Nevertlleless some inconveniences are caused by tlie require- 
~ n c n t  o  Ila.ve pliytosanita,ry certificate, as this requires a lot of nloiiey a.nd time; arrangement of 
custonls <lecla,rations is very cuinbersome as well. 
8 March (Textile Industry) 
Background Information 
Estc~~0li.shcd: 70 yews a.go a,s a chemical works, but transformed gradua,lly int,o a textile fa.ctory 
11). 1936. 
,Si:c of' Inbor- fbrrc: 170. 
,Si:c of' tllc capitrrl PIOCL: 130,000 Ls. 
I'r.oducts ri.arzufirctured: The enterprise undertakes a,ll stages of tlie processing of 11:oolen fabrics. 
Conipa,ny protluces yarns of count Nm ,5512; woven and finished fabrics in wool a.nd blends for 
clresses, suits, coa,ts, furnishing fabrics and blankets. 
0utpi)~lt (1990-95): Diminislied from 1..5 mil m of fabrics i n  1990 to 0.22 mn nl in 1993 and 1994. 
1 1 1  1994 only 1.5%) of ca,pa,cities \yere used. I11 199.5 10% growtli is possible. 
Profits: Compa.ny susta,ins losses due to  fluctuations i n  currency nlarket, irregular orders, rise 
of fixed costs per production unit (energy). 
Ir~dc.btc.rlrze.~.s: Higli debt to  the budget (social tax);  a,t tlie same time compa.ny ha,s high unre- 
c,overal)le out.st.a,nding clai~ns toward customers from previous years. 
,S'tr~llctrrr~ of oi~r~ ,er~s l~ ip:  Tlie company is still a sta,te enterprise but ha,s been included in the 
list of conipanies sclieclulecl for priva.tization I>y t,he Latvia,n Priva~t~iza.tion i\ge~icy (LPA); tliis 
creat.es s~~fficient uncertainty. 
Export Orientation 
Tratlitionally .50'%1 of production was sold in Latvia, the rest was sent to  other republics of the 
1iSSR. During tlie first years of transition exports to  the former Soviet Unit (FSU) republics 
reaclied (jO'X, of the total output. For tlie last two years tlie picture was as follows: 
Sales CIS Western Countries Latvia 
1993 167,000 Ls 12S,000 Ls 163,000 Ls 
36.4% 2S.O% :3.5.6%, 
Clonil>a,iiy's nlain partners in tlie West are Denmark, U I i ,  Finland a.ud Austria,. In  UIi most 
tl~ina~liclecl are company's coa,t fabrics. I n  Deninarli - furnishing fa,brics (coinpa,ny " Richters", 
\vliicli coi~stant,ly iiicrea,ses orders). Finland is also very important pa,rtner: la,st year its sha,re 
\\-as especially la,rge tlia,lilis to  state procureinents. Company export,s fa,brics tlia,t were developed 
I>!. o\vn clesigiiers: only color is adjusted to  the custonlers' specific desires. 
Neiv coiit,acts with foreign partners are establislied through Latvian Developnient Agency 
(LD.4) (it lias informat~ioii desli wit'li offers froni a,broad) a,nd through conipa~ny's ads: la,st year 
1Iic coiii[~a~ny spent 3000 USD for advertisement i11 one of tlie Eurocatalogues. Very often foreign 
clieilts fintl coiiipa.iiy's address through Latvian consulat,es abr0a.d; some - ivith a.ssistance of 
Lat Cha,niber of Tra.cle. Unfortunately, company has no possibility to talie p r t  i11 different 
 resentat at ions a,iid international exhibitions because of finaiicia,l coi~st,raints. 
Production for Export 
('on~pa,ny lias strong intention t.o expand its exports in 1Vesestern ma,rkets. This orielitation 
is ii~fluencecl by gra,dua,l cont,ra.ction of domestic market. Sucli sit,ua,t,ioii is to a large extent 
tlctcrniiiietl by developments in the Latvia.11 clothing industry, enter~>rises of which in ma.ny 
c~,ases clioose t,o export the ca,pacity of tlieir low priced la,bor force (t,lirough sub-contracting) 
i nst~ea~cl of o\irii procl uction. 
\'cry iiiil>ort~aiit conipetitive a,dva.ntage of company's ma.nufact ures al)roa,cl is tlie rehtively 
lo\\. price arl~icli. ill combinat~ion with Iiigh quality of products, could provide comlIa,ny witli good 
ofrers in the long run. ITsua,lly sta.nda,rd quality criteria neecled to  I)e iiiet when esportiiig into 
El l  are surpassetl by 20-25%, a,s all clieniicals neeclecl for product,ion are purc1ia.secl i11 tlie Pilest. 
To sa.tisfy customers' needs conipany ca,rried out  substantial assortnient cha.nge during 1992-93. 
TIowever. in the nearest future serious problenis call arise because of liigli ra,te of ecluipnieiit 
tlcprcciation (about  67%). New machinery especially is needed in finisliiiig (color control and 
i i i s t ru~~~ei i ta t io i i ) .  Fl~rtliermore the compa.ny lias not got scouring fxilit ies and 1ia.s t o  rely on 
iniportetl supplies of scoured wool. 
I11 t,erms of quality tliere is no difference between fa,brics sold i11 don~est ic  or foreign markets. 
O111y color ~)erforma.iice is a bit different: if  i n  Western Europe niost denia,iided are fabrics of 
past.el tones, mliile i11 Latvia black is more i11 deri~aiid. 
111 teriiis of prices it is Inore profitable to sell production in tlie donlestic marliet than a.broa,d, 
I)eca.use i11 contracts wit11 foreign pa.rtners prices a,re fised in USD for a, periotl of 3-6 nionths; 
ta,kiiig into account revaluation of the domestic currency a.gainst LISD this very often causes 
siiia,ller revenues a,nd even losses. 
Doillestic Eilviro~lille~lt for Exports 
P o . s i t i 1 7 c  r 1 ~ 1 ~ c c t . s :  assistance of Association of Textiles aiid Clothing manufacturers; activities of 
[,U:l ant1 tlie Latvian Chamber of Trade and Coinmerce (LCTC) .  
. \ . ~ y r ~ t i ~ ~  ( 1 . s l j ~ r t . q :  ( I )  absence of governriieiit concept for textile industry. tha t  fueletl destruction 
of the sector: (2)  eschange rate policies; (3 )  high credit rates t ha t  are iiot suitable even for 
short-tern) financing. The  only credit tha t  colnpaiiy have talien recently. was provitletl by an 
E5toniaii I)aiili under guarantee of company's foreign partner. 
1s regards ~x i r c l~ase  of raw materials, main problems are caused by illcrease ill prices for 
\vool ant1 export duties i11 tlie Co~nnionwealtli of Independent States  (CIS) countries. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Cr1,5': prol)leins with lia,rtl currency assignments; contacts wit,l~ former largest pa,rtners in Russia 
- clotliiiig factories "Iialuzanka", "Slovya,nka" a.nd "Vologda" are stoppecl for tlie tinie being, 
tllie to  lack of n.orliiiig ca,pita,l in tliese enterprises. Decrea,se in conta,cts with R.ussia was fueled 
1)). the \va,r i l l  Clliecnya a.s well. Very significant impediment to  exports in Russia. is also high 
('LO',%) custo~iis  dut.? for imported fa.brics plus a 28%) VAT. La.st yea,r "S Ma.rcllV solcl only wool 
I~laiiliets for some liot,els i11 Moscow (sta.te procurenlent). 
Export,s to  tlie \Vest a,re mainly hampered by existing tra,tlitions a,nd system of rela,tions, 
a l~ t l  11ot I)y fornia,l Imrriers such as  ta.riffs or cert,ification. Conipany needs years t o  create 
its in~a,ge, t.o persuacle customers a.bout compa.ny's relia,bilit,y i11 terms of clua.lity and delivery. 
T-Io\vever, eI.eii untler sucli conditions company achieved soiile progress i n  establishing contacts 
<luring :3 years of esport  p rx t ices  in the  LT7est,. 
Terms of payiiients also pose serious obstacles for compa,ny's opera,tions, as payments are 
set tlecl iiot ~ a r l i e r  than 30-60 days after delivery, causing sliorta,ge of worliing ca.pita,l. Inflow of 
foreign invcstnients is practically iinpossible in the nea,rest future, before compa.ny is privat,ized. 
Xlain conil)etitors are t.lie UIi,  Italian aiid Pakistan producers. 111 tlie future serious threats  
coul<l be posed 11y competition fro111 Asia11 FSU republics? ~vliose developn~ent pot,ential is very 
I~igli. 
Aurora (Textile Industry) 
Background Inforlllation 
E.~tc~bli.sl~ed: in 1946; in 19.5G it was expa,ncled t o  supply o t l ~ e r  USSR lnarliets. 
,Size of Inboi. force: 1600. 
,Size of the ccrpitnl stock: NA. 
P~~oducts  ~l( i~~lrf i lc t i lr~d:  Hosiery products: pa,nty-hoses, stocliings, tights. ilIa,in product - syn- 
t lietic pa.iit~7-hoses. 
Outl~lrt (1990-95): Dinlinislied from 70 mn units in 1990 to  4.5 11111 in 1994. Shop producing 
sj.nthetic pa,nty lioses is w~r l i i ng  i11 3 shifts, while department producing cotton panty-l~oses for 
chilclreii and other nia,nufactures is only partly employeel due t o  tlie fall in demand. 
Ttrr.rlor~r. (1994): Ls -1.8 million. 
Pi,r?fit.~: At present coillpany operates witliout profits. Reasons: fluctuations in currency market,  
rise of fixecl costs per production unit. 
Iridtbte(111e.~~: Higli clebt t o  tlie budget (Ls 0.9m). The  sums of cla~iiiis on custo11lers aiid coin- 
pany's o\vn debt  are approxima.tely the same. R.easons: unrecoverable cla.ims 011 c u s t o r n e ~ . ~  from 
1992; tle11t.s of ;~l>a,rtrnent houses around tlie premises of the coinpany for heating (company 11a.s 
oiv11 ),oiler-liouse). 
,S ' t r .uc t l~~~ oJ' 011,1~tr.~hi11: As a joint stock compa.ny was registerecl in 1994 and is i l l  tlie process of 
~,riva.tization. sta.te a,ssets are being bouglit out  over a period of 5 yea,rs. Private equity capita,l 
c~lrreiit.ly accouiits for 24%) of the total. 
Export Orientation 
'I'raclitionally conipany solcl 20% of total output  i11 Latvia; the rest was solcl to  other USSR 
rel>ul,lics. As inany other enterprises, company has t o  change consiclerabl\ inarliets after tlie 
I)reali-up of the USSR. I11 1994 the situation with sales was as follows: 
Latvia Russia Estonia EU (Germany, Holland, Austria, etc.) 
20%, 10%) 2% 68% 
( 'ompa~ii~.  cloes not einploy services of any Latvia,ii export-iniport firm. At the  sa.me t i n ~ e  
conlpany's a,l1 partners a.br0a.d a.re wholesale organizations. The  la,rgest market is G e r i n a ~ ~ y ,  but 
it is 1-ery clifficult to  cletermine further distribution of sales in the  ELI. Large portion of ou tput  is 
solcl through O T T O  cat'alogues, Gerkens k Co. and oilier fa.mous firms. C'oiitacts witli western 
partners ivere est~ablislied through different presenta,tions ancl a,cls i11 catalogues. -4s rega.rcls 
Russia,, 110 effort,s liad t,o be n ~ a d e  t o  a'dvertize, a,s company preservetl its goocl iia~iile in all CIS 
sta.tes froni tiiiies \vllen it was doininant seller there. Compa.ny lia,s its own procluction collectio~i 
ai~cl only color ant1 sizes a,re adjusted t o  tlie needs of tlie custoniers. 
Production for Export 
111 t l ~ e  long run coinpa,ny plans to  expa,nd its export performa,nce in both Western a,nd CIS 
couiit,ries. Hoi\.ever, i11 the  nearest future, while exports to  tlie Ea.st are liamperetl by political 
ailel econoi~~ic  iist,ability aiid payments problems, EU states  are considered a,s the main target 
co~intries for exports. For a. while company doesn't need t o  expancl its activities in C!IS sta.tes 
also beca,lise it is not in a position t o  fulfill even all current orders. 
111 terius of clua.lity there is no difference between manufactures proclucetl for cloniestic or 
foreign 111a.rliets. Only color performance is adjusted to  peculiarities of each re,gion: for Latvia 
ancl Russia c o n i ~ ~ a n y  produces nla,iiily brow11 or bla,ck panty-hoses while for LVestern Europe 
111ort~ gray a ~ r d  bright (reel, green, etc.) pa,nty-hoses are nianufactured. Pa.cking is better for 
\Vestern Europe. 
111 t e r n ~ s  of price it is much more profitable t o  sell production in tlie do~iiestic inarket (with 
a,t least 6;-7'%, profits), but domestic nla,rket simply cannot absorb coriipa~ny's wliole output .  Tlie 
inarket is very sma~ll, and it is also flooded with illega,lly inlportetl (i.e., \\~itliout paying VAT 
ant1 custoi i~s duties),  low quality maiiufactures from other FSCT states. 
Current conlpetitive strengths of tlie enterprise a,re: lo\v price; quality, completely nleetiilg 
\\.est,ern st,antla.t.ds (a.11 clyes a.re imported from Switzerlantl); gootl pa.cliing design which does 
not tliffer fro111 European packaging. As regards price a,dvaiitage, conipany intends even to  
illcrease its coinl>etitiveness in this fieId. It 1ia.s prepared business pla,~i for obta~ining $15 mil 
low-interest credit needed t o  buy 100-1.50 computer controlled knitting ma.chines ant1 t o  renew 
esist,iiig ca.pa.city. Such undertaking will increase current productivity level sollle 5-6 times and 
significantly lo\ver costs. I t  seems tha t  company will succeed in a.ttracting tliese funds, as it 
a,lrea,cly I1a.s got ma.ny offers from Germany. The  only obstacle is t ha t  agreement between Latvia 
alltl Germa.ny on niutual protection of investments up t o  now has not been ra,tified. 
Doillestic Eilviroilillent for Exports 
Po.sbticc r/sptct.s.: Activities of Association of Testile and Clotliing A~Ia~iiufacturers, LDA, LCTC. 
:Vcg(/ , t i~c n.sl,tct.s: (1) escIia.nge rate policies; (2) credit policies of Latvian ha,lili~: coinpa,ny is not 
i l l  a posiitio~i t o  t,alie even short tern1 loan t o  finance purclia,se of raw ma,t,erials t o  fulfill current 
ortlers I>eca,use of liigli interest rates. 
\Vit,li purchase of raw materials conipany 1ia.s no particular problenis as  largest part of them 
is Ijouglit in Latvia a,iicl i11 ECJ countries. 
Foreign Environment for Exports 
'rile iila,iii competitor country in its sector is Italy. Competition from Russia is not consiclerecl 
cla,iigerous for t l ~ e  iiea,rest future, as  its producers very often ca,nnot meet not only quality 
st,aiicla,rcls ljut also delivery ternis. 
There a,re no fornial barriers to  conlpa,iiy's export's iieitlier i11 Wester~i  Europe, nor in Estonia, 
(Latvia lia,s free tratle agreeillelits with tliese regions). Soine inco~ivenieiices a,re caused only by 
tlle recluireiiieiit t o  Iiave quality certificates, a,s tliis needs a lot of money a.nd time (but  not 
atIclit,ional effort,s to improve quality). Company has received ta,riff-free import quota (50 mn 
pairs per >.ear) l o  EIT sta.tes under EU-Latvia free trade agreement (FTA) .  Currently "Aurora's" 
esports  to EU a,re well below this quota.  
Notwithstancliiig a.l>sence of direct barriers to  company's exports to  the West, there are some 
\.el.!. st,rong infornial ba.rriers. First of all it is customers' traditions t'o nia.iiita,in their loya,lty t o  
ccrtain bra,iicls. T l ~ e r e  is also an informal distribution of influence splitres by cert,a,in producers. 
:Is a result. coiiipally ca,n elbow its way in overcrowded EU iuarket only uncler bra,nds of famous 
t ratling co~nl>a~nies. 
Latvija (Clothing Industry) 
Background Information 
E.~tt~bli.sActl: in 19G4. 
,S'r:c of ltrbor force: 3,200 in five plants constituting the enterprise: tliree in Riga: one in Dau- 
gavpils ancl one i l l  Iiriislava. 
,S'izc of the ctrl)rt(rl stock: NR. 
Pi~oclucts rrrcrrrufoetlrrtd: LIl~per~vear: suits (major product),  costumes, \\rnrrn jackets, coats. 
0utl)ut (1.990-95): Diniinislied by more than a factor of two in 1992-1993, in 199-1 output  was 
stabilizeel, achieving 1 m articles per year. Now tlie output  is slo~vly increasing. Presently ca- 
pacities are usecl by sonie 30-3.5%. 
Tui*noorr (19.94): 1.:3 rn Ls. 
Pi.ofits: .At present conipany operates without profits. I11 1992 it suffered In1 Ls losses 011 prod- 
uc ts  esported to  Russia. For part of delivered production tlie company simply did not receive 
~);~ynient.  Otlier manufactures produced for Russia could not be sold due t o  delay of most fa- 
lored nations agreement ratification between Russia and Latvia: clouble customs cluties were 
;~l,plicable t o  Latvian goods t ha t  together with additional esport  related espenses increased the  
[)rice 11). 100%. Furthermore, company had t o  pay liigli interest paynlents on credits ivl~ich was 
take11 for the p~rrcliase of fabrics. 
frrtlc.btcdrlc.ss: Company still has not settlecl debts. caused by tlie difficulties rne~itio~iecl above. 
Furtlierniore. it accumulated solilc new debts owing t o  the s ta te  buclget. 
,S'tr.ucturr of ocon~r..\hil): Since 1991 joint stock company 56% of shares belongs to  employees, 
29'x to  the Lat\,ian s tate ,  the rest (15%) belongs t o  co~ripany's partners. One of tlieni is tlie 
largest balilr of Latvia "Unibanka" . This partnership did not help the conipany in financial 
~l iat tcrs .  \-ice versa: colnpany still pays high interest on oltl cretlits. 
Export Orie i~ ta t io i~ /Produc t io~~  f r Exports 
I ~;ttlitio~raIIy company solcl 1.5% of total output  i n  Latvia; the rest \ \ as  sent t o  Russia ancl other 
I'SSR republics. IIowever, after negative esperience i n  1992 ancl general weakening of economic 
nltcl l>olitical ties nit11 Russia, company had to  change markets considerabl!r. 19913 ancl 1994 
\yere t l ~ e  \.eals of ~stal)lisliing contacts in the \Yest. .4s a result, last year sales distribution was 
cornpletel!. ~ l i f f ~ r e n t  from tha t  observed in Soviet period: 
Latvia C4ermanv Others: Sweden, UII;, Finland, France, Dennlark 
.Also the 11ature of procluction completely changed: earlier conipany esportetl only own pro- 
cluction. no~v  it espor t s  the services of its cheap labor force. As a result, company's niain partners 
abroacl are clotliing proclucers. Some producers deal with company directly, some through me- 
cliators (foreign) : part of production is solcl through catalogues of O T T O  ancl QUELLE. Some 
contacts with present foreign partners were inherited from late 1980s wlien coliipany esported 
\el.. sniall ~~or t i o i i s  of its own production t o  I lestern Europe. Sonie contacts nere  established 
a t  international exhibitions. However. more often foreign partners souglit contacts with the  
coliipany themselves as  tliey n.ere interested in cheap labor force: tliey cliose "Latvija" because 
it is one of the niost modern and largest clothing colllpanies in Latvia. The  maill reasons why 
the), prefer t o  deal with the Latvian company, notwithstanding a bit Iiiglier price level than 
in the rest I;'SLT, ale: (1)  Higher technical level of production in comparison \\.it11 many other 
1TSII producers. I n  1958 wlien colnpany still was a s ta te  enterprise, four of its plants (especially 
tlie main factory in Riga) were reconstructed and received rnodern ecluipment fro111 Italy. As 
;I re<,ult. co1111)any call provide tiigli quality tha t  meets western standards. (2)  Stable terms 
of tleli\.er.. (3 )  Lo~ver risk, clue to  more stable political situation and relative niacroeconomic 
s ta  Ilility. 
"La,t,vija," receives a growing number of orders from different Europea,ii states! but sometimes 
company lias to reject them a.s envisaged remuneration does not cover production costs. The 
fir.e plants coiistit.uting "Latvija" enjoy large indepentlence i11 their ol~era.tioiis. Ea,cli enterprise 
is free t,o sign production contracts with foreign customers. I-Io~vever, largest part of potential 
j)iirt~iiers come to tlie ma.jor plant of the company in Riga. Tlie main plant, however, often 
reacltlresses orders to plants in Daugavpils a.nd I(r2slava. 
.4rtuallj. coinpa,ny uses the ea.siest and may be the oiily possible wa.y of stabilizing its fiiia~icial 
sit,uation. It engaged pra,ctically i11 risk free business, but this also iiieaiis tliat tlie company 
pi~actica,lly lias no perspectives for further development. Exporting tlie services of its labor 
rorce, coliipany hardly ca.n compeilsate costs and ca,n ga.iii only little profits. At the same time 
for esports of onrn production compa.ny simply 11a.s not got enough ivorliing ca.pita1 needed for 
initial purcliase of fal~rics and other inputs. It is doubtful whetlier through esport of its services 
conipany will succeed to accrue needed funds. Tho otlier problem is establishing ma,rket a.ccess. 
Tlie conipany makes all efforts to find its way out of this situation: it seeks serious foreign 
~>a,rtiiers for establishing joint venture that would help to  solve both problems, financial and 
liiarliet a,ccess probleiii. Company has already started preliminary tallis with some of potential 
invest,ors. For~iiing a, joint venture would be profitable for all sides a,s no serious reco~istructioil 
of t,lie e~~terpr ise  is needed in the nea.rest future (escluding the pla.nt in I\rSslava.). Company 
sl~cceecled t.o iiia~intain its esperimental laboratory for the loca,l marliet where it sells its ow11 
protluct.ion. (However, developnient possibilities in loca,l market are very limitecl). It lla,s good 
colit,acts with fa,l>ric producers and distributors: QUELLE, OTTO (e.g., for viscose silli), va,rious 
l,itliua,niair protlucers (for fa,brics for cloaks), "Astotais nia,rts" (for woolen fabrics). Company 
Ilas atl\:a,ntage of gett,ing state procrireillent orders (procluctioii of r~niforins for police). Tlie 
sriccess i11 attracting foreign investnients ilia,y be dependent on coiiipany's possibility t,o tlivitle 
illto sinaller units. At. 1ea.st tlie five fa,ctories now forming tlie corripa,ily have to  I~ecoine legally 
indepenclent . 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Po.~.iti~!t  ns1~ect.s.: Local unfavorable conditions for developnient connected with illegally imported 
low cl~~ality, but cheap products, and \vith still very low purchasing power of population. These 
condit,ions siinply force company to seek otlier outlets. However, profits per unit sold in the 
clouiestic 111arliet a.re much liigher t1ia.n i11 esports. Another positive factor is t,lie free trade 
a g r e ( > ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ t  with EU. 
;\7tgutil-c (/.s.pccts: ( 1 )  Higli price of energy which liave a negative iinl)a.ct 011 costs: (2)  Tiglit credit 
policy of' Latvian ballli~; very low possibility of getting iiiternationa~l credits; (3 )  Esclia.nge rate 
~~olicies \vliich deprive conipa.iiy of its traditional eastern marliet. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
AS regartls eastern markets, esports are hampered both by forinal and informal barriers: im- 
port tariffs (about 2.5%,), liigli VAT (28%), as well as low purchasing power of population and 
increasing competition from Asia. Besides, companies in many FSlT republics are also involved 
ill jol) norli for western conipanies, and tlierel>y increasing competition i11 tlie LJTest. Tllere are 
also sizable clifficulties to  enter the market under owl1 name. 
Venezia (Footwear) 
E.\tabli.<Oc(l: ill Octolxr 1991, on the base of the former state enterprise "Pirmais n~aijs" \vliich 
11 ;IS split i n  two joint \,entures: "irenezia" and "Pir~naden". 
Si:r c-,f ltrbor. forrt: 110. 
,Yizr of thr rr/piftil stock: NA. 
Pr.o(ltrct.\ r~~nr~li fcrct~i ir~l:  S a ~ d a l s .  shoes and boots (mainly for women). 
Oufptrt ( 1  9.90-SS): One can only compare data of Venezia and the old enterprise "Pirmais maijs". 
.At its Iieight tlie old company produced some 3 nl pairs of footwear per year (low quality sinlple 
footwear). \'enezia overtook about 20-25% share of tlie enterprise. The figures for the last t\vo 
Tears are given below: 
tllousands of pairs 115 76 27 
Last year production capacities were employed only by 20'3,. 
,Y(lfr.< irl flrorr~~or~rl.~ of Ls: 
Pr.ojf.\: Conil~any llad sufficient profits only in 1992. 
Ir1r/rbt6drtr~<: C'ompany has substantial debt to the budget. 
,Ytr~lrc.tlirr of cllr,r,c r.\lrip: Since 1991 the structure of ownership 1las not clianged: 33% of shares 
I)clo~~g to tlie l t a l i a ~ ~  partner; the rest (6'7%) belongs to tlie Lat\ i a n  state. (In the other successor 
of tlie old enterprise 4V belongs to a German partner and tlie rest to tlle State) .  
Export Oriei~tatioi~/Productioil for Exports 
111 tlie **l)est" !,ears of the Soviet regime "Pirmais nlaijs" sold ~nucll inore tlian llalf of tlle 
o ~ i t p t ~ t  to the rest of tlie USSR. I11 the first real year of "Venezia's" operations (in 1992) tlie 
nelv company was also quite successful in terms of esports: approsi~nately 30% of productio~i 
\ \as soltl in Russia. Practically all capacities were employed. Company's big success tliat year 
can I)e esl~lained quite sirnply: foreign (western) production tliat began to appear in tlle FSLr 
~l lar l~et  n a s  too expensive for ordinary people, a t  tlie same time most of state enterprises still 
tontinuetl to produce old fashion footwear. -4s a result, "Vcnezia"~ protll~cts (like tlie products 
of man!l otlier joint ventures) quickly won consumers' recognition due to liigli quality. 
tlesign, and reasonable prices. That  was tlie main strategy of \'enezia's fo re ig~~  investor (an 
Italian footwear producer): to conquer Eastern markets by expanding production in one of the 
FSIT states. Esporting finished products from Italy, Italian partner could not reach this goal 
clr~e to s l ~ a r p  depreciation of currencies in all transition economies. In tlie periocl from October 
1991 till mid-sumnler 1992 tlie foreign trade regime ~vas  not yet liberalized in Latvia either. 
However, s i ~ ~ c e  then situation changed a lot. The banli of Latvia set its course for stabilization 
of national currency, wliicli very soon led to steady increase of Lats rate. Besides, it seems 
t liat go\rernment \vent too far with tlie liberalization of trade in 1992, because new or recently 
rc\t ructurecl elitel />rises lost opportunity to strengthen their financial situation, to reorganize 
their ~xoduction before meeting the co~npetition from abroad. .As a result, i'enezia not only 
llatl to stop espansion but even cut protluction. The nlarkets in Latvia and tlie rest of FStJ  
I~ecan~e  more and more Aootled wit11 cheap medium (if not lo~v) quality, mainly leather footwear 
from ('liinese. Taiwan ant1 Italy (at least products wit11 Italian labels). Due to sucll unfavorable 
clcl-clopnlents company's esports fell to 5% of product in 1993 and llad to be stopped in 1994 
at all. Practically the sanle happened wit11 the other enterprise "Pirmaden". The difference 
was tlia,t Pirmaclen's German partner used iiPirniaden" also a.s a c1iea.p labor force for its own 
~x~otluct~ion. Ilo~vever, witli apprecia.tion of Lat, Pirmaden could not work anymore for the saliie 
reniuncra.t.ion, \vliich eventua~lly turned away its partner. As a result, despite a lot of positive 
for tle\relol)nie~its hotli companies are in deep crisis. 
r-IS tlie first advantage should be mentioned availability of cheap 1ea.ther from Latvian farmers 
as cattle l~reecling is quite well developed in Latvia.. Company produces only natura,l lea,tlier 
sl~oes. Due to unsatisfactory work of Latvian leatlier processing enterprise "I\o~nkta" i n  both 
price and clua,lity respects, conlpany esta.blislied good co~itacts witli a. Litliua.nian company, tha.t 
;illowecl \i .~~ezia. to obtain liigli qua'lity leatlier witli niinimum costs ( I n  Lithua,nia wage a,nd 
price levels are lower than in  Latvia). Furthermore, company has good ecluipment tlianks to 
i~~vestments by tlie foreign partner. Only 20-3076 of tlie equipment remained from "Pirmais 
maijs". C.!onipa,ny is a,lso sniall and flesible, and lias very good design la,bora.tory and does not 
11eec1 assista,lice i n  design fro111 its foreign partner any more. Product prices are not liigli if one 
talies into a,ccount high qua,lity: in average one pa.ir of shoes costs 7 Ls (without 18%) I7.4T). 
Honrever, for Russia. even sucli price is too liigli, taking into a,ccount additional payments for 
tra,~~sportat ion,  customs anel higher I'AT. Former partners and otlier business in  Russia keep 
cspressing interest i n  con~pa,ny's products, but tlie price is decisive. 
Not~vitlista,ncling: co~iipany's very stra.ightened fina.ncial situation, Venezia. is active in rnar- 
Iieting ancl sales. C'onipa.ny ha,s well developed network of sales agent,s i n  Latvia. It also has (j 
own shops in  Latvia.. If possible, conlpa,ny participates i n  international esl i ibi t io~~s (in Mosco\v, 
l.,oipzig, a,licl Poland). I-Iowever, pa,rticipation i n  tliese esliibitions helped only in esta.blis1iing 
goocl cont,act,s with suppliers of raw ma,teria,ls (chemicals, decorative elements, otlier compo- 
I I P I I ~ S ) .  a ~ ~ c l  not to get. new cont,ra.cts for sales. 
Domestic Ei~vironmeilt for Exports 
l'o.s.i/ioc- cL.s.pect.s: Activities of LDA (earlier it provided a,ssistance i n  esta.blisliing some conta.cts 
ivitli Russia). 
:Ycgclt i~c tr.s.l)ccts: ( I )  Escliange rate policies; ( 2 )  Very low customs ta,riffs for inlported fo0twea.r; 
(3 )  Poor horcler control that  cause large inflo\v of illegal imports (\vitliout paying VAT a,nd 
c ~ ~ s t o m s  ta,riffs): (4) Absence of government strategy in  respect to footwca.r i~iclust.ry. Lat,\ria. Iias 
I I I ; ~ I I ~  foot\vea,r factories, most of them not bad factories, which coulcl supply footwear to  five 
sucli count,ries as La,tvia. However, i n  present situa.tion none of them ca.n sufficient.1~ espantl its 
operations ancl, as a result, t o  cut costs. Capacities are utilized a.t 20%,; fixed costs per proclucts 
steaclil!, rise. Nolie of these compa~iies have sustainable financia,l situa,tion. As a. result, also 
payments to tlic buclget are ignored. In sucli situa,tion tlie Latvia,~l government lias to take some 
steps to ensure 'ivilized licluidation or stimulate reorientation of sonle of tliese enterprises, a i d  
to provicle support for tlie rest to survive as footwear producers. 
Foreign Eilviroili~leilt for Exports 
111 Russia. ~iiain obstacles to co~npany's export development are 20%) custo~lls cluty ancl liigli 
\'.-IT, as nell as inflow of low quality cheap products frot-tl China. I11 tlie west t lie lilain obstacles 
are overproduction ancl tlie consumers adlierence to well-established brand names. 
Meteors (Chemicals/Footwear) 
Background Iilforillatioil 
Drrtr oj' ~.strrbli.s1~7~?cr~t: 1864. 
,5'/:c oj' lrrbor. fbr~cc: 3.50. 
,?I:( of tlrc royitcil stock: 700,000 Ls. 
P17orltrtts rrlcrricrfocttrre(1: footwear made of rubber, PVC, polyuretliane, fabric, natural aiid irni- 
tation leather for nieii, women, teenagers aiid children for everyclay u5e (all seasons), ancl sports 
-- allout :300,000 pairs per year. 
Tur-rzorr r. (19.94): 991,600 Ls. 
Olltl~llt ( I  990-.9.i): diminished by a factor of 4 to  5 (largest fall \\.as ol~ser\~ecl i n 1992). 
Profits: Sul~stantial financial losses due to  tlie currency reforills (e.g., i l l  1992 240,000 Ls; in 
1993 170,000 Ls). 
Dc b1.s: S10,000 Ls (mainly to  the state budget and to  electricity suppliers), however, if conipared 
1 0  clainis on c~rstomers plus tlie value of raw material stock with conlpanies clebts, the two values 
are practically the saine. 
,S'tr.ucttlrc of ouyner.slrlp: Since 1990 state lease company. Privatization has been applied for. 
C'oinpaiiy lias to  Ile clivided a t  least in 4 parts (now it nlaiiitains huge unesploited assets, that 
causes losses). 
Export Orieiltatioil 
In 1990 l5'% of procluction ivas solcl in  the domestic market. Export niarliets were .4fgliani~tan 
(IS'/:). Russia (12%!), Lithuania (8%),  Estonia (3%,), Ukraine and Belarus (-1%). Tlie rest (about 
40% of output)  was sold in  the Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, llzbekistaii aiid I<irgystan. 
After tlie collapse of the USSR production drastically diminished; due to  dist~irbances in pay- 
~iients iriecliaiiisni with the FSU republics largest part of output was sold in Latvia. In 1994 tlie 
cli\tril~utioii of company's sales was the following: 
Latvia Other Baltic republics Uzbekistan Russia 
50%) 14%) 10%) 30% 
I11 1995, according to preliiiiinary estiiiiates a t  least 10%) of inanufactures will I)r esported 
to  Denmarli. 
.At present exports to  Russia are stopped, a t  least for the time being, due to  very unstable 
financial situation there: a lot of wliolesale organizations \vent bankrupt. At tlie saiiie tinie cleals 
I\ ith retailers are unprofitable as orders usually do not esceed 300 pairs of footwear. Furthermore, 
within 3 days after bringing goods into Russia 20% custoins duty aiid 28% VAT liave to  be paid. 
I n  such a situation tlie only possible solution is to  rent some of customs warehouses in Russia 
ancl to  cleliver goods to  tlie customer directly froin there. But for tliis purpose company has 
to iniburse CTSD .50,000 guarantee payment and a regular rent to  tlie owner of the warehouse. 
Present fiiiaiicial situation does not allow the firm to  realize such unclertaliing. 
C'oiripaii!. cloes not employ services of any esport-import firms. 
Coiiipany esports footware elaborated by its own designers. 
Contacts n-itli foreign countries are established i n  a variety of ways: some remained from 
Soviet tiines. soiile were recently created tliaiiks to  personal relationships i n  repul~lics of Central 
.\sia: i11 soiiie cases potential customers contact t,he conlpany themsel~es. Besides, company 
puts ads i11 relevant international catalogues (e.g., "Eurocatalogue"). If possil~le, company 
participates i n  international fairs. Tlie last time it took part in Diisse1dol.f exhibition, wliere 
tlie contacts Lvitli Danish partner were established. Company's ~-uanufactures are offered i11 all 
large\t cities of the three Baltic republics; sonletimes contracts are signecl even with retailers 
(clepart nlent stores). .A11 compaiiy's everyday activities are directed towards espaiidiiig outlets 
for sales. Alanagerial staff very often undertakes business trips wit11 company's collection i n  
Baltics as well as in otlier FSU republics. 
Productioll for Export 
('rrlreiit acl\.autages of tlie protlucts of "Meteors" are first of all low prices: the  largest part of 
n~annfactures are priced below 10 1,s. Tlie other advantage is very rich assortment of practical 
e~eryclay footnale.  2 1 3  of present assortment was elaborated during tlie last few years, and they 
are produceel in uiore than 120 different models. Color performance is very good, esl~ecially for 
cliiltlren's foot\vear. Due t o  inanageme~it efforts a substantial technical reconstruction could be 
accomplislied recently. During 1992-1994 the company invested 600,000 Ls t o  machinery and 
ecluipluent notn~ithstanding persistent financial problems. However, further large investments 
are ~ieeclctl in 11laiit t o  meet higher Western quality standards. 
In terins of price it  is more profitable t o  sell production in the  tlonlestic marliet. Howevei, 
tlon~estic niarliet is too small, especially taking into account escessive inflow of legal and illegal 
i~l iports  of foot~vear. Tlie other problem is the small purchasing po\rer of tlie population. 
Donlestic Ellvirolllllent for Exports 
Posit ice. osl)ccts: none. 
!Vcgatirc. n.sl)crt.s: (1) credit policies of Latvian banks; (2) incomplete settlement of pa,yment 
issues even n.itl1 otlier Ba.ltic states: payments are usua,lly settled trough thircl countries' banks 
(e.g.. Swetlens ba.iilis); ( : 3 )  a.bsence of perinanent I,a.tvia,n trade centers in EU;  (1) distribution 
of' C4-21 creclits t,lirougli commercial ba.nks, which ra.ise credit costs up t o  50%); ( . 5 )  slow pa,ce of 
~)ri\.atiza,t.ion tlia,t does i ~ o t  allow compa,ny t o  get free from huge unutilizetl premises a,ncl other 
assets: (6)  clela,ys in refunding VAT 011 inputs. 
I n  general t,liere are no problems with getting inputs. The  terms of delivery d o  not ca,use 
problems as  allout lialf of a,ll raw ma,terials are imported from Ita.ly. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
There are no otlier enterprises in Baltics producing the footware of the sanle type; tliis is very 
lucrative fro111 tlie company's point of view. Italian company "Simons" was ~nentioned as  the 
largest competitor in the West. 
Iln11ort tariff:\ i l r  CIS countries as  well as  payment conditions very often inlpede c o m p a ~ ~ y ' s  
clsl>ort eslxtnsion. Tliis applies especially for Belarus lvhere payments are settled in national 
c u ~ r e l ~ c ~ . .  \\,llicl~ is sharply depreciating and is difficult t o  convert t o  other crlrrencies. T h e  other 
prol)len~ is onclercle\lelol>etl legal systein in  all FSU states, which ~nakes  it difficult t o  recover 
t la i~i is  on customers. This is a very important obstacle since nlost of the company's partilers 
inil)ort o n l ~  ul~cler condition tha t  payment is made after the realization of supplies. 
Till HOW conclusion of free trade agreement with EU has positive inlpact on firm's activities 
only i l l  ternls of the imports in inputs. 
Laima (Food industry) 
E.5tc1blishtrI: i n  1870. 
,?I:( of Irrbor forcc: 700. 
Prorluct.5 ~,,n~ll~filctured: Chocolate candies - 6372 tons; Toffees - 498 tons; C'hocolate - 130 
ton5. 
O l ~ t l ~ ~ t  (ill o176): 
Pi.ofit.~: Conipany has large profits, but precise figure is NA.  
I~,(kbtctl~zcs.\: Company has not significant debts. 
,'j'tr-uctii~u of ocr~zcrship: By the end of 1993 transformed from state enterprise into joint stock 
conipaiij,. :30'X, of stock capital belongs to  the state, 32-3.5% to employees, and the rest to  other 
i~ivcstors (there are no foreign owners). Ownersllip structure lias not cl~anged cluring 1994. 
Export Oriei~tation 
C'o~npanp always worked mainly for clomestic market. Exports never esceecled 20% of output. 
k'rolll these 20'X approximately 90% were sent to  Russia, 2% to  R~ilgaria (earlier also many 
inputs were iniported fro111 Bulgaria), the rest was sent to  other FSU republics. In the last years 
\it uation lvitli export was as follows: 
1992 1993 1994 
Exports in per cent of total sales 11% 1.5%) 26% 
:IS earlier, practically all export is sent to  Russia; the rest is solcl in Iiazalilistan, Litliuaiiia, 
Belarus, (;el-many ancl the USA. "Laima" does not use services of any Latvian export-import 
colllpany. However, all business partners abroad are ivliolesale organizations, ancl about one third 
of them are stable clients over long period of tirne. "Laima" is one of few Latvian companies 
that 1iai.e a \yell cleveloped marketing unit. I11 Latvia, tlie company launched a large proniotion 
canipaign: coml~any's advertiserneilts call be seen on TV, in newspapers and in the streets. 
It has opened clozens of shops around all Latvia and it is popular as never before. However, 
the cornpan! is not so active in foreign markets. "Laima" has not got its shops abroad, and 
aclvertisement\ appear ver!. selclo111 in foreign mass-meclia. Nevertheless, coinpany participates 
i l l  all relcvaiit international exhibitions (in Russia, Lithuania and C;ermany) and its ads are 
~~lacecl in seine international catalogues. "Laima" is one of few companies \vhich Iiave becollie 
meml~er of Electronic Article Numbering Latvia. 
Production for Export 
coiiipany produced very high quality chocolate even in Soviet times and it succeeded to  
maintain this lo~v quality till now. Moreover, recently the company espanclecl assortment by 
nea~ly  .30'X. Duriiig the last years only two types of candies were withcl~awn from production 
clue to lacli of clemancl, and now it produces clozens of different candies, cliocolates and toffees. 
It I)lPl>ares \ometl~ing special for each large holiday (Christmas, Easter, etc.).  Also design of 
parbaging \ \a\  signilicaiitly improved. It lias accluired good reputation not only among Latvian 
cu\toiners, I~u t  also in other FSU republics due to pretty good taste ancl originality of its procl~lcts 
dncl natural ingreclients of high quality. 
-411 the5e positive changes were achieved without renewal of ecluipment: some ec1uiprnent 
ic~liaiiiecl fro111 the clays of company's establisliment, some were bought in tlie 19.50s and 1960s. 
0 1 1  a\.e1age tlie age of equipment tends to  be inore than 1.5 years. But that is not considered a 
5c1ious p ~ o l ~ l e ~ i i  l ecause conlpaliy earns enough money and it will be in a position to gradually 
renew equipinciit without inflow of capital from outside. Moreover, conipany's management 
strongly ol>jecLs foreign participation, and it has serious reasons for that .  Western producers do 
~ i o t  want to  share their market with someone else, and company received even solile warnings. 
I11 fact a lot of Lai~ua products are much better than products of "h/lars", "Fazer" and others. 
It hat1 never had problems witli acquiring quality certificates in EU. 
The onl!. p~oblem f o ~  company's expansion in  FSLI is low purcliasiiig power of populatiori i n  
<i l l  ~el)ublics. For the t iirie being Russian partners buy only cheapest protlucts of the coulpaiiy 
(a\erage retail price of company's products is 2 Ls per kg). As a result, more tlian half of 
capacities are not employed. Company works i n  one shift. 
Tliere is no difference in  terms of profits between production solcl in the doiilestic market or 
esported. as coiilpaily has standard list of prices. The coiilpany lias no losses fronl collecting 
1'") me~its  abroad because foreign partners liave to  pay in  advance. May be it is not good policy 
i n  [elms of increasing sales, but company secures itself from defaults. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
P o . i / t / ~ c  r.\ixct.i: Coiicl~isioii of FTA witli EU, activities of LCTC. 
\ rgrr tire cr.iljcc th: ( 1 )  Iilsufficieiitly stable relatiolis witli Russia: (2 )  Escliaiige rate policy, which 
5tratlilj- tlecreases co~ilpetitiveness of Latvian gootls abroad: (3)  clela~s, oftc~i esceetling 3 niontlis, 
in  rcfuiitli~ig 1X%! ITAT paid for inputs; (4) high credit rates that  are not s~~stai i iable even for 
diort-terin needs. 
Foreign eilviroililleilt for Exports 
"Laima" lias not succeetletl very much i11 espantling exports to  western Europe. notwithstanding 
the escelleiit characteristics of its products. One reason for this is overproduction i n  Europe, and 
1 Ilc inforilia1 tlistril~utioii of influence spheres by local producers. Sucli obstacles as import tariffs 
i111tl ~)~ocetlures of getting the necessary certificates are not decisive. "hlars" was nlentioned as 
t l ~ e  ~iiai~r co~iipctitor. Esports to Russia are liainpered by low purchasing pourer of population, 
2S'X I-A4T, ant1 relatively liigli import duty - 0.G ECU per Lg (allout '20% i11 at1 valorem terms). 
Kaija (Food industry) 
Background Iilforillatioil 
E.stnbli.shcd: in 1583. 
,S'irc of lobor force: 6.50. 
Pr.oduct.s r r ,n~~l~f (~c turcd  (in 5% of totc~l output): tinned fish G0..5%; preserves (pacliaged salted 
fisli) 29 .3s j ;  fish cookery (incl. snloked fish) 10.2%. 
0 utput ( 1  990-1 994) (ill tons): 
,S'nlc.< (1994): about  7,7 111 Ls. 
Profits: NA. 
I ~ ~ d ~ b t e d r ~ c . s . ~ :  According t o  company's management, company lias debts,  however, claims on 
customers are higher. 
, S /~ .uc tu~r  cJf' ou*rltr.sh~l>: Recently company was privatizeel through tender organized by the 
Latvian Pri~ratization agency  (it  was one of the first enterprises privatized in such a way). 
C'onlpany has become joint stock conlpany with a major shareholder (company "Avelus") having 
;J'%, of shares n~hile 2.5%, in accordance with present legislation, was offered for privatization 
certificates t o  the  public. 
Export Orieiltation 
Lnfortunately, p~ecise da t a  on situation in 1990 were not available, however, it i y  clear t ha t  
no significalit clianges in export structure happened during transition periocl (in 199:3-1994, for 
instance. sales clistribution was conlpletely identical). As earlier, main customers of "I\;aijans 
p~oduction are FSIT states. Approsirnately one ninth of production is exported to  other East 
European states.  Distribution of sales for 1994 is given below: 
Lat \.ia CIS + Lithumia Czech Republic, Pola~icl, Bulzaria 
4nlo11g CIS importers nlost important are Russia, I<azalihstan ancl Belarus. Conlpany lias 
custo~iiers (~vl~olesales firms) even in such distant Russian to~vns  as  hlurmansli, Arhangelsk and 
\~latlivostok. \-ery snlall cleliveries are sonletinles sent to  Germany ancl the ITSA (obviously for 
emigrants from FSIT). 
It is necessary t o  mention, tha t  for different groups of products, also sales distribution is 
tlifferent. If \\-r talie tinned fisli, 72% are sent to  CIS and Lithuania and 1.5%) are sold t o  other 
East European states  (primarily the Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria); the rest is sold in 
Lat~ria. Salted fish, in turn,  is exported only to  Russia (71.2% of total output  of salted fish). 
Otlier procluction is sold only in Latvia, because of short storage term. 
Till now colnpauy was not enough active in sphere of marketing and sales. Company partici- 
p.ltes o n l ~ .  i t1  cloniestic exhibitions; only once it took part in international exhibition in Germany. 
511lall aclvertisements are given only in local newspapers or magazines. hlost of customers find 
the company themselves, as  they remember company's nanle from the Soviet times. Only re- 
cently has the company ordered prospectuses for propaganda. 
Productioil for Export 
C'ompany has not cliange assortment in the last years. Only labels became more bright t o  at tract 
customers' attention. It still produces canned fisli wit11 bones t ha t  is disadvantage in comparison 
wit11 western products where only fillet is used. Nevertheless, this does not rnean tha t  company's 
~ ~ ~ o c l u c t i o n  nloulcl be bad. "Iiaija" llacl never had problems with getting quality certificates 
~vhen exporting to I'Vestern Europe or USA. Iiaija's production Ilas its own range of reliable 
customers. \"cry i ~ l ~ p o r t a n t  fact,or is habits (ea.rlier many consumers in  FSU simply ha,ve not got 
other alternative to buy ca,nnecl fish). Other factor is that  Iia,ija7s protluction practica,lly does 
not cont.ain preservatives. However, it seems, that after recent cha,nge in  ownership structure, 
sit,uation will improve beca.use "Avelux" priva,tized the compa.ny uncler t,he condition that  it 
nil1 invest, 1.3 m Ls for modernization of the enterprise. The first thing, t l ~ a t  LbAvelux" plans 
to  realize is to install vacuum packing ecluipment that  would allow company to  export also 
~>rotlucts other t11an tinned or salted fish (for insta.nce its high cjuality smoked fish). Besides, it 
is l>ossiI~le that  compa,ny will resume productio~l of sinoltecl sprats in oil, a,s deinancl for this type 
of tinnecl fish is especially high. years a.go, in accordance with state plan, this production 
\va.s moved to collective fa.rms on the sea,shore. Very important thing is also cans, cvhich are 
inconvenient in use, a.s t,hey ca.nnot be opened without key. All the a~forementionecl features 
inclica,te that coin~>a,ny I1a.s to change its productioi~ fundamentally if it   ants t,o be successful 
also i n  kC'ester11 Europe and the rest world. The proble~n of prices is a,lso very a,cute as prices 
for such inputs a s  tinplate, oil a,nd tonlato-paste more than doubled in  the la,st two years. As a 
result it. I~eca.me nlore difficult t o  keep prices low. Now the standa.rd price in the nrorlcl marltet 
for tiniietl fish for one 2.5Og ca.n is O..53$; this is much lower t,han t,lle coinpa,ily gets for conserves 
solcl in the domestic marltet. However, when production reaches the final consulner abroad very 
often its price is twice as high a,s the initia.1 price, due to  11igIi tra,nsporta,tion, stora,ge costs, 
other ~necliat,or-services a,nd iinport tariffs, applica,ble in Russia ant1 t,he rest of East,ern Europe. 
Doillestic Eilviroilmeilt for Exports 
a Insufficiently st,a,ble rela,tions with Russia and cvitll other CIS states. 
a Strong real appreciation of the Lat against ITSD (most frequently usecl currency in trans- 
actio~ls) that  when combined with the clepreciation of CIS currencies leacls to the decrease 
of Iiaija's competitiveness. 
a .4bsence of Latvian trading houses abroad. 
a 1,acli or financial support by the government to Latvian exporters (subsiclies, lo~v-interest 
creclits for export operations). 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Largest ol>\t;\cles to  company's exports to  FSU countries are high ITAT in FSU countries, inflow 
of \~~l)siclic,ecl proclucts from western Europe, extremely low purchasing power of populatio~l 
(esl~eciallj. in Ukraine). transportation and mediation costs ancl import tariffs (in Russia the 
latter is 1.5y). IVhat concerns Western Europe, the company is silnply not ready to  begin its 
expansion there, due t o  inadequate assortment and other drawbaclis rnelltio~~ed above. 
RVR (Riga Carriage Plant) (Mechanical engineering) 
Background Iilforillatioll 
I I~ .< tory :  Founded in 1895 and manufactured a range of products including train cars and as- 
sembly of Ford cars. During the Soviet period tlie plant manufactured 90% of the passenger 
rail cars usecl in tlie LJSSR, including both electric and diesel power cars. The  RVR conlpany 
~nanufactures the carriage and mecl~anical parts for tlie product, but electric controls are bought 
from the o t l ~ e r  Latvian company RER. 
,$I:C of l(16o1' fbr'ce: 3056. 
,S'rzc of the rapital stock: 5.4 111 Ls. 
O ( ~ t ~ x ~ t  (1.990-1994): cliiniilished from 600 carriages in 1990 to  120 in 1993. Since 1994 output  
I~cgan t o  recover: in t ha t  year 201 carriages were produced. However, it is clear, t ha t  previous 
levels of ou tput  will never be achieved again. (The best result acllievecl during the Soviet period 
\\.a\ 6SO carriages pcr year when company produced also large number of trains).  
,S'rrlta (1994): 11 m Ls. 
Profits: NA. 
111d~btcdi1c.s.s: There are debts of some $ 3m which incurred \vhen demand droppetl sharply i n  
1992-1993. There are also problems related t o  a train set for Lilacedonia (value $1 m )  wl~icli 
llas i ~ o t  bee11 cleliverccl and remained in Bulgaria as a consecluencc of an clnbargo on deliveries 
to  Llaceclonia a t  tlle request of Greece. 
,S'tr*irc.tlrrc of 0llr17c r'.\lr~l): Sta te  enterprise, has t o  be privatized: company's inanagement seeks 
[~a r tne r s  for privatization itself, as  it fears of placing con~pany's  future in the  hands of the 
Latt.ian Pritatization Agency. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
C ' o m ~ ~ a i l ~ .  always nrorl<ed for esports,  sales to  other FSU republics. However, till 1991. the 
clisi~~tegration of tlre LJSSR only supplies t o  former 17ugoslavia. constituting about  4% of total 
output ,  ncrc coirsiclered as  esports.  In the meantime contacts with l'ugoslavia were stopped 
tlrlc to  the l-ugosla\' war. Latvian railway company. i n  turn,  never I~ought  morc t hail 5%) of 
R\'K piotluction. Due t o  lack of financial resources tlie rail\iray conipany's purchases clecreased 
from 2'X in 1990 to  0%) of RVR production in recent years. As a result, company has become a 
100% pure exporter. Current distribution of company's productio~i between clifferent countries 
i \  f'ollo\ving: 
Ulira.ine Belarus Russia. I iazakl~stan 
Earlier Russia was the major importer of company's production, its share was well above 
.TO%. 
C'on~~>aiiy clid not nlake significant efforts establishing new contacts as  the ~ l l a r l ~ e t  for trains 
i\ nell-known. T l ~ e r e  are not so many producers in this sector ailcl they hnon each other very 
well. -411 crirrent customers are from the Soviet tinies. 
Esport  o~>erat ions take place in a very interesting way, with the assistance of mediator-firms. 
Uctween the foreign railway conlpanies and RVR no cash flow esists. T h a t  has quite a simple 
explanation: foreign railway companies sinlply have no money for buying new trains. At the 
5aln.e time the! liave very large claims on custonlers who, in turn. also liave not got money. 
Railna! coinpanie\ sign contracts with intermediaries, in accordance with wlricll inediators get 
Illc right to  gat lie1 these claiins from the  custon~ers  (it is done in kind, in coal. fuel, illeta1 etc .) ,  
i l l  c s c h a ~ ~ g e  f o ~  wlriclr tliey supply tlie railway companies with trains. As a result, RSR signs 
c o ~ ~ t i a r t s  wit11 nlediators which subsequently transfer money on RVR's account, RVR, in turn.  
s c ~ ~ t l s  cal i iages clirectly to  the foreign railway companies. Sucli Iiilld of operations are practically 
i~iil>ossil>le to  arrange \vith tlomestic producers of FSU republics; this gives RVR an advantage 
i n  co~llparison \\lit11 railcar producers of Russia. 
C'onil>any's nlanagerial staff very often attends international exhibitions of mecliaiiical en- 
gillccii~lg. but such trips practically are important only for broadening tlieir ~ u t l ~ ~ l i ,  not to  
conclutle contracts. 
The conipany I>clieves tliat while its products would not be suitable for western ~narliets, 
they could liave goocl opportunities in developing countries. However, RVR finds it difficult to  
join co~isottia biclcling for contracts in developing countries. Tliese deals usually require to secure 
crcclit for cu5toniers: iVestern companies liave better access to  these sources of credit. The ~iiain 
ol>l>oltunitie5 for the conipany are seen to be in developing collaborati\e arrangements with a 
foreign partner. Such partner could be Sweden's ABB which expressed interest in cooperating 
\\it11 RiTR becal~se of desire to  conquer markets in FSU and (leveloping countries. 
Productioil for Export 
( ' o ~ n p a q ' s  1llai11 acliantage in tlie eastern markets is that  it can supply cheaper trains by a factor 
of three tlian \\ester11 producers of analogous trains. As regarcls other FSU carriage producers - 
~ ) ~ o d u c e r s  of Deniilio\ro and Toriok (Russia) - till now company succeetled sonieliow to  coexist 
nit11 tlieni peacefully. Tliese producers have more problems with settlenient of paj~lnents and. 
,~ccorcling to  RI'R iiianagenient. \vitli their lower technical level. 
O\erall niost of tlie pre~llises and ecluipment of tlie plant are i n  goocl sllape (during 1987- 
1991 coliil>an>. carriecl out reconstruction), although there appeal to be opportunities to  i~iiprove 
cfficienc! a ~ ~ t l  1.educe \\ ork ill progress. 
During last jears neitlier quality nor assortment of production was changed I>y RVIZ. kIo\v- 
c \ c ~ ,  t ll,ing illto account tlie lack of qualified labor force (despitc tlie problem of o\rernia~lning), 
i t  is goocl that conil>any succeeded a t  least to  maintain former level of quality. Compan!.'~ man- 
agcillent co~llplained on unreliable delivery a ~ i d  poor quality of tlie otlier\vi~e cheap imported 
steel from Russia ant1 Ukraine. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Po\rti(,c ci.\ptct.s: C'o~lclusio~i of collaboratio~i agreement in ~neclia~iical engineering sector with 
Russia. '4s a result, imports of raw materials and exports of finished goocls to Russia are free 
fro111 export-i~ilport duties. 
\ . c y ~ t / ( ~  I ~ ~ I C C ~ . \ :  (1)  Ill-considered exchange rate policy: Lat is pegged against SDR, not\vitli- 
standing still relatively liigli inflation (in 1994: 26.3%). Sniall decrease of prices for soliie 
i ~ l l p o ~  tecl law niaterials. thanks to  appreciation of national currency against USD (this currency 
is ntost f~ccluently used in transactions with Russia) could not conipe~isate for increase of other 
costs (\\ages, taxes). As a result, company has no choice but rise prices; (2) Higli credit rates 
forcing R17R to  deal only with companies which agree to  pay in ad~ance ,  taking into account 
tliat production is very costly and production cycle is very long. 
Foreign Environment for Exports 
.\*cgcitirc c~jccts: (1)  Illcreasing co~iipetitio~l from two Russian plants which for~iierly ma.nu- 
fact.11rcd only cargo wagons, but now involved in tlie production of electric rail ca.rriages. (2) 
Difficult financial situa.tion of FSU ra.ilway companies. (3) Very stra,inetl polit.ical rela.tions 
I~ct\veen Russia ancl Latvia that  could nega.tively i~lfluence business conclitio~ls in  tlie future. 
l 'os i t i~c  c'flccts: It is possible tliat tlie company will establish joint venture \\it11 ABB in the 
course of ~>ri\ratization. This could help company to  cliversify production as well as to  ~iiaintai~i  
~ t i l l ~ l c  positions i n  FSU markets a.nd enter tlie developing countries. 
Rigas Motoriipnica (Motor vehicles) 
Background Illforlllatioll 
E.ctablishtr1: in 1927. 
,S/zt of lcrbor* force: 39.5 (1992 - 1200, 1983-84 - 2400). 
, S I X  of tht cnpitol stock: NA. 
Crc, of Sales 
hlopeds (manufa.cturing a range of moped frames, wheels, etc., 
assenlbly of niopeds; engines are imported from Lithuania, Russia, 
Polantl antl Slo\laliia) - company produces about 60% of the 
\.slue of tlie product. 9 0 
Exhaust sj.sterns for 7 types of cars 10 
,Sr/lr.5 (19.94): 78.5,000 Ls. 
Olrtl~trt (1990-95): tliminislied from 100,000 mopeds in 1990 to 10,900 mopetls in 1994. In 1983- 
84 :3(',.5.000 mopeds per year were produced. I11 198.5 output was administratively cut by more 
than Iialf clue to  overprotluction. 
Pi.qfit.\: C'olnl~any operates witliout profits. 
D c b t ~ :  C'olilpally lias large debt to  the budget (social security tax) ;  debt for electricit!. is 220,000 
Ls; tleht for heating is 70,000 Ls. 
,5'lr.rrctlrru of'olrr?tr..\liil): Company is still a state enterprise; solme oxvnership problems exist, as 
part of the lantl, currently occupied by cornpa,ny belongs to  former owner of the plant. This 
r~licertaint!. \\.it11 oxvnership, and privatization of the company impedes reconstructuring of tlie 
plant ant1 hintlers inflow of foreign investments. 
Export Orielltatioll 
11,atlitionally 5'Xi of protluction were sold in the domestic market; the rest was sold in other 
liSSR republics. Distribution of sales by different regions for 1992 and 1994 is given below (in 
tliousands Ls): 
Other Countries 
(Germany, Czech Republic, 
Latvia Otliet Baltics Russia Other CIS Denlnarli, Holland, Sweden) 
1992 353 9 9 546 700 47 
'% 20.29i 5.7(X1 31.3% 40.1Xi 2.7%) 
1994 92 9 2 348 32 22 1 
Y 11.7%) 11.7%) 44.3% 4.1% 28.2% 
('ompany tloes not employ services of ally Latvian export-import company. As regards 
cornpan!.'~ customers abroad, some are wholesalers (e.g., in Russia, Swetlen), some (in CEFTA 
states) company has more close collaboration also in production sphere. For instance. colllpany 
exl~ol ts  to Polantl carriages without engines, which in turn are installed by Poland's producer and 
are further exl~ortetl. Conlpany also has contacts with wliolesalers in these states. Sonle contacts 
\vil 1 1  foreign partners remained froni Soviet times, others are established tlirougli international 
exhil~itions (e.g., i l l  Iioln) or using catalogues. 
LIajol European moped niarkets such as Spain are not covered. Tlie company lacks agents, 
\\-orking capital antl market information to  enable it to expand sales. 
Production for Export 
('oml~an!. has strong intention to expand its exports in both Eastern and \Vestern markets. 
Esported niopeds range from a very basic Russian eiiginecl moped with an e s  works price 
of 130$ to  a range of more upmarket mopeds. Tliese include a motorbike styled moped with an 
engine from Poland and a sinall wheeled monkey bike moped wit11 a Sloval<ian (Jawa) engine. 
Tlic company has also recently introduced a small tliree wheeler with a Polish SO cm3 engine 
nllich is iiitencled t o  be sold t o  street vendors and for local deliveries. 
Tlie Jawa po\vered monkey bike which is certified t o  West European standards is sold t o  a 
range of esport  nlarlcets, including Germany, the Czech Republic, Deninarli, the Netlierlands 
and Snreden. Tliis has an e s  works price of $302. Tlie other moped types are sold t o  Eastern 
inarkets including Russia where the  company was traditionally the leading supplier. Eshaus t  
s! steins are mainly esported for Russian company " ~ i ~ u i i " .  
C'lirrent coml>etitive strength of company in the foreign markets is low price and good look of 
its inanufactures. Quality, however, could be better. Price advantage can be illustrated with the  
follo\ving sainple a low-class "Honda" in Sweden costs 1200$. The  company's Swedish partner 
iinl>orts Latvian inopeds for 302$ per unit and sells for GOO$. Notwithstanding such big price 
niargin these motorcycles are quite competitive in low-class moped sector. 
Tlie main clisadvantage is limited product range, particularly for FT7estern markets, t ha t  is 
cleteriniiiecl by underdeveloped design capacity in tlie company. 
Serious obstacle t o  improving quality is obsolete production ecluipment (011 average 20 years 
olcl). hIoreover, macliining, paint and assenlbly facilities are installed in old multi storey build- 
i11g.s. Quality is negatively influenced by staff inconsistency and low salaries (40-60 Ls per 
luoiitli). l~urtherinore,  there is an increasing aging of their einployees as  young people are at- 
tracted into other areas of the economy. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
I- 'O.\l~ll ,~ (ISIICC~.G: Coiic1~sion of collaboration agreement with the  engineering sector of Russia. 
4s a result. i i i i~>orts of raw inaterials and esports  of finished goods t o  Russia are free from espor t  
ant1 import duties. 
A\ycg(~f~cc (l.\l~crf.G: (1) cscliaiige rate policies; (2) high credit rates: inaccessibility of c4-24 and 
otliei international credits; (3) delays and sometiines even failures t o  refund 18% VAT on inputs 
for csporters.  
Foreign Eilviroilimei~t for Exports 
C'oiii[>aiiy succeeded in establishing new long-term contacts with foreign partners. However, 
some of them, especially with Western partners, are discriminatory. 
Tliere are no coinpetitor producers in FSU (in Soviet tiines tlie company had monopoly in 
~>iotluciiig niopccls). Tlie only nlopeds producer in CIS - an Ukrainian enterprise - stopped 
its operations in 1993-1994. Tlie same situation is with Slovaltian proclucer "Babetta". As a 
result, conipany lias good prospects in Eastern markets, lio\vever, increasing coinpetition from 
Cliiiia, India, e tc  sliould not be neglected. 
For a while, very large payments problems exist with many CIS states.  For instance, pay- 
illelits froin Belarus can be settled only through the central bank of Belarus (due t o  regulations of 
conversion of currency); with Iiyrgistan only barter is possible. Such problems a s  low purchasing 
I>o\ver of tlie population and depreciation of CIS currencies are also painful. 
Overprotluction in Europe and insufficient quality of company's manufactures were men- 
tioiietl as tlie largest obstacles t c  exports t o  Western countries. Tlie impact of free t rade  agree- 
iiiciit ~vitli  Eli  lias not yet been evaluated by the  company's management. 
Riki (Tools) (Mechanical engineering) 
History: Initially the company was one shop of the large state enterprise Riga Radio Plant, 
supplying it witli the necessary tools. Part  of the production was sent also to  another enterprise 
Electro-hleclianical Plant in Kandava. 
.C/:c elf Inbor. fbr*ct: 120. 
Ptoduct.~ r~~l~riirfilttulrcl: Press lllolds about 5 units per month (60%) of total sales): Punches 
(iiiclucling puiiclies for publishing houses) about 10 units per month (30% of total sales); Equip- 
illelit for \voocl ~vorliiiig, non-standard technological ecluipment (c.g.. co~l~plicated cog-wheels) 
(lo'% of total sales). 
Output (1990 1,994): cliininislied approsimately by a factor of four; now it is stabilized and 
fort her improve~iient in  199.5 is expected. 
,Ylrlts (1994): about 115, 000 Ls. 
Profits: N.4, Iio\vever it seems that  company lias small profits. 
11ldcbtfdnc.s.s: There are debts to the budget from 1991 and 1992 due to  difficulties witli pay- 
111ents ancl losses through currency reform. Another reason is tliat tlie company paicl escessively 
Iligl~ \alaric\\ to  it5 employees during late 1980s and early 1990s. 
511 rrctrlr.c of oulr~cr.\h~p: Since 1991 private lirnited liability company leasing state assets. 
Export Orientation 
Traditionall? "Ril\i" \\larked oiily for Latvian enterprises - primarily for enterprises of large 
procluction association "Racliotelinika". Since 1991 it has started business \\-it11 Russian en- 
terprises, as the economic transitioil seriously affected tlie radiotechnical iiidristry in Latvia. 
Du~ii ig 1991-1992 company maintained most active collaboration witli Russia's car building gi- 
ant "ZIL". I-Ionever, after huge losses through currency reform, tlie company stopped esportiiig 
to Russia. In 1993 "Riki" did not export at all; it was tlie year when company esperienced 
1 lie largest fall in output. 1994 was tlie year of establishing contacts with \\ester11 partners. 
Initially large assistance ivas provided by Latvian Chamber of Trade tlla~ilis to its contacts with 
tlie analogous Ckrnlan institution. Company established contacts also with partners in Snreclen, 
t Iic ITS.& ancl Israel through putting advertisements in  different catalogues and participating in 
international exhibitions (e.g., in Hanover). Swedish and USA partners were iliediators which 
I>or~gI~t 5tanclarcl cletails for punches from tlie company. The current inajor partner is a German 
~ ) ~ o ( l r ~ c e ~ .  that rires part of tlie inlported articles (puncl~es, small lion-standard metalworking 
I)rnthes) for its ow11 production, the rest is sold uncler its own brand. Approsinlately the same 
relations \\ere established with a firm in  Israel. Exports constitutecl 15'Xi of company's sales in 
1994. 
,At tlie last csliibition in I-Ianover company established contacts with a famor~s Lusembourg 
co111l)aii.v. a n~o~iopolist i n pl.oduction of hydraulic systems. RiLi l ~ a s  already received drawings 
or \tandard p a ~ t s  for hyclraulic systenis from Lusembourg, and if it can meet quality require- 
nients. long-term contract will be signed. Company uses also sources otlier than iiiternatio~ial 
esliibitions ancl present contacts to  get more information on foreign markets. The company's 
nianagement lias very good esperience with the periodical "Latvia in tlie world" published by 
t l ~ e  Latvian De\.elopn~ent Agency where offers by foreign entrepreneurs who want to  establisli 
l)artnersliil) witli Latvian companies as well as other important information is published. 
Productioil for Export 
'-1Iilii'' has strong intention to develop further its contacts in tlie \Vest. Now company has 
Iro prol)lcins proclr~cing cciuipnient of average complesity tliat meets western cluality standards. 
'rhc co~i~l)an!,'s major partner i n  C~ermany was understanding to  Rilii's clifficr~lties especially to  
tlrc fact that  its prodr~ction had been based on the USSR Standard System (UJCN).  The only 
ieclui~eiiient by tlie C;crman partner was that the equipment had to  fu l f i l l  its necessary functions. 
Now colnpany gradually adjusts production to  FASCO standards. To a large estent company 
~eaclies sufIicient level of quality due to  high labor intensity of production. The conlpany's 
ecluipment is quite old: some benches remained even from 1939; largest part of equipment was 
l~ouglit in the early 1980s, few be~lches were bought in 1989. Prernises are also insufficient; large 
p~ohlem is heat insulation, whic11 is a common issue for Latvian enterprises. Notwithstanding 
aforementionecl disadvantages, company can compete in the western markets clue to  still very 
lo\v labor costs: nhile a C;erman toolmaker earns 10,000 DM per month, the Latvian worker 
o n l ~  540 Dhl. 
[Jiifortunately company's profits from exports and lucrative domestic orders are used up 
IIJ b~ conimitment to  provide the old Riga Radio Plant with tools. The Radio Plan dictates 
~~nreasonably low prices as it works with losses and is seriously indebted. "Riki" has to  accept 
tlie conditions of the Radio Plant as it leases the premises and equipment from that  company. 
Doillestic Eilvironillent for Exports 
Pe~.sltlcc cr.sprct.s: Activities of LDA, International Trade Center Riga. LCT: conclusion of free 
tiacle agreement with EU. 
.\.cgcrticc cr.sl~ccts: (1) Land ownership problems that  block foreign investments; (2) C;overnment's 
inal~ility to  ensure civilized liquidation of highly indebted state owned enterprises-giants (such 
;IS Riga Raclio Plant): (3) Eschange rate policies; according to  company's management better 
solution \\auld be to  devaluate tlie Lat. (4) Delays (esceetling 3 months) in refunding VAT paid 
011 raw materials. 
Foreign Eilvironiment for Exports 
bbl{ilii" is 5till i n  tlie process of establishing stable contacts with western producers aiid mediators, 
and it seenix tha t  coiilpaiiy will succeed in this undertaking. As regards Russia, esports are 
impetlecl by uiifa\rorable escliange rate and a strong Russian mechanical engineering sector (many 
ne\\ enterprises appeared in tlie course of conversion of inilitary factories). Visegr6tl countries 
( the  Czecli Republic, Slovaliia, Hungary and Poland) were inentioned as the maill competitors 
\\it11 iespect to  esports aiid foreign investments. Esports to EU are impeclecl by prejudice tliat 
~ ~ o t l u c e r s  of FStJ can not produce higli quality goods aiid deliver tl~ein on time, rather tliaii by 
some formal barriers. 
Rinar (Mechanical engineering) 
Background Iilforillatioil 
L:sinbli.s.hcd: about 100 years ago, but the company has its present specia.lization for 30 years. 
,Size of' Inbor. firre: :300 (in 1990 it wa.s 1,000). 
Pr.oduct.s r,1cc1~lr,f'(r,ct~rrcc1: Pumps a,nd va.lves for clien~icals, food, a,nd for I>iologica,l substances. 
Proclucts are prot,ectetl from aggressive fluitls by plastic coa.tings. Elect,ron~ot,ors a,ntl retluction 
gears come from tlie LTliraine. 
Olrtl~ut ( 1  990-1 994): Tlie company ura.s formerly the nmin lnonopoly supplier t o  the Soviet 
Irnion aiitl lias a capa,city of 7,000 dosa.ge punips a.nd 320,000 pipe set's per annum. During 
years of transition output fell more than a fa.ctor of five with tlie la.rgest fa,ll in 1992. However 
in 1994 out,put st,a.bilizetl. Now company works only 3 t1a.y~ a. week. 
Tur>rlotv 1.: 
DrLt: The coliipaiiy lias debt amounting to  450,000 Lats mainly for nonpaying for energy and 
taxes. Energy costs constitute a t  least 14% of the total expenses. .4 major problem is tlie large 
5tochs (allout tlie value of 600,000 Lats) of fiiiishecl products. Tlie reason is colitinucd manufac- 
turc of output after tlie dernand fell. 
,S'iructlir*t of oc~r~ersh i l~:  Tlie company is still state enterprise but it is inclutletl in the privatiza- 
tion list. Problenis may emerge witli former owners in Germany. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Neither t,he share of exports in tota,l sa,les 1101. export distril~ution between different regions has 
significantly changed tlurilig last y e a s .  As ea.rlier, loca,l nia.rket constitutes only 5%) of tota,l 
sales nrl~ile the rest is export'ed. The distribution of exports is tlie following: 
Litliua.nia, Estonia, China., Pa.kistan, 
C!IS (Russia., IIlira.ine, Bela.rus) Iran, Cuba., Hungary, Bulga.ria 
From ti~iie to time company has slnall orders also froni otlier countries in  tlie West (e.g., 
S\\c.tlcn). It lias gootl relations with German pump producer "fIauc1ien \vllich lias an intention 
to estal~lisli joint \.enture with "Rinar" after stabilization of economic situatio~i and o\vnersliil~. 
Tlie main aim in this case mould be capturing tlie eastern nlarliet by tlie Gerlnan company. 
All partners abroad are i~ldustrial enterprises, mainly clie~iiical ant1 oil-processing enterprises. 
Sollie are enterprises of the food industry (for instance, champagne producers). Tlie largest part 
of present partners abroad have been inherited from Soviet times. However, some colitacts were 
c~stal~lislietl recently: company distributed its prospects, participated in international exhibitions 
(Iiairo, China). All export operatiolis are done directly, \vitliout mediators. 
Productioil for Export 
C'o~u pan! produces pumps a.nd va,lves ela.bora,ted by its own design burem. ~~nfortuna.tely,  
linliages \\.it11 technical universities in the rest of FSU a.re practica,lly lost. Nevertlieless, compa.ny 
steadily tries t o  ilnprove the quality of produced a.rticles a.nd to I~roatlen t,lie a.ssortment. of 
~)rotlucts. Since 1990 coliipaliy increa.setl its assortment by sonle 30%. For exa,mple, it ilitroduced 
protluction of cent,rifugal pumps in a.ddition to  plunger pumps. Compa.ny consta,ntly seeks new 
sl~lieres for applica,tion of pumps a.nd ma,lies necessa.ry modifica.tions. In recent y e a s  it bega.1-1 to 
s111)11ly custoniers in tlie food industry (earlier it worked olily for tlie chemical industry). The 
conipany ~ecentl!~ started manufacturing parts (gear housings) for Hungarian Iltarus buses. The 
company also started production of plastic skis for cliildreii witli the mould produced inhouse. 
C'omp,i~iy p~actically lias no competitioil in the eastern market (CIS) as tliere are few en- 
terp~ises of such type. Western producers, in turn, offer more than twice as expensive pumps 
,is Riiiar. Tlie \vestern products, although have a bit higher quality, do  not sell i n  tlie major 
111arl;cts of Riiiar. Tliere is no quality difference betn~een exported production and tha t  sold in 
tlie local marliet. as only 5% of pumps and fittings are soltl in Latvia. Tlie sanle is with price. 
('oinl>an\: has to  aslc p~actically all customers to pay in  advance to  secure its operations and to  
avoitl tlefaults ant1 losses connected with changes in exchange rates. Unfortunately, f o ~  the time 
I)eiiig in all tlie current marltets tlie situation is far from stable in legal and financial respect but 
tlie company has to  accept this. 
Tlie company used to  manufacture to  tlie Soviet GOST standards but is now using both 
\Yestern European and Eastern standards. Riilar would like to  get assistance in developing an 
I S 0  9000 quality system. 
Coml>aiiy understands how inlportant is to liave up-to-date equipment to improve efficiency 
and quality of protluction; wlleri it becomes possible it tries to  renew equipment. Tliere are 
t n o  C'onlputer Nulnerical Control machining centers bought i n  1991. However, cornpaily has no 
C'AD (co~iiputer aided design) system. Tlie colllpany has one of tlie best pig iron fountlries in 
I,at\,ia and it supplies even otlier compa~iies. 111 general, equipinent is ~ io t  new, it is some 10-1.5 
\ear\ oltl. 
Doillestic Eilviroilineilt for Exports 
Po.<~f 1c.c (~.<l)cc I.\: (1) C;onclusio~l of collaboration agreement witli the engineering sector with 
Itus5ia that  allo\\s company to  import raw materials and export fi~lislied goods to Russia duty 
free; (2)  Inforniative materials provided by LDA, LCTC and World Trade Centre Riga. Tliey 
~>rovitleti assista~lce i n  organizing participatioii of' Latvian producers in international fairs and 
c~xhi Ilit  ions. 
. \ ( g ( / t ~ ~ c  n . < l ~ c ~ t . < :  ( I )  Changes i11 "Law on foreign investments i n  Latvia" tliat reiiiovecl incentives 
( tax Ilrealis) provitletl earlier for foreign investors. (2) Credit probleins: company operates witli 
coiistaiit lacli working capital, and excessively high credit ratcs (allout -50% a year) dictated 
I)? commeicial banks. (.3) Absence of Latvian tracling houses abroad. ( 4 )  Absence of export 
quarantee iiieclianism. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
('ompan\: lias niaintained many old and created some ne\v coiltacts abroad. However large 
~>rol>lems coultl arise due to unstable relations between Russia a.nd Latvia: niost. favored nations 
.st.atus granted Ily Russia, to  Latvia in 1994 operates on a tempora.ry ba.sis. Very sooil also for 
exports in  Russia certificates will be needed (now these are neecled o~ily for \Vest,ern countries). 
la rge  prol)lenis could be created by tile competition of tlie mi1ita.r~ ent,erprises in Russia, which 
start producing civilia,il products. 
For a red  expalision i11 tlie West compa.Iiy needs to find goocl foreign partners. 
RAR (Auto-electric) (Electrical engineering) 
Background Illforillation 
,!?\tc~blr.qhcd: in 1946 t o  manufacture auto-electrical instruments and other components. It en- 
joj.ecl monopolistic position in supplying USSR vehicle nlanufacturers. 
,S'I:F of lnbor force: 1815. 
,S'I:F o_f t l ~ f  rnpltnl stock: 4 m Ls (under revision). 
P~.oclucts r~icriir~f(1ctulrr1: for vehicle builders: speedometers, tacllometers and drive cables; instru- 
ment panels ~ ~ i t l i  e ectronic instrulnents (10-15,000 units per nlontli); pressure sensors (Italian 
license); steering colunln switch clusters; blades and mechanisms. Other  products include a 
I dllge of I~uilcling loclis and padlocks (tliese are sold in tlie domestic ma1 liet ancl constitute no 
more tlian 10% of total sales). 
O L I ~ ~ L I ~ :  I>eginning wit11 1991 fell by more than a factor of 6. 
,Ycrlc.\ ( 1  994): allout 3.6 m Ls, 1993 10.8 m Ls. 
Plqfit .~: N.A. 
Drbt: RAR has significant debt t o  tlle budget from 1992, wliicli arose in the course of currency 
lefornl. 14'lien implelnenting s ta te  procurernelit orders, company had t o  supply Russian clients. 
Originally tlic exchange rate of tlie interim currency Latvian Ruble (LVR) t o  tlie Russian Ruble 
(SLTR) ivas 1 : l .  \\.Then tlie payment was received, tlie SUR/LVR rate, determined by tlie Bank of 
Lat\.ia was 1:3. ancl tliis let1 t o  huge losses. Taxes. in turn,  were calculated from the initial sums. 
Non it seems. tliat government will take a decision 011 tlie liquidation of Latvian enterprises' 
clcl>ts. ~vliicli arose clue to  currency reforms. Company has large (4 In Ls) unrecoveral~le claims 
011 custolnels such as  tlie bankrupted car makers "ZIL" and "Zaporoyec". 
,S/~.crr tlov of' ou~nr  sllil): s ta te  joint stock company, included in tlle list of privatization by the 
Latvian Privatization Agency. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Dulillg tlie last yea15 export orientation practically has not cliangetl. As earlier, only 5-10% of 
output  is sold in tlie local market,  the rest is sent t o  tlie CIS. However. rnaliy former partners were 
lost. clue t o  clisis of car industry in tlie CIS and payment problenis witli some CIS states .  During 
1992-93 contacts with producers in Ukraine and Belarus were lost. Company's real exports t o  
Ilrlssia fell aftel sharp clecrease in output  of major car manufacturers. Tlle banbruptcy of "ZIL" 
also liacl a llegative inlpact on company's exports. Now company works only for Russia, for 
\uch ellterprises as  -'h/Ioskvicli", "Lada". "Togliatti", Moskow Tractor Plant and others.  Very 
small cleliverie5 a le  sent to  Hungary and the Netlierlands - spare parts for old cars produced by 
aforenientioned enterprises. In tlie nearest future the  collaboration witli tliese enterprises can 
l~ecome e ien  stronger tlian before, as  many of them expressed tlieir intention t o  buy company's 
share\. Now tlie only problem, wliicli has t o  be solved, is valuation of tlie assets of the enterprise. 
.ifterwards, even joint venture creation will be possible. 
1 k s t e r n  producers (VW,  BNIW, FORD etc.) also express tlieir interest in company's pro- 
clrlction, hut till now company did not get any serious offer, altliougli very low prices were 
cluotetl. Last !.ear conlpally received an i~lvestment offer from a German enterprise. However, 
Rz4R rejecteel tliis offer, l~ecause investnle~lt was t o  be provided under tlie condition tliat RAR 
iliiports niicroscliemes fro111 the  German company, for its production. Tliat was entirely unprof- 
itable. taliing into account the price dictated by German side. The  other obstacle for active 
collal>olation nitli  European auto~notive companies is tliat present production of tlie company 
is niailily clcsigned for the given Russian carmakers. Tlierefore it is possible tliat in tlie nearest 
future plocluction will be reoriented, a t  least partly, towards more universal apparatus. Recently 
conil>anj 's nianagement begins t o  attend semi-annual car maker's exliibitions in Hanover: cur- 
lently \11c1i tl ips are valuable t o  obtain the latest information on clianges in car industry but 
not t o  conclucle contracts. 
Productioil for Export 
('ompan!. has succeeded to maintain its strong positions in the Russian market after the collapse 
of USSR. because it offered lower prices than western producers and often even lower than 
Russian ~llanufacturers (may be thanks to  economy of scale). The other factor is cluality which 
ensures larger elenland for Latvian production than for Russian analogues (e.g., products of 
a plant i l l  1-laclin~ir). The variety of production diminished significantly during last years. 
Earlier Rr\R produced more than 200 different articles, today this figure is well below 100. It 
i5 ~nainly coiiiiected with cessation of operations by many Russian tractor producers. Company 
cut production of fuel gauges and windscreen wiper arms as well. However the remaining range 
of articles are steadily improved (company has its own design bureau). Development is not very 
easy as ecluiplnent is quite old: more simple prototypes are produced on equipments from the 
1960s aiicl 19705, while in or^ complicated ones are produced on equipment froni the late 1980s. 
Doillestic Eilviroilillellt for Exports 
P o k l t t i v  { i<l~cc t . s :  Coilclusioil of treaty on collaboratio~l in sphere of mechanical engineering 
I)et\\een Latvia ancl Russia that allows to  import raw materials atid esport finished goods to  
I(  u55ia ii ithout [,aying customs duties. 
\-rg{itri,c { i k p c c t k :  (1) Lack of government concept on industry development i n  Latvia. Ten 
national progran15 Lve1.e prepared by the golernnient but industry is not included il l  any of 
thein. Go\-ernment I~esitates to  identify which industries will be co~~sitlered priority inclustries. 
i\ hicli industrie\ will have government's support; (2) Peg of national currency against SDR in 
( o1lil)ati5on \\lit11 still higli inflation; depreciation of USD: (3)  delays i n  refunding VAT on inputs, 
111~~l1li1ig that espoi ters provide the government with interest free credits: ( 1) lacl, of production 
ce~tification centers in Latvia. As a result, production must be sent to Russia foi attestation; 
( 5 )  Fo~nlation of standardization institutions still is a t  initial stage. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
C'ompan!. lias very goocl relations with business partners in CIS. At least for t l ~ e  time being 
coinpaiiy cloes 11ot face serious competition in CIS. Escessively politicizetl relations between 
Lati.ia and Russia is a serious problem, which can lead to  disturba~lccs economic relations still 
fallilig output of Russia's car industry. 
4s  ~egarcls conipeti t io~~ from abroad, foreign producers cannot conipete with RAR i n  the 
[2us\ia11 ~iiarliet clue to  price clifferences; a t  the same time RAR cannot coinpete in the West clue 
to  loiver cluality aiicl specialization of production for the Russian inarket). 
Vermerk (Electrical engineering) 
Background Illforlllation 
E~t~iblt.shc(1: i n  1992 as a joint venture between a German partner and tlze ole1 Riga Electric 
Bull) state company (shop of filament bulbs; other 2 shops practically stopped their operations) 
ivl~icl i  n a s  originally a subsidiary of the conzpany VEF and reportecl directly to  I~loscow. 
, Y l ~ t  of l(/bor ~~J I 'CC:  372. 
,Y~sc o j  t h ~  req~)it~il .stock: 249,,500 Ls. 
Pr.o(luct.s rrrtr r z u  firrturccl: Prior to  a review in 199 1 main products were high pressure xenon lamps 
ancl quartz halogen types with filament lamps planned to  be phased out. However, the review 
concluded that fila~zient lainps required least investment to  become competitive and these lamps 
nolv account for nzore than 90% of tlze output. 
Total ~ ( i l t ~  (19.94): 1.7 ~n Ls, (in 1993: 1.5 in Ls). 
Otrtput (1990-95): During 1990-1993 diminished approximately by a factor of two; in 1994 it 
i11c1 easecl by 15'x. 
Profit.\: NA. 
Dr1)t.s: C o ~ i ~ p a n y  has some unsettled liabilities with tlie budget and ciiergy suppliers, but for a 
wl~ile these clebts clo not threaten tlze operations of tlie coliipany. 
,S'/r~rirturr o j  o (~ irz~rsh i l~:  Initially 50% Latvian state property anel .50%r Cier~nan propelty. The 
~):u.tnerslzip has nonr been extendetl with aclditional participation of a Dutclz company. The 
current structure of ownership is 39..5% German, 39.3% Dutclz, 14% Latvian state and '7.2% by 
p r i ~ a t e  Latvian company Latlus. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Tratlitionally 'LO'i: of production was sold in tlze clo~llestic marltet, 12%) in  Lithuania, while tlze 
1cs1 (bS1xl) was supplied to  otlzer USSR republics (Russia, Belarus. LTliraine, and republics of 
C'entral .Asia). After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian ~narliet was practically lost and 
this forced company to seeli for new contacts in  the West. .As a result, clistrihution of sales by 
tlifferent regions in 1994 sharply differs from that obse~.vecl i n  1990: 
EU 
Latvia Otlier Baltics Russia Germany Netherlands Finland Sweden UI< 
E ~ e n  i n  mo5t difficult years company's esport share did not fall below 75% of the total 
output. 
krmer l t ' s  pal tners abroad are wl~olesale firms as well as otlzer producers of electrical bulbs 
which sell co~nl>ang's manufactures under their own brands (AIRAM, CALEX, NOt'C"C'4 etc.). A 
large part of procluction is sold through German co-owners, which act as intermeeliates. However, 
companF cloes not use services of any Latvian esport-import firm. Initially contacts witlz foreign 
partners were establisliecl with the assistance of co-owners. Later company's management began 
to  I,c nlore acti1.e seeking new partners through catalogues and international eslzibitions (e.g., 
i l l  I-Ianover). Contacts witlz neighboring states, Estonia ancl Lithuania, were maintained from 
Soviet times. 
C'ompany esports own production, using only own know-how. 
Productioil for Export 
C'o~lil~any has strong intention to  expand its esports in Western markets \vhile mainlaining its 
sales in the huge CIS market. 
C 'u~re~ l t  competitive strength of company in foreign marl<ets is 10-1.5%1 lo\\rer price for tlze 
salzle qualit! as \vestern analogues have. Furthermore, company tries to  react as soon as possible 
to custonlerx' tlemancls. Recently company began to  produce candle-type bulbs, mini-bulbs ancl 
other types of bulbs. At the same time, the 1991 review wllich lecl to  the emphasis on filament 
l an~ps  also ievealecl the high cost of producing glass envelopes in-house, partly because of high 
clnci gar costs and also the costs necessary to con1 ply with environmental regulations relatecl to 
glass etching. '4s a result, tlie glass making line was closed and glass envelopes are now imported 
from Poland ancl the UI i .  Manufacturing now consists of higher value added activities including 
filament \vincling and assembly. 
Company has its own rail coi~nection and dock. 
Tliere is no clifference between inanufactures producecl for the local inarhet ancl foreign 
marliets neither in terins of quality nor in terms of input usage. Howeirer, production for local 
market is inore profitable. 
Doillestic Eilviroilillellt for Exports 
P o . \ i t i ~ r  n.\l)ccts: Conclusion of free trade agreement with EU. 
. \ - rgnt i~e nsl)ccts: (1) exchange rate policies: decrease in prices for some imported raw materials 
t l ~ a l l l i ~  to appreciation of national currency cannot coinpensate for decrease in prices for exported 
protluction accountecl in Lats. It is frustrating that Latvian state enterprises "Latvenergo" and 
"Latvijas gilze" clo not lower prices of energy and gas following the appreciation of the Lat against 
tlic ITS clollar; (2)  high credit rates which significantly liinit coinpany's possibilities. Company 
has  an ortler from the USA for production of 201n bulbs per year, but it cannot fulfill the orcler 
clue to  lack of working capital; (3)  inaccessibility of C4-24 and other international credits: (4) 
clelays ancl often even failure to  refund VAT on raw inaterials to  exporters; (.5) insufficient efforts 
on the government level to  recover economic collaboration with Russia. 
Foreign Environn~ent for Exports 
C'olnpany has created a sufficient nunlber of stable contacts abroad anlong \ \ ~ l ~ i c l ~  the nlost 
iliiportant ale \\.it11 co-owners of the enterprise. The foreign partners' presence was nlostly 
affected I>y the possibility to  produce low-price products with sufficiently high quality, wit11 the 
investmei~t of minimun~ sun1 of money. There are a lot of sinall unstable customers as well. 
LL hich iualie orclers very irregular. 
There are no more forinal barriers impeding company's exports to  the EU thanks to  free 
tiatle agreeinent bet\veen Latvia and the EU. However, such aspects as customers' attitude and 
t~atlitions liave to  l>e talien into account as well. To cope with this problem, the company has 
to use service5 of other producers selling the products of Vermerli under their own brand. In 
s r ~ c l ~  a nay liuge portion of company's profits has to  be shared with mediators. 
-4s regaicls competition, in the future serious problenls can be caused by competitors from 
t l ~ e  C'zecli Republic and Poland. 
VEF K T  (Electrical engineering) 
Background Iilfori~~ation 
Hi\for*y: 1-EF l i T  was the largest part of the olcl VEF company (initially established in 1921) 
manufacturing telephone escliange equipment of whicli it supplied Illore than 80%) of the needs 
of tlie ITSSR. 
S I X  of lrtbor. forrc: in direct production 2,008; in management and aclministration ,546. At its 
peal< in  198s-1989 total einploymeiit was some 6,000. 
.?t:c of' tht cnpltnl stock: 4 in Ls. 
Pr.otlucts rnnrzclfetcturcd: Since 1989 company gradually reorients from procluction of analogue es- 
clianges to  digital types of esclianges. Current range of products derives partly from in-house de- 
sign, and partly from collaborations with designers including Iivant Intercom (Latvian company 
dealing with telecommunicatioiis equipment design). Main products: "livant tligital","Cirulis" 
- electronic automatic digital exchanges for CIS countries; AOS, PABXs - small rural digital 
esclianges: "SETO" - for office and hotel applications; "SAUS" - maintenance and control 
s~s te i i i  ecluil)n~ent; Teleplione hand-sets-systems and equipinent for call billing including a corcl- 
less type. 
Out1)l1t: (in conventional units) in 1991 - 600,000; in 1992 - 3.50,000, in  1993 - 23.5.000, anel 
i11 199 4 - 100,000. 
,Stile.< (1994):  about 6 ~r i  Ls. 
Ol)erutrr~g l)~~ofitc~bility: 1990 - 20%, 1991-1992 - 18%, 1993 - 1.2%. 1991 - negative. 
Debt: C'oiii~>aiiy has sufficient debt to  the budget, to  energy and raw material suppliers, and a 
sniall clebt to  credit institutions. 
,5'tr-uctur*e of on~r,rrshil~: till 1992 it was part of large enterprise "VEF", then it became inclepen- 
dent state ownecl enterprise. Privatization is not anticipated for tlie nearest future. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
During tlie last years esport orientation practically lias iiot changed. .4s earlier, only Fj-lO%] 
of output is soltl i n  the local market, the rest is sent to  FSU republics. There was a gradual 
clecrease of contact5 with LTkraine due to  clifficulties witli payments arrangement: during 1990-94 
I-lilaiiie's sliare i l l  co~npany's sales decreased from 20%) to  -5%. Russia's sliare, in turn, increased 
f~on i  55'X to  75%. The rest is esported to other Baltic states. 
C'oni[,any's iiiain clients abroad are former ministries of coi~~i~~uii icat ioi is .  A part of the sales 
contracts is concluded witli mediators. Company lias a contract witli an enterprise i11 h'loscour 
(Digital Electroiiics Coinpany) for collaboration. Under tliis contract VEF delivers the largest 
p.lrt for teleplioiie esclianges, Russian partner, in turn, produces tlie rest of components, assem- 
I)les and l>roi.ides guarantee ancl afterguarantee services to  users. Company has 110 problems 
c\tablisliing contacts i n  the FSU republics as it has well-known name and there are no significant 
~ i i a l s  in tlie market. Eacli year company participates i n  coniiriunicatioiis ecliiipineiit eshibitioii 
i l l  I~Ioscow. .As regards Western countries, till now company clid not target WTestern markets as 
its production is adapted to  Russia's specific needs. However, the recent eshibition in Hanover 
showed. that inany foreign companies are interested i n  the products of 1'EF KT. This interest 
is niaiiily tlcteriiliiied by tlie desire to  conquer CIS markets. 
Productioil for Export 
C'oiiil>an!. lias a very stable position in CIS markets as its production is specially designed for tliis 
~iiarliet. Furtliermore, the company's products are sold for half tlie price of western analogues. 
AIost of \'EF IiT's plant and equipinent is up-to-date and results from investments made be- 
tncen 10S-I ancl 1990. Facilities include: parts store equipped witli elevators; highly automated 
~>lating shop. estensive test equipment and ecluipment deriveel from contract manufacture for 
the company Tele Nokia, including "Optron" senzi-automatic asseinbly equipment. Company 
112s a sufficiently good research base. In the nearest future company intends to clevelop surface 
inouiiting technology and gradually move to  IS0  9000 cluality system. 
The 0111) problein is difficult financial situation, that  does not allow company to  grant enough 
fu~~cls  foi at11 ertising and market research. Undoubtedly, in the coming years the costs will rise, 
ancl if the BanL of Latvia does not alter its eschange rate policy, the company's competitiveness 
i n  CIS nlarl;ets will decrease. Currently it is more profitable to sell production in the donlestic 
1narl;et t11a11 i n  tlie CIS, because in export operations losses are suffered clue to  eschange rate 
fluctuations. However, in the domestic market company has no opportunities for expansion, as 
Latvian 1narl;et is 1-ery small. Moreover, tlie inlplementation of a large project aimed a t  re- 
construction of Latvia's telecommunications system was awarded to  an English-Dutch company 
"Tilts conii~~ui~ications".. 
Doillestic Environlnent for Exports 
Po.\iti[,c (/.\IN C ~ A :  Assistance of Latvian embassies in CIS in organizing eshibitions. 
.Ycgottoc cc.spcct.s: (1) Eschange rate policies: clecrease i n  prices for some importecl raw materials, 
t11anl;s to  rcal appreciation of the national currency cannot conlpensate for the clec~.ease i l l  esport 
1)1ic-ts (accounted i n  Lats). (2)  delays in  refunding 18%) VAT for raw materials to esporters. 
iiiouiitii~g problems with worl;ing capital; (3) high credit rates; (4) insufficient efforts on the 
government level to  recover economic collaboration with Russia. 
Foreign Eiiviroililleilt for Exports 
Co~nl>aiiy ha5 irel.c good relations with business partners in tlie CIS. Company cloes not face 
serior~s coinpetition i l l  CIS despite price its disadvantages comparing with CIS proclucers because 
of l ~ i g l ~  qunlity of VEF IiT's inanufactures. I-Iowever, large problems coulcl arise clue to  unstable 
political relations I~etween Russia aiid Latvia. Up to  now Russia clicl not ratif!. nlost favored 
 atio ions treaty xvith Latvia, signed in  1992. hlost favored nations status g~antecl by Russia to  
Latvia in 199-1 operates 011 a temporary basis, aiid can be removed any time. As a result, 
con~pany's future clepends to  a large estent on political relations between tlie two governments. 
Ausma (Chemicals) 
E.\tablishcd: after the war. 
,'ii:r of labor force: 114 (68% are engaged in manufacturing). 
, S i x  of tljr ctryital stock: USD 2.3 n111. 
Tllerinoplastic a.rticles XI of Sales 
Household articles and packaging 58 
Ba.throom fittings 11 
Toys 6 
Stationery 5 
Itellls for personal hygiene 4 
Sports equipment 2 
I<itchen articles 1 
Telescopic fibreglass fishing rods 13 
7'rtr.norcr (1.994): 155.605 Ls. 
Olrtput (1.990-95): diminished by a factor of 4-5 (largest fall was obsel.vecl in 1992); procluction 
capacities are eiiiployed by 1.5-20%; 1994 - year of stabilization; prospects for 199.5 - small 
i~~cl.case of output. 
lJ1,t?fits: NA. 
Ucbt.\: to  creditors - 600,000 Ls (mainly to the budget); debtors' liabilities 310,000 Ls (bad 
tlebts. eiiierged ~iiainly in 1992). 
,'itrurturf of o u ~ ~ ~ c r s h i p :  In September,l992 company was transformed from state enterprise into 
joint stocli conipany. Currently '73% of shares are owned by large shareholders, including 10% 
l~elcl I,\ Frencli conipany .'Eurotraden . 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Traditionallj. 10-12'X, of production were sold in the dolnestic niarliet; the rest were sent to  
other FSL- republics (mainly to Russia). After the collapse of the USSR situation dramatically 
cl~augetl: FSU niarliets were practically lost. 
.As regards 1994, the distribution of company's sales was following: 
Other Baltic Other Eastern Otlier Western 
Lat~via States CIS States States States 
90'XI 4% 2% 2 5% 2% 
The coliipanj. has good partners in Soutli Africa, Australia and the Netlierlantls which mainly 
illiport fisliing rods for middle class custon~ers. In Russia highly demandetl are 12usma's folding 
I>oscs for transportation of goods, that  is a new product of the firm. 
In future colnpany's nlost significant partner could be French firm '.Eurotrade" which plans 
to participate together with "Ausma" in the Latvian National Catering Services Programme. 
Tlle ta5li of' "A4usma" will be to  produce heatproof plasticware that  could endure up to  170°C 
temperature. Total suln of needed investments for the project (USD 2.7 mn) will be financed 
from statc guaranteed loans and partly by the French partner. According to  tlie contract "Eu- 
lotlaclc" will export all remaining heatproof plasticware. SHELL and TEXAS are interested in 
Suture cooperation as ~vell (containers for petrol and lubricants). 
l los t  of conipany's present foreign business partners are wliolesale companies. It cloes not 
c1ul>loy \cr~-iccs of any Latvian export-import companies, though. Company is co-owner of 
t ~ s o  xllol,s i n  Russia. Conlpany mainly produces manufactures developed by its own personnel. 
l lone\er .  some ~)roclucts are made in accordance with specific needs of the partner, using the 
c ~ ~ s t o ~ n e r ' s  samples. .A11 example is plastic parts for mowers, exportecl to Ciermany. 
<'onrpan!. uses all possibilities establishing contacts with foreign partners: it places its ads 
i r r  such catalogues as "Data Control", "Nordic Business Guide"; besides it cooperates with LDA 
,IIIC! Inter~rational Trade Center Riga. 
Productioil for Export 
('ornpany has strong intention to  expand its exports both in Eastern and IVestern marhets. 
Ilonever. cletailecl business plan is developed only for tlie Public Catering Program. 
For tlre time being main competitive strength of company in foreign marliets is low price. 
'rdhing into account such factor as real appreciation of Lats and rising costs (\\ages. electricity, 
 an nlaterials), suclr advantage could if not lost, seriously climinislied in co~ning years. Com- 
pany's flexibility is liuiited by its excessively large share of obsolete, not employed equipment 
( the nenest ecluip~iieut was bought in 1987). Due to  financial constraints the company cannot 
afFo~cl to  lieep necessary number of designers. Nevertheless, situatio~i can change, thanks to  
~~Iannecl investnlents fro111 abroad. 
i15 regards inputs usage and assortment, there is no clifferelice between production sold in 
tlre donlestic and foreign markets; might be quality control is a bit stricter for exported goocls. 
l u  terms of profitability it is more lucrative to  sell production in tlie donlestic marliet; however, 
L,lt\ ian nialliet cannot provide sufficient expansion possibility for the conlpany. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
l 'c- , .hi t~~*r rl.ql;lfcth: activities of LDA4, N'orld Trade Center Riga. LCTC. 
L \ 7 r g t ~ t ~ l v  n.\prct\: ( I )  exchange rate policies; (2) still high credit rates, that  are not suitable even 
for sliort-tern) financing, (3) unfair allocation of G-24 and other i~lter~iational credits; (4) delays 
iir refuncling \i.AT on inputs for exporters (in such a way large sums of nioney are frozen): (.5) 
;~lxence of go~vernment support to  exporters. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
('onipany enjoys preferential treatment both i n  respect of inlports of raw rnaterials (plastics) 
ancl exports of finished goocls to  Russia because it sonieliow beca~ne a niember of Russia's Union 
of Llanufact urers. 
C'ompany has sr~cceedecl in establishing new contacts with foreign mecliators, and sonle of 
them seem to  1)ecome stable. 
-45 the largest olxtacle to  exports to  Western countries was mentioned saturated nrarkets 
ancl i~ifornlal clistribution of iriflue~ice spheres, rather than sonle formal barriers. Conclusion of 
FT.1 n.itli EU till now did not influence company's activities abroad. hIay be to  some extent 
tlre situation will change with assistance of the French partner, which, in  turn, hopes to  conquer 
tlre Lat\.iarr marliet. 
Olaine Pharmaceutical Plant (Pharmaceuticals) 
Background Iilforillatioil 
Dntc of c.ht0611.5l~n~c1~t: i n  1972. 
,S'r:c of lnbor forrt: 956; peak employment was 2,500. 
P~oduct.h ~iinrznfirrtl~red: I~iitially main products were raw drugs: Central nenous  system agents; 
iioii-steroiclal anti-infla~nmatories; peripheral neuromediators; cardiovascular system agents; spa- 
siiiolytic nletlicines; diuretic, antidiabetic, antibacterials, antiviral, antilielnii~~tliic, and anti- 
cancer clrugs. Currently tlie maill products are tablets, ainoilg wllicll tlie ~ilost importaiit by 
~.alue are ortopliene (14% of sales), tlieobromine ( lo%) ,  pyracetam and fencarol (7%) each). I11 
total conipaiiy produces 3.5 types of tablets. 
Outptrt (1990-1994): Diminished by half after collapse of the USSR; production of raw drugs 
clecreased l>y a factor of 4.5 while production of tablets increased 2.8 times. fall in 1992. 
T ~ I  rrzovci': 
1992 1993 1994 
Sales ( i n  million Ls) 3.4 3.6.5 4.0 
P1nfit.s: I11 1994 coiilpaily suffered Ls 1.6 ni losses. 0.3 m Ls of losses, for instance, came from 
tlie niainteiiance of biological purification system as it has to  deal additionally with waste water 
fro111 other Olaiiie industrial eiiter~)rises and from Olaine public services. 
I I ) ~ c ~ / c ( / I L ~ . ~ s :  Tlie cornpany has significant debt to tlie budget (Ls 0.7111) and to  energy suppli- 
ers. 
,Y/l.urtul.c of' oll,llc rship: Tlie Compaily is owned by tlie s tate (Privatizatioii .Agency). Tlie 
intention is. if possible, to  privatize into a holding company, and than attract a \Vestern pliar- 
liiaceutical ~nanufacturing company to  form a joint venture. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
111 1972 company was established under auspices of tlie Iiiev Institute for Synthesis of Biological 
Sul>staiices, aiicl on such a scale tha t  it could manufacture thirty pharmaceutical products to  
s11111>1y the entire USSR. Initially company produced only intermediate products, ~vliich were 
sent for tal>letting in Russia. Later the company was gradually engaged in prodnction of fin- 
isliecl proclucts. B!. 1990 tlie distribution of company's sales between different regions was tlie 
following: 
La.tvia. Other republics of USSR C~zecl~osloval~ia 
5% 90% 5% 
LlSSK republics were supplied with hoth raw drugs and tablets, Czec1iosloval;ia ivith raw 
clrugs. \Ter!. small portions of finislied products were sent to  Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and hlongolia. 
After tlie tlisintegration of the USSR the pattern of trade significantly changed: 
La tviaa FSU Austria U I( Germany Poland 
1993 S.791 60.5% 10.3% 8.3%) 9.5% 2.7% 
199.5. forecast 10%) 8.5% 5%) 
" - Figures for Latvia are very unprecise as large part of prod~lction solcl to the dolnestic conlpanies is further 
c~ul>o~.tetl. 
\Vhy so pessimistic forecast for 1995? Company simply can't allymore coinpete with its 
prices. (111 t o  no~v conlpany supplied Western market with raw drugs. It could compete with 
price I>cca~~sc  it had huge reserves of cheap compo~ie~its  needed for production from Soviet times. 
Now tlicse stocks have been practically esliansted. Tlie reason why tlie coinpaiiy cannot increase 
price following tlie rise of price for raw materials is that  compatiy cannot meet G M P  (Good 
Alanufacturing Practice) standards. Such situation is typical for all phar~iiaceutical e~iterprises 
in Latvia \vitli tlie only exception of the company Cirindes. 
Other marl;ets (such as the Baltics, CIS) are supplied \vitli finislied products, i.e., tablets. 
C'o~nlxin!. cloes not esport raw drugs to the East, because it is more profitable to  supply tablets 
in id also I>ecause Russia has begun to import extremely cheap but lo\\. quality raw drugs from 
India and C'liina. 
Irnfortunatel~,, conipany does not visit international fairs, and tlic reason is not only its 
tlifficult financial s tate,  but also still "Soviet orientation" of the thinking of managers. &lost of 
t l ~ e  p~esent  partners i n  FSU collaborated witli the company also earlier (organizations clia~iged, 
I,ut people are the same). In 1991 some new contacts were establisliecl witli tlie assistance of 
Latvian Clia~iiber of Trade. For unknown reasons company does not initiate cooperation witli 
LC'TC ant1 other Latvian organizations, tliat would be able a t  least to  lielp witli provision and 
clistril>ution of inforniation. Western firms find tlie company through catalogues. All partners 
in the East ancl the \Vest are wliolesale companies. Olaine cloes not know anything about final 
collsulilers. 
Productioil for Exports 
The maill atlva~itage of the company in  the Eastern market is tliat the colnpany is tlie only pro- 
t l r ~ c c ~  of se~-en ~iiedicines. However, tliese medicines are of very narrow sl>ecializatiou. To enter 
nestern marliet ~vitli tliese products, company has to  pass cunlbersome registration procctlure 
lasting 111uc1i lilore than a year and costing thousands of dollars. Taking into account also fact 
that the company cannot meet G M P  requirements. it woultl be very risky to  engage in this tin- 
tle~taliing. i-lc~ually, the quality of produced substances ant1 tablets is lrery liigli and conipany 
lias never receivecl any coinplaint neither from FSU nor from LLrestern partners in respect to  
cl~cli~ic;~l paranieters of medicines. It has to be admitted tliat sonie ecluipn~ent remained from 
tla!.s of cstal>liblinient and production pretnises are also far from ideal. At the sanle time, sec- 
oiitlary protluctio~i facilities are niostly new. (i.e., built after 1992). During transition periocl the 
tonlpany succeeded to  espantl its assortment by 18 types of tablets, using substances tliat were 
~,~oducecl earlier only for otlier products; also dosage forms significantly changed. Company has 
sollle contacts \\it11 a research institute i n  St .  Petersburg; it maintains also sonle contacts wit11 
Ldt\ ian .Academy of Sciences, but in general collaboration witli scientific centers is insufficient. 
.A\ the main disadvantage should be mentioned absence of market researcll, wliich very often 
liinits oiieiitation of production. Sales activities are also insufficient. The otlier disadvantage 
is that tlie entire vast complex was intentionally built as an integrated concern witli a central 
enelg\. supl>l!'. This inalces it difficult to  split off efficient smaller scale primary and secondary 
~ ~ ~ o t l u c t i o n  units. 
Doillestic Eilviroilnleilt for Exports 
( 1) Pri\.atization l>roblems; (2) insufficient or even negative stimulation of foreign invest~iients, 
wliicli \voultl bc urgently needed for modernization of production; ( : 3 )  eschange rate policies. 
Tlie only positive nion~ent is tliat the company does not have to  pay import duties 011 imported 
coliiponents for production. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Xegati1.e a5pects of this environment are GhfP stantlards nrllicl~ actually serve to  protect El! 
niarliet: increasing competition from low cost India and China; Russia's I~ureaucratic customs 
procecl~~rc\: tlie requirement to  ]lave permit from Russia's health protection coniniittee for each 
tleliver!.. Besicles. in  Russia all regulations are changing so frequently tliat conlpany very often 
1ia\ to  pay for storage of products in customs wareliouses, wliile getting additional docunientation 
\vliicl~ is iieeded according t o  the latest regulations. Ilkrainel in turn,  claimed tha t  Latvia as  
\yell as  other FSlT republics has to reregister medicines they are esporting t o  the Ukraine. 
Taking illto account t ha t  the procedure of registration is very costly and the  purchasing power 
of pol>ulatio~i still is estremely low (e.g., average pension in Ukraine is 4%)) it is doubtful whether 
the company will continue exports t o  Ukraine in the nearest future. Quite stable relations are 
tvitll 1iazal;hstan; company even agrees t o  receive payment in local currency tenga as  its rate  
is relatively stable and there are no problems with conversion of tengas in Latvia. Relations 
with Russia are reci[~rocal, as  company imports part of raw materials fro111 there. However, the 
~xol>leni s tha t  conlpany is forced t o  accept unfavorable payment conditions (about 30 days 
after delivery), \vhile for raw ~llaterials it has t o  pay in advance. 
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'l'al,le 7.1 P~.oGles of companies covered in the case studies 
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"O\vne~.ship: classification based on nationality and control rights of inajority shareholcler; SO = Stcrte-ott~necl 
c.01111,rrrcy - majority oIvner is the State, via the State Ownership Fund; Privcite - p~iva te  shareholders retain 
111ajorit,y: J\; = .Joint ventnr.es - majority retained by foreign private investors. 
".IS = Joint-stock company. 
'Size: L = Large: hI = h'ledium; S = Small. Classification is not based on the al~solute nuinber of staff; rather, 
111l111l>er of staff of the conlpanies in the sample was related to staff sizes of ot,her companies in t.he same sectors. 
' /EL[ = European LTnion; CIS = Commonwealth of lndependent States. 
"I~lcl~~clecl ill the Mass Privatization Program. 
General Explanatory Notes 
Tlie espression comn~erciol compnizy used in the case studies needs some esplanation. According 
to the Conil)aii~. Law of 1990 enterprises were classified as either commercial companies or regie 
a~~toiioines. C'oinmercial companies were to function as commercial firms and were declared 
~)ri\,atizahle. Regie autonomes reinailled fully state-owned i n  strategic areas as utilities, mining 
of natural resources, etc. These companies were declared not privatizable, but they could lease 
out  sonie of their activities under concession contracts. 
111 eacli case study we attempted to estahlisli a constant price time series of the turiiover of 
1 h e  give11 company. Tlie tur~lover was calculated for all firms a t  1994 prices using the producer 
price index (PPI). The reason for using 1994 prices instead of 1990 prices is the desire to  show 
all turliovers i11 USD. Since the only year in the period 1990-1994 when a really free exchange 
rate was i n  place was 1994, we preferred this method, in spite of the criticism it might generate. 
COMPl 
Background Information, Structure of Ownership 
The company \\-as established i n  1971. I11 December 1990 it was turned into a commercial 
company. I n  1993 the company was privatized and in 199.5 it had the following structure of the 
sharel~olders: 39% of the shares were held by the employees, 22% by Dacia Felix Bank, 10% 
t)y Ion Tiriac Bank, 12% were jointly held by tlie Private Ownership Fund Arad and Private 
O\~nersIii~, Funcl Craiova, 17% by other shareholders (small investors). 
The company can produce about ,5000 tons of porcelain products per year. Its main prod- 
ucts are china-made tableware both for l~ouseholds and hotels. The production capacity ivas 
constantly fully used throughout 1990-1994. The number of staff was maintained around 2.400 
people throughout 1990-1994, with 2,343 people employed in 1994. Tlie turnover calculated in 
l1SD was 10.55 million i n  1990, maintained itself a t  the same level in 1991 and increased to  
a peak of 11.6 i n  1992, to  decrease afterwards to  11.46 i n  1993 and gro~ving to  15.19 in 1994. 
(';\pita1 stocli was 3953.:3 million lei as a t  end-1993. 
Tlie traditional export markets of the company are alnlost exclusively i n  tlie EIJ (mainly 
Gelmany, Italy and the III<). The price per ton grew by 3.5% in 1993 as compared to 1992, 
sl~o\ving a sul)stantial upgrading process. The profit margin was constantly higher than the 
Ronianian average, althougli decreasing - from 36% in 1990 to 22%) in  1994. However, the 
profit rate \\-as constantly under the rate of inflation. 
The conlpany has relatively low bank credits in the working capital. Tliis ratio lias however 
illcreased from 11.42%) in 1990 to  41.46% in 1994, mainly as a result of the de-capitalization 
protluced by FIFO stock accounting system in a very inflationary environment ant1 the very 
abrupt increase of tlie interest rates a t  end of 1993. Tlie company lias no arrears payable. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
T l ~ e  Association Agreement with the European Union stimulated a boom in exports, as export 
s l~are  in total output grew t o  40..5% in 1993 and .50% in 1994 from 24.1% in 1992, showing a 
gro\ving share of COMP1 i n  the total Romanian exports and a declining sliare in the domestic 
uiarl\et. AIost of the exports (9.5%) go to  the European Union (mainly C;ermany, Italy, UI<) 
11 Iiile .j'% of the output is exported i n  the USA. 
Expol ts  are done rnainly through intermediaries (60%)). The company works to  a large extent 
according to specifications and designs supplied by the foreign partner. It also benefited from 
supplies of special inputs such as colors, glazing products, etc. The foreign partner also supplies 
pacliaging ~oaterials. The company managed to  maintain its trademark in most of the cases. 
Export Strategy 
The company plans to  diversify in the upper end range of products and to  benefit from the 
relatively fast-growing EU market. It also plans to  expand its exports to  the USA (the world's 
~iiost iniportant i~~ ipor t e r  of chinaware) up to 10-15% of the output in 2000. Tlie targeting of 
a position in tlie upper end of the market requires tlie dimiilution of the specific weight of the 
protlucts \\-liicli are about 15% heavier than the ecluivalent products i n  the EU. 
The company plans to  turn towards a higlier share of automatically-cast proclucts in order to  
assure uniformity and high quality of tlie output. COMPl  sees as its main strengths the highly 
qualifiecl 11,orl<force, tlie good position in the relatively close EU markets, and its long-standing 
rclationsliip \vith EU importers that allows it t o  fully observe the deniandiiig West-European 
standards. Its major weaknesses are the price and quality of Roinailian components and the 
price of ran materials, both imported and domestically-purchased. 
C'ompanj managers assert tha t  there is no difference in  factor usage bet\\leen tlie exported 
a11cl t lie t lo~~~estical ly sold output. The statement is probably true as the opening of the clomestic 
niarliet let1 to  ceramics inlports from virtually zero in 1989 to USD 10 mil. in 1993 as compared 
to  an esport of IrSD 13 mil., a significant proof of an i~lcreasingly competitive domestic market. 
Tliere has been a growing gap between tlie profit rate for tlie sales on tlie cloniestic market 
aiicl tlie esport 1iiarl;ets: i n  1994 the former attained 21% while tlie latter was 2.5%. Tlie incentive 
to  esport \ \as  thus substantial, although somewhat lowered by the liiglier number of days needed 
for tlie cashing of invoices for the exported output (30 vs. 20 days for tlie domestically supplied 
output iri 1994). 
Doillestic Environment for Exports 
The firill is sul>stantially harmed by tlie high import duties for inputs, especially modern tecli- 
uologies ant1 ecluipinent, altliougll only a very little part of tliese equipinents are also produced 
tlo~iiesticallj.. Tlie firm is also liarnied by tlle liigli interest rates (in 199.5 about 60%) and it is for 
tlii,s reason tliat it would very mucli welcome tlie diminution of interest rates for export credits. 
Tlie fir111 often liad difficulties in paying the bills for the imported inputs due to  tlie great delays 
i n  payillelit operations by banlis. The situation improved somewliat in 1994 hut the cashing 
periods for tlie exported output still substantially exceeds the one for domestic deliveries. The  
company also co~nplains about long waiting periods a t  border crossings as most of its exported 
o ~ ~ t p u t  is delivered on road. The last difficulty leads occasionally to  tense relatio~isl~ips witli the 
('ustoms Department. It is lioped that  the new border crossings a t  tlle Roiiianian-Hungarian 
I~orcler \vould facilitate the transit. The company lias generally good relationsliips witli tlle 
hlinistry of Trade, tlla~ilis t o  the relatively fast issuing of export licenses. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Due to  t,lle fact, that  iriost of tlie export is performed tlirougli intermediaries the company 1ia.s 
little informa~t~ion about its conlpetitors a,lthough ma.nagers liliow tliat tlie nia.in competitors come 
fro111 C:liina n,nd Soutli-Ea,st Asia. Tliere is a,n over-dependence on foreign pa,rtners for inarliet 
information. It is actua.lly for this reason tl1a.t the conipa~iiy indicates a.s a, substantial weakness 
the lack of a perma,nent representative a.broa,d a,nd it would welcome governnlent support for 
establishing offices abroad. 
The coinpa.ily openly recognizes tha t  it lias little informa.tion about the price level 011 tlle 
?sport marliets. the coiniiiercia~l legislation on foreign ma.rkets and of the business rules abroa,d. 
The ilssociatioii ,4greement did not have a ma.jor impact on tlie stmtegic clioices of the 
conipa.ny-, as  i t  alrea,dy enjoyed a tradition i n  exporting t o  the EU. 
AUTOMOBILE DACIA S.A. PITESTI 
Backgrouild Iilforillatioil and Ownership 
The conipany started its operations in 1966. In 1990 it was turned illto a coniniercial company 
acco~cliiig to  Law 1.5/1990. The firm is still state-oivnecl, with 70%) of tlie equity owned by tlie 
State Oivnersliip Fund and 30% by the Private Ownership Fund Pitesti. The conil>aliy is a t  an 
atli.anced stage of negotiations for a joint-venture rvith Peugeot. 
Tlie plant started producing in 1966 (under a Renault license) a 1100 cm3 car. Tlie pro- 
cluction was discoiitinued in 1973 wlien the production of Dacia 1300 started under tlie Renault 
12 license. Dacia is an average class car, 4.3 meters long, 1200-1400 cm3 engines. This license 
nas  used ivith minor technical changes up to  now. Wliile keeping the same basic design the 
range of products was somewhat diversified with a pick-up, a break and a sport model. The 
firiii benefited until 1989 frorn a quasi-monopoly on tlie donlestic market given the other Ro- 
~nanian auto-malier, Oltcit, was mainly export-oriented. The firm esportecl mainly to  tlie East 
European countries presently Associated with the European Union and to  other "soft" markets 
such as Latin r-Iiiierica (Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina), Turkey and Cliina. Exports were also 
suppliecl to cleveloped countries (Canada mainly) a t  dumping prices. 
'I'l~e projectecl capacity was 96,000 pieces a year but it was never attained. The capacity 
~~tilization followed somewhat the general evolution of the Roiilanian economy after 1989: it 
tlecreased from 81.4% in 1990 to  6.5% in  1992 and it recovered to  90% in 1994. The labor force 
ivt\s lialvctl in 1991, from 30872 in 1990 to 1.5321 in 1991, as an effect of t l ~ e  strong contraction of 
cloinestic demand and it increased only sliglitly since, to  15902 people in 1994. The productivity 
lags far behind European auto makers, but the comparison is not easy, as 40% of the inputs are 
internally produced and not subcontracted. Tlie teclillology is a t  the level of the 1960s. The 
turnover a~uounted to USD million 16.5.59, fell to 153.01 i11 1991 and grew steadily ever since to  
171.0:3 niillion in  1992, to 235.77 million in 1993 and to  267 inillion i n  1994. 
The conipany 111acle losses in 1990 (this was the main reason for tlie subseclue~~t substantial 
lay-offs) and afterwards it recorded low profit rates, much behind tlle inflation rate, tlie best year 
I~cing 1993 mitli a 9.9% profit rate. It  is however to  be mentioned that  prices for tlie firm's cars 
are still controlled by tlie Ministry of Fiilance which only admits a "legitimate" profit rate. The 
coiiipany managed to  improve its credit rating. Tliis rniglit be esplained by the fact tha t  the 
fill11 ren~ained liquicl ( in  spite of tlie negative casli flow) "thanks" to  the liigli and accelerating 
iiiflatio~l coupled with real-negative interest rates for cleposits tliroughout 1990-199:3 tha t  created 
a strong pressure towards investment in durable goods as a reliable store of value. The liquidity 
or tlie company allowed it t o  have virtually no arrears payable. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Tlie esport accounted for 41%) of the output in 1990 (25,316 cars), decreasing to  a lou~est 26% 
i11 1991 (15,414 cars) and increasing afterwards to  a liigliest 57%) i11 1993 (48,817 cars). The 
slight recovery of the purchasing power of the population in 1994 decreased the share of exports 
i l l  output to 40';: (36,000). 
I11 19S9 S49, of the esports were headed toxvards the present EU associated countries: Hun- 
gal !, Czecl~oslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria. Esports to this area decreased d ranlatically to  zero in 
1992 and the inarliet did not recover yet. The export to  the EU became zero in 1994 from a 
peal; of 13% of total esports in 1990, mainly due to  the fact tlie Dacia 1300 does not comply 
wit11 the EIJ COL pollution standards (tlie car complies wit11 the ECE-UNO 1.5 anti-pollution 
nornis - presently espirecl). Esports were thus reoriented to  Cliina wliicli absorbed in 1994 
0.5'% of tlie esportecl output, with Mercosrir (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil), Colornbian 
ant1 Turkish inarliets absorbing the remaining 3.5% of the esported output. 
Esports are nlaii~ly done directly. About 10,000 cars were exported by hlASINEXPORTIM- 
I'OItT, a 5l>ecialized foreign trade firm performing esports of machinery and ecluipment. 
Productioil for Export 
TIIE co~~il)aiiy s aware of the fact that  it cannot penetrate "hard" markets such as tlie EU and 
CISA \vitli the products it can currently offer. This is why it developed a two-level strategy: 
1. It recently launched a new car, Dacia Nova, a 2000 ern" four-seated, transversal engine car 
with -4BS brakes tha t  complies with the EU pollutiorl standards thanks t o  the equipment 
nit11 cathalitical filters. Tlie developmental costs for this   nod el announted to  414 million 
llSD in five years. The company declared the car would sell for about 3000 USD ( t a s  
non-inclucled). It is however hard to believe this is a price that  can t>e maintained without 
"cannibalizing" the sales of the older Dacia models. 
2. It pla.ns to  invest 450 million dollars by the year 2000 to  increase its c a p c i t y  to  135,000 
cars per yea,r. 40-50,000 ca,rs are planned t o  be esported in 2000, although the esport 
miglit sul~stantially increase with tlie launch of the Dacia Nova and the planned joint- 
venture. The investment money a,re supposed t o  be partly generated internally and partly 
a,lloca,t~ecl by tlie State Ownership Fund who is tlie major shareholder. Tlie planned joint- 
venture with Peugeot might substa.ntially alter upwa.rds these pla,ns a.s tlie plant tvould 
very l>rol>a,l>ly mirror the plans of Da,ewoo wlio recently bought Oltcit, the second largest 
Roma,niai~ a,utoma.lier. The model planned t o  be producetl by the Da,cia-Peugeot joint- 
venture is the newly-designed Peugeot 306. 
Tlie conipaiiy considers its main strengths lie in  tlie price and in the lligli qualification of the 
worliforce a,s tvell as in tlie quality of the components supplied by foreign subcontractors. On 
the contrary, company's competitiveness is seriously harmed by tlie outdatedness of equipment 
ant1 t,eclinologies and tlie low quality of the Roma,nian-made components. Consequently, the ga.s 
consumption is up t o  20% higher tllaii for the equivalent cars, the durability is lialf of those, 
a,nd the relial)ilit,y is variable and decreasing. 
Tlie ini1)orters of second-hand cars made ~na jo r  inroads in the Ronla,niaii markets in tlie last 
!.ears th rea,t,ening the lonfer-end segment Dacia competes in. As a.n effect, there a,re no differences 
i t 1  the clua,lity of inputs used in the production of Dacia ca,rs for tlonlestic and foreign markets. 
Tlie coml>a,ny cl~arges olnewhat higher prices for tlie esportecl output 11ut the difference is 
claiined t o  1,e ra,ther a ma,rlieting tool (maintain a certain reputa.tion of tlie trade ma.rli that  
ti-oultl otlierwise be ha,r~ned by escessive low pricing) than a systematic a.pproa.ch. Consequent,ly 
tlie profit rate for the esported output is not systema.tically higher t l ia~i  tlie a.vera.ge. It has even 
I~een loiirer i n  1990-91 a,ntl in 1993 (.5.4%, vs. 6.4(z1), down from the 1992 (31.4%) vs. -2.2%]) a.ntl 
I993 (15.5'h vs. :3.4'Xl) levels. Tlie gross profit was 28661 million lei in 1993. 
Doillestic Eilviroilillent for Exports 
The car compet.es abr0a.d \vith equivalent cars of its cla,ss: Fia.t Tempra., Peugeot 309, Rena.ult 
19 or CXtroen ZX. 
Tlie inail) clolnestic impediment to esports is claiinecl to be the high interest rates. l~Ia,na,gers 
I\-ould like to see low-interest credits ( a t  least 30% under the market rate), low interest esport 
credits and high esport primes. The company is also seriously affected by the low quality of 
railroatl services which affects the credibility of the firm through tlie delays i n  deliveries and 
I]!. tlie I~igh custorns duties for imported inputs. Tlie input's the company is most in need (and 
ivhich a.re genera,lly very costly) are a.nti-pollution devices needed to  esport i n  the EU and 
inotlern ecluipment for teclinologica~l upgra.ding of the compa,ny. 
The counpany is harmed by the large dela,ys in tlie reimbursement of VAT a.nd custolns duties 
for t l~ose iml~ortecl inputs that  a,re incorporated after\va.rds in tlie esported output. The supply 
of' a I>alili letter of gua,ra.ntee. is not an alternative either, as banks block tlie accounts of t,he 
c.ol~~l~aily for an aniount equiva,lent to  tlie value of the guarantee. The best solution tvould be the 
(lust~o~iis Aut1iorit.y to accept written commitments coiiceriiing the re-export of tliese iinported 
in l~uts  insteail of ba.nk guarantees, considers the company. 
A donlestic impedi~nent is seen to be tlie too f a t  1ibera.lization of foreign trade. Managers 
slio~v a very strong bias towards tlie protection of tlie domestic markets: they strongly support 
the idea of a,ii extended transition period as concerns the imple~nentation of the Association 
:\greenlent a , ~ ~ c l  tlie aclmissioi~ to the domestic markets of only 2,000 ca.rs a. year. They also 
propose increa.sed custo~ns and excise duties for imported cars. 
Tlie number of subcontractors increased somewhat from one for a, ma,jority of tlie inputs in 
1989 to 2-3 for each of tlie inputs. Still, some 90% of the inputs are doniestically produced. 
C.;o~nl~etition is still fa,r from intense and tlie company can not afford yet to import a Inore 
suhsta,ntia.l part of its inputs; a.ccordingly doniestic producers still Ilolcl a substa,ntia,l leverage 
and ca,n ra.ise prices to follow inflation rate. The dollar depreciated very little in 1994, much 
I~eliind tlie infla,tion ra,te, so that  in fact the dollar prices of inputs increa,sed. Tlie company 
noulcl tlius favor price controls over tlie domestic colnponent suppliers in order to  avoid the 
erosion of its export positions; it proposes in fa.ct price increases for componeiits only in line 
with the ~1evalua.tion of tlie leu. 
The coliipa,iiy lieeps a good relationship with the Ministry of Tra,de allowing it to have quick 
a,ccess to export licenses. 
Foreign Environment for Exports 
Tlie ma,jor foreign impediment to export is by far the level of customs duties on export markets. 
No other ~na.jor iiilpeclinlent is seen as harming tlie competitive position of tlie firm. 
Tlie compa.ny lias good rela,tion with its clients altliough negotia.tions on the price are tra.- 
clit.ionally very hitter as it is generally the situation a,t the lower-end segment of tlie car market 
Da,cia is serving. Tlie only area of major involvement by foreign clients is transport. The firm 
11a.s relatively cliversified sources of information. It is not only relying on persona,l contacts with 
business pa.rtners but also on a permallelit represenht'ive abroad ( in  China) and on specializecl 
11u blications. 
The coiiipaiiy is seriously harmed by the lack of liquidity on ma.rliets sucli as China or the 
('IS. Tliis is tlie reason why it woulcl be very much i n  favor of illore facilities for barter. 
Tlie coillpaiiy does not seem to fully understand the impact of tlie Associa,tion Agreement on 
its sitl~at,ion 011 the clomestic market. Although demanding liigh prot.ection tlie fir111 cleclares tlie 
r-\ssociation :\greeinent lia,s neutra.1 effects on its business, i n  spite of the fa,ct tliat tlie Agreement, 
~voultl thl.cat. its ina.rket share in Ronlania in the near future. 
The ~iiost clra,i~iatic ha.nges in tlie structure of tlie niarket occurred in t,lie East Europeali 
:\ssociat'ecl countries of the EU. The success of Fia,t Cinquecento in Poland, the purcha,se of 
Sliotla 11y \''I\.', the emerging of Hungary as a producer, as well as Slova,kia's and Bulgaria's new 
car ~naliiiig indust,ry would make competition a t  the lower-middle segment extremely tough. 
It is however to be iioticecl that  the scale of the investments is very substantial only in the 
Clzecli Republic a,nd Poland. Hungary, Slovakia and l3ulga.ria host niainly small plants, probably 
clircct.cd t.owards tlie donlestic market. 
ARO S.A. Off-road vehicles, Cimpulung Muscel 
Backgrouild Illforillation and Ownership 
Tlie colnpany nras established in 1957 as an assembler of a Soviet-desigiied off-road car (GAZ). 
Starting from 1970 tlie integrally Romanian designed AKO 240 is manufactured. Several types 
of body are offered. Tlie car is equipped witli either gas or diesel engines. I11 1978 the range 
or ~>rotlucts \\as completed with a 1.3 liter engine car, also offered in several types of body and 
engine, either gas or diesel. 
'The projected capacity is 20,000 cars per year. Capacity utilization declined drastically 
tlirougliout 1990-1993, from 17,371 cars in 1989 to  11,559 cars in 1993. Tlie size of tlie workforce 
tlitl not follo~v as fast, as it declined from 12,300 persons i n  1990 to  10,600 in 1994. Tlie turnover 
was 61.7 inillion USD i n  1990, decreased to  51.42 million in 1991 and ij1.5 million in 1992, up 
to 52.7 niillion in  1993 and down again to  43.6 million in 1994. 
Tlie same as i n  the case of Dacia, the most important market i n  1989 was the presently 
East European -Associated countries of the European Union. Tlie destinations of esports were 
Iroucvcr substantially inore diversified with a quarter of the output going to  the EU and another 
quarter to Latin America. China was also an important market. Tlie company sold some 35,000 
cars i n  1990-1993. Tlie rate of profit was very low and the company even made losses in 1993-94. 
T l ~ e  level of intlebtedness diminished towards 1994, witli short-term credits representing only 
53%) of tlic n~orkiiig capital, as compared to  83% in 1990. The esplanation might be tlie same 
as for Dacia. 
I11 199r> the company was still state-owned, with 70% of the shares held by tlie State Om11- 
rrsliip Fund and 30% owned by the Private Ownership Fund Muntenia. 
Export Orieiltation 
Esports decreased both in absolute figures (from 15,600 cars i11 1989 to  3,933 cars in  1993) and 
relative figures as share of esports in output (from 90% in 1989 to  34% in 1993). 
Esports were distributed almost evenly in 1989 between EU (23.9'&), associated countries 
of' tlie ELI (:3.5.2'%), China (13%) and Latin America (26.2%). Esports towards tlie associated 
t o ~ ~ n t r i e s  i11 total esports increased substantially in  1991 and 1992 (to 52% aiid 36% shares, 
respecti~.ely) while decreasing to marginal figures after 1992. Esports to  CIS increased also 
sul>stantially after 1989 (43% i n  1992 although decreasing in 1993-94 (11.8% share in 1994). 
Tlir olily marliets where tlie share of sales in total esports increased are tlie EU (36.4% in 1994) 
' ~ I I C I  ('11i11a (47.9'Xl ill 1994). 70% of tlie total esports is done directly aiid 30% via intermediaries. 
Productioil for Export 
Tlie coinpaiiy has two alternative strategies for capacity estension. The first is supposed to  
I~ring tlie protluctive capacity to  35,000 cars a year in 1998 using only tlie present facilities 
and a second aiming a t  estending the facilities witli tlie objective of i~icreasing tlie productive 
capacity to  45,000 cars a year in 1998. The market research undertaken by tlie firm establishes a 
total deinand (domestic and foreign) of more than 45,000 cars a year in 2000. For the time being 
only the first strategic alternative is currently being implemented as the financial resources for 
the seco~id one are not yet assured. 18,000-20,000 cars out of the total 35,000 (as in the first 
alternative) are planned to  be esported i n  tlie year 2000. 
The protluction of a new car under a foreign license is planned to  start  a t  ARO. Tlie car 
nould be elitlowed nritli a 2.500 cni3 engine, 85-90 H P  or 11.5-120 HP turbo).  The engiiie is 
plaiiiiecl to  Ile produced by ARO itself, after a foreign license. I n  this respect, negotiations are 
Ileiiig carried on with Peugeot, BMW, and VW. It is planned to  produce about 15,000 engines 
of tliis t!.pc a year, out of which a certain number sliall be sold to ROCAR (tlie Romanian 
pa<sengrr ~,ellicles producer) in order be used for a new van. 
It is also planned to  start  the production of a new 11.5 H P  engine for tlie ARO 23 model. 
The iiii.estnieiit effort for this objective to be attained is about 280 mil. USD until 2000. 
rllbout SO mil. tISD can be assured from domestic resources. Tlie remaining part is to  be 
assured from foreign credits with governmental guarantee, as well as the participation of foreign 
financial institutions such as tlie EBRD which seems interested to invest in tlie Romanian car 
inclust r y  
Negotiations are also being carried on for a joint-venture wit11 an Italian partner whose 
icleiitit!. \\as not disclosed. 
C'onil>any's position is inaiiily built on the price of the product and on tlie quality of the 
uorliforce, tlie quality of tlie imported inputs and the capacity to  satisf:, tlie specific standards 
of tlie export marliets. The company indicates as the main competitive disadvantages the price 
of tlie raw inaterials and the high price of the components, either imported or Romanian made. 
The:,. also conlplain of the low quality of the Romanian supplied compo~~ents ,  outdatedness of 
the teclinologies and tlie difficult access to  distribution channels. 
Tlie coml>any claiills to  use equal quality raw materials, components, worliforce and equip- 
nient for the exported and domestically supplied cars. The teclinologies used for exported cars, 
I~o~ve\.el.. are different. Reliable data allow us to  doubt \\,hetlier really equal quality conlponents 
are usecl. Accorcling to  our da ta ,  the share of Ron~anian made coinponents reaclies 9.5% for the 
tloinestically supplied cars ivllile it may decrease to  under .50%, for tlie exportecl car5 especially 
in tlie EU where in inany cases the engines are completely foreign (mainly hlercecles). 
Tlie coiiil>aiiy declares no difference in the profit rate between the domestically delivered 
ant1 the exported output. It is difficult to assess the reliability of this statement. It seeins tliat 
a t  least tlie average cashing periods for the exported output are shorter than tlie ones for tlie 
tlomestic deliveries, ensuring by tliis simple fact a some\vliat higher profitability. 
Doillestic Ellviroilnleilt for Exports 
The main domestic impedi~nents to  exports are according to  ARO S.A. tlie cllsto~ns duties on 
the i~npor t  of inputs, the cost of doinestic credit, tlie long tluration of banking operations and 
tlie price controls over tlie inputs. This is why tlie company supports tlie siniplification of the 
input inil>orts formalities and tlie export formalities (such as automatic issuing of licenses up to  a 
certain \.slue). tlie extension of tlie export credit facilities granted by Eximl>anli (the Romanian 
rxport c~r t l i t  banlier), quotas on tlie import of cars, indexation of tlie prices for inputs with the 
piice of tlie clollar, and low interest export credits. The company is also liarmet1 by frequent 
iiiodifications of tlie Romanian commercial legislation, tlie low quality of teleconi services and 
tlic long cluration of border crossings. 
Tlic compan!r is harmed by tlie costly bank guarantee (mainly in terins of casl~flow mainly) 
Tor tlic iml>orted inputs tliat are to  be incorporated in tlie exported output. hloreover, the 
Exinil>aiili is supposed to  disburse subsidized credit for la~incliing the production and exporting 
i t  : t lie sul>sicly for interest is, however, disbursed after tlie actual export is performed while for 
tlir coiiipaiiy it woulcl be essential to  have a good caslifloiv in  orcler to start  production for export 
i n  good conclitions. Subsidized credit sliould tlius be disbursed on the grounds of firmly signed 
exl>ort contracts. 
Tlie retluced purchasing power on the home market, tlie growing inter-enterprise arrears 
in Romania and tlie desperate need for tech~~ological upgrading let a company such as ARO 
little cliance to  grow by other means than exports. One could tlius say tliat with the delays in 
re5tructuring the economy tlie government is actually forcing the company to export. 
Tlie conipany has good relationship with governmental bodies responsible for exports al- 
thougll i t  jutlgeh this factor as playing no role in export competitiveness. 
Foreign Ellviroililleilt for Exports 
T l ~ e  coinpany llas good relationsliips with its custoniers although these liave solnetimes a strong 
I);lrgainil~g position over prices. The main competitors of tlie company are tlie companies pro- 
clucil~g cars of tlle same class. such as: Lada Niva, Suzuki Samurai, Suzuki Vitara, etc.. for ARO 
10, ancl I~litsul>islli Pajero, Toyota Land Cruiser, Isuzu Trooper or VAZ 469 for ARO 240. Thus, 
tlie only colnpetitor i n  tlie former COhlECON zone is tlie Russian producer \'AZ while in the 
Ii'e5t tlie 11uiil1)er of conipetitors is lnucli higher. ARO does not have a cotnpetitor intelligence 
\!,\tern. 
Tlie conipan!.'~ esports are mainly harmed by high custonls duties on tlie export marl<ets, 
as \\ell as IIJ- cluotas, tlie lack of a permanent representative abroad and tlie clifficult access to  
tlisttihution channels. All the clients pay in hard-currency so the payment conclitions play no 
tole in the decision to  export. 
Tlie main sources of information about the foreign markets are tlie specialized publications 
atlcl persotla1 contacts with tlie business partners. 
T l ~ e  European Agreement seelns to  be an unknown opportunity and threat for the company, 
;I\ matlagers declare they do not liave enough inforniation to judge its impact. 
AUTOCAMIOANE ROMAN S.A. Brasov 
Tlie company was established i n  1921 under the name RORILOC. Tlie coinpaiiy started produc- 
ing trucks on a h1AN license in the early 1970s. The company is s tate owned, witli tlie State 
Ownership Fund owning 70% of the shares and the Private Ownersliip Funcl Brasov another 
30%. It \ifas turned into a coinmercial company in 1990, on the grounds of the Law 15/1990. 
The conlpany produces trucks, road tractors between 7-33 tons, 120-540 H P  cliesel engines, 
cabins. cast parts, specialized processing equipment, etc. The company also produces the engine- 
ecluipped chassis for the production of buses, vans, and various other containers. The company's 
piocluctive capacity is 18,000 various trucks, 28,000 diesel engines, 26,000 engines chassis; this 
capacity puts the company among the biggest producers in Europe. Presently, in order to 
compensate the fall of sales, the company is increasingly oriented towards producing parts for 
esport in Germany and tlie USA. 
Tlie capital stocli was in 1993 of about 60 billion lei. Company's turnover was 139.56 million 
llSD in  1990 and fell continuously to 117.22 million in 1991, 82.22 million in 1992, 72.88 ~ilillion 
in  199:3 ancl moved to  77.11 million in 1994. Tlie capacity used, however, cleclined from 76.3% 
i l l  1990 to  37.7% in 1994. The labor force declined substantially from 20,095 in 1990 to  17,456 
i n  1994. It clicl not keep the pace, however, with the dramatic fall in capacity utilization. 
I11 1990 tlie traditional markets of the conlpany were in  Latin Anlerica (where more tlian 
half of the esported output was sold), Cliina ( a  third of the esports), tlie current East European 
-15sociated countries of the EU and to a very little estent the liSSR. 
The piofit rate was low and declining tl~roughout 1990-1994, witli a peak of 17% in 1992. 111 
1994 the company iecordecl losses. The share of tlie short term-credit in the ivorking capital was 
.33X i n  1994, don n from a 3S% in 1993 but up from a 13% in 1992, the year posting the Ilighest 
csports. I11 199:3 the coinpany posted 960 million lei esports while arrears payable accounted 
fol inore tlian 14 billion lei and stocks for more tlian 30 billion lei. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
.411TOCAAhlIOA4NE ROhlAN S.A. Brasov is a very good esample of a conipany tha t  failed ( a t  
least so far) to  adapt to the new market environment. The share of the esportecl output in 
total sales tl~clinecl from 7.7% i n  1990 to  1.7% i n  1991. I11 1992 the coinpany posted tlie highest 
r>sports: 'LT.Si% of the tot,al output. Esports fell again to  marginal shares in 1993 (-5.2%)) and 
i l l  109 1. ii lien the capacity used was a t  its lowest (37.7%) esports were only 2.57% of tlie total 
0 1 1 t  [)Ut. 
Esports ivere inainly oriented towards Latin America ancl Cliina. After 1990 C'l~ina over took 
t lie sales to  Latin America absorbing some 80% of the esports throughout 1990-1993. In 1994 
Latin .41lierica (30%) became again a niajor export market; in the meantime the EU emerged 
as the niain iinporter (40%) and South-East Asia (Thailand and Malaysia mainly) as the third 
market (1.5'%). Middle East countries account for another 10%. This shift is, however, hardly 
relevant ancl its ia~portance should not be overestimated as the absolute volume of esports was 
estremely loll.. 
9 0 9  of the esports are performed directly and only 10% via intermediaries. 
T l ~ e  ~iiajor  area of involvement for importers is the supply of teclinical specifications, projects, 
tlesigns, and standards. Overall, the importers have a certain involvement for 5onie 30% of the 
csportecl output. 
Productioil for Export 
The coinpan!. r~ndertook comparative studies concerning the markets of transport means i n  
variorrs regions of tlie world. The conclusion was that  Eastern Europe, Asia, Latiii ,4inerica and 
i\frica lag largely bel~ind developed countries in terms of equipinelit wit11 transport vehicles. 
'rile purchasing power there is generally lower so the markets are price-sensitive. Tlie specific 
coiiibiiiation of factors that  characterize tlie Romanian truck producers iniglit thus find good 
co~nmercial opportunities. 
The coiiipanjr seelis the increase of exports by: 
starting the production of 1.50-425 HP diesel engines in line with the international eco- 
logical standards EURO 1 and EURO 2 together with a foreign partner, selected through 
teiitler: 
i~lcreasiiig t,lie guara~itee for the cabins and chassis; 
fina,liziiig the association with plants in Rashkiria and Russia in order to sell there truck 
a,nd bus engines for tlie I<AMAZ company; 
enlarging tlie sillall and medium capacity trucks, introducing the 3 and .5 tons trucks 
equippeel \\.it11 90 and 110 HP EURO 1 diesel engines in co-o~~eration witli AVL Austria. 
The \vliole cost of all of this restructuring program is planned to amount to 8G million 
LrSD tlirougliout 199.5-2000. 
Tlie ~iiaiii coinpetitive strengths of Autocan~ioane Roinan is tlie low cost and high qualifi- 
catioii of lal>or. togetlier witli the price of raw materials. The positive iinpact of tlie low-price 
Ilonianian supplied con~ponents is coinpensated by the negative impact of the low quality of the 
same inputs. On tlie contrary, tlie high price of the foreign inputs is compensated by their high 
quality. Tlie coinpany also complains that the access to the distribution cliannels is difficult. 
Tlie outdateclness of the equipment and tecl~nologies impedes quality improvements (the 
coliil>aiiy estiinates a t  75% the degree of wear and tear of the fixed capital). Tlius, tlie ratio 
bctt\~eeii the \\eight possible to be carried, the weight of tlie vehicle is 1.2-2.1 as coinpared to main 
coinpetitors' 1.4-2.2: the specific power reaches 8-9 HP/ton as compared to competitors' 11-13.5 
HP/ton. The fuel consun~ption is 10-1.5% higher than by vehicles of coinpetitors and the bralie 
s!.stenl ancl the cle-pollution equipment are inferior. Moreover the eiigiile upgrading prograin 
r~~~tlertakeii  togetlier with a specialized research institute (INAR Brasov) is niuch behind tlie 
scl~etlule. I11 sucll a context the company cannot capitalize its position on the domestic market 
i n  orcler to increase its competitive advantage on the foreign ones. 
Tlie coillpaily cleclares that  no difference exists in terms of input usage between donlestically 
sul>pliecl ancl export output, except for the components included in the products. 
The profit rate was systeiilatically higher for the exported output all over the years wl~eil 
tlie conlpany made a profit. The biggest tlifference was recorded in 1992 when the ratio was 
:3 1.0'X/11.2'%1. The cashing period \vas generally longer for tlie exported output although the 
situation cliangecl i n  199-1. 
Doillestic Eilvironineilt for Exports 
r 3 1 hc inain cloniestic impediments to export are the price controls over certa.in inputs, tlie long 
period for border-crossings and the low quality of road and rai1roa.d tra,nsportation. The company 
is also lia,rined by custo~ns duties for imported inputs and the cost of clomestic credit. The 
restrictions 011 ba,rter t,rade a,re seen as paramount in impeding the expansion in less liquid 
countries such as the ones in the ex-Soviet space. 
:\ inajor co~npet,it,i\:e disadvanta,ge for tlie firm is the out,datedness of the Ro~nanian ba.nking 
scrvices ancl the liigli illflation t,ha,t makes ba,nks reluctant to extencl long-t,erm 1oa.n~. Conse- 
cluent,ly, secontl-lia,iid truck i~nporters made major inroa,ds in tlie coinpa,ny's doi~~est ic  ina,rket 
t 11anl;s t,o niucli more acltra,iita.geous credit facilities. 
.As cloillestic tra.nsactioiis can only be performed in lei and since the iuterhanli market beca.me 
less flriitl i11 t,lie last 2-3 months, the company has problenls in getting the high clua,lity steel alloys 
from a specialized conipany in Romania wliich prefers to  export the steel in order t o  get liard 
curreiicy for tecliiiological upgrading. Obviously, importing the steel would either diminish the 
profit iiiargiii of tlie conipany or make tlie products less competitive. It is for this reason tha t  
11~. the  beginning of June  199.5 the company was about t o  lose a very important esport  contract 
for parts delivered in Germany. 
Tliis is wliy tlie conipany would welcome the following measures: 
tlie elimination of the  customs fee (presently 0..5% of tlie value of imported merchandise); 
the  elimination of custonis duties arid VAT for imports realized in the system of barter 
trade: 
the payment of VAT and customs duties for inputs imported and incorporated in the goods 
produced to  be performed only after tlie sale of tlie output ;  
low interest (10-20%) espor t  credits (tlie current interest rate hovers around 55%); 
tlie clin~inatioii of custoins duties for components not produced in Romaiiia; 
full eseniption from customs duties for the imported Iiigh-power engines; 
possil~ility t o  pay its domestic suppliers in liard currency. 
Tlie relationsliips with tlie s tate  administration are good escept for tlie Custoins Department 
with ~vliicli tlie relationsliips are very tense. 
Foreign Environment for Export 
The  relationships with the  foreign customers and mediators are  generally good, also because tlie 
capacity of tlle importers t o  exert pressure over esport  prices is judged as medium. 
The  company does liave a competitor intelligence system and its level of efficiericy is judged as  
~a t i s f ac to r j .  Tlie products produced by tlie company are of the same class as the ones produced 
111. Ii.Ai\I.AZ or LIAZ in Eastern Europe or RENAULT, IVECO, DAF i11 \Vestell1 Europe. Tlie 
loucr quality of tlie ROMAN truclcs is compensated by the 2-2.5 times lower prices than tlie 
s i ~ ~ i i l a r  \I'esterii trucks. Tlie problem is t ha t  all produce1.s froni the es-C'OLIEC'ON (especially 
LlAZ ancl IiALlAZ) are willing to  prop up their esports  via aggressive rebates in order t o  built1 
1ii;iil;et sliare. The  same behavior can be noticed with producers from third world countries 
such as  India. Thus ROMAN is forced t o  sell a t  prices wliicli are 2.5-30% under its costs just t o  
niaintain a nlinimal market sliare on its traditioiial marliets. 
Tlie iiiain sources of information for the coinpany are tlie personal contacts with business 
partners ant1 specialized publications. Tlie company also uses market research studies but t o  a 
liiliitecl estent .  
Tlie iiiain I>arriers t o  esports  faced by the firm are ecological and safety norms, tlie difficult 
access t o  tlistribution cl ia~l~iels  and the stagnant marlcet for trucks. Tlius, in 1993, the  output  
decreased in Europe by 30-50% and tlie plants are working in a single shift. to  a certain estent  
clue to  tlie coiistaiit increase in retail prices which squeezed the markets \\lit11 lower purchasing 
po\ver. .All tlie otlier impediments are connected with the lacli of information: about  tlie price 
I c ~ e l  on foreign markets, the business rules and the conlmercial legislation there, etc. Much of 
these could I1e solved had the company a permanent representative abroad, something also seen 
as  a iiiajor barrier. 
,As to  tlie coiiditions of payment tlie conipany would very much ~velcome the  possibility t o  
csteiicl tlie barter operations with such less liquid partners as  tlie ones in CIS and even C'liina. 
'I'llc cornpail!. i5 aware of tlie prospects tha t  it can hardly penetrate \Vestern ~narl iets  a t  the 
( uircnt cluality le~rel of its proclucts and it looks forward t o  capitalize 011 softer marliets. 
The European Agreement is judged to  have a neutral effect on the compa~iy 's performance. 
Tlrc cornpan?. does not seen1 to foresee a n  erosion in its market share on the tlomestic market, 
although it is not very optinlistic about its prospects to strongly penetrate \Irest-European 
nrarliets i n  the near future. 
ROCAR S.A. Bucharest 
Tlle compa.ny ivas esta.blished in 1951 as "Intreprinderea Autobuzul Bucuresti". It was turned 
into a, commercia.l conlpany in 1991 on the grounds of the Law 1511990. The company is still 
st,ate-oiviied, ivitli 70% of tlie shares retained by the State Ownership Fund and 30% by tlie 
Private Ownersliip Fund. 
The main products of tlie company are: urban buses 12 and 17 meters long, long distance 
(inter-cit,y) buses 9 and 12 meters long, 15-18 seats va,ns, 12 and 17 meters long buses, 2.5-3.4 
t,ons freight va.ns. 
~ a . i ~ i t a l  stock a,t end of 1993 accounted for 4100 million lei. The capacity utilization hovered 
around 40%) tliroughout 1990-1994, wit11 45% in 1990, 37% in 1991 (tlie lowest level in the 
period) a,nd 46% in 1994. Tlie turnover was 37.91 million USD in 1990, decreasing continuously 
to :37.(iT million in  1991, 29.43 in 1992, 22.32 i n  1993 a.nd moving t o  26.4 in  1994. 
Tlie nuinber of personnel decreased substantially tlirougliout tlie period, from .5,690 in 1990 
to  3,900 i l l  1994. Tlie profit ra.te nra.s constantly under 5% throughout tlie period. Tlie company 
ma,de 1919 [nil. lei profits in  1993. In tlie same year, arrears receiva.ble reached 3.500 million lei 
aiicl stocli I~uilding over 5000 million lei. 
C'ompa,iiy's csports were directed until 1989 towards the present East European a.ssociated 
countries of the EU (.5O% of tlie esported output) ,  tlie CIS (30%) a.nd the remaining 20% wa,s 
solcl t,o Middle East. 
Export Orieiltation 
Esa,ct,ly a,s ROMAN, ROCAR is tlie type of company which did not ma,na,ge t o  atljust quickly 
to  iiiarket changes a i d  it is still looking for its proper direction. The compa.ny esported 21% 
of it,s out,put i n  1989 a.nd only 4.6% four years later, esports hovering around 4%) of the total 
or~t ,put  througl~out 1990-1994. 
After 1989, t,lie ma.rket sliare of tlie a,ssociated countries increased ra.pidly and a.s a, result of 
t , l~c efforts to  cliversify tlie esport markets the share of Middle East increased also rapidly. 111 
1~994 the coinpa,ny was esporting 75% to tlie associated countries and 2.5% to  Middle East. The 
coiiipa.nv csport.ec1 1.206 illillion USD worth goods in 1993, representing 89,3% of the 1992 level 
aiicl 37.9% of tlie 1989 level. 
Tlie esport is entirely done directly. Although tlie ma,nagement ivould not admit it,, since 
professional foreign t.rade specialists are hard to find, tlie la,ck of espertise of t,lie firm's sta,ff 
111igIit csplain sonic of t,lie a,brupt fall i n  esports. 
Tlie only area where tlie importers get iiivolved in  the nia~~ufa~cturiiig of tile product is the 
supply of sl,ecifica,tio~is, designs, projects, standards. 
Productioil for Export 
Tlie compa.ny is maliing substantial efforts in order to  modernize a.nd diversify tlie range of its 
products; this effort is actually seen as the only viable source of groivtli in the longer run. The 
colnpany is in the course of implementing a cooperation a,greement \\lit11 De Simon company 
I)? starting ma.~iufacturing for urban and inter-city buses equipped with MAN EURO 2 engines 
ancl wit11 R.enault. RVI using Renault ecological engines. It also pla,ns to s tar t  manufacturing 
the R-207 va.ns. .Ail a,greement for the joint production of transport va.ns wit.11 Per~geot is to  
Ilc concluclecl. Tlie ivliole cost of restructuring is planned to a~niouiit to  almost 38 nlillion USD 
t l~rougliout 199.5-2000. 
The st,rengths a,nd weaknesses of the company a.re very similar to tlie ones of ROMAN. 
Tllc company sees a,s its strengths tlie monopolistic position on tlie domestic nmrket which 
~i r ig l~t  bc capit,alizecl on in order to  build stro~lger export capci ty .  Tlic cost and quality of 
I;~l>or is seen a,s a iiiajor a,dva,iita.ge, as well a,s tlie cost of ra,w ma,terials. The competitive 
a,clva.ntage is further strengtliened by tlie quality of the imported components as well as by tlie 
new tecl~nologies cleveloped internally. 
On tlic other side, t'lie company is affected by tlie liigli degree of wea.r of t>lie fixed capita,l: it 
is 2.5.5%,. Tlie price of the imported compoiieiits as well a,s the quality and price of the Romanian 
supplietl components a,re also st~bstantia,l weaknesses of tlie compa,ny. In  the case of the exports 
to I,a,t,iii Ainerica. long distance to  this nia.rliet liarins the expa,nsion of sa.les since it leads to  lower 
price coinpetitiveness. All the other technology-connected wea,l<iiesses as well a,s the difficulties 
related to t,he stagnating tleinand are very similar to  those alrea,dy tlescribecl in the case of the 
con) l>a,ny ROLjlAN. 
Tlie coml>a,iiy a,clniits that  the qua,lity of inputs, labor ant1 teclinologies used for the produc- 
tion of exported goods is higher than in the case of tlie products delivered to  tlie domestic market. 
0111y the equipment used are of equal quality for both destinations. This shows a substaiitial 
I>a,rgaiiiiiig power of importers abroad, valued as medium by company's nianagement. 
The profita,t)ility is 3-4 times higher for the exported procli~cts tlia,n for the domestically- 
delivered ones. However, due to the marginal share of exports in t'lie tota,l output this much 
Iliglier prolit,a,l>ilit,y cannot be ca.pitalized 011 for a higher profit rate overall. 
Dolllestic Environment for Exports 
Tlie com11a.ny is impeded to  expa,nd exports first of all by the customs duties for imported 
inl>uts. Thc colIipa,iiy a.ctually woulcl welconie tlie exeniption of customs duties for imported 
ii~l>ut,s to  he incorpora.ted in exported products in order to  iniprove its weak ca.sliflow position. 
Tlie coml>aiiy is a,lso liarmed by tlie high cost of domestic credit and tlie frequent niodifications 
of the coiiimercial legislation. Tlie long duration of banking operations seeins t o  represent 
allother concern and the company proposes tlie multiplica,tion of the banks a,ble to  disburse 
export credits. 
T l ~ e  st,ill very rudinieiita,ry credit syst'em undermines the company's position on tlie domes- 
t.ic iiiarliet ancl lielice its ability to  export in the longer run a.s it does not allow ROCAR to  
a~cc11iilu1at.e tlie resources for teclinica,l upgra,ding. Foreign suppliers of second-ha.ii<l busses a,nd 
!.ails offer a t t r x t i v e  credit sclie~nes a,nd rapidly erode ROCAR's doinestic position. 
The coinpaiiy is st~iinulat~ed t.o export by the higli level of a,rrears bot,li pa,ya,ble aiid receivable. 
E1.ri1 if  liigliel. ~>rofital~ility is enougli to  stimulate exports, the simple fa,ct of liaviiig a liquid 
client heca,iiie essentia,l for recovery. 
Tlie company 11as goocl rela~tionsliip witli the Ministry of Trade aiid the Cllia,inber of Com- 
Iiierce ant1 Indust,ry. Its rela,tionsliip wit11 t.lie Customs Authority is neutral. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
l'he f i ~ i n  has good relationships witli the importers. It ha.s very good informa~tion a.bout the 
coiiil>a,iiy's competitors in Europe aiid less information about Latin America, a ma.rl;et harder 
to  iiionit~or. T l ~ t  ~na,in competitors of the compa.riy in Ea,stern Europe a,re the Hungaria.11 fir111 
Ikarus and tlie C'zecli Ihrosa .  
The rompally has a. ba,laiiced information system, ranging from specialized publica~tioiis, mar- 
liet ~.esta,rclI rea,lized by specialized institutions, to persona,l conta.cts with the foreign partners. 
Tlie l~eriiia,iient representative of tlie coinpany a,broad is seen as the ma.in and the most reliable 
source of inforina~tioii .
.As far as the foreign iinpediinents to export a.re concerned, the most important among tliein 
are t,lie liigli ct~st,oiiis clutics, tlie lack of informa.tion 011 tlie price level on the export market 
i l , t ~ c l  t,lie banliing coiiditioiis imposed by tlie iiiiporter. Conipaiiy's perfornia,nce on tlie export 
111ar1iet is also affect.et1 by it8s poor complia.nce witli the ecologica.1 a.nd safety norms, the la.cl; 
of' a ~>ernia~iieiit rel>rese~ita,tive 011 the specific export market, the lack of iiifornia~tion on the 
cto~~imercial 1cgislat.ion 011 the export market aiid the stagnating dema.nd for the proclucts of tlie 
firtlls. hloreover, it is often tlie case for the importers to  obtain tlie iniport licellses (in fact, with 
tuucli difficulty), especially i n  the associated countries. 
T l ~ e  conditions of payment play a big role in the expansion of exports on less liquid markets 
such as  C'IS. Tlie elimination of the barriers to barter would thus give the firm an extra  chance 
to  reco\.er and prosper. 
In spite of the foreseeable danger for its sales on the domestic ~narl iet  he firti1 considers t ha t  
tlie ,L\ssociation Agreenlent is going t o  have a neutral impact on firm's performance. The  loss of 
large shares on the clolllestic market, however, might put the firm in  cleep trouble and increase 
t l ~ e  chance to  go bust rather than prosper 011 the large European market, a s  it xvould lacl\ tlie 
tnoney t o  aclapt. 
The company was estal~lislied in 1969 and it was turned into a conllliercial co~npany  in 1991, 
on the grounds of the  Law 1511990 on the transformation of state-owned firms in commercial 
companies and regies autonomes. The  company is still state-owned, with 70% of the  capital 
nit11 the S ta te  Ownership Fund and 30% with the Private Ownership Fund. 
Tlie conlpany produces nitrogen based fertilizers, such as: alnmonium (capacity 600,000 tons 
per year),  diluted azotic acid (240,000 tons per year), urea (700,000 tons per year),  anlmoliium 
azotate and nitrocalcar (300,000 tons per year). Most of the  equipment dates  back t o  1972 
when the plant was put  into operation; only one ammonium and one urea installation da t e  
bacli t o  1980. All the equipment is considered t o  be equivalent t o  tlie so  called third generation 
equipment (i.e., tecl~nologically rather modern). \'irtually all the ecluiprnent was imported from 
C;erlnany, France and LISA. T h e  technology was assimilated dolnestically ant1 used t o  lnaintain 
the ecluipment. In  tlie 1980s all technology imports were cut  off ancl what uTas once lnoder~i  
rcluil)ment is nonr an outdated plant. 
The  capacity used increased throughout the period analyzed from 6.5% iin 1990 t o  74% in 
1994. T l ~ e  nunlber of staff decreased sul~stantially in tlie same period, from 2,410 in 1990 t o  
1.501 peo[jle. No further reductions of the worl<force are planned. The  capital stock of the  
company was by the end of 1993 around 18.7 billion lei. Company's turnover amounted t o  29.2.5 
nlillion liSD in 1990, followed by a drastic fall t o  20..56 million in 1991. ,4 strong recovery of 
\ales started in 1992 with a turnover around .54.06 million USD followed by 40.16 nlillion in 1993 
alitl 55.1s niillion USD in 1994. Tlie profit rate increased very sliglitly, fro111 virtually nil in 1990 
t o  .J.(j'X in 1994. ~nuch  under tlie inflation level, though. Thanks to  the esports  the  company 
~iianaged to  I)e liclr~id enough t o  pay its suppliers and b a ~ ~ l i s ,  and invest in nenT technologies. 
Tlie company registered an increase in stocli-building from 4.8% of the  total turnover in 1992 
to  11%) in 199:3, amounting t o  5.4 billion lei. The  company was heavily i~ldebted in 1993 with 
[ja?.al)les amounting t o  6.7 billion lei, altliougli in net figures it is profitable, as the receivables 
a ~ ~ ~ o u n t  t o  7.8 billion lei. 
Until 1989 the company's traditional markets were China (36% of total espor t s ) ,  the  EU 
(29Y) and tlie hliddle East (26%). 
Export Orieiltation 
T l ~ e  coniljany has tratlitionally been serving mainly the export marliets. The  share of exports 
i l l  total output  increased fro111 .5.5%1 in 1990 to  67%) in 1994, a s  cle~uand on the domestic market 
\lir~lnli t o  its lowest levels in the last 20 years. 
C'onipany's core market becanle after 1990 the Middle East markets ( the countries around 
t l ~ e  hlecliterranean) whose share in total exports increased fro111 26% in  1989 t o  52% in 1993 
ancl clo~vn again to  40% in 1994, while the exports t o  the EU, after a trough in 1992, recovered 
t o  pre-1989 levels. It is encouraging tha t  exports t o  South-East Asia increased from zero in 
1989 t o  19% of the total in 1994, altliough a t  the expense of the exports on the Chinese marliet 
\vl~icl~ cleclinecl fro111 36%) in 1989 t o  3% in 1994. Thus overall a focusing of the  business on the  
\ ~ ~ r r o u n d i n g  region niay be noticed, while exports on fast-growing Asian marliets declined. 
0111y a niarginal (3%) share of total esports  is done directly, all other exports being performed 
\.ia iarions foreign t rade firms. 
Foreign partners only get involved in securing proper transport means. 
Productioil for Export 
The  colnpany sees Asia a s  its main target marliet after the EU. The  Asian market shall increase 
its share in global demand t o  53% by 2000 (on a 92.8 million tons total marliet) as  compared t o  
4.j'Ll in 1990 (on a 79.1   nil lion tons total market).  
Tlie company elljoys iinportant competitive strengths: cheap and liiglily clualified workforce 
aiicl a rea,soiiably goocl level of teclinologies and ecluipnlent, a,llowing it to  esport perfectly 
cotnpetitive protlucts as fa,r a.s technical stmdards are concernecl. The company has also easy 
access to distribution clia,nnels. The company pla,ns to detach itself from the cost of primary 
factors such a.s ivorkforce by investing a substantial part of earnings from esports in  modern 
t~eclinologies. 
The coiiipally wa,s consunling 10.S-12.4 Gcal/l ton of ammonium 100% i11 1993, mucl~ under 
the iiitlustry a.verage, offering tlie conlpa,iiy a,n extra competitive edge. 
Tlie company uses rigorously tlie s a n e  inputs for the esported output a.s for tlie domestically 
tleliverecl products. Compa.ny's negotia.tions witli its clients is much facilitated by the specific 
features of the output: bulk, liomoge~ieous output, traded in  tlie conlniodity escliange, meaning 
that prices a,re a.ctually a. given entry data in commercia,l negotia,tion. 
The coml>a,ny declares no difference between tlie profitability of esported a.nd domestically- 
supplied protlucts exists (5.6% in 1994) wliile the duration for tlie ca.sliing of exported output 
versus the do~nestically delivered one is relatively longer, indicating that  esports are to a certain 
r~st~cnt licluitlity tlriven rather than profit driven. The company claims there is no difference in 
price levels I~et~veen foreign and domestic markets a.s the coinmodity esported is lioniogeneous 
aiicl traded i n  tlie coillmodity exchange. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The coml>aiiy is nlost of all disturbed by the customs duty and VAT 011 importecl inputs which 
are to be incorporated in the exported output. I11 case of inputs' incll~sion in tlie esported 
output, \'.AT and customs duties are reimbursed although ivitli considerable delays, aggravated 
I,!. relatively high inflation, as well as by the long duration of banking operations and the low 
c1~lalitj. of railroatls transport which is used for illost of its exports on the European markets. 
('OAlP(i is also liarmed by the frequent alterations of tlie fiscal legislation. 
Tlie company is thus sti~nulated to export in order to get rid of t l ~ e  illiquid clients. The com- 
pany has general1 neutral relationsliips witli tlle Ministry of Tracle ant1 tlie Custonis ~Autliority 
ant1 cloes not consitler tliis relationship as being a competitive advantage. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
('OAIPB has goocl relationship with its customers, a.s the management put ail einpliasis of 
a~loidiiig escessive dependence on one single intern~ediary. Consecluently, as already stated, i11 
spite of it,s dependence on services rendered by intermedia.ries to esport, the company is not 
c-onfrontetl \\it11 ma,jor pressure over prices. 
:\tllong the es-socia,list countries the ma.in competitors are Poland a.nd tlie Czech Republic 
(alt~liougli 1ia1.iiig niucli lower production ca,pacities than Romania) and i11 Iliesterii Europe 
compa.iiies i n  France, Germany and UI<. Export to China. declineel sharply and are t1irea.tened 
Ily the fa.st emergence of tliis country a.s a major producer, as well as by the tough coinpetition 
froin India. 
Tlic coiiil>any cloes liave a competitor intelligence system and it considers it as being an 
effective one. For ~narliet information the company is mainly relying on specialized publications 
and on personal contacts witli business pa.rtners. 
Prol~al,ly as a result of its almost exclusive dependence on intermediaries in order to perform 
csports. t,lie company does not seem to be particularly disturbed by any ba,rrier on the main 
esport liiarliets. Tlie payment conditions 1ia.ve a,lso no role i n  determining the decision to esport 
as all iiiil>orters pa.y i n  hard currency witliin rea.sona.ble terms. 
The -4ssocia.tion Agreement is considered to have very positive effects 011 esports. I n  fa.ct, 
tlie free access t,o the EU market can only strengthen tlie reorientation of tlie company's core 
I,~~siiiess ton.a.rcls Europe, a tendency already dating back three years ago. 
Background I~lforillatioil 
Tlie conipany was established in 1961 and in 1991 it was turned into a commercial company 
according to  tlie Law 15/1990. Tlie company is fully state-owned, witli 7OZl of the shares witli 
the State O~vnersliip Fund and 30% witli the Private Ownership Fund. 
Tlie company produces ammonium (500000 tons per year installed capacity), diluted azotic 
acicl (720.000 tons per year), ammonium azotate (600,000 tons per year). urea (400,000 tons per 
!ear), coniples fertilizers-nitrophosphates (100000 tons per year). 
Liost of the ecluipment dates back to  the 1960s witli only some of tlie ecluipment dating bacli 
to  1976-77. Tlie same as in tlie case of COMPG, tlie equipment was generally imported, with 
licenses assimilated domestically. As no technology imports were i n  the 19SOs, the outdatedness 
of' tile ecluipment became a substantial competitive disadvantage. 
C'OLIPT is organized in two different sections: the inorganic zone, where all fertilizer and 
interniediary inputs for fertilizers production installations are located and the organic zone, 
dealing with intermediate products and organic synthesis. 
-4 capacity of about 100,000 tons of urea shall be discontinued for being non-efficient. An 
ecluivalent 100.000 tons of ammonium nitrate capacity shall also be cliscontinuecl, as  well as an 
200.000 tons capacitj of ammonium and a 100,000 tons of azotic acid capacity. 
Tlic collipany used a decreasing percentage of its capacity tlirougliout tlie analyzed period, 
f'roni 67.(i'x1 in 1990 to  37.7% in 1994. The employment decreased accordingly, fro111 7,438 in 
1990 to 3,229 i l l  1994, witli the productivity only decreasing slightly. .After the long-term (1997- 
2000) restructuring plan, the company plans to keep only 2,986 employees. The capital stock of 
tlie colnlxinc Ivas around 66.4 billion lei. Company's turnover amounted to  48.09 million USD 
in 1990, followetl by a strong growth in 1991 (67 million USD), declining in 1992 (61.8 million 
IISD) ant1 1993 (51.28 million USD) and growing again to  86 million USD in 1994. 
Tlie colnpany registered an increase in stockbuilding from 10.6% of the total turnover in 
1992 to 24% in 1993. anlounting to  13.3 billion lei. The reason for this increase in stockbuilding 
n as t lic absence of adequate warehousing facilities a t  tlie main custo~ners. 
Tlie coml~any was heavily indebted in 1993, with payables amounting to 13.2 billion lei; 
overall, tlie company was nialiing great losses, as tlie receivables aniounted to only 3..5 billion 
lei. hIoreover, sliort tell11 credit accounted for 7Fj-80TJ of tlie total \z~orliing capital tlirougliout 
tlie period. 
C'onlpany's profitability [vas disappointing throughout tlie period. After a profit in 1991 two 
yc3ars of lo5ses follonled i n  1992-93 wit11 a slight recovery in 1994 when tlie company had a 3.3%) 
p~of i t  rate, ~ilucli under tlie inflation rate liowe\~er, not to speali about interest rate. 
Before 1989 tlie company used to  esport niai~ily in tlie Middle East, Africa ant1 Latin Amer- 
ica. 
Export Orieiltatioi~ 
Tlic colnpany is increasingly esport oriented as tlie esport share in total output grew from 
15.:32% i n  1990 to  61.63% in 1994. In fact, most of tlie fall i n  capacity utilization was due to  
tlie contraction of the domestic marliet, while the value of esports was rather stable. 
Esport ~narliets diversified after 1989. The dependence on third world markets declined as 
esports to tlie EI! increased dramatically (from 2% in total exports in 1989 to  22% in 1994) 
wliile a substantial increase was registered on the South-East Asian marliets (from 8% in 1990 
to 1.5%) in 1994). Tlic company is actually not doing business in tlie CIS and the importance of 
tlie ~narliets of East European Associated countries is growing (from 1% in 1989 to  6%) in 1994). 
('hina is anotlier clestination whose importance is growing, although slowly (frolu .5%, in 1989 to  
S'/: in 1994). 
SOT of t l ~ e  xports are performed directly and only 2031 via intermecliaries. The saille as for 
C'OhIP6, iml>orters get involved mainly in transporting the output and to a very little extent in 
otlier respects. Thus, the exported output is 100% produced wit11 the firms' internal resources. 
Production for Export 
'rlie company sees Asia as its main target market after the EU. In order to  increase tlie company's 
export coml>etitiveness tlie management sees the decrease in specific costs (especially energy 
intensity) as paramount, since tlre company is substantially above the average in tliis respect. 
C'ompany's main coillpetitive strengths are the cost and clualification of its workforce as 
\\ell as tlie quality of tlie iillported inputs. The company considers it is capable to meet a t  
satisfactory leiels the cluality standards on tlie foreign markets. On the contrary, tlie company is 
Ilarmed bj. the Irigli price of the imported raw materials and components. A some\vhat expected 
\vealiness for a product sold in bulk is the distance to  the export markets as well as the not easy 
access to clistribution channels. Company's energy intensity increased slightly throughout 1990- 
1993. especially as far as natural gas was concerned. The company was consuming 12,35-14.33 
C;cal/one ton of ammonium 100%, much above the industry average. 
Inputs used for the exported output are not different from the ones for the domestically- 
suppliecl out put. 
.As already ille~ltioned above, tlie company recorded losses for tliree of the five years between 
1990-94. In the years when tlie company made a profit the profit rate was, however, higher 
for tlie exportecl output, although tlie cashing period is substantially longer in the case of the 
exporteel output ,  iniplicitly diminisliing the profitability of exports. 
Donlestic Ellvirolllnellt for Exports 
Domestically, the coillpaiiy is mainly concerned with the barriers created by tlie customs duties 
for imported inputs, cost of domestic credit, as well as price controls ancl tlie frecluent alterations 
of the fiscal legislation. The company is also harmed by the low cluality of railroacl transport (the 
main \yay t o  export to  Europe). Customs duties for high-tech ecluipinent which is not produced 
in  Ro~rra~ria are thus higlily disruptive for company's efforts to  upgrade its productive base. 
.As i n  all t l ~ e  other cases the company does benefit from c~istoms duties exemptions for the 
i ~ l ~ p o i  tecl i~r]>uts incorporated in the exported output only after tlie actual export \\.as perfor~necl. 
Tlie coml>any is largely forced to  export by tlie growing clomestic inter-company arrears. 
t l ~ ~ r  in(1irrctly to  the clelays in resolute reforni measures by the government. C'OLlP'i has good 
rclatioiislii1,s Ivitli the Chamber for Commerce and Industry, allo\ving it to  have soille access to 
i~rforination u.Iiile the relationships with the Custorlls Authority are considered as bad. 
Foreign Ellvirollllleilt for Exports 
Tlie company boasts good relationships with customers a ~ l d  intermediaries, tlianlis to  a policy 
of cliversification that does not offer to  the latter too much leverage in tlie negotiation with 
the firm. Tlie saiiie as COMP6, the company has a competitor intelligence system which is 
consiclerecl satisfactorily efficient. 
.Ainong the ex-socialist countries the main conlpetitors are Polancl ancl the Czech Republic 
(altl~ougli ha\.ing much lower production capacities tlia~i Roniania) ancl i n  Western Europe 
coml>anies in France, Germany and UI<. Export to  Cliina is tlireatenecl by the fast einergence 
of tliis coui~try as a major ~>roducer, as  well as by tlie tough competition from India. 
The coml>anq does not face major foreign impediments to  export. It is solnewhat disturbed 
I,! high tariffs. cluotas and tariff cluotas. The access to the distribution net\vorh is somewhat 
difficult although the most iillportant concern is produced by the limited space for expansion on 
a market \\.here the demand is declining (a t  least 011 the rich markets), due to  an olerall trend 
to\\ arcls inore nature-friendly farming. 
Tlie payment conditions have also no role in deterlnining the decision t o  export as  all im- 
porters pay i n  hard currency mithin reasonable delays. 
Tlie .Association Agreement is considered to have very positive effects on exports. In fact. 
111c free access t o  the EU niarlcet can only strengthen the reorientation of the company's core 
l~usiliess to~varcls Europe, a tendency already dating back t o  three years ago. 
COMPS 
Tlie company Lvas established in 1973, being one of tlie oldest joint ventures in Romania. Only 
~~i inor i ty  foreign sl~areholdings were accepted a t  tliat time, so that  the Italian partner owned 
only 4S'AI of the shares, out of a total 2.333 niillion USD equity. In February 1992 the Italian 
partner ~~rovicled an ecluity addition in  order to arribe a t  a total equity of 3,:3.59,.520 USD out of 
\\-hich the foreign partner ilow llolds 55..5G%. 
The coinpan!. is proclucing colored poliacrylic yarns. 
After a slump in  the anarchical year of 1990 (70% of the capacity used) the colnpariy came 
I~acli t o  100'X1 capacity tlirougl~out 1991-1994. Turnover was 12.3 million USD i n  1990 and grew 
continuousl~~ to  18.3 million in 1991, 20.7 in 1992, 25 in 1993 and almost 24 million in 1994. 
Eml~loyment grew only slightly in the company, from 450 in 1989 to 470 in 1994. The 
manage~nent asserts tliat even in case some excess of manpower emerges, they can use it by 
increasing the number of shifts. 
The profit rate was 8.6% in 1990 and increased steadily to  17.4% in 1994. The company 
Ilas virtuall!. no arrears, receivable or payable, esplained to  a large estent by its overwheli~~ingly 
t1spor~-oriented activity. The sliare of short-term creclits in the worliing capital decreased from 
2TjiA, in 1990 to  almost zero in 1993 ancl up again to  15.5% i n  1994. 
11ntil 1989 the company was exporting roughly 314 of total esports to  the Middle East ancl 
C'yprus ant1 114 in the EU. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Tile colnl>an\. llas traditioilally exported most of its output. In 1990 the sliare of exports in 
total output was 68.7% while in 1994 it grew to  86.2%. 
The company's dependence on Middle East esports decreased (from 80% i n  1990 to  27.4% in 
1994. altliougl~ the company consolidated a 70% market share in  Cyprus) as esports increased 
to\ \a~cls  the EtT (from '20% of total exports in  1990 to  3.5% in  1994), USA (froni zero in 1989 to  
2.5% i n  1994) as well as to\vards the East European .Associated couiitries (from zero in 1989 to  
11.9'X1 in 1994). 
The conipany esported some 1,000 tons of yarn i n  1992 and about 1,200 tons in 1993. 
O\.erall, the Romanian esport of colored polyacrylic yarn is the oilly subsector within tlie 
s~riithetic yarn industry where sales esceed tlie 1989 level by 1.55% both for esport ancl for the 
doinestic inarliet. .4 13.5'%1 growth of exports in 1993 as comparecl to  1989 for poliacrylic yarns 
\\-as also registered. Tllese results are also a result of the efforts of COMPS wllo is the second 
largest clomestic producer. 
Esport i\ entirely performed directly. There is virtually no involvement of importers i n  the 
j~iocluction or transport of tlie exported output. 
Productioil for Export 
Tlie colllpany made substaiitial efforts to  enhance its strengths on the esport marliets. Thus, in 
1991-1992 it in\,ested heavily in new equipment managing to  replace 70% of the old one with 
state-of-the-art equipment. The company would need some es t ra  5 million USD in new plant 
I)ut. althougll it has the resources, it is still reluctant to  go ahead with the investment due to  
the aggressive competition on tlie esport markets and the already compressed profit margins 
\vliicl~ might not properly absorb the new clepreciation costs. 
Tlie expansion prospects are good and tlie conlpany plans to  double or triple its output by 
2000.  The company sees as its main strengths the cost and quality of tlie worliforce, as well as 
thr  quality of the ecjuipnient and the internally developed tecllnologies. The ~na jo r  neakness 
t lie coiiil)aiiy has to cope with is the low quality and liigli price of the Ronlaniaii supplied 
coinponents. 
Inputs used for the esported output are not different a t  all from tllose used for the doines- 
ticallp supplied output. 
Nost surl~risinglj~, tlie profitability of the domestically supplied output is higher than that  
of the esported output and tlie gap increased from a 10.8/8.4 ratio i n  1990 to 24/15.7 in 1994. 
The colnpany esplains this by the following factors: 
1. Its position on tlle domestic market (it has only one donlestic conlpetitor to share tlie 
1iiarl;et with) i11 a context wliere domestic custoiners are allnost without exception i n  
financial <lifficulty and are unable to mobilize tlie needed resources to buy hard currency 
for iinports of acrylic yarn. 
2. Tlie need to c1ia.rge a premium in order to protect itself to some extent against the risk of 
lion-pa,yinent, a.s ~ilost of the customers a,re caught in tlie c1ia.in of inter-enterprise arrea.rs. 
A/Ioreover. tlie cashing period is much longer for the esported output,  further strengthening 
tlie itlea that tlie esport is subsidized via the position the company holds on tlie tlonlestic market. 
Donlestic Environment for Exports 
'The ma,in do~nestic iinpediinents to export a,re tlie cost of donlestic credit, the duration of 
I>a,nking operations a,iicl the frecluent changes in tlie fina,ncial legislation. 
C!oml>any's major concern is the growing gap between tlie domestic prices for inputs which 
increase<l 113~ roughly 60% between March 1994 and Marcli 1995 a.nd tlie slow growth of foreign 
prices for t,lie esported output (due to tlie devaluation of the leu) in tlie same period by only 
1lci;l,. Tlie profits a,re squeezed while dema.nd on the domestic ma.rket did not take off yet. 
IvIoreover, for many inputs customs duties a,re higher than for tlie finished products, artificially 
offering foreign producers an a.dditiona1 competitive edge. 
Tlie conlpa.lly is 1ia.rmed by tlie slowness in tlie draw ba,ck of the value of customs duties for 
i~nportetl inputs included in the esported output (wliicli actually made it to  sliift towards the 
guara,ntee systein \vllich is considered a,s less harming since tlie compa.ny lia,s escess liquidity), 
a,s well a,s by tlie t.iresome procedure for participating in the interbanli ina,rliet to buy or sell 
lia,rtl corrency. The Esimba.nli is a.lso reproa,clied for its slowness i n  t,lie delivery of tlie subsidy 
for t,lie esport credits. 
T l ~ e  colripa.ny would be very glad if RENEL (the national elect'ricit,~ a,utllority) would allow 
it to iillport ciit.irely its electricity input. The coinpany can import electricity a t  30% lower 
price per IiiYH, although electricity in Roma.nia is substa.ntia,lly chea,per than in most of the 
Europea,n countries. Tlie explanation resides in the residual character (for the producer) of tlle 
clect,ricity iiilportecl which would otlierwise be conlpletely lost. 
-4s a,lready iiientioned, the compa.ny is stimulated to export by still illiquid donlestic demand, 
althougli tlie profitability of esports is lower. 
Tlle conlpa,njl considers that its present relationsliips with public institutions do not offer 
eit,ller a competitive advantage or a.n impediment to esport. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
'Tlie coml>all>r llas good relationsliips with its importers. Their bargaining power is considered as 
acceptable. COhIPS is, however, often forced to squeeze profits in order to resist aggressive Asian 
conipetitioii (especially from Thailand and Indonesia), wliicli is accused of "buying" nlarket 
share. 
Tlie coinl>aiiy declares it lias a good quality conlpetitor intelligence system. Most of the 
i~iforniation the coinpany has a t  its disposal is sourced from the foreign partner and firm's 
rc.prrsentati\.c abroad. The picture is very typical for a joint venture fully controlled by the 
l'olrigil partner. The information provided by business partners has also a great value. 
The inain foreign impediment to  esport is the stagnating denland for the esported products. 
The fir111 gladly welcomes the Association Agreement as it gives it the chance to espand 
csports in  the EU. 
-4s to  t l ~ e  impact of the joint venture, it is considered to  have improved only to  a limited 
cstent the financial situation of the company. It had, however, an important impact on access to  
nrnr foreign marltets and training the e~nployees in using more efficient technologies. The joint 
\.enture nras essential for the access to high-tech equipment and up-to-date know-how as  well as 
for the access to  raw materials and components. 
The  coiiipaliy \\'as establislied in 1970 and it was turned into a coiilmercial company on tlie 
glountls of Law 15/1990. It  is currently state-owned, 70% of the  shares being controlled by tlie 
State  Onrnersliip Funcl and 30% by the Private Ownership Fund. 
Tlie colnpany procluces porcelain sanitary equipnient for batlirooms ancl ];itchens. 
Tlie conipany employs 2600 people. a number t ha t  did not change tlirougllout tlie analyzed 
periocl. Tlie capacity used oscillated from 92% in 1990 t o  100% in 1992 and down again t o  87% 
i11 1994. Company's turilover was 9.35 million USD in 1990, growing strongly t o  14.3 million in 
1991, 13.5 million i11 1992, 15.4 million in 1993 and 18.3 million in 1994. The  profit rate was tlie 
liigliest i n  1991 (29%)) t o  decline abruptly afterwards t o  11.6% in 1992, 8.6% in 1993 and 3.7% 
i11 1994. Tlie company is heavily indebted, witli short term credits exceeding the  value of the 
\\-orliing capital. showing the company is seriously short of liquidity. Outstanding payables to  
clients tlecrcased soniewliat from an ecluivalent of 62% of the working capital in 1993 t o  26% of 
tlie \vorliing capital in 1994. 
Tlie traclitional markets of the company before 1989 were the ELI (witli SO%), tlie remaining 
csports  being distributed among Israel, Iiuwait and Cote d'Ivoire. 
Export 0rientatioi.l 
Tlie company esported 31% of its output  in 1990. This share fell in 1991 (1.5% of the  output )  
ant1 started afterwards t o  increase steadily, reaching 26.6% of t l ~ e  output  in 1994. 
The  tlistribution of exports only slightly changed all along tlie period analyzed. T h e  EU 
'.stul,l,oriil~~" maintained its 80% sliare of total esports  while the share of Iiuwait was eroded 
as an effect of the war, and for tlie first time tlie East  European Associated countries and CIS 
catlle into play in 1992. Their sliare in total exports increased only very slowly, so  tha t  in 1994 
tlie figures were .5% for the Associated countries and 3% for the  CIS. 
T h e  export is n~ain ly  performed by intermediaries who sell 80%) of tlie esportecl output .  T h e  
rcinaining 20%) is done by tlie firm, mainly towards Hungary where company's sales personnel 
I,IIo\\ s tlie iiiarliet best. 
Tlie only way ilnporters get involved in export operations is by assuring in illany cases the  
transl>ortation of the goods t o  tlie destination. Thus, the products esportecl are lOO%i the result 
of the internal ~ i ia~~ufac tur i i ig  resources of the firm. 
Production for Export 
The company wislies t o  espand its exports t o  the European Union iliainly in order t o  accumulate 
tlie resources needed for the  modern technology it needs so badly. Wit11 this objective in mind, 
tlle coiiipanjr also strives t o  reduce its depeiideilce 011 natural gas as  tlie single energy resource 
ancl I>uild ne\v electrical kilns, combined with a continuous casting system of the  various kaolin 
mistures. The  company is still contemplating the possibility of entering the  US market ( the 
largest in tlie \\.orld) although it is somewhat discouraged by tlie aggressive conlpetitioii there, 
mainly froni lower-end producers with similar factor combinations as  Romania's. such as  Taiwan, 
C'liina. Thailancl, and Mexico. 
The  iiiaiii strength of the  firm is seen t o  be tlie price and quality of the worliforce and the 
t rchnological level of tlie equipnlent. Tlie prosimity of tlie export market also ranlis high in tlie 
I~ierarcl~y of the strengths. 
Tlic main \veakness of tlie company is seen to  be tlie price of thc raw material. mainly liaolili, 
i ~ i ~ [ ~ o r t e d  from Germany and the UII;. T h e  company managed, however, t o  recluce its dependence 
O I L  tlicse sources starting t o  i ~ n p o r t  kaolin from the Czech Republic and Uliraine. T h e  teclinical 
o~itclateclness of the ecluipnient ranks second in the hierarchy of wealinesses. Thus,  the  degree of 
wear of co~npany's kilns is 30% to 45%, resulting in  products witli a specific weight 15% bigger 
tlian tliat of tlie foreign conlpetitors. The energy consumption is almost double as compared to 
\Vestern Et~ropean producers. 
Tlie profitability of domestically supplied and exported output is liardly relevant. There are 
sniall differences but tlieir sign cliange from one year to another, suggesting it is liard to jump 
to a conclusion about who cross-financing. The cashing periods for the do~nestically delivered 
output are systeniatically longer than the ones for the exported output. 
Tlierc is no difference between tlie input usage for the domestically deli\.ered and the exported 
otltl>ut. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Tlie company is ~iiost of all harn~ed by tlie domestic impedinlents represented by cus to~ns  duties 
for iml>ortetl inputs (fortunately, for the main input, kaolin, customs duties are zero) and to a 
\,cry large extent by tlie high cost of domestic credit (not surprising given the high indebtedness 
of tlie f i r ~ n ) .  COhlPS ~llanagement finds unacceptably high tlie custorns duties for modern 
cquil~iients which are not produced in Romania. The company is also harmed by the low 
quality of roads, especially as far as exports to the neighboring countries are concerned. 
The colnpany has good relationships with the hllinistry of Trade, tlie Chamber of Commerce 
,~ntl  tlie C'~rstonis ,4uthority, something tliat offers it an adtlitional competitive edge. 
Foreign Eilvironilleilt for Exports 
Tlie company has genera,lly good relationship with its customers. It 11a.s rela.tively often problems 
\\.it11 pa,rtners in tlie East European Associa.ted countries who have often difficulty i n  paying the 
freight in  due t,ime. None of these partners, however, Ins problems in obta.ining the 1ia.rd 
c~lrrency. 
The company ha,s no co~llpetitor intelligence system, a lack tliat ~uiglit be esplained by tlie 
overwlielming dependence on intermediaries for the carrying out t,he exports. 
C'onlpany's ~nain  conlpetitors come from tlie Czecli Republic ( a  ~ilajor exporter i n  the ELJ), 
Italy a.nd Spa.in. 
Tlie niost I>ainful impediments in the externa,l market,s axe considered to be tlie  difficult,^ 
to get access to distribution channels (something a,lready suggested l>y the i~nporta,nce of in- 
ternlediaries) as well a.s the lack of information over the price level 011 the export rna.rket and 
t,lie co1nniercia.1 1egisla.tion there. Tlie lacli of a perma.nent representative on the esport nmr- 
litt is seen t,o be a prime cause for tliis lack of information and for tlie over dependence on 
int,rr~ncdiaries. 
Thc condit,io~is of payment only affect the decision to export in the case of Llliraine, where 
Inore ba,rter facilities would expand trade; this is why the firm requests the a,uthorities more 
facilities for barter tra,de. 
Tlie conipany is a1rea.d~ exporting mainly to tlie ELI so tliat tlie Association Agreement does 
~iot, 1ia1.t a special significance. The expansion of exports to the EU is now ma.inly a matter of 
conipany strat.egy ancl mana.gement than of co~llmercia,l fa.cilities. 
Background Iilforillatioil 
Tlie company \\-as established in early 1950s. It was turned into a conlillercial company as a 
rc.sr~lt of tlie Law 1.5/1990. The company produces cement, challi and asbest/cement roof tiles. 
Tlie conipany is still state-owned witli tlie shares distributed between the State O w ~ l e r s h i ~  Fund 
(YO'X,) and the Private 0n.nersliip Fund Muntenia (30%)). 
Tlie c o n i p a n ~  is producing: 
ce~iient using tlie following capacities: two productioli lines with rotating kilns which were 
put in operation in 1974-1930 and are using tlie dry teclinology and have a capacity of 
3000 tons clinlier per day; 
clia,lli using the following capa,cities: 1 regenerating kiln put in ol>eration i n  197.5 wit11 a 
'LOO t,ons/clay productivity. 
I n  1990 C'OMP10 was ernployilig 3.311 people. Tlie number tlecreased steadily to  2,958 
p c ~ p l e  i n  1994. Tlie capacity utilization decreased as follows: 
for cement, from 71.5%) i ~ i  1990 t o  46.1% in 1994; 
for c1ia.lk. from 97.1%) iii 1990 to 16.8% in 1994; 
asbest/celnent tiles fro111 64.4% i n  1990 to 39% in 1994. 
On yearly basis tlie company call produce: 1900 tlious. tons/year cernelit 80%) clinker equiv- 
alent. using tlne tlry technology; 270 thous. tons/year chalk; asbest/cement pipes (by line), etc. 
The turnover of tlne company was 18.6-5 million USD in  1990, increasing to  27 million in 
1991, 30 million in 1992, falling t o  24.3 nlillion in  1993 and 29.13 liiillion i n  1994, as a result of 
I~et ter  prices (clue to price liberalization) and the elimination of certain inefficient capacities. 
The capital stocli evaluated a t  tlne end of 1994 was 164 billion lei. 
Bet~vee~n 1990 and 1994 tlie profit rate oscillated between 1.8% in 1990 and a peak of 6.7,5%, 
in 1994. Tlne i~idel>tetlness increased throughout 1990-1994, as tlne share of bank credits in total 
I\ 01 king capital tlecreasetl from 71.7%) iin 1991 to 35% i n  1994. 
(Inti1 1989, the colnpanp was traditionally exporting towartls the EU (314 of total esports) 
,111tl l o  t lie Pllitltlle East ant1 Africa. 
Export Orientation 
Tlie slia.re of esports i11 total sales increased from 25% in 1990 to  40% in 1993, to  decrease again 
to  26% iii 1994. Tlne company ma.na,ged t o  keep its traditional marliets, even increasing the 
sliare of esports to  tlie EU from 73% in 1989 to  85% in 1994. 
Esports are 100%) perfor~ned by internlediaries (actually the priva.te foreign tra,de company 
1-ITROCIM). 
Iml>ort,ers get ii~\.olved to  a la,rge extent in supplyirig consumables and components and also 
in supplying pa.cliaging niateria,ls. 
Productioil for Export 
Export Strategy 
In  order lo  boost esports, COMP10, together with two Romanian and two foreign companies, 
est;~l>lislned i l l  1991 a joint venture witli tlne objective to produce and export cement and other 
r an  niaterials. T l ~ e  Rolllaniall party has 75% of tlne shares. 
Tlie quality and cost of workforce are seen as prirne competitive advantages for the company, 
as \veil as the capacity to  comply wit11 the standards of tlie foreign markets. Tlie company has 
also easy access to  raw material sources. 
Tlie price of raw nlaterials is a major conlpetitive disadvalitage for the firin. together with 
tlie price for conlponents, both Romanian supplied and foreign. The long distances to  the export 
markets and the difficult access to tlie major distributions channels are also wealinesses of the 
company 011 foreign markets. Tlie outdatedness of the equipment conlbined ivith the fall in sales 
(110 inore econonlies of scale) led to and increase in specific fuel consunlptio~l after 1989 by 7% 
for clinlier ant1 2'X1 for clialk. Tlie same figures for specific electricity consuniption are 10% and 
.5% . 
I n  order to  diminish tlie competitive disadvantage resulting from tlie outclated~less of the 
equipment, tlie company is in the course of introducing a technical upgrading plan. 
.As an effect of all tliese measures the company estimates productivity in clialk production 
c i ~ ~ t l  pacliaging sliall double and substantial savings of natural gas and fuel oil sliall be obtained. 
T l ~ e  \\;hole cost of tliis technical upgrading might amount to  some 'LO million USD, out of 
ivl~icli more tlian I I  illillion will be paid from tlle company's o~vii sources. 
Tlie company asserts tliat 110 differences between tlie quality of the domestically supplied 
ant1 esportetl deliveries esist. 
There is a sizable gap between the profitability of domestically supplied and exported de- 
li\.eries - the former are more profitable tlian tlie latter. Thus, in 1993 the profit rate for 
tloinestic deliveries hvas 9.13% and only 5.7% for the esported output. This liiglier profitability 
011 tlle donlestic market is somewliat attenuated by tlie sliglitlp longer cashing period for the 
tlonlestically delivered output. 
Overall, we can co~~c lude  tliat the esports are somewliat suhsitlized by tlie domestically 
tlelivered out put. 
Doillestic Eilviroilnlent for Export 
The major tlomestic impediments to export are the high cost of credit, tlie poor quality of railroad 
t~anspor t  (vital to the company in terms of both capacity ancl price i n  order to transport tlie 
esported output to the port of Constanta where the only specializetl loading terminal esists) 
a11t1 tlie liil~itetl availability of transport capacities. In order to  cope with tliese difficulties 
the company \\,auld very mucll welcome the distribution of subsidized esport credit via tlie 
specialized institution (Esimbank) and a flesible fare system for railroad transport,  witli a 
wgressive fare per carriage according to  the total number of carriages included in  a convoy; 
~)lesently. the price of doinestic transport represents 3*5-40% of tlie FOB price of the esported 
cement. 
The coinpaiiy would benefit nlricli from an eselnption of custolils duties for imported inputs, 
inclutling pacliaging materials. After almost a year of reasonably good functioning tlle interbank 
marliet s tarts  to  create problems again to  companies which want to buy hard currency, mainly 
I,!. substantial tlelays in  the esecution of purcliase orders. Tlie coillpany would thns \velcome 
the authorization of payments in hard-currency domestically, in tliis case made by the foreign 
tratle conlpany VITROCIM, in order to  get rid of the interbank market. 
Participating a t  international fairs and exhibitions is much beyond the means of the company. 
The coiilpany would thus welcome governmental support i n  this respect. 
Go\-ernment regulations do not a have substaiitial impact on tlie clioice \vlietlier to  esport 
or not. Tlle only esception is tlie recent Governmental Decree 60.5/1994 offering lower interest 
cretlit for the realization of construction, wliicli is expected to produce a certain increase i11 
ceiiient tlemantl froill big construction contractors. 
Tlle coinpany considers an important competitive advantage its good relationsllip witli the 
LIinistry of C'onlnierce, tlie Chamber of C>ommerce and tlie Customs Authority. 
The Foreign Environment for Exports 
The colnpa.ny has good rela~tionsliip with VITROCIM, a private foreign trade company who 
carries out  most of conlpany's exports. Although the con-lpany cla.ims VITROCIM lias a lim- 
itrcl ba~.ga.iiiiiig; power over prices, it is doubtful whether COMPlO really lias illucli room for 
m;l,noeuvre in terms of prices. VITROCIM lias got control over tlie specialized cement loading 
teriiiiiia,l i n  tlie port of Cloilstanta and COMPlO is vitally depending on. 
The i11ai11 i~iip~cliineiits t o  export faced by the firin on foreign ma,rkets are tlie pa.cl<aging 
standa,rds, t , l~e  unfa.ir coin~nercial prxtices of foreign coiilpetitors and t'lie difficult access to 
distribution clia.iiiiels. The company is also harmed in tlie longer run by the sta,gnating demand 
for its products, due to the numerous innovation in construction lea,ding mainly to  a drastic 
clecrease of t,lie specific. consumption of cement. 
The compa,ny coi~siders tha,t tlie Associatioil Agreement is going t o  have a neutral effect 011 
its exports, a,s most of its exports are already heading towards the EU, on the one hand, a.nd 
brcause it foresees a strong recovery of construction on the domestic ma.rket in tlie following 
five years, on tlie other. 
Background I~lfor~l lat io~l  
The company nras establislied in 1913. I11 1948 it was nationalized and in 1990 it was turned 
into a commercial company in accordance witli the Law 1511990. Tlie company is still state 
o\vned witli the shares distributed between the State Ownership Fund (70%)) and tlie Private 
Ownership Fuiicl hluntenia (30%). 
The conlpany is proclucing: 
white cen~ent,  iising the follon~ing capacities: two production lines n-it11 rotating liilns 
I\ liicli were put in operation in 19rj2-195.5 and are using the huniid teclinology and have 
a capacity of 300 tons clinker per day; 3 lines with rotating liilns, put i n  operation in 
1962-64. using the humid teclinology and having a 800 tons capacity per day; 
challi, using tlie following capacities: 8 high kilns put in operation in 1951 with a 100 
tons/tlay productivity out of whicli 7 were put in conservation in 1991; 2 regenerative 
alternative I>uriiiiig kilns writ11 a 230 tons/day productivity; 
plaster using the two processing lines put in  operation in 197.5. 
On a rea,rly basis the company ca.n produce: 1018 thous. tonslyear cenient 80%) clinker 
equivalent, using tlie humid teclinology, out of which 100 tlious. tons/year white cement; 250 
tlious. tons/yea.r chalk; 100 thous. tons1yea.r plaster and 20 tlious. t,ons/yea,r refra,ctory silico- 
aluminous 1)riclis. 
Coiiil>a~iy's capital st.ock as of December 31, 1993 was 10.656 billion lei. The turnover 
amor~nt~ecl t,o 11.32 million lISD in 1990, decreasing to 9.47 i n  1991, 8.0q5 in 1992 and growing 
i~ga,ili to 9.31 niillio~l in 1993 and to 13.5 million in 1994, t1ia.nks to the increa,se in prices on the 
worlcl inarliet and to the price liberalization on the domestic market, that  compensa.ted the fall 
i l l  the capacit.y used. 
The coiiipa~iiy used its ca.pacity to a decreasing rate, falling from '14.3%) in 1990 to 19.4% in 
190-1. ~nainly clue to tlle tll.a.stic fall in ca,pital investnients on the domestic ma.rliet a,fter 1989. It 
is. lio\vever: to be renlarlied tlia,t tlie functioning of some ca,pa.cities was cliscont~inued for rea,sons 
of energy efficiency. 
The profit ra.te wa,s oscilla.ting froni zero i n  1990 to 12.58% i n  1992 a.nd down to 3.3.5% in 
1994. C'onipa~iy's inclebtedness decreaecl tllrougl~out the period under st'udy. The share of 
short-tern1 credit, in tota,l working capita.1 decreased from 32.78% in 1990 to 13.1%) in 1994. 
IInt,il 1989 the company was exporting inainly towards the Ell a.nd tlie Middle Ea,st. Export 
was ca,rried o r ~ t  entirely via VITROCIM, the specialized state-owned foreign tra,de compa,ny. 
Export Orie~ltatio~l 
r 3 1 lie conipany lias been ex~>orting tliroughout the period under study between 6-776 of the 
output. It is to  be remarked that  after its transformation into a conlmercial company C O M P l l  
tlecitletl it \voulcl undertake export on its own account. It managed to perforin alinost all export 
directly (96'7, i n  1994). although a t  a very high price: the loss of all markets in  the EU ancl 
the drastic decline i n  the share of output exported (as comparecl to 10-12% of the total output 
cs1)ortecl I~efore 1989). The company managed. however, to enter new markets, such as those of 
tlle East European Associated countries, where in 1994 it sold 98% of t l ~ e  sportecl output (up 
froill 20% in 1992). The ~narltets in the hfiddle East were also lost. declining from 80% of total 
csports in 1992 to zero in 1994. A mere 2% of the exported output is sold in tlie Eli  in 1994, 
n.itIi the prospect to increase the EU share to 10% in the foIIo\ving five years. 
.Ax alreacly mentioned, almost all export is carried out directly by tlie firni. Tlie iinporters 
g c ~  in\.olvcd to a very liinitecl extent in tlie production of tlie exported output. 
Productioil for Export 
T l ~ e  fir111 is currently negotiating wit11 the -4ustrian firm C4LASSNER Gnlbli ainiing a t  estab- 
lisliii~g a joint \.enture in order to: inodernize the cement processing tecl~nology by replacing t l ~ e  
present SO0 tons/day l~uinid teclinology processing lines witli a 2000 tons/day clry procedure 
~~rocessing line. using solid fuels; niodernize the chalk processing installations by shifting from 
LOO tons/cla!r high kilns to  2.50 tons/day nioderil regenerative kilns; introduce a new line for 
plaster ~ ~ r o d u c t s .  
The investinent effort for these projects to come true is estimated to  some 38 illillio~l LTSD. 
:Is one of the main products exported is the white cement, the company undertook geological 
research in order to  discover new resources of silico-aluminous raw inaterials needed to produce 
the \vliite cement. 
C'OMPII clecided to partially replace tlie use of natural gas for the production of clinker with 
solicl or liquid fuels, considered more cost-effective; tlie investment is scheduled for 1995596. I11 
1995, a l~acltaging niacliiiie and an automatic stacking machine are to  be put in operation. By 
1996 a new line for the production of special moulding plaster is to  be put in operation and in 
t11e folloning years the company plans to  launch a 1.50-200 tlious. tons/year construction plaster 
capacit!.. .A new installation for producing cement roof tiles is under stucly. 
The \vliole investment effort for the 1995-1998 period (supposing that  the association with 
the sAustrian firm would not come into effect) is planned to amount to  11.7 niillioii LJSD, out of 
wl~ ic l~  6.2 million would be the company's own sources. 
The company is also about to  lauiicli another joint venture with a French firm in order to  
proclucc. ],laster. 
The exported output generally has to  conil~ly with the British BSS, .4merican ASTM or 
Fr(xi1~11 ?IFNOR staiiclards. 
The current coml~etitive strengths of the firm are the cost ancl quality of worl<force. A sub- 
5t ant ial conlpetitive advantage is the closeness of raw materials resources (u hich are considered 
5ufficient for a t  least 10 years froin now on) together with the possibility to  buy without any 
li~uitation additional teclinological inputs (various thermal power plant waste products). The 
fir111 is ~~egatively affected by the outdatedness of the equipment ancl technologies, tlie long dis- 
tanccs to  the export markets and tlie difficult access to  distril~utioi~ cliannels, as \\,ell as  the poor 
q ~ ~ a l i t y  of t l ~ e  com~~onen t s  and tlie outdatedness of the surveillance/control ecluipment. leading 
to i~uiiieroris accidental interruptions of the technological process. The company is also liarmed 
I)! the high costs for railroad transport. All these competitive disadvantages are generating 
10-1:3'% liigl~er specific consumption as well as a 7 times lo\ver ~~roductivi ty as compared to the 
\\'ester11 Europcan producers. 
There are no clifferences in the input usage between the do~iiestically supl11it.d ancl t l ~ e  ex- 
portecl output. 
The same as for C'OLIP10, the profitability of the output sold on tlie domestic nlarltet is 
11lr1c11 Iligher than the profitability of the exported output. I11 fact, tlie company maltes virtually 
zero profits on the exported output. Moreover, the cashing period for the exported output  is 
sligl~tly longer tl~aii for the donlestically delivered output. I11 fact, the main reason for the 
cornpan) to export is the security of payment (extremely necessary in an economy where the 
i11te1-ente~ prise arrears attain threatening levels) and only secoildly the need to  break-even. 
Doillestic Environment for Exports 
T l ~ e  main cloinestic iinpecliments to  export the company faces are tlie cost of cloniestic credit ancl 
the customs tlulies for the importeel inputs, in particular the high custonls cluties for the imports 
of I~igll-tech ecluil,ment. The low quality of railroad transport is also a relatively important 
inil~ecli~nent, together with its price, representing 30-40% of tlie price FOB Constanta. 
The coiiipanj9 sees its relationships witli the state administratioii as having a neutral impact 
on its export performance. 
The Foreign Environnlent for Exports 
'l'lle company lias several sniall-medium wliolesale clients i n  tlie East European Associatecl 
countries (inainly Hungary). Their diversification aiid limited financial power gives tlie company 
s ~ ~ l ~ s t a n t i a l  bargaining power in the negotiations over prices. 
Tlie iliain sources of information of the company are personal contacts of tlie managers with 
tlie business p a r t n ~ r s .  
Tlie main iiiipediment t o  export on tlie foreign markets are  cluotas and packaging standards.  
I n  principle, tlie importers in tlie East European Associatecl countries have 110 problerris in 
ol~taining tlie neeclecl hard-currency. 
Tlle A4ssociation Agreement is seen as  having a neutral impact on tlie firms' export perfor- 
mance, as  the cement produced by COMPl l  is a t  the highest s tandards aiid it might be well 
received on tlie EU marl;et, no matter  the presence of other producers fro111 other Associated 
countries riritli similar factor combinations. 
Background Iilfor~llation 
Tlie coliipany was established in 1949. In 1990 it was turned into a conimercial company and 
it \vas organizecl in autonomous manufacturing divisions. There are five autonomous manufac- 
turing and services divisions (bottling lines, equipment for food industry, freezing equipment, 
services, utilities ancl metal processing) and five functional divisions (general, raw materials and 
cons~~rnal>les, inarketing, finance/accounti~ig, human resources). The  company as  a whole is 
managed 1>y a :3-menll>er managing team and tlie autonornous and functional divisions are man- 
aged by managers. The  organizational scheme was desigiiecl along tlie main three groups of prod- 
ucts currently produced: bottling lines, food industry equipmeilt and refrigerating ecluipment. 
The  company is still state-owned, with 70% of the shares controlled by the S ta te  Ownership 
Funel ancl 30% by tlie Private Ownership Fund. 
The  companj7 had a turnover of 12.31 million USD in 1990 growing t o  1.5.84 million in 1991 
ant1 falling afterwards t o  10.08 million in 1992, 8.13 million in 1993 and 9.07 million in 1994. The  
capacity utilization declined from 69.4% in 1990 t o  40% in 1994. The  number of staff declined 
clrastically from 3,792 people in 1990 to  1,995 in 1994, an excessive decline in productivity being 
thu5 a\.oitletl. The  size of capital stock was 4.5.9 billion lei as  of December 31, 1994. T h e  profit 
~ a t c  lldtl a l>eali of 17.8%) in 1990, followed by a decline down to  9.2% in 1993 and up again t o  
11.2'i: in 1994. 
The  company managed t o  maintain a good financial balance in spite of the enormous dif- 
ficulties it facecl in this period. The  sliare of short term credit in worliing capital is zero in 
199-1 ancl it neler exceeded 3%, except in 1990 (8.6%). Total arrears amount t o  1.027 billion lei 
ant1 stoclil>uilding amounts t o  3.878 billioii lei, out  of which finished goods represent only 1.323 
I>illion lei. 
The  companj. \vas traditionally exporting to  China 80% of its exports in 1989 already, with 
the renlaining 20'%1 split between the present East European EU Associated countries (1.5%) and 
the C'IS (5%)) .  
Export Orie~ltatio~l 
The  company exported 15.4% of its output  in 1990, steadily increasing afterivartl5 to  28.3%, in 
1993 ancl tleclining some\vhat t o  25.4% in 1994. 111 1991-92, the company recluced its sales to  
tlie C'hinese marliet to  -51% ancl 59%) respectively of total esports  ivllile increasing sales t o  the 
('TS marlict to  2G% and 1.5'7~ respectively. Starting from 1992, the company has been selling 
alniost exclusively t o  China (99.6% in 1994), with only marginal sales to  the CIS. Sales t o  China 
< ~ r n o ~ ~ n t e d  I>etn.een 1982-1995 to  300 million SFr. 
The  company sells only 40% of the exported output  directly, the remaining GO% being 
cxportetl via foreign t rade conipanies. Generally the intermediaries are the old state-owned 
foreign t ~ a d e  coin~>anies, such as  COMP20,  with whom the company has old relationships. Tlie 
tclative tli~ersification of intermediaries, together with the old relationships assure the company 
a good bargaining position in price negotiations. 
T~nporters only get involved in assuring transport of the exported gootls t o  tlie destination. 
Tlius. the exported output  is exclusively the result of the firm's oivn manufacturing capacities. 
Production for Export 
Tlie only p r o t l ~ ~ c t s  exported by the coinpany i n  1994 were bottling lines for liquids, where exports 
a~nountecl t o  1.6 million USD. This is why the conlpany is making efforts t o  diversify the range 
of its exports to  otlrer iteins currently produced, such as  meat-cutting machines, natural juice 
t ~ ~ a c l ~ i n c s  or I~ot t le  n-ashing illacllines which are considered t o  be a t  the average ivorld level in 
trrtnb of clualit!. ancl performance. T h e  company is also trying to  diversify its 111arliets to  the 
C'zccll Republic. Slovaliia, Bulgaria, CIS, Syria, Cuba, Egypt. Tlianlis to tlie strong expansion 
of exports, tlie company plans to  reach its 1989 turnover i11 the following '2 t o  3 years. 
The company considers as its main conlpetitive advantage the cost of the \\~orliforce, as well 
as the quality of the foreign supplied components. 
On the contrary, it is very negatively affected by the outdatedness of the equipment and 
tecllnologies (tlie average degree of wear and tear of the fixed capital is 20%), the long distance 
to  the export nlarliets and the poor quality of the Romanian supplied components. Company's 
export performance is also harmed by the insufficient quality of the worliforce, the lligli price of 
the foreign supplied components and the difficult access to  distribution cliannels generating the 
neetl t o  use intermediaries. 
The company declares that  no difference exists in terms of input usage between the output 
suppliecl for tlie tlomestic market and the one sold abroad, witli the only exception of raw 
materials wliicli are of better quality for the exported output. 
The profit rate for tlie exported output was persistently more than double the rate for the 
tlonlestically delivered output all along the period under study (2.5111.5 in 1990, '27112.5 in 1992, 
27112.6 in 1992), altliougli a certain decline in the gap can be seen for 1993 (21112.4) and 1994 
(22/14.4), when the ~nacroeconomic stabilization eliminated to  a large benefits of the exporters 
as cornpared to  the conlpanies selling exclusively on the domestic market. This liigli difference 
in profitability is somewliat attenuated by the slightly longer period for cashing the invoices for 
tllc exported output. 
Doillestic Eilviroilillent for Exports 
The ~na in  cloinestic impediment to  export the firm faces is the liigli cost of domestic credit. 
Among otlier impediments to  export the high customs duties for inputs sliould also be mentioned. 
I11 fact. the company is harmed in terms of casliflow by the banli practice of blocking an amount 
i n  company's accounts equivalent to  tlie value of the guarantee; the company would favor the 
rliminatioii of tliis guarantee or the guarantee to  be offered by the Eximbank a t  a subsidized 
interest rate. C'OMP12 is also harmed by customs and insurance formalities, tlle low quality of 
railroatl transport and the frequent nlodificatio~i of the domestic com~nercial legislation. 
The conipaliy considers tha t  its good relationsliips with the Ministry of Commerce and the 
C'lla~nber of Co~nmerce have a substantial positive impact 011 its export perforinance while tlie 
relationsliip nitli tlie Customs Authority has a neutral impact on the export performance. 
Foreigil Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Tllc conipany has good relationsliips with its intermediaries ancl its custonlers, as  already men- 
t ionetl. 
The ~naiii conlpetitors abroad are actually all European firms: the German ICRAMER, 
SEVDELhLBN, SEN and ICRONES, the French ALFA-LAVAL and GONGLOFF and the Italian 
hL.ANZIN1. 
C'OMP12 cloes not have a competitor intelligence system of its own and the marketing 
acti\.ities are rather weali, due to  the shortage of skilled people witli such a bacliground. Personal 
contact ivitli I~usiness partners rank liigliest as a source of information. All otlier sources are 
consideretl as marginal. The coinpany would very much welconle governmental support for 
establishing a per~nanent representative office abroad. 
Exports are harmed by various impediments on the export markets. The main impediments 
of this liincl are seen to  be first of all the high customs duties and afterwards the difficult access 
to the tlistril~ution channels and the general lack of information about the foreign commercial 
legislation. business rules and price levels tha t  could substantially be eased by a representative 
locatetl on the market. I11 its core export market (China), the demand for imports is decreasing 
ant1 there is a tendency to  expand investment mainly via direct foreign invest~uent or imports 
i n  tlle fra~nework of mediunl-long term payment arrangements. The company identified some 
G O  investment projects in food industry on the Chinese market which are t o  be put in operation 
as  joint ventures with foreign direct investment and 5-8 years credit or i~ i ipor t s  witli 3-5 years 
~ ~ a y n i e n t  arrangements. This might create enormolls pressure on the cotlipany as  payment on 
clel i~.ey (as  used so far) would be drastically limited. 
111 China tlie company is selling bottling lines, turnkey plants for beer, soft I~everages, alco- 
hol. ancl refrigerating installations. All this equipment requires long-cycle manufacturing (9-12 
months) with a period of 1Fj-20 months from tlie entering into force of the contract until the 
starting of opelations in the plant. The  Ordinance 14/199.5 of tlie Romanian government offers 
some facilities for complex equipment exporters, such as: 
guarantees for a.ttending international tenders; 
governniental guarantees for short ,  medium and long term credits used for doriiestic and 
i~nportecl inputs tliat are  to  be incorporated in complex equipment a s  well a s  for up t o  8 
!.ears loug export credits; 
subsiclies for up t o  60% of the interest paid for credits contractecl t o  realize the various 
coniponel~ts tliat a.re t o  be incorporated in comples equipment exports; 
country risk nlediurn and long term export credit insurance on behalf and on tlie account 
of tlie government; 
exemption from anticipated payment of customs duties, VAT and customs colnmission 
p a ~ m e n t  guarantee for imported inputs incorporated in complex exports. 
The  main shortcoming of tliis support is tlie limited resources allocated for its enforcement. 
T l~ese  facilities are, liowever, insufficient for COMP12 as each firm is supposed to  finance 
itself tlie capital needed t o  realize the  high value equipment, a most clifficult task with tlie current 
interest rates. hZoreover, the Ordinance makes reference t o  contracts tliat are  being carried out  
while tlie conipany would be interested t o  have a liiglier degree of certainty over the support  of 
tlie governnie~~t  in order t o  be able t o  fine-tune its price. Tlie subsidy is t o  be disbursed after 
t l ~ c  payment of the payment of the  credit, leading to  high amounts of capital blocked. 
C'OhIP12 would be in favor of special conditions for firms exporting t o  the Chinese market 
i~~clucling the  guarantee of governmental assistance from tlie very stage of negotiations, as well as 
tlic possibility t o  obtain the subsidy when paying tlie interest for the credit and not afterwards. 
Tlle conipany consiclers the EU market a hard market,  with very liigli quality s tandards tliat 
callnot Ile penetratccl in the  short run. Tlie Association Agreement is seen as  a positive thing 
that  night be \.slued when the conipany would be able t o  comply witli all these standarcls. 
By tliat time, tlie company's main concern is t o  build a strong share on tlie markets where it 
iq already present (China mainly) and capitalize afterwards tliis position to  try t o  penetrate 
Iiarclrr markets. In the short run, the  expansion space appropriate for tlie conipany's present 
capabilities is in tlie CIS and in tlie East European Associated countries. 
Thc company was created in 1963 with Swedish tech~lical assistance, a s  nlost of the equipment a t  
that  time was imported from Sweden. In 1990 it became a commercial company on the grounds 
of Law 15/1990. Early 199.5 the company is still s tate  owned with 70% of the shares controlled 
I,> tlie S ta te  O~vnersllip Fund and 0% by the Private Ownership Fund. It is t o  be privatized in 
the sliort-run in the fralneu~ork of the mass privatization program. 
The  company produces wooden furniture. 
('ompany's turnover was in 1990 9.13 million USD, increasing t o  9.76 in 1991, 10.26 in 1992, 
10.ST in 1993 and 13..52 in 1994. The  capital stock amounted t o  2.167 billion lei as  a t  end-1993. 
The  company employed 2123 people in 1994, down from 2693 in 1990. T h e  capacity used 
reliiaineil roughly a t  the same level (around 87%) througl~out  the period under study. 
The  profit rate  increased from 6.08% in 1990 t o  a highest 14.1% in 1991 and declined steadily 
afterniarcls t o  7.4% in 1994. 
Tlie company has a good financial balance managing t o  finance the worliing capital exclu- 
sively from its otvn sources. 
C'OhIPl:3 trailitionally sold more than 40% of its total exports on the  EI1 market,  almost 
tlie same sliare t o  the CIS, the  remaining share being split between the h'Iiddle East  ancl the 
presently East European EU Associated countries. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
T l ~ e  company exported 73.4% of its output  in 1989, a sliare t ha t  increased steadily t l ~ r o u g l ~ o u t  
the period up t o  85.4%. 
Tlie share of exports t o  the  EU in total exports increased t o  a highest (75.S%) in 1991 and 
dcclinctl a f te r~vards  t o  55.4% in 1994. Exports t o  the East European Associated countries fell 
to  zero in 1991 and never recovered. Sales t o  the CIS fell t o  11.4% of total exports in 1993, a 
cluarter of tlieir 1989 level. Tlie only region outside the EU where sales expanded nras the  hIiddle 
East (Syria, Jordan,  Egypt ,  Turliey) with a share increasing from 10.8%) in 1989 t o  23.7% in 
199 1. 
T h e  conipany sells directly 68% of its exports and 32% via intermetliaries. Importers gener- 
;ill> get inbolved ill providing transport and to  a certain extent they marliet the furniture under 
their otvn trade mark. 
Only 11% of the output  incorporates components supplied by the importers. 
Productioil for Exports 
Tlie company plans t o  diversify the range of products and the marliets, ant[ upgrade the  output  
I>>. targeting upmarket segments. With this aim in mind the company plans t o  import certain 
nootlen species such as  oali, pine, cherry tree, nut tree, and exotic wood. The  company has 
a design division of its own comprising several of the most reputed furniture designers in the 
cor~ntry. The  expansion of the R&D expenses is, however, harmed by the  legal cap  on the  
R k D  expenses (3%) out  of total sales), allowing rather face-lifts of foreign furniture models 
than launching of own collections. The  company plans t o  launch furniture made of mixtures of 
several nrooden species, new designs for furniture fabrics, office furniture made of wood-metal 
a l~ t l  tvood-li~etal-glass combinations. The  company eyes up the Japanese and South-Korean 
~ilalliets ant1 aims t o  expand the t rade with Middle East countries, as  well a s  t o  reduce the cost 
of transportation by delivering the furniture disassembled. 
One of tlie future projects is t o  import wood from Russia and process it .  
Currently. the  company produces only wooden furniture with tlie following structure: liitchen 
furniture, office furniture, open air furniture and dining-room furniture. 
Tlie conipany considers its main competitive strengths are cost and cluality of \vorkforce, the 
price of ra\v n~ater ials  and the price and quality of the foreign coniponents. On the contrary, 
t lie conipany is mainly negatively affected by tlie outdatedness of teclinologies and the difficult 
a c c e s  t o  foreign tlistribution channels, togetlier with the long distances t o  the  esport  markets. 
.A ~ n a j o r  \veakness is induced by the  unreasonable price/quality ratio of domestic components. 
Tlie company acknowledges tliat tlie esported output  incorporates definitely better inputs 
(conil>onents, raw materials, workforce, technology and equipment) than the output  soltl domes- 
tically. Consequently, tlie exported output  is ratlier upmarliet as  compared t o  the clomesticall~ 
cleliveretl one, esplaining why the profit rate for the esported output  is ~>elsistently almost dou- 
Ible as  comparetl to  the  profit rate  for the  domestically delivered output  (S.OT'% for tlie exported 
output  vs. .5.2'Xi for the tlomestically supplied one in 1994). This profitability gap  is attenuated 
I]? the fact t ha t  the cashing period is generally double for tlie esported output  as compared t o  
the tloniestically delivered one. 
Doillestic Eilviroilnlent for Export 
Tlie t op  tloniestic barrier t o  exports is the high cost of doniestic credit ~vhicli seriously affects 
the espor t  performance of the  firm. Second, the firm is harmed by the customs duty  for tlie 
iniported inputs,  whose reduction or possibly elimination would be very nlucli welcome, since 
profits are sclueezed between the  ever rising prices for domestic inputs and the conlparatively 
loner tlevaluation of the dollar in 1994 and 1995. Alternatively, tlie company consi<lers price 
controls sliould be enforced for input prices. Tliird, tlie firm is harmed by tlie long duration of 
I>anliing operations. 
For the imported inputs t ha t  are incorporated in esports  tlie company has t o  deposit a 
guarantee tha t  seriously affects its casliflow as this amount is bloclied by banks in the firm's 
accounts. Tlie guarantee should normally be reimbursed 30 days after the  performance of espor t s  
but delays are frequent. 
Tlie relationships wit11 tlie s ta te  admi~~is t ra t ion  are uneven, depending on the  organization: 
1 l i c ~ r  are goocl relationships with tlie Ministry of Commerce and Clian~ber of Commerce while 
there are very bad relationships witli tlie Customs Authority. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
'l'lie conipany claims it has a good bargaining position i11 the relationsliip witli i ts custoniers and 
t~aclitional relationsliips with firms in Germany and Austria mainly. It is, however, doubtful 
\\ I~ether  this is true. First of all, COMP13 is selling a gootl part  of its output  under tlie 
trade niarli of tlic importer or sinlply acts as an assembler for inputs brought by the  importer.  
Lloreover. tlie quality is higher for the esported output  than for the don~estically supplied one, 
slio~ving again tliat the bargaining position of COMP13 is actually weak, a s  importers can force 
it to  inclucle better inputs in tlie exported output  (although the  esplanation might also be 
clifferelit protluct ranges for different markets). 
C'olnpany con~pet i tors  are mainly from Poland, the  Czech Republic, Sweden and Italy. 
Tlie conipany does not have a competitor intelligence system. T h e  main source of information 
is personal contacts with business partners. A very limited importance is attached t o  specialized 
publications, and market research made by specialized organizations. 
Tlie nlaiii barriers t o  espor t  are seen t o  be the tariffs togetlier with the  difficult access t o  
foreign clistribution channels. The  following major barrier is the  lacli of illformatioil about  the  
foreign niarliets: price levels, business rules, commercial legislation. The  company would be in 
favor of support by tlie government t o  locate a permanent representative on each of its major 
niarliets. 
Paynient contlitions by foreign partner might play a certain role on the  less liquid markets 
5ucl1 as  tlie C'IS in order t o  boost exports. The  company is ratlier reluctant of getting involved 
in I>a~ te r  t acle via tlie government as  traditionally tlie paynient by tlie government is performed 
\vith very long clelays. seriously harming tlie company's cashflow. 
Tlie conipany is colifident tha t  the Associat io~~ Agreement would play a positive role and 
I~oo\ t  its espor t s  on a nlarket where it is lias already been present for a long time. 
Background Inforlllatioll 
The conlpanj ivas established in the early 1970s and it was turned into a coinrnercial company 
in 1990. Sub~ec~uently, a division of tlle company located in Harlau was cut off and turned 
illto a conlmercial company of its ow11 called bIoBIMEX Harlau. Early 1995 the company is 
state-o\vnetl. wit11 70%) of the shares controlled by the State Ownership Fund ant1 30%) by the 
Pri\-ate Ournersl~ip Fund. It is to  be privatized in the short run in the frameworli of the Mass 
I'rivatization P~ .ogran~ .  
The coml>any ~>roduces wooden furniture. 
The turnover amounted to 13.61 million USD in 1990, followed by a drastic fall to 10.51 
million in 1991 and 9.38 million in 1992. A recovery started in 1993, with 13.53 million LJSD 
sales, followed by 1.5.78 million in 1994. The capacity used was highest (90%) in 1990, followed 
I)! a decline to 'i.5'X1 in 1992 and a recovery to 86% in 1993 and 81% i n  1994. The number of 
staff tlecl.ea~etl from 4,022 in 1990 to  3,337 in 1994, indicating an important inlprovement in 
lal~or protluctivity. The capital stock amounted to  2.851 billion lei by end-1993. The profit rate 
replicates somewliat tlie ups and downs of the turnover ~vitli 11%) i n  1990, followed by a 14..5% 
I~igliest in 1992 and 6%) in 1994. CObIP14 has a weak financial situation with the share of short 
term credit in working capital increasing throughout the period and attaining a higllest 68.5% 
i n  1994. 
The traditional markets of the company until 1990 were the El l ,  Israel and USA (accounting 
together TO'% of the sales) and the current CIS (for the remaining 30%)). 
Export Orientation 
'Tl~c colnpaltj Iias I)ersistently exported around 80% of its output tllroughout the period, with 
a peak of S9.4'X i n  1992. Exports are increasingly going to  the EU, wllicll absorbs 75.5% of the 
esportecl output in 1994 while the share of the other developetl countries decreased dramatically 
froin :30'%) i n  1989 to 7.5% in 1994. The share of the current CIS clecreased also but less 
tlr;~matically, from 30%) in 1989 to  17% in 1994. 
90% of Ilie exports is performecl directly and only 10% via intermediaries. The company's 
i~ l~por te r s  get involvecl to  a large extent in realizing the exported output. They supply design 
ant1 projects, co-finance the R k D  expenses, supply raw materials and components and assure 
transportation. Altogether 32% of company's exports are realized in cooperation with the im- 
porters. 
Production for Export 
The strategy of tlle company is mainly oriented towards expanding the i,olume of sales in the 
EIy marllet ancl reconquering the CIS markets. This is actually why the colllpany would be 
interested i n  expanding barter trading. Moreover, tlle barter would be in exchange of wood 
fioill S ihe~ia  as the firm has already established contacts with Russian suppliers that  would be 
interestetl i n  such arrangements. 
C'onlpany's strengtlls are mainly connected to  the qualification of the workforce, the quality 
ant1 piice of foreign components and the capacity to  satisfy the specific standards of the export 
marliets. The company can also build a competitive edge as compared to  other foreign and even 
13oiiianian firms from the closeness to the ethnically Romanian Republic of Moldova by using 
the Russian speabing people available there having knowledge of the Russian market in order 
to  builcl an export base towards CIS markets. 
Tlle conipany is I ~ a r ~ n e d  first of all by the price of the raw materials, the outdatedness of 
Ihc equip~nent. tlle difficult access to  distribution channels and the price and quality of tlle 
1301ilania 11 coulponents. 
Tliere is 110 difference in terms of input usage for the domestically supplied aiid tlie esported 
products. The profit rate for tlie exported output is persistelitly double as compared to  the rate 
for tlie domestically supplied output (16.118.7 in 1993 and 6.61.6 in 1994). On the other side, 
tliis liiglier profitability is attenuated by the longer payment periods for tlie esported output, 
wliicli are generally almost double as compared to  the payment period for tlie tlomestically 
sr~pplied output. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Tlie iiiajor domestic impedi~nents to  esport are the custo~ns duty for tlie i ~ ~ ~ p o r t e d  inputs, tlie 
cost of domestic credit and the long duration of getting bank credit. To a lesser extent, the 
coiiipany is liarlned by tlie low quality of roads. 
Tlie present Romanian legislation discourages barter while tliis kind of arrangements mould 
Ilc essential for estending the company's activity. 
As in illally other cases, the company is squeezed by the rising prices for domestic inputs 
and the mucli slower devaluation of the leu. 
Siiice tlie company desperately needs new investment in modern equipment, it would welcoine 
t l ~ r  eliinination of customs duties for modern equipment not produced in Romania. Another 
I)c~ieficial tlevelopiiient would be if the State Ownership Fund would behave as a respoiisible 
owner. stopping for a while, until the company recovers, to  cash its tlividends. 
The Foreign Environment for Exports 
Tlle colnpany tloes not have a competitor intelligence system. 4 s  Inany of tlie other compa- 
nies already analyzed, COrVIP14 is niainly relying in terms of business information on business 
part11el.s and only to  a very limited extent 011 market studies. 
C'oinl)anv's co~npetitors come from Italy, Sweden, Poland and the C:zecli Republic. 
Tllr con1pal1y is niainly harmed 011 foreign markets by the lack of a permanent representative 
on compa~~y ' s  niajor markets. To a lesser extent it is also llarined estent by unfair commercial 
111;tctices aiicl its orvii ignorance as concerns tlie price level and the commercial legislation on the 
foreign marliet. 
T l ~ c  European Agreement is considered to  have a positive iillpact on con~pany's esport 
~)erformance as it would boost company's esports on a mal.ket rvliere it is already successfully 
cst a1)lishetl. 
T l ~ e  company was established in the early 1970s and it mas turnetl into a cornillercial company 
in 1990. 
COhIP15 is producing household refrigerating appliances. The production started in the 
early 19rOs according to a French Thompson license which was steadily improvetl and by now 
100%, '.nationalized". 
C'ObIPl5's turnover was 26.61 million USD in 1990, growing steadily to 33.25 million in 
1991, 41.63 in 1992, 48.07 in 1993 and to 52.31 million in 1994. The capacity was fully used 
througliout the period. Labor force declined only slightly, from 4678 people in 1990 to 4388 
in 1994. The profit rate was 3.6% in 1990, growing to a highest 19..5%, in 1992 and declining 
afterwards to  11.7% in 1994. The company has virtually no debts, the share of short term credit 
in the ivorliing capital being 5.75% in 1994. 
11s of early 199.5 the company is still state-owned, with 70% of the sliares controlled by the 
State Ownershil:, Fund and 30% by the Private Ownership Fund. 
Company's traditional markets were until 1989 the EU (with 70% of total esports), Canada 
(10%)) antl China (20%). 
Export Orieiltatioil 
The co~npany espanded strongly its exports througl~out the analyzed periotl, fro111 '203, of the 
total output in 1990 to  FjO% in 1994. The conlpany becaine esclusively depentlent on the EU 
marliet iirliicli accounts for 100% of the exports. This is a most remarkable evolution as total 
csports increasetl also in absolute terms. The loss of the Chinese market mas esplained by the 
co~nparati~.ely easier transport to the EU. A long run foothold on that  huge market could be 
co~i~iectetl to  a direct investment there, something the company cannot afford yet. 
All esport is perforilled directly. Importers' involvement in the realization of the esported 
o ~ ~ t p u t  is only niarginal, comprising the supply of certain components and to a certain estent 
the sale of the protluct under the trade mark of the foreign partner. 
Productioil for Export 
('o~iil>any's niain strategic objective is to strengthen its positio~i on the EU marliet and to start 
[~enetrating the rriidclle antl upper segments of the market using its own trade mark. 
Tlie saine as the vast nlajority of the other companies, COMP1.5 sees the price and quality of 
the \~orIiforce as an ut~liost competitive edge, together with the internal technical capabilities to 
iliiprove and innovate. Tlie quality of tlie imported compo~ients and the close~iess of the export 
~iiarliets are also seen as important competitive advantages. 
The conipaiiy is harinetl by the high price of the raw materials and the high price and inferior 
q ~ ~ a l i t y  of the Rolilaniail components. The company made substantial efforts in the last years to 
tlii ersify its cloniestic suppliers but the very intimate structure of tlie Ro~uaiiian industry hardly 
allows tlraiiiatic changes in this respect. Shifting to foreign suppliers is not al~vays possible due 
to the relatiirely high prices supplemented by customs duties; consequently. COblPl.5 prefers to 
iniport only colilponents that  are paramount to the quality of the final product. 
There are no differences in terms of input usage between the esported and the doillestically 
tlcliveretl out puts. 
C'onil>any's output is oriented towards the middle to low end segment of the marliet, that  is 
precisely the seg~lient with the liigliest demand in the price-sensitive Romanian market. This 
is n-liy the profit rate for the domestically delivered output was Illany times liiglier tlian tlie 
~xofitabilit!. of the esported output, the ratio between the two profitability levels being 4/0..5 
ill 1990. 19..5/4 in 1991. 22.615 in 1992, 20..5/3.Fj, 1312.5 in 1993 ancl i n  1994. Such enormous 
clifferelice in profitability clearly sliows that  tlie company subsidizes its export conlpetitiveness 
I>!. ca~>italizing on tlie good domestic position. Tlie cashing periods for the exported output  are, 
I~on-ever. longer tlian for the domestically clelivered output .  
Domestic Eilvironilleilt for Exports 
The compaiiy's 1llai11 domestic barriers t o  export are tlie cus ton~s  duties t o  imported inputs, price 
cont~ols .  the frequent alterations of the conlmercial legislation, ancl in particular the taxation 
legislation antl the long waiting periods a t  border-crossings. The  company is also squeezed 
I,etiveen the  rising price of the domestic components and the illucl~ sloner devaluation of the 
leu. 
This is ~vliy the company would be in favor of an exchange rate used by the Central Bank t o  
l ,uj  tlie hard currency from exporters indexed by the producers price index. hloreover, imported 
c o ~ ~ ~ l ) ( ~ ~ e i i t s  to  be incorporated in exported products should be considered a s  temporary imports 
ancl thus not taxed by the Customs Authority. The  draw bacli (wllich is currently recorcling 
l o ~ ~ g  delays) slioulcl be performed in 30 days for the most, wliile the formalities needed to  obtain 
c lpor t  credits froill Exinlbank sliould be drastically simplified. 
The  company does not consider its relationsliips witli s tate  administration either particularly 
Ilar~uful or llelpful for company's export performance. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The relationships of tlie company witli its partners are often tense. Tlie niarliet in this sector 
i \  extremely c01npetitix.e. especially in the ~neclium to low end segment where tlie company 
coml>etes abroad. This offers tlie importers a substantial leverage for pressures in order to get 
lo~ver prices. hloreover, in many cases, on tlie most profitable markets the company has virtually 
no image and it ha5  t o  accept to  sell i ts output  under labels of other con~panies. T h e  company 
is. lio~vever, forced t o  export in orcler to  have tlie volume of activity needed t o  breali-even and 
accuinulate resources t o  replace its relatively old-fasl~ioned equipment. 
The  company has no co~xpeti tor  intelligence system and it relies for market information on 
tlle co i~ tac ts  wit11 l~usiness partners and on the information supplied by the  company's repre- 
sentative i l l  France. Specializeel publications play an iniportant role also, inaii~ly for designing 
long-term st I ategies. 
Tile colupan!. cloes not consider the foreign environment as  hostile antl it does not consider 
a c e ~ t a i i ~  barrier a\ having a very harmful impact. The  main probleins are actually connected 
ii it11 tile insufficient inforlnation about  the foreign environment, as  well a s  a less competitive 
tlc\ign of t l ~ e  products and very limited resources for advertising. 
C'ompany's main competitors are tlie Italian and German white goods producers, a s  well a s  
tlle protlucers froin Slovenia. 
The  .Association .Agreement is seen to have a positive impact, althougli tlie company thinks, 
after the  first burst in exports, thanks t o  the free access to  tlie EU,  tlie resources for further 
gro~vtli  i11 exports are rather inside the company than in the commercial regulations. 
Tlie colnl>aiir. ~ v a s  established in the early 1970s and it was turned into a commercial company 
i l l  1990. It is state-owned, with 70% of the shares controlled hy the State Ownership Fund and 
:30'i/c, bj. tlie Private Ownership Fund. CONIPlG is going to be privatized in the framework of 
llie Mass Privatization Program. 
Tlie company produces wooden furniture. 
Tlie turnover recorded a strong growth througliout tlie analyzed period. It accounted for 9.1 
inillion lTSD i n  1990, 10.77 million i n  1991, 11.19 million in 1992, 14.15 inillion in 1993 and only 
13.37' iiiillioii ill 1994. Tlie capacity used oscillated from 82% in 1990 to 90% in 1992 and back 
to 8'29') in 1994. The number of staff decreased strongly from 4,197 people in 1990 to 3,273 in 
1994, sliowing a clear upward trend in labor productivity, with the only exception of 1994 when 
productivity actually decreased. The capital stock accounted for 2.7 billion lei as of December 
1993. Tlie profit rate attained a highest i n  1990 with 12.l%, declining steadily afterwards to 
:3.S'% in 1994. Tlie company has a liigli level of indebtedness, with short-term credit accounting 
for 70% of tlie i\lorking capital in 1994 wliile the short term outstanding payables to suppliers 
accountetl for some extra 11% of the working capital. 
Exports were directed until 1919 towards the EU mainly (68%,), Japan, USA, Soutli Africa, 
C'aiiada (some. estra 3%), with the remaining 29% of the exports directed towards the current 
('IS. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
The co~npaiiy exported in 1990 some 80% of its output, the share of the export,ed output in 
total sales tlcclining afterwards to 17% i n  1992 and climbing then to almost 70% in 1994. 
Exporls to tlie EU attained a highest 72% of total exports in 1992, declining to 63% in 1994. 
Tlie sliare of tlie export to otlier developed countries (Canada, Japan, USA) remained marginal 
(untler -4%)) throughout tlie period. Most surprisingly (an unprecedented case so far) exports to 
llie CIS expanded to 4.5% of total exports in 1993 and declined to 33% in 1994. 
Three quarters of the exports are performed directly and only one quarter via intermediaries. 
Tliert is virtrially no involveinent of the importer in the realizatio~i of the esport product, 
SO t hat tlie result is exclusively the expression of company's manufacturing capacities. 
Productioil for Export 
Tlicx coiiipaiiy plans to reduce its dependence on the EU market and to  increase its exports on 
the inarllets of otlier developed countries, tlie USA and Canada mainly. \vllose combined share 
i l l  total exports is planned to be a t  least 10%) within tlie next f ve years. Tlie share of the CIS 
liiarliet shall reinaiii a t  the present level. The ~nain investments COMPlG lias to do i n  order to 
increase its export coinpetitiveness are mainly in finisliing equip~uent and i11 finding reliable top 
cluality mctal parts suppliers. 
Tlic coinpany considers its competitive strengths mainly the price and quality of the work- 
force. together ~vitli the quality of the components supplied by foreign suppliers. 
0 1 1  the contrary, COMPlG seems to be seriously harmed by the price of the raw materials, 
e.sl)eciallj. r is-ir-o1.5 tlie pace of devaluation of tlie national currency. Tlie outdatedness of the 
ecluipmeiit is also a top barrier while the impact of the difficult access to foreign distribution 
c.lla111~cls and the cluality of the Romanian compoiieiits is less important. 
Tlie company claims no difference in terms of input usage between the products produced 
for tlie foreign ant1 domestic markets. 
'The company reports persistently higher profits for the exported output tlian for thc output 
sul>plietl to tlie tloinestic market, although the gap is decreasing throughout the periotl (tlie ratio 
cleclinecl from 13.5.119.63 in 1990 and 10.8.5/.5.G8 in 1991, to  9.519.4 in 1992, 11.518 in 1993 and 
D.llS.4 in 1994), ~vliile in tlie same period tlie cashing delays for the esportecl output  became 
lol~ger than for the domestically delivered output.  
No transfer fro111 the clonlestically delivered output  to  tlie esported one can thus be presumed. 
Donlestic Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
Tlie lantlscape is the classic one a s  far as  do~nest ic  barriers t o  exports are concerned. Company's 
Iunclamental inlpediments t o  esport  are tlie cost of domestic credit (early 199.5 60% interest rate) 
and tlie liigl~ custonls duties for inputs. To a lesser extent the  company is liar~ned by tlie long 
~ t a i t i ng  periods a t  I~orcler crossings and the low quality of both roads a~lcl railroad transport.  
The  company would very much welcome more facilities for barter trading, as  t ha t  is seen as  
a very advantageou5 way to  buy cheap wood without having t o  pass through all tlie procedures 
l~eeded to  buy hard currency on the interbank market. 
Tlie relationshil)~ with the s ta te  administration is considered t o  have a positive impact over 
the compan~/ ' s  esport  performance. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
Tlie colllpanjr has good relationships with its custonlers and intermediaries. T l~roughout  the 
periocl it made substantial efforts to  diversify its clients ancl tlie esport  nlarliets, so t ha t  the  
leverage of tlie partners in terms of bargaining power over prices is limited. 
Tlie colnpany's main competitors come from Italy and Poland. 
The  company does not liave a competitor intelligence system. Its main sources of information 
are tlie personal contacts with tlie business partners and t o  a lesser estent  the  specializecl 
publications and nlarliet research da ta .  
T l ~ e  main foreign barriers t o  exports faced by the company are the lack of lcnowledge of price 
levels on the esport  market,  on the  business rules and tlie commercial legislation. Tlie access t o  
clistril~rltion cliannels is sometimes difficult. Tlle conditions of payment by the foreign partners 
clo not play an important role on the company's main marl<ets. The  only luarliets where the  
coliipany faces clifficulties are Ukraine and Belarus, where not only tlie purchase of liarcl currency 
11). i l i~porters is estremely clifficult but the banking system is shal<y a s  ~vcll. 
The  A4ssociation Agreement is seen t o  liave a positive influence on the company's sales, 
altliollgl~ the lnanagers think the esport  espansion potential is limited due t o  the tough com- 
~)ctition OII  the  lower elid of the market. To be able t o  target more upn~arl iet  segments tlie 
col11panJ. shor~ld invest large resources. 
Background Iilforlllation 
The  company was established in 1975. In 1990 it was turned into a commercial company and 
in 1991 it became a Romanian-Canadian joint venture owned 75% by tlie Romanian s ta te  and 
2.5%: 11y tlie C'anadian investor. In 1993 the Canadian investor bouglit most of tlie stake owned 
11). tlie s tate .  Tlle employees of tlie company bought 20% of tlie shares and 10% remained under 
tlie control o l  tlle Private Ownership Fund Moldova. In 1994 the  Private Ownership Fund sold 
its 10%) t o  t lle employees. 
Tlie conll>an!r produces what is called ''hard garments" t h a t  is men suits. The  turnover was 
in 1090 9.61 ~iiillio~i ITSD, followed by a decline t o  6.32 million in 1991. The  company grew 
steaclil!. afterwartls t o  6.71 million USD in 1992, 8.66 in 1993 and 13.38 million in 1994. The  
norkforce countetl 1,911 people in 1990 and increased afterwards t o  2,644 people until 1994. 
C'apacity utilization was constantly 96-97%) tlirougliout the analyzed period. The  profit rate 
\vas SIX ,  i11 1990 and mounted t o  30% in 1991, declined t o  28% in 1992-93 and went up  again t o  
34Yl in 1994. 
l u  1989 the company was selling about 50% of the exported output  t o  the  EU and other 
tleveloped countries (Canada mainly), and the other 50% t o  the current CIS (46%) and AlIiddle 
East (5YI). 
Export Orieiltatioil 
t i i ter 1989 the  coiiipany strengthened very much its export orientation as  tlie sliare of tlie ou tput  
esl~ortet l  in total ou tput  increased form 60% in 1990 t o  98% in 1994. 
hlost of the output  is sold t o  the EU (almost entirely to  Germany and the  UII;), whose sliare 
in llie esl~ortet l  ou tput  increased from 7% in 1990 to  81% in 1994. 11-12% of the esported 
out put were constantly soltl t o  Canacla. Tlie sales t o  Middle East came down t o  zero in 1994, 
\\ liilc tlie sales t o  the current East European Associated countries s tar ted in 1991 (4%) and 
accelerated t o  S%l in 1994. 
E s j ~ o s t s  are 100% done by contractors under jobwork contracts. Obviously, contractors get 
i n \  ol\ etl in all stages of product development, from the supply of technical designs. specifications, 
ctc.. t o  co-financing tlie development espenses, supplying the raw materials, etc.  Actually 90% 
of' the inputs are ilnl~ortecl. Tlie products are entirely sold uncler the foreign partner's t rade 
~narl,. 
Productioil for Export 
The  colnpany aims a t  securing its order file for a t  least two years from now on ,  via 2-3 years 
long contracts. It  aillls a t  espanding the output  under tlie same jobwork contracts regime, based 
on the high tjuality of the output  they can offer, thanks t o  the very high quality equipment tlie 
company is presently endowed with. 
C'onipany's main competitive strengths are the qualification of tlie worliforce and tlie tecli- 
 lol logical lei.e1 of the equipment. The  Canadian partner introducetl actually state-of-the-art 
tcclinologics such as  computer-aided design and sawing of apparel components, coml~uterized 
order system, etc. Tlie company also considers as  competitive advantages tlie cost of worliforce, 
tlie prosiniity of the ELI markets, tlie access t o  distribution channels and the quality and price 
of foreign conlponents. 
Tlie company is harmetl t o  a cer tai~l  estent  by the price of conlponents supplied by tlie 
Roiiianiaii protlucers, a t  least as compared t o  their quality. 
There is geneially no clifference between the input usage for the domestically supplied and 
csl~ortet l  ou tput .  Tlie only difference is in terms of raw materials and components which are bet- 
ter for tlie esportetl ou tput ,  although domestic deliveries are so  marginal t ha t  their importance 
is very retluced. 
The profit rate for the exported output is substantially higher than tlie profit on the do- 
~iiestically delivered output. Moreover the gap is growing dra~natically thro~ighout lie analyzed 
period. Thus, tlie ratio between tlie two profit rates (for the exported and doinestically de- 
l i~ered outputs) started a t  4.813.2 in 1990 aiid welit upwards to 2'2.817.2 in 1991, 22.415.6 in 
1992. 26.ljll.4 in 1993 and 33.710.3 in 1994. In fact, as in 1994 tlie <loinestically delivered output 
tleclined to '2'X of the output. this ratio lost its relevance, showing that in fact only unexportable 
goods are sold domestically. The cashing periods for the exported output are, however, double 
as compared to the output delivered domestically. 
Dolllestic Ellviroilineilt for Export 
.Aiiiong the domestic inlpediments to export the company is most harmed by the cost of domestic 
credit and the low quality of roads. It is also affected to  a lesser extent by tlle customs duties 
for inputs, the long duration of banking operations, the frequent modifications of tlie Romanian 
co~ii~nercial legislation and tlie low quality of teleconl services. 
The counpany sees its relationships with tlie s tate administration as having a neutral or 
positive influence over its coinpetitive capacity. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Tlic compaily claims it has good relationships with its customers and tlie bargaining power of 
it5 clients over prices is reduced. It is, however, worth noticing that tlie whole output is bought 
Iby tlie foreign partner in tlie joint venture. Good relationships with the for~ner are probably 
essential for tlie recent expansion of the firm. The decreasing value of the turnover wliile the 
share of capacity used did not decline throughout tlie period might sho~v tliat tlie foreign partner 
11as actually decided to  apply rather low transfer prices, harming somewhat the interest of the 
other particil>ants i n  the venture. This fact might hide some potential friction i n  the firm. 
Tlie conipany's conlpetitors abroad are other Romanian firms, as well as Polish, Hungarian, 
ITliraiiiiai~. Turliisll and Moroccan firms. As already mentioned. the company conlpetes offering 
liiglier cluality thanks to  its very modern equipment. 
Tlie company subcontracted its market research and "client-hunting" to  a specialized mar- 
betiiig firin, so it 1las i n  fact little to do with specific market inforn~ation. 
Tlie colnpany does not consider itself very seriously harmed by foreign barriers. The only 
i~iipecliinents that create it some problems are the quantitative restrictions 011 the EU market. 
Tlie firiii is actually looking forward to 1998 when all cluotas 011 textile inlports of Romailian 
o~igin sllall disappear i n  tlie EU. 
T l ~ c  onip;~iij. considers the Association Agreement a very positive fact, since the implemen- 
tation of tlie Agreeinent would offer additional space for growth, esl~ecially after 1998, tha t  can 
shortly be fructified using the present competitive advantages of the firm. 
The joint venture is considered by the management as essential for the present good situation 
of tlie company a t  all levels: financial situation, access to  foreign markets, access to  raw materials, 
conipoiieiits. access to liigh teclinology and training of employees. 
The conipany was established in 1968. In November 1990 it was turned into a cominercial com- 
pany. In hlarcli 1993 it was entirely privatized via Management-Employees-Buy-Out (MEBO). 
The conipaiiy produces ready-made clothes (men's trousers). In 1990 its turnover amounted 
to 10 niillion CTSD, tlie same in 1991, declining to  7 millio~i for tlie 1992-1994 period. The 
coiiipaiiy used its capacity 100% tlirougliout the period with a profit rate growing from 15% in 
1990 to  34%) in 1994. Tlie number of staff grew from lGO0 in 1990 to  2300 in 1993 and down 
again to  2100 i11 1994. 
Tlie conlpaiiy lias a reasonable level of indebtedness, with short-term bank credits amounting 
to  5'%, of tlie working capital in 1994. 
LIiitil 1989 the company traditionally exported 90% of tlie output to  the EU and the remain- 
ing 10%) to  tlie USA and Canada. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
'l'lie coiupanj. constantly esported 91-95% of its output tlirougliout tlie period. Starting since 
1991 a11 exports were directed to  the EU. 
The conipany works 100%) under jobwork contracts. Obviously, iniporters get involved to a 
large estelit iu realizing tlie esported output. They supply designs, co-finance tlie clevelopmeilt 
espeiises, supply raw materials, packaging materials and assure transport. 
Productioil for Export 
Tlie conipany sees jobwork as a nlealls of getting accustonled to  tlie constrailits of Western 
~iiarl<ets and accluiring lin0~-110w. For the following five years tlie company is looking for long- 
tern1 contracts i11 order to  have a constant casl~flow to  support tlie technical upgrading now 
~ ~ i ~ c l e r w a ~ , .  COhIPlX is nlaking efforts to  diversify its markets and contractors. 
Tlie company's nlain competitive strengths are the price and quality of tlie nlorl<force and 
tlie good tecl~iiological evel of tlie equipment, thanks to  the massive investnient i n  tlie last years. 
cspeciall!. since tlie company became private. Tlie proximity of tlie export niarket is also seen 
a5 a competitive advantage, as well as the quality and price of foreign components. 
There is no difference in terms of input usage between tlie esported and the domestically- 
clelit.ered output. 
Tlie profit rate for the exported output is persistently above tlie one for the clomestically- 
cleliverecl output ,  with a growing gap t l~rougl~out  the period. Tlie ratio between the two profit 
rates was 15/1.5 in 1990, growing afterwards to  17/15 in 1991, 3.5/1.5 in 1992, 3411.5 i11 1993 and 
1994. Tile cashing periods for the exported output are longer but tlie gap is decreasing. In fact, 
t l ~ e  t n o  casliing periocls became equal in 1994. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The ~ilaiii clonlestic ba.rriers to  exports are seen to  be the customs duties for tlie imported inputs 
and tlie liigli cost of domestic credit, together with tlie long wa.iting periods a.t border crossing 
ancl tlie low qualit,y of roads. 
The rela.tions1iips with the sta.te a.dministration is seen a.s liaving a positive impact on tlie 
export perforniance of the company. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The conipany has soiiletinles tense relationships with its clients due to  their strong position in 
I~argaining over prices. The company is fundamentally dependent 011 several big contractors w11o 
supply all the inputs needed to  work under jobworl; contracts. It has an embryonic marketing 
division whose effectiveness is considered as satisfactory. The main sources of information are 
personal contacts with tlie busi~less partners and the specialized publications. 
The main impecliments to  export on the foreign markets are seen to  be tlie quotas and tariff 
quotas, ant1 to  a lesser estent the lack of information on price and legal aspects of the foreign 
marl;et. together ivith the low growth rate of the textile market i n  tlie EU. hloreover, the Asian 
competition seriously squeezes the profit margill of the company. 
The Associati011 .Agreement is seen to have a very positive impact over the firm's business, 
especially after 1998 when the access to  the EU market of testile products would be colllpletely 
free. 
Tlie company was established in 1991 as a state-owned foreign tracle company following the 
splitting u p  of a more diversified foreign trade company. It became private in May 1994 by 
hlanagement-Employees-Buy-Out. 
The company imports and esports ready-made clothes. It started its operations i n  1991. 
The coiilpany's turnover was 2.76 million USD in 1991, follo~ved by 3.04 in 1992, 1..58 in 1993 
alicl 0.9 million lTSD in 1994. The company employed 46 people in 1991, 64 in  1992-93 and 43 
i n  1994. Tlie profit rate was 66% in  1991, 103% in 1994 and 38% i11 1993, followed by losses i n  
199 1. Short-term credit in total working capital decreased from 66% in 1992 to -57.6% in 1994. 
Outstanding payables to  suppliers accounted for 1.5% in 1994. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Esports accountetl for 35'% of the company's activity in 1991, 30% in 1992, 28%) in 1993 and 
32'5 in 1994. 
I11 principle esports are entirely done towards tlie EU, witli the only esceptiori of 1992 when 
70%) of exports were directed towards China. 
The company gets involved to a large estent in supplying designs, raw tmaterials and assuring 
transportation for the exported goods. 
Productioil for Export 
C'oiiipang's strategic objective is to  diversify its markets and take advantage to  a larger estent 
of' its geograpliical location. Thus the company foresees the EU would decrease to only 10% of 
t spor ts ,  while the USA and Canada would account for some otlier 10%. The most surprising 
(at least when taking into account what all otlier firins think) is tlie objective of the firm to  
export 50'X towards the CIS and 30% towards Asia, mainly to China (20%). 
The company sees as its coinpetitive strengths the clualification of workforce. 
111 tern15 of input-usage, tlie goods esported by the company use definitely I~etter  inputs for 
tlie esportetl output. It is only for tlie raw materials tliat the difference is not important. 
Tlie profit rate for esports was half the profit rate for imports in 1991 ancl 1993, \vliile in 
1992 tlie two rates were equal. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The domestic barriers to  esport are, in  the company's viewpoint, by far more important in 
harming esports than tlie foreign ones. 
Tlie conipany is harmed most of all by tlie customs duties and VAT for tlie inputs tliat are 
to be incorporated in tlie esported output, since they seriously affect the company's casliflow; 
it \vould malie no difference in case a bank guarantee would be used. Tlie company has to  bear 
the oppoltunity cost of these duties and VAT in order to  maintain good connections with its 
clients, manufacturing companies which are in many cases seriously short of cash. 
Tlie long ~vaiting periods a t  border crossings are very much harming tlie business. Goods 
wait sometimes for ~veeks a t  border crossings, due both to  corruption (some customs officers 
opeiilj. reclucst to  be "paid" to  do the regular inspection) and to  tlie fact tliat the touristic and 
sniall commercial traffic, on one side, and the regular freight traffic flows, 011 the other, are not 
5eparated. 
Tlie high cost of domestic credit is a barrier witli disastrous effects 011 manufacturing com- 
1)illiies: i l l  spite of the fact they have contracts they do not manage to  be profitable because 
tl~eir specific tecliiiology imposes very long production cycles. Esport  credits sliould thus be 
subsidizecl in accordance to  the length of tlie production cycle. 
Tlie insufficiently detailed regulations, on the one haritl, and tlie extremely frequent changes 
of tlie legal fralnework, on the other, are important barriers. Tlie National Balili should make 
a clifferelice between exporters who deliberately do not repatriate tlie liard currency and the 
ones who are not paid i n  due time, and tlie Bank sliould enforce fines only on the former. 
I'sport incentives sliould be based on laws and not on governmental decrees or even lower-rank 
regulations. \vliicli are too subjective, change too fast and do not assure the legal security of 
contracts. 
Not surprisingly, taking into account the level of discontent on the part of the firm, the 
~elationsliips are rated as bad cvitli tlie Ministry of Trade and tlie Clia~nber of Commerce and 
\ PI.!. I>ad \\ itli the Customs Authority. 
Foreign E~lviro~l~llent for Exports 
'l'lie company has often tense relationships with the foreign clients due mainly to  their bargaining 
po\ver over prices and delivery conditions. 
Tlie company asserts it managed to  acquire a good core group of skilled people in market 
~escarcli \vI~ose activity is rated as good. 
Tlie conipany is most of all harmed by the tariffs and quotas and by sanitary and security 
regulations, packaging and labeling standards that create enormous clifficulties for a slllall com- 
pan! that  liardl~r has the resources to  manage sucli ariiounts of inforniation. The lack of skilled 
personnel i5 ob\lious in  tlie firm, as it is also affected mucli by the lack of information on business 
rules abroad, commercial regulations and market trends. Tlie most painful lacli of informatiori 
is. however, in the area of legal information. 
Tlie Associati011 Agreement is said to  have a neutral impact on company's performance in 
exports. 
The coml>any was established in 19-50. It was turned into a commercial company in 1990 on the 
grounds of La\v 15/1990. The company is still state-owned, with 70% of tlre shares controlled 
I>y tlie State Ownership Fund and 30% by tlie Private Ownersliip Fund. Tlie company started 
the ~>rit.atizatio~i process according to  a Management-Employees-Bup-Out scheme. 
Tlie company esports aiitl imports ball bearings and to  a lesser cstent spare parts for 
Roinaniaii-niatle planes ant1 helicopters esported before 1989. It works on commission for a 
large numl~er of industrial firms. 
Tlie turnover was 109.22 million USD in 1990, falling to  7.94 million i n  1991 and 48.8 million 
i n  199'2 and recording afterwards a certain recovery. with turnovers of Fj0.7 million lTSD in 1993 
a ~ ~ t l  7'2.8 million in 1994. The company employed 173 people in 1990 and 1-56 in 1994. The 
p~ofit rate grew from 0.16% in 1990-91, to  1.04% in 1992, 1.62% in 1993 and 1.16% in 1994. 
The company has a substantial indebtedness, as tlie ratio of outstanding debt to  total worliing 
capital accounts for 60%) in 1994. 
The company traditionally esported before 1989 towards the EU (3.5',%), USA (5%). tlie 
curre~rt East European Associated members of tlie EU (30%1), the current CIS ( l o%) ,  South- 
East .Asia (5'3) and Latin -4merica (15%). 
Export Orieiltatioil 
C'OhlP20's activity is doniinated by esports. Exports represented 47% of comlmny's activity in 
1990. growing to  over i O % ,  i n  1991-92 and attaining around 68% in  1993-94. 
The main esport directions changed dramatically, with the EU accounting for 47.6% of 
esports i n  1994, while esports to  USA accounted for anotlier 18.2% in  1994. The sliare of 
the es-COhlEC'ON countries (tlie present East European Associated countries and the CIS) 
tlecreased to nil, wlrile South-East Asia increased its share to  lli.li%. Latin America increased 
o~rly sliglitly its sliare in total esports, to  18..5%. This pattern is more or less foreseen for the 
follo~ving five years, too, with the doubling of the sliare of other developed countries a t  the 
espense of the share lieltl by Latin America. The Associated countries are only seen as ~narliets 
of marginal iinportance. 
Strengths and Weakilesses 
Tlie maiir strategic orientation of tlie company is to reconquer tlie markets in the C'IS (especially 
Russia) ant1 the Associated countries, as before 1989 Romania was the top producer in  the 
C'OhlECON tlianks to  tlie nioder~i Japanese and German equipment its producing companies 
ncre endowed nitli. 
l 'he company sees as its main streiigtlis tlie cost and quality of the workforce, allowing it to 
ieiitler a seri ice a t  international standards. 
T l ~ c  niain iiealiness is tlie fact that  all ball bearings protlucers are state ownetl and are 
s~~fferiiig from all managerial weaknesses these kinds of firms are liarined by. 
Tlie company considers the products it esports do not differ in terms of input usage from 
tlrow destined to  the domestic market. 
There are no tlifferences in tlie profit rate for the export activity as compared to  the import 
nctivity. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Export 
I'llc coinl>any sees as the main barriers 011 the dornestic market the high cost of tlomestic credit 
ant1 tlie customs tluties for imported inputs wliicli seriously liarm the expansion of exports 
5iircc Ronianiaii illputs are not competitive enough and Romanian suppliers still can afford to  
clcliver es]>ensive arid low quality inputs. Tlie customs duties and VAT on inputs tliat are  t o  
I>e incorporatecl in esported goods sliould be eliminated and no guarantee sliould be asked for 
tlienl or the  g u a ~ a n t e e  for tlieni sliould be made by the  Esimbanli wit11 lo~v interest credits. 
Tlie company considers it appropriate tha t  esports  of raw materials and seniifinislied goods be 
allowed only after the necessities of Romanian producers are satisfied. 
l'lie coliipany Iias orders for ball bearings tliat esceed the present capacity used by suppliers. 
It is. however, reluctant contracting credits guaranteed witli tesport  contract as the company is 
not sure it can face tlie repay~nent  schedule imposed by tlie bank and the presently very high 
i ~ ~ t c r e s t  I ates. 
Since unfair conlpetitio~i and nionopolistic practices attained worrisome levels, the company 
\vooltl \velcome t o  apply a whole set of regulations and institutions t o  protect competition 
accortling t o  tlie European patterns. (It  is worth mentioning Romanian does not have yet a 
coml>etition protection law, although it has a law preventing unfair competition). 
Tlie relationships with s ta te  institutio~is play no role in company's esport  performance. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Export 
T l ~ e  relatioiisliips of the firm witli i ts partners is directly connected with tlie degree of conipeti- 
tioii on the specific market. Tlie tougher the competition, the more tense tlie lelationsliips. Tlie 
relationsliips with the Asiaii importers are, for esainple, better than tlie ones icith tlie American 
inil>orters, who operate on a much more demanding market and are thus pressing towards very 
l~igli quality staiitlards a t  the best price. 
Tlie conipany's main coinpetitors are China (for the  lower entl), Russia, and Czech Republic. 
The  company's main sources of information about foreign markets are the personal contacts 
n it11 l>usiness partners ant1 specialized publications. 
Tlie cornI>any is most harmed on foreign markets by high tariffs and unfair co~nmercial 
p~act ices IT conipeting firms (e.g., falie, very poor quality "hIade in Romania" ball bearings 
actuallj. niannfacturetl in China).  
T h e  situation on the Russian market exemplifies a special barrier. In spite of the fact tliat 
i l l  p~inciple importers can obtain hard currency t o  import,  the issuing of the iinport and espor t  
Iice~lses is ts t remely difficult and hard t o  understand. The  company had a representative located 
i n  hIo.;cou until last year but he was inefficient since the wliole range of conlmercial coilnections 
11 11irh supportecl the business before 1989 crumbled. It becaine almost i~npossible t o  get in touch 
nitli t l ~ e  real proclucers of steel, for esample, in order t o  make a barter against ball bearings. 
' r l ~ e  conlpaiiy can not esplain this kind of behavior. LIoreover, tlie sul>pliers i11 Russia tha t  
\\ oulcl I>e interested t o  engage in barter t rade have often banlcs of clu bious reputation. Anyway, 
I>arter tratle nrould liabe a very limited room of espansion and tlie cornpany would welcome the  
emergelice of an institution able t o  carry out  sonietliing si~iiilar to  ~nultilateral clearing. 
Tlie coiiditioiis of payment by partners are only important in the less liquid inarkets of the  
C'IS. 
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General Explanatory Notes 
Readers slioulcl apply caution ~vlien comparing the data presented in tables for sul>sequeiit years. 
The accounting and reporting regulations and metl~odology changed several times since 1988. 
'The   no st iinportant change occurrecl as of beginning of 1993 when a substantial accounting 
~ ~ f o r i i i  took effect. In addition, most of tlie enterprises presented here underwent traiisforrnation 
inclucling changes of legal form. That implied that  somewliat different accounting and reporting 
proce<lures \\.ere to be applied before and after the change. Finally, and most iniportantly, many 
of tlie enterprises presented below underwent clianges of internal structure \\~hen one or nlore 
ut~it \  were taliell out of tlie enterprise and transformed into indepenclent entities. Although we 
.il)l)liccl estrenie care to filter out the effects of such events, this was not always possible. 
The inforination and da ta  presented for tlie individual enterprises stems mainly from the 
aiiiir~al reports, information material provided by tlie management, and fro111 personal inter1 iews. 
Ho\ve\,er, information from other sources such as press was also used 1\111e11 appropriate. 
Ilnless other\vise specified, the figures accompanying the case studies are denominated in 
('zecl~oslo\.al~ liornnas (CSIi) for the period until end of 1992 a~icl Slo~al i  liorunas (SI<Ii) after 
199:3. To sa1.e space. only the SI<Ii syml>ol is used in  certain tables and tlie CSI< symbol is 
oiiiitted. 
The inost iml>ortant data for the enterprises presented in this section are sunimarize<i in 
Table S.1. 
The content of certain items presented in tlie Iiey Figures Tables of tlie case studies is as 
follo\vs: 
Turnover: Suin of revenues from ordinary busi~less a.ctivities; 
Gross Profit: Profit before tax escluding estraordiiiary items. 










Frliicl of National Property 
Restitution Investinent Fund 
Council for hlutual Economic Assista~ice (COMECON) 
Central and Eastern Europe 
C'ommonwealtl~ of Independent States 
Former Soviet LJnion 
Slo\.ak RepubIic 
European IJnion 
Slovak abbreviation indicating that the enterprise's legal forin is joint-stock 
corn l>aii!. 
Slo\.ali abbre\,iation indicating that  the rnterprise's legal forill is limited liability 
corn pai~y 
Slo\.ali al>l>re\liation indicating that the enterprise's legal form is state enterprise. 
C hemolak a.s., Smolenice 
('he~iiolali a.s. Siiiolenice is tlie most important Slovak producer of synthetic paints, lacquers. 
glues a ~ ~ d  related products. Tlie company also enjoys a dominant position in the Czech Republic. 
\\.'it11 tlie size of its annual turnover, Chemolak places in tlie second half of tlie top one hundred 
Slo\.ali enterprises (it ranked 57th in 1994 and 65th in 1993, according to  the TREND T O P  100 
chart of Slo\.al, conipanies, TREND 25/95, p. 3C). Clie~iiolak is locatetl in S~iioleiiice in Western 
S l o ~  akia. 
History, Trailsforillatioil and Ownership 
C'lieniolal, \\.as originally fountletl i n  1883. Tlre enterprise from the very beginiiiilg engaged in 
clieniical ~,rociuction. Since 1929, natural and synthetic paints and lacquers became tlie primary 
output and this orientatioli lias been retained until present. 
Tlie enterprise was iiatioiialized after the World War 11. The present productiou facilities were 
coiiipleted i11 1964 few kilometers from the original factory. In 1992, the state-owned enterprise 
\\'its t~~ansformccl into a joint-stock company and privatized using the voucher method. Presently, 
2S1% of tlie shares are held by individuals while 69% are held by in\~estmeiit fuiicls. The shares 
of tlie coinpaiiy are publicly traded and belong to tlie most liquid ones. 




Institutional Investors 65 69 
Iiidividuals 30 28 
Fund of National Property 2 0 
Restitution Investment Fund 3 3 
"Refers to the ownership structure resulting from 
the voucher privatization. 
Since 1992, Clieinolak unclertook several strategic investments to support clistrib~itioii and 
nia~~lietiiig of its proclucts. The company has a majority in companies responsible for distribution 
of i t 5  proclucts, such as Triton s.r.0. Bratislava, Cheri~olak Moravia s.r.0. Zliii and C'lieniolak 
B o l ~ t ~ n i a  s.r.0. Liberec. The stake of Clien~olak is 51% i n  all three enterprises. 
Key Figures 
Table S.:3: Iiey Figures, Chemolak a.s. Smolenice 
C'heniolali a.s. IJnit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1993 
Turnover SIiIi mil 1066.08 1330.76 1479.16 1218.335 1467.07 
Gross Profit SIiIi nin 13.5.75 213.62 162.47 176.20 17.5.82 
Total Assets SKI\ nln n.a. 1035.49 931.37 1081.29 1232.13 
Ecluity SIiIi mn n.a. 571.65 62.5.88 76 1.78 776.32 
T,iabilities SICK mn n.a. 463.84 3.5.5.49 319.51 35.5.81 
.4ccouiits Receivable SIiIi mn n.a. 340.84 261.24 274.68 250.20 
Inventory SIiIi ~n 11 n.a. 232.71 262.89 205.08 2.50.93 
Labor Force 11 .a. 838 808 I r9 - - 
Profit/Turno\,er "ro 12.73 16.13 10.98 13.68 11.98 
l'rofi t/Assets % 20.73 16.56 16.30 14.27 
'I'uriio\.e1./.4ssets %I 128..52 1.50.72 119.1.5 119.07 
N r l  Profit/Share SIiIi 61.00 183.00 138.85 164.93 206.68 
Characteristics of Production 
T11e output of Cl~elnolak consists of paints, dilutions, laccluers, adhesives, synthetic resins as 
\\fell as otlier l~rotlucts. Overall, the company's output coniprises some 700 products in 1300 
variations. Over 60% of the total output is accounted for by paints. C'heinolali is the dominant 
producer of paints, synthetic resins and glues in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. Cliemolak 
currel~tly sells a l ~ o u t  70% of the total consumption in Slovakia and FjO% i n  the Czech Republic. 
Table 8.4: Commodity Structure of Output 
O u t l ~ u t  (tons) 1991 9% 1992 9% 1993 9% 1994 9% 
L \ 
Paints 29796 63.62 29517 -59.95 21760 60.24 23862 63.27 
Dilutions 7726 16.50 9133 18.55 5876 16.27 6980 18.51 
Lacquers 3229 6.89 3826 r . r  i 2484 6.88 2996 7.94 " v- 
.4tlhesi1~es 2037 4.35 1461 2.97 3711 10.27 2015 .5.34 
Syntlietic Resins 2765 5.90 3961 8.05 1227 3.40 TrjG 2.00 
Other Coat Paints 1283 2.74 1336 2.71 106-5 2.9.5 1104 2.93 
Total (tons) 46836 100.00 49234 100.00 36123 100.00 37713 100.00 
Total (SIiIi mn)  1196.7 1384.0 1209.8 1410.9 
Export Orientatioil 
C'liemolali has always been oriented niainly toward the production for the C~zechoslovak market. 
'The exports to other countries a,ccounted for a minor part of the total sa.les - ra,nging from 
;'A t,o 12% (see Ta.l>le 8.5). Tlie ~na.in destination of exports lia,s been the former Soviet IJnion, 
especia,lly Russia.. Nevertheless, tlie volume of exports to Russia declined substa,nt,ia.lly, from 
soliic 10.000 tons prior to 1989 to 1,500 tons in 1994 (the foreca.st for 1995 is 2,500-3,000 tons). 
Tlie sliare of Russia i n  total exports helice declines as well - while it a,ccountetl for some 80% 
of t,otal esl>ort,s prior to 1989, its slia,re in 1994 wa,s less than 50%. Tlie reasons for this decline 
lie esl~ecially in tlie instability of the Russian market as well as in tlie loss of the institutional 
sl~pport  o esl~ol.ts a,nd coortiination provided by the CMEA. The fall in trade wit11 Russia and 
t.lie former Soviet ITnion contributed a,lso to tlie overall decline of exports after 1990. 
Otlier import.ant destina.tions of tlie exports of Chemola,k are Bulga.ria, Croatia and Lithua- 
nia. in a snialler extent Poland and Hungary. Exports to PVestern Europe and other developed 
countries are ratlier small. 
Table S.5: Brealc-up of Sales 
Sales t,ons SIiIi mn tons % tons % tons % 
'I'otal Sales 46.5-57 1308.3 49868 1509.0 35889 1493.7 37685 1724.1 
Clzecli R.. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12365 ,510.2 11221 ,511.3 
n.a. 34.2 29.7 
1Sxports 0 0.0 5608 175.9 18.54 87.5 3200 128.6 
11.7 Fj.9 7..5 
Prior to 1990, the exports of Clielnolak were centrally coordinatetl. Since the company 
\vas not allo\vetl to export directly, it used so-called foreign trade enterprises (FTE) :  C'liemapol 
I'lague. Petrimex Prague and Technopol Bratislava. After tlie deregulation of the foreign trade 
i n  1990, Chelilolah continued to use the foreign trade enterprises until 1991. Nonetheless, the 
compa,ny sta,rted to engage in exports also directly in 1992 and tlie share of indirect exports has 
Ileen falliilg gradually ever since then. The main reason for this change should be seen in the 
tle~nise of the Ch/IEA. Due to the growing instability following the Ch/IEA collapse, the FTE's 
lost their st,roilg positions a t  the markets of CEE and the former Soviet Union a,nd they could 
no longer secure the necessary volumes of export a,t conditions favorable to Cliemolak. 
Presentlg, Chemola.li is strengtlleiling its position by fou~lding joint ventures for the distri- 
bution of its ~)roducts. Up to the date, Chemolak has a majority (51%) in one such company in 
Slova,ltia a,nd in two joint ventures in the Czech Republic. However, Cl1emola.k does not currently 
tlisl~ose over sufficient funds to use the same approach in other couiltries a.s well. 
Most of the trade partners of Chemolak abroad are wholesalers. Tlie exported products 
are mostly small pa,cka.ges determined for retail. So far, the conlpany wa.s not very successful 
in selliilg it,s products directly to tlie industria,l enterprises tha,t colild use a.lso large-volume 
packages. On tlie other hand, in former Czecl~oslovakia, about half of the total sales is to 
t l ~ e  i11~1ustria.l enterprises. More than ha'lf of t,lle exports (about 65%) are based 011 long-term 
contracts. The rest is coinposed of a,d hoc contracts and seasonal va,riations. 
Productioil for Exports 
The cluality of tlie prodlicts of Chemolak conforills to the Western European standards. Chemo- 
lalt espects currently to  be awarded the I S 0  9001 quality management certificate. However, 
~narketing and advertisement for the products are not a t  a sufficient level. The prices are in 
general lolver than those of the foreign competitors. Overall, the profitability is higher i n  the 
case of esported products than for the prod~icts supplied for the domestic market. 
.According to  the management, the optimum volume of esports is in the current conditions 
allout 5.000 toils annually. This could be increased only in  case the political and economic 
s i t u a t i o ~ ~  i n  Russia and former I'ugoslavia stabilizes and improves substantially. A11 additional 
increase of esports would I)e possible also if the tariffs were lower in Poland and Hungary. 
The espolts  to \Irestern Europe will probably remain low due to tlie absence of tradition and 
contacts. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
7'11e esports of Clicmolak are not subjected to  export licensing in Slovakia. Tlie enterprise 
occasionally has had problems wit11 insolvency. In such cases, there were temporary fall backs in  
the protluction since tlie conlpany was not able to  pay for the inputs. However, these proble~lls 
11- re cal~setl in fact I)? the difficulties Chernolal< had in collecti~lg payments on its claims. 
Foreign Environnlent for Exports 
'rhe most inlportant restriction for the esports of Chemolak is presented by the level of tariffs. 
This is especially the case in Hungary, Poland and Romania. \l.'hile i n  most countries where 
('lieuiolak esports the tariffs do not exceed lo%, in Hungary there is a 8.9% import tariff and a n  
ST iinport surcharge. In addition, in the spring of 199.5 the Hungarian currency was devalued 
by 9%). I11 Polantl, the import tariff is 8.7% and there is also so-called border fee of 5%. On the 
other Iiand, the tariffs are 0-5% in Russia and 0-1% in the Baltics. For comparison, the import 
tariffs i n  Slovakia range from 1.9% to 7.7% (all information in this paragraph was provided by 
the ~ ~ ~ a n a g e n i e n t ) .  
The esports to \Vestern Europe are mainly restricted by the requirements of quality cer- 
tificates and strict requirements on environnlent protection. Furtliermore, the co~npetition is 
quite intense i n  \Vestern Europe. Tlie company also feels that  there is a certain aversion or 
tloubt toward the products from CEE among the consumers in Western Europe. For this rea- 
son. C ' l l ~ ~ n ~ l a l i  attempted to  esport also in cooperation with Western European producers and 
uncler the ilailie of the foreign partner. 
The ~~+yi i i en t s  conditions ancl the ability to make paynlelits is quite important for Cheniolak 
siiice iiiost of its esports are to the former Soviet Union and CEE where the payments disci- 
pline is particularly bad. Chemolak therefore usually requires an advance payment or a bank 
guarantee on payment. Only traditional partners can enjoy longer payinelit periods (17 to  50 
clays). although there is often an upper limit on the outstanding liability (usually USD 50,000). 
C'liemolalt is usually able to obtain sufficient esport creclit financing. 
Tlie split of C'zeclioslovaliia resulted in a decline in sales to sinall aiicl lnediuill firms while 
the company was able to retain the larger clients. I-Iowever, the treucl of losiiig slllall custoniers 
slioulcl I)e stopped by tlie activities of tlie daughter conlpanies that  Cliemolalt estal)lislled in tlie 
Czech Rep11 blic. 
Chirana Prema a.s., Star5 Tur5 
C'liirana Prema a.s. S t a r i  Turd along with its daughter companies is tlie major producer of med- 
ical ecluipment and supplies and measuring devices in Slovakia. Its products include medical 
ecluipnient sucli as dental equipment, x-ray equipment, anaestliesiological equipment, etc.; med- 
ical supplies - in particular disposable injection needles and syringes; a ~ i d  nieasuri~ig devices 
fbr liouseliolcl or industrial use. With tlie size of its total consolidated turnover C'hirana-Prema 
ra~ilied -19th in 1994 and 28th in 1993 in the TREND T O P  100 cliart of Slovak companies 
(TREND '2.519.5, p. 3C). Cliirana Prema a.s. is located in Stard Turd, in N~rtli-L$~estern Slo- 
\.aliia. 
History, Trailsforinatioil and Ownership 
C'liirana Prenla nras originally founded in 1935 under the name Micliera. The company then 
l>roclucetl water meters, gas meters and otlier related metallic products. During World War I1 the 
colnpany reoriented temporarily to production of ammunition. Production of measuring devices 
was resu~iiecl after the lvar. In 1947, the company started to produce also medical equipment. 
This orientation was retained until present. 
After the nationalization following the war, Cliirana Prema evolved to a concern enterprise. 
Tlie conipany was associated with otlier related state-owned enterprises so as to create a single 
concern enterprise esercising control over enterprises throughout entire C'zeclioslovakia. After 
1990, C'liirana Prema underwent a vast transformation and restructuring. Several enterprises 
were taken out of the concern enterprise and transformed into independent joint-stocli companies 
and were privatized later. Cliirana Prema retained a minor stalie in some of them, though. 
Other units were transformed to daughter companies with a 100% or a majority stake owned by 
C'liirana Prema. The daughter companies as well as related companies cooperate closely with 
tlie parent colnpany and with each other. Cliirana Prenla itself was transformed to a holding 
t~ pe co~ i~pa~i j . .  At the same time, the company was put into the first wave of tlie voucher 
pri~atization. The shares in the company were acquired by a total of 29,256 individual investors 
a ~ r t l  50 i ~ ~ \ . e s t ~ n e n t  fu cls. Tlie ownership structure after tlie end of vouclier privatization (VP) 
ancl its later cleve10~)ment is displayed in Table 8.6: 
Table 8.6: Ownership Structure and Its Development (%) 
Cliirana Prema a.s. V P  1993 1994 
Fund of National Property 7.6 0.0 0.0 
1ndividua.l Investors 37.3 35.7 29.9 
I~istitutional Investors 55.2 64.3 70.2 
~sterreichische I(ontro1bank 0.0 0.0 20.8 
VUB Invest a.s. 12.9 12.9 12.0 
PSIS a.s. 6.8 7.1 7.2 
SCI a.s. 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Istroinvest a.s. 12.5 12..5 4.6 
Otlier institutional investors 16.6 25.2 19.1 
T I ~ P  internal structure of Cliirana Prema is presently based on two organizational levels: 
cli\.isions and claugliter companies. The first level consists of seven production divisions accord- 
ing to  tlie main product lines: medical equipment, injection supplies, technical services, tools 
aricl instruments and finally co~ilmercial services. The individual divisions are not i~iclependent 
rntities in a legal sense but enjoy a significant degree of autonomy and can enter into contractual 
relationships individually. 
Tlle second lebel includes companies with a majority stake or a significant stake held by 
('llirana Prema. T l ~ c  ~ilost important ones are, according to maill area of business: 
Pr~otllictiorl: Premes s.r.0. (100% owlled by Chirana Prerna), Chiradelta a.s. Humennt. (100%), 
Premagas s.r.0. (-19%) and Justur s.r.0. (40%); 
,Sc.r*rices: Chiros a,.s. Piest,a.ny (100'%), Management School Sta.ri Turd s.r.0. (6.5%,), Chirana, 
Leasing s.r.0. (66.7'&), C!liirasys s.r.0. (51%) and Premaress s.r.0. (52%); 
Trndc: Chirana Esport-Import a.s. Piestany (39'%), Chirex-Prema s.r.0. Prague ( loo%) ,  For- 
dent Dental Depot s.r.0. Olomouc, Czech Republic (29%), Chirana-Prema GmbH Aaclien, 
Germany (-L9%,), Chirana Baltic Zp. z 0.0. IVarsaw, Poland ( G O % ) ,  C'liirana Hungaria Iift. 
Budapest (25%)) and Chirana-Prema AOZT., hloscow, Russia (.51'%). 
See also the case study of Chirana Export-Import a.s., Piestany, for a related enterprise. 
Key Figures 
Table 8.7: Iie): Figures, Chirana Preina a.s. Star& T u r i  coiisolidated 
Iie!~ Figures LJnit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Turnover SICIi mn 1043.0 11.54.0 2309.0 1900.7 2696.1 3131.5 
C ~ I O S S  Profit SICIi 111 11 
Total .Assets SIiIi mn 
Equity SICIi m n  
Long-Term Liabilities SIiIi inn 
Current Liabilities SICIC mil 
I-lccounts Recei\.able SIiIi mn 
I n \  entory SIiIi 111 11 
Labor Force 
Profi t/Turnover %I 
Profit/.Assets 5% 
Turno\.er/Assets 
Net Profit /Share SIiIi 
Characteristics of Production 
C'liirana Prenla along \\lit11 its daughter companies is the inost iinportant producer of ~neclical 
ecl~~ipment aiid measuring devices i n  Slovakia. The output of Chirana Prenla call be divided 
into three categories: medical ecluipment (dental equipment. s-ray equip~nent, equipment for 
eiilergenc!. staff ancl a~iibulances, anaestliesiological equipment, electrocardiogra~>l~s. clisposable 
s~.ringes aiitl iieeclles, special needles); measuring devices for industrial and household use (water 
iiieters. heat meters, gas meters, pressure gauges); and other proclucts. The structure of output 
in recent years is displayed in Table 8.8. 
Table S.8: C'ommotlity Structure of Sales, Chirana Prema - consolidated 
Sales Structure (SIiIi mn) 1992 % 1993 %> 1994 '% 
Total Sales 1847.7 100.0 1380.7 100.0 1660.9 100.0 
I\Iedical Ecluipment 736.6 39.9 747.8 54.2 1107.6 66.7 
Dental Ecluip~nent 308.8 16.7 380.7 27.6 .590.7 35.6 
C;eneral hIeclical Ecluipiiient 87.9 4.8 68.3 4.9 11.5.2 6.9 
X R a y  Ec]uil>ment 50.5 2.7 38.8 2.8 13.0 0.8 
Iujection Supplies k Other 289.4 15.7 260 18.8 388.7 23.4 
Aleasuring Devices 872.4 47.2 ,565.9 41.0 .526.9 31.7 
Gas I\leters 389.7 21.1 298.9 21.6 216.8 13.1 
Pressure LIet ers 52.8 2.9 32.9 2.4 17.6 1.1 
IVater k Heat Meters 429.9 23.3 234.1 17.0 292.5 17.6 
Other Proclucts 238.7 12.9 6 7 -1.9 26.4 1.6 
Ta,ble 8.9 l>resents the coillposition of tlie Group output by the nmin enterprises. (However, it 
should be noted that  tlie data. a.re not perfectly coniparable with the data. in the otlier tables due 
to clifferelit a.ccounting and consolidation methodology applied. Data, for 1994 are not a,vailable 
here.) 
Table 8.9: Structure of tlie Ciroup Output by hlain Companies 
C:roup Turno~.er (SIiIi mil) 1992 7% 1993 7% 
Total Turnover 1900.7 100.0 2111.9 100.0 
Cliirana Preina a.s. 777.7 40.9 803.8 38.1 
Premex s.r.0. 429.9 22.6 3.57.2 16.9 
I'rcniagas s.r.0. 442.5 23.3 677.7 32.1 
C'liiradelta a.s. 151.0 7.9 185.6 8.8 
C'l iiros ' a.s. 99.6 5.2 87.6 4.1 
Export Orientat ion 
'rlie export orielitation of Cliirana Prema is substailtial. Overall, about 40% of tlie total output 
of tlie C;roup is exported a t  present, not including exports to tlie Czech Republic, or 70% with 
t lle Czecti Republic (see Table 8.10). Tlie export sliares range from about -50%) to as mucli 
as 90%! for indiiridual product groups while these shares used to be 10-GOTI in tlie past. The 
export orientation lias increased since 1989 by nearly ten percentage points (\vitliout tlie Czech 
Republic). 
Ta.ble 8.10: Destinations of Sales, Cliirana-Prema Group 
Destiiiatioiis (SI<Ii mil) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total Sales 1043.0 1154.0 2309.0 1900.7 1380.7 1660.9 
C'zeclioslo~.al;ia 705.0 790.0 1493.0 1399.5 1229.1 902.4 
Slovakia 1i.a. n.a. n .a. -58Ij.5 622.2 370.9 
C'zecli Republic n.a. 11.a. n.a. 814.0 606.9 .53 1.5 
E x ~ o r t s  338.0 364.0 816.0 .50 1.2 882.8 7.58..5 
Dest inations (5%) 
Total Sales 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
C'zec tioslo\-a I;ia 67.6 68..5 64.7 73.6 89.0 -54.3 
Slo1.a kia n .a. n.a. n .a. 30.8 4.5.1 22.3 
C'zecli Republic n.a. 1i.a. ii .a. 42.8 44.0 32.0 
Exports 32.4 31.5 3.5.3 26.4 63.9 45.7 
Tlie most. importa.nt destination of the exports of Chiraiia-Prenia Group 1ia.s been tradi- 
ti on all^. tlie former USSR and otlier countries of CEE (see Table 8.11). Significa,nt portion of 
exportas lia,s been suppliecl also to  developing countries. These two destinations reta,ined impor- 
t,a,iice a,lso after 1990. On tlie otlier hand, while tlie share of exports to tlie developed countries 
(in pa,rt,icular Western Europe) iiicrea.sed after 1990, tliis increase was not very substantial. 
Tlie nlai~i rea,soiis for tlie orientation toward Eastern European and developing countries are 
t h e  strong conipetitioii in Western European countries a,nd the quality of the products. With 
respect t,o tlie latter, while certain products reach the quality level of tlie coiilpetitioii in de- 
\,eloped countries, otlier products are only of an average quality and do not lience completely 
satisfy recluirements colnmon in the developed countries. The main factor determining tlie qual- 
ity is tlie level of teclinology. For example, the teclinology used in  tlie production of disposable 
~netlical sul)plies is perfectly up to date and tliis product line is relatively successful a.t tlie West- 
ern inarliet,~ as well. 011 the other hand, otlier products are not conlpletely u p  to the Western 
stan(larc1s but a.re quite successful a,t tlie Eastern niar1;ets due to t,lieir lower prices. I11 fa.ct, 
since t,lie reqr~iremeiits and preferences i11 tlie CEE and FSU countries a,re frecluently different, 
C:I~iraiia,-Prema t.1ius can supply these markets with the quality tliey need a t  tlie prices they can 
afford. I n  general, tlie prices reflect tlie quality of tlie products. Tlie company is planning to 
update tlie existing production technology gradually in the near future. 
'I'l~e 111ost iinportant future risks are embodied in the high dependence of the company 011 the 
former Soviet Union and the unclear political and economic developments there. In tlie future, 
tlie management of Chirana Prema would like to decrease this dependence. This should happen 
1 ) ~ .  retaining the absolute volume of the exports to this territory while lowering its relative share 
in  total exports. I11 particular, good prospects are expected in China, Vietnam and India. The 
inc~ease or exports voluiiie along with a revival of the domestic rliarket should make it possible 
To1 Cliiraiia P r e ~ n a  to more than double the present turnover of tlie Group within the next five 
vea rs. 
Table 8.11: Structure of Exports of Cliirana Group by Regions and Countries (%I) 
Region: 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Former ChlEA 57.81 56.20 74.39 50.4.5 
Developed Countries 5.94 7.92 6.27 2.5.89 
Other Countries 36.25 35.83 19.35 23.66 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
C'o u 11 try: 1992 1993 1 9 94 
C'IS 38.99 33.33 37.14 
Iran 19.71 29.21 4.29 
Lithuania -3.11 1.5.42 n.a. 
Poland 11.79 9.64 17.14 
C;ermany 13.07 4.8.5 7.14 
I1liraine 1.20 1.43 11.a. 
I3 (I ngary 1.24 1-17 n.a. 
.Austria 2..53 1.02 11.a. 
Other Countries 8.36 3.94 34.29 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Tlie exports of the C'hirana C:roup are cl~anneled prinlarily tlirougli claughter and associ- 
ated companies of Cl~irana Prema. These are Cliirana Baltic-Poland, Cliirana Hungaria, Chi- 
raiia Deutscliland-Geri~lany, Chirana Prema East-Russia and C'l~irana Export-I~nport Piestany- 
Slovakia. Sollie 1.5-20% of exports are carried out by mediators from outside tlie Group. Unlilie 
most of the Slovak industrial enterprises, Chirain Prema organized its exports directly also 
prior to 1990. This was because Chirana Export-Import, then still past of tlie Cliirana concern 
euterprise. had a status of a "foreign-trade enterprise". 
hlost of exports of the Group are based on quarterly adjusted annual contracts and three to 
five year outlooks. 
Productioil for Exports 
The qua lit,^. of tlie exported products differs. While certain products are perfectly competitive 
wit11 the most advanced products, a majority of them is merely average. Tlie prices then reflect 
the cluality level. There are 110 significant differences between products deternlined for the 
clomestic market and exports. I n  general, all product categories are also exported, with the 
share of exports presently raiigir~g from 50 to 90%. 
The inost successful export item of Cliirana Prema are disposable injectio~i supplies arid 
dental equipinelit. Tlie quality of these product lines is high arid the products are also exported 
to Ii'estern Europe. Cliirana Prenla has a 10% market share in C:ernian,v and 20% i n  France in 
t lle clisposil~le injection supplies. 
Do~llestic Ellviro~llllellt for Exports 
Tlie esp0rt.s of tlie Clhira,na-Prema Group a,re not directly restricted. However, tlie ma.na,gement 
of' t,he company feels tlie government export policy is fa.r from being sufficient. Tlie dolllestic 
llla,rltet is cha,ra.cterized with a rela.tively low degree of import protection. In addition, govern- 
111e1it contracts are often awarded to foreign producers who ca,ii accept delayed paylilents and/or 
offer financing armngements. The active involvement of the government is also a,bsent in the 
a.rea. of export financing and providing export guarantees and/or insurance. Fina.lly, the govern- 
ment could do more in tlie ta.x legislature. In fa,ct, expenses for certain ma,rketing xtivit ies and 
l~roniotion a,re presently not ta'x deductible a.nd are thus paid from the a.fter-tax profit (those 
i1l.e for example direct ma.il ma,rketing a,nd training of the dealers who a.re not employees of the 
c o l n ~ ~ a n y ) .  
Foreign Environnlent for Exports 
Tlie   no st important foreign restrictions faced by Chira,iia. Group are the indirect ones: require- 
ment of clua.lit,y certificates and unfavorable pa,yments conditions. Tlie former mainly causes 
a.clministrative delay and a.dditiona1 expense. Presently, after the split of tlie USSR, the com- 
pany must actua,lly .apply for a sepa.rate registration and clua,lity certificate in every republic 
\\here it exports. This further increases tlie a,dministrative troubles. As for unfavorable pay- 
llient condit,ions, some buyers require long payment periods. Chirana Prema is not a.l~vag's in 
the ~~osi t ion to enable this. Direct restrictions are not very significmt. 
Clhirana Prelila wa.s quite adversely affected by tlie collapse of tlie C:PVIEA. This implied in 
~>art,icular t,he encl of la.rge-volume long tern1 deliveries, especia,lly to  the USSR. Initia.lly, tlie 
volume of exports declined clue to the cha,nge in tlie organization of exports a.nd tlie absence of 
tlie governnlent coordination. Tlie volulnes rose la,ter and presently even exceed tlie 1989 level. 
Tlie split of tlie Czecl~oslova,k Federation brought about especially increased bureaucra.cy. 
Tlie compa.ny found it also lliore difficult to face foreign, pa.rticularly German competition. 
Hon.ever, a, deeper decline wa,s prevented by the customs union and by the extensive dealership 
netn~orlt of C'liirana Prema.. 
Chirana Export-Import a.s., Piestany 
C'liirana Export-Imports a s .  Piestany is a trading company specializing in exports and imports 
of ~nedical ancl dental ecluipment and supplies. hlajor part of tlie exports is presently realized 
~vith Russia. Accorcling to its total annual turnover, Cllirana Export-Import ranked 43rd in 
1994 in the TREND T O P  100 chart of tlie Slovak enterprises (TREND 25/95, p. 3C). Cliirana 
Export-Import is located in Piestany. a well-known spa resort in Western Slovaliia. 
History, Trallsforlnatioil and Owilership 
Cl1iira.na Export-Import was founded in 1969 as a part of Chirana Concern (a, group of state- 
on:necl enterprises producing media l  arid dental equipment and supplies as well as sorne other 
procluct,~, with 1zea.dqua.rters in Sta.rd Turd, about 30 krn a,wa,y from Piesta,ny). Tlie original 
tasli of Cliiraua. Export-Import was exporting the products of the enterprises a.ssociated i n  the 
C'liirana Concern - this included enterprises througliout Czeclioslovakia.. Since 1983, C1iira.na 
Export-Import became also responsible for inzports of rnedical eq~~ipnient .  The enterprise had 
exclusive riglit for both exports and imports of medical equipment and supplies in Czeclioslovakia 
until 1990. 
In 1991, t , l~e  nterprise wa,s transformed into a,n independent joint-stocli compa,ny. Neverthe- 
less, tlie close relationship to the former concern enterprise remained as tlie former lieadquarters, 
C!liirana. Prema a,.s., Stard Turd (present na,me), became with 48.6% tlie major shareholder in 
Chirana. Export-Iizzport. Pa,rt of the sha.res was also distributed through tlie vouclier privatiza- 
ti011 scheme. Fina,lly, sta,kes in  tlie company were also acquired by other enterprises, an outside 
investor arid employees. Overall, the ownership structure is as clispla,yed by Ta.ble S.12: 
Table 8.12: Ownership Structure, Chirana Export-Import a.s. (%I) 
Ownership Structure 1993 1994 
C'liirana Prema a.s. Star6 Tur6 48..58 48.58 
hlr. blartdk 1 1.84 11.84 
Inclzeba a.s. Bratislava 9.81 9.Sl 
E nl ployees 6.28 6.22 
Frind of National Property 2.26 2.26 
hlecli-Invest Slovakia s.r.0. 0.00 2.2-1 
Cliirana BMT Brno 0.6.5 0.6.5 
Inclivicluals frorn Voucher Privatization 20..58 18.40 
C'liirana Export-Import further owns stakes in several daughter companies and joint ventures 
- out of those seven are in Slovakia and ten abroad (in the following countries: Czech Republic, 
Polancl, Hllngap, .4ustria, Ukraine, Russia and Egypt). 
See also tlie case study of Chirana Prema a.s. Star6 Tur6, for a related enterprise. 
Key Figures 
Ta.ble 8.13: Iiey Figures, C1iira.na. Export-Import a.s., Piesta.ny 
Iiey Figures Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Turnover SIiI< mn 2999.88 2560.41 1086.34 760.62 1810.40 
(4 ross Profit SKI< mn 24.83 16.72 17.16 19.80 26.93 
'Sotal .Assets SKI< mn 734.42 999.59 1110.12 743.18 1724.69 
Equity SIiIi nin 11 .a. n.a. 67.34 78.97 82.26 
Long-Term Liabilities SIiIi Inn n.a. 11 .a. 0.00 20.50 834.50 
C'urrent Liabilities SI<I< m n  11.a. 776.56 1042.79 643.71 807.94 
.Accounts Receivable SI<I< mn 621.14 1136.61 955.88 626.27 419.01 
In~.entory SI<Ii mn 24.85 3.31 27.15 62.50 121.52 
Labor Force 246 207 135 130 128 
Profit/Turiiover % 0.83 0.65 1.58 2.60 1.49 
Profit/Assets 5% 3.38 1.67 1.55 2.66 1.56 
Turnover/Assets 5% 408.47 2.56.15 97.86 102.35 104.97 
Net Profit,/Share SI<Ii 303.10 262.30 255.88 167.84 144.01 
Not,e: T l~r  increase in the total assets between 1993 and 1994 is reflected pr-i~narily iri increases of long-term 
lial>ilities (see al~ove)  and long-term receivables (from SKI< 333 mn. t,o SI i I i  1068 n-111.). However-, we were 
not able t,o clet,er-mine the specific reasons for these increases. 
Cllaracteristics of Turilover and Exports 
C1hira,na Esport,-Import, a,s a trading firm, does not produce a.ny products itself. Instead, it 
acts as a, media.tor selling products of other industrial enterprises. Originally, tlie company was 
liolcling a monopoly position in esports and imports of medical ecluipment ancl supplies for entire 
C'zechoslova~liia~. Tliis commodity structure was granted by tlie central regulation of the foreign 
t,ra,cle. Aft,er tlie regulation was cancelecl i n  1990, medica.1 equipment and supplies rema.ined 
tlle ma,in pa.rt of tlie turnover of Chirana Export-Import. Nevertlieless, the company started to 
deal with other conl~nodities a,s u~ell. These a.re currently not of great importance to  the overall 
turnover of the company, thougli, a.nd often are realized on an ad lioc ba'sis. 
Li~~ti l  1990, tlie turnover used to be SKI< 2-3 billion annually. Tliis declined a,fter 1990 
sigi~ifica,ntly. The tlecline could be attributed to two facts: (1) loss of tlie esclusive right to 
esl>ort a,ntl import, medical equipment and supplies and (2)  collapse of the CMEA a,nd subsequent 
n.ea,liening of tlie company's position in these ma,rkets. With respect t,o tlie latter, Cliirana 
Esport-Inlport pa,rt,icularly suffered from the absence of an a.ppropria.te pa,yments ineclianism. 
Besicles tlie a.bsolute fall-back in turnover, the relative structure of turnover changed as well. 
ITnt,il 1990, the sliares of esports and imports were roughly eqoa,l, 50%. In recent years, the 
s l~a re  of esports increased to some 70 to 80% (see Table 8.14). It shoold be noted, however, that  
tlie 11aria.tions in individual years result in  part from one-time la.rge-amount transactions (such 
as import,s of espensive advanced llospital equipment). 
'[able 8.14: Structure of Turnover, Chirana Esport-Import a..s. Piestally 
Structure of Turnover (SIiI< mn) 1990 1991 
Total Turno1.e~ 2999.88 2560.41 
Export 1050.40 1248.49 
Inlport 1939.48 1301.49 
Domestic Sales 0.00 10.43 
Esport (%,) 3.5.01 48.76 
1111port ( 'X ) 64.6.5 50.83 
Domestic Sales (XI) 0.00 0.41 
The regional structure of esports (see Table 8.15) did not change substantially despite the 
cllanges that came along after 1989. Instead, the absolute volu~ile of esports decreased while 
t,lic rela.t,ive structure did iiot cliange too much. Interestingly enough, tlie slia.re of esports 
to cleveloped countries did not increase (and even declined in some years) despite the general 
opening of tlle iiiarkets in these countries. This is to some degree caused by the changes in 
coiiiniercial policies of some Slovak clients of C'hirana Export-Import. Tliese companies started 
to pursue esport,s to  certa.in countries and/or regions directly while t,hey relied on Cliirana 
Esport-Import when exporting to other countries. I11 effect, some of tlie producers took over 
tlie resl~onsibility for esporting to F%'esterii Europe which brought about a reduction of the 
esports of Cliirana Esport-Import to tliis region. 
.As in  tlie past, the ~naiii destination of exports of Cliirana Export-Import is Russia. Before 
1990. t l ~ e  s l~or t s  to tlie former Soviet Union macle up over 60% of tlie total exports. Developing 
countries, especially North Africa and Middle East, are currently regaining importance. In 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Cliirana Export-Import is exporting especially 
to Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Ukraine. Finally, tlie main clestinations in Western 
Europe are G;ermany, Austria and the UIC. 
Table S.15: Regional Structure of Exports (9'0) 
Destination of E s ~ o r t s  1992 1993 1994 
Russia 74.9 57.9 58.3 
Uliraine 0.0 0.0 1.5.1 
Ckntral Europe S.2 7.G 9.G 
Western Europe 8.7 6.7 6.9 
Africa 3.3 19.6 -5.0 
Rest of the Former USSR 0.0 0.3 3.4 
La.tin America 0.9 1.1 1.2 
Asia and Middle East 4.0 6.8 0..5 
The coiiiiiiodity structure of exports differs with respect to the particular regions. In gen- 
eral, tlle exports to \Vestern Europe include priillarily syringes, injections and otlier disposable 
bupplies. Tliese are products with relatively low degree of processiiig and sopliistication (al- 
t hougli \\.it 11 high cluality). The share of highly sophisticated and fine equipment such as dental 
c~l~iipiiicut ancl X-ray ecluipment is rather low. On the otlier hand, Cliirana Esport-Import is 
rather successful in exporting tliis equipment to tlie countries of C:EE a i d  cleveloping countries. 
?'here are several reasons for tliis pattern: ( I )  there is certain aversion or e\.eii douht among 
buyers in II'estern Europe with respect to highly sophisticated products froill C;EE countries; 
( 2 )  some Slo\~a,li procluc,ers esport fine equipment directly to Western Europe a i d  indirectly to 
otlier regio~~s;  and (3 )  Slovak enterprises enjoy a greater competitive advantage with respect to 
certain labor iiitrilsive products due to low labor cost. 
Table 8.16: Commodity Structure of Exports (%) 
Structure of Esports 1992 1993 1994 
Dental Equipment 17.0 39.0 58.9 
Disposable Syringes 8.z Needles 32.4 13.9 9.6 
Pl~ysiotlierapy 0.9 4.4 8.6 
X-Ray Equipmei~t 39.5 13.8 8.4 
Sterilization Equipmerit 5.0 1.4 3.4 
Respiration and Anesthesia 0.0 0.0 3.3 
Measuring Equipment 2.S 5.2 1.2 
Instruments 0.4 3.2 1.0 
Other 2.0 19.1 5.6 
T l ~ e  overall commodity structure of esports is presented in Table S.16. Table 8.17 brings an 
cn.e~.\.ic\v of tlie sliares the main clients of Chirana Export-Import have in its total esports. It can 
1)c seen c lca r l~~  that tlie major part of esports are products of enterprises tliat used theniselves 
to belong to the Chirana Coilcern before 1991. Other enterprises accounted for less than ten 
percent, of the total exports in 1992 and slightly over 2.5% in 1993. 
Table 8.17: Main Suppliers of Products for Exports ( % I )  
Maill Suppliers for Exports 1992 1993 1994 
Chiraclelta Humennii 16.7 22.6 33.9 
Chira.na. Prema Stard Turd 34.9 21.2 27.8 
Cliira.na Piestany 3.8 12.9 17..5 
BMT Brno 10.8 2.0 4.1 
Chirana Strasnice, Pra.gue 14.5 13.5 3.7 
Chira.na, Modrany, Prague 9.9 2.2 2.1 
Other 9.4 2.5.6 10.9 
To support its esports as well as provide necessary accompanyiilg services for the prod- 
ucts sold, Chirana Export-Import has an extensive network of partner companies. affiliates and 
rel~resentati~.es i11 the   no st important countries. These take three forms: 
foreign ~)artners - foreign cornpallies with or without exclusivity, presently in 1.5 countries; 
joint. vent,ures - a t  present tell joint ventures abroad a.nd seveii i n  Slovakia; 
represent.a.tive offices a t  S1ova.k embassies in Russia and Ulira,ine. 
Sribsta~lt,ia,l pa,rt of the exports is realized ba,sed on long-term relationsllips with foreign 
clients. Exports a,re mainly coiltracted regula.rly and well in a.dvance. Nevertheless, occasionally 
(but ilot regula.rly), Cliira,na Export-Import engages in one-tinie tra.nsa.ctions that  malie up a. 
significant pa.rt of the turnover. 
I11 t.he future, the managenlent of Cllirana Export-Import expects tl1a.t tlle volume of exports 
will increase every year. The company will a,ttempt to  further reestablish its lost positions in 
t.llc tlevelopiiig countries - in particular the Isla.mic countries in North Africa and Middle East. 
I t  will also seek to strengthen its present positions in Western Europe (in Gerinany, Austria 
ant1 the U.Ii.) as well a.s to  penetrate new markets, especially France. It will a,lso a.ttempt to  
~>cnet,ra,te he C:IS couiltries other than Russia - Ukra.ine, Centra.1 Asia a,nd the Baltics. On the 
o t l ~ ~ r  Iia,nd, the nla,na,gen~ent would like to see the sliare of Russia in  the tota,l exports to  shrinli 
so as to rccluce t,lle depencleiicy on this market. However, this redrlctioii shoulcl not occur in 
al)solut,e t,erlns Illit oilly relatively by increa.sing the volumes of exports t,o the other countries. 
'l'11c I~est  prospects for increa.sing exports a,re a,ssessed to be in the countries of Nortll Africa 
and LIicldle Ea.st because tliese markets are relatively less sa,turated. On the other lia.ncl, the 
conll>etition in Europe is quite strong. Good prospects are also envisaged in -4sia,n countries, 
rspecially C'hina,, \rietnanl, India and Iran. 
Doillestic Ei~viroili~~eilt  for Exports 
The exports of Chira.na. Export-Import are not subjected to ally kind of lice~isiiig in Slova.kia. 
Tllc compa,ny cloes not face other direct impediments either. The ma,i~i way in which the 
go~:erniiieut inclirectly promotes exports of Slovak enterprises is tllrough official visits of members 
of the government a,broad. During these official visits, the government delegatioils are often 
i~ccoiiil>a~niecl by rel>resentatives of Slovak enterprises who thus 1ia.ve a.n opportunity t,o engage 
i n  the highest level negotiatio~ls with represeiita,tives of foreign a,uthoritics ancl enterprises. 
Tlie management believes the orientation of Slova,k foreign policy a,fter 1990 has neglected 
1.etainii1g a,ncl eleveloping tra,cle relatio~lsliips with the countries of CEE a.nd t.lie former USSR - 
clcspit'e t.he ~>otentia,l i~nporta,nce of these markets. The government promot.ion of exports would 
I)c particula.rly helpful in facilitating pa,yments (especially taking over gua.rantees for pa,yn~ents) 
ailtl i11 c r e a t i ~ ~ g  a, favorable environment for interna.tioual trade (for example signing ta,x treaties). 
Tlie government should be also helpful in  the field of builcling an effective network of commercial 
cle~~artments a t  tlie Slovak embassies abroad. A compreliensive system of export credit financing 
and export insurance is presently only i n  preparation and development i n  Slovakia. Finally, 
the management feels the government could introduce certain Legislative measures to proniote 
exports, especially tax incentives. 
Foreign Eilviroilimei~t for Exports 
In genera,l, t l ~ e  quality of the products exported by Chirana Export-Iniport is con~pa,ra.ble with 
t,lie competing products. However, the competition can be divided into two groups. \L7he1~ 
comparing ivit.11 ~>roducts from developed (OECD) countries, the export products are comparable 
\vit,li respect t.o their utiliza,tion, but they do not come with certain "fancy" and/or high-tech 
fea,tures. On tlie other hand, when comparing with products from otlier countries, the export 
l>roclucts of Chirana Export-Import are a t  the same or higher quality level. The prices of 
the products a.re in genera.1 competitive. Finally, the level of repa,ir a,nd maintenance services 
~~rovicletl a,broatl is coniparable, too. 
The ma.rl;et shares are difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, tlic ma.nagement wa,s able to  make 
t.lie follo~ving approxima,te estiniates: 10% in Germa.ny in tlisposable injection supplies, 25%) in  
I-Iunga,ry in clenta,l equipment, and 30% and 20% in Ukra,ilie ancl Russia, respectively, in denta.1 
ec[uip~nent. 
The exports of Chira.na Export-Import are not significantly a,ffected by direct foreign re- 
st.rict.ions. In  fa,ct, the level of tariffs decreased especially in tlie EU a.fter the signing of tlie 
.4ssociation A4greei~~ei~ts .  On the other ha,nd, an indirect a,dministrative difficulty wa,s created 
1)y tlie requirements of qua,lity certificates in several countries. Nevertheless, this problein can 
Ile liaiidlecl witli. 
The split of C!zeclioslova.kia did not cause a.ny pa,rticular difficulties apart froin tlie increa,sed 
a,clmiiiistrative burclen. On tlie other hand, the colla.pse of the CMEA found a ra.ther adverse 
reflection in the export activities of Chirana Export-I~nport. The ma.in reasons were: (1) absence 
of all a,ppropria,t,e pa,yiiients mecha.nism accompanied by a lack of foreign excha.nge i n  t,lie fornier 
IrSSR,, (2) laclc of t,he government coordination and direct enga,ge~uent in facilitating tracle and 
payment flo\vs and (3)  difficulties connected with ba.rter tra~nsa~ctions. 
The level of competition is quite high abroad, especially from producers of dental equipment 
i n  17'estern Europe. The Western Europea.11 producers a,re a,lso quite a.ctive a.t the mar1;ets of 
CEE. I11 a,ddit~ion, since 1990 Chira.na Export-Import faces a growing competitioii from Czech 
and Slova,lc enterprises tha,t previously exported through Chira.na. Export-Import but la.ter chose 
to export tlirectly or tlirough otlier exporters. The exports of Chirana Export-Import are also 
atlversely affected by the lack of coordination of direct and indirect exports of the domestic 
~~roclucers \\:lie use Chiraiia Export-Import for a part of their exports. 
Tlie nla,in source for obtaining informa.tion about and ma1;iiig conta,ct with potential trade 
pa,rtners a,re fairs and exhibitions as well as advertisements in inelustry sl~ecific journals a.nd 
~~ublications. Direct contacting is also used. 
Tlie ~~ayrnen t~s  conditions occasionally create difficulties for exports. After the colla.pse of tlie 
C'RIEA: Cliira,na. Export-Import wa,s unable to collect some cla.iins it had in the former Soviet 
I11iion. At present, the company requires advance payments or guaranteed pa,yments when the 
pa,ymeiit a,bility of tlie buyer is in doubt. Furthermore, the required payments periods are in 
some ca.ses too long. Due to tlie high interest rates and lack of credits specifica.lly designed for 
cxport fina~nciiig. such pa,yments periods are mostly unacceptable. This ma,cle Cliirana Esport- 
Inl]>ort t,o give up cert,a,in transactions - for example Iranian compa.nies a,re recluired by la,\v 
to stipula,te t,\vo-year pa,yments periods. Obtaining credit financing for such tra.iisactions would 
iiicrea,se the price clue to the high interest ra,tes so that it would be less competitive. 
Recently. tlie proceeds from esports were significantly affected by tlie fluctua.tions in  the 
csclla~nge rates of the ITS dollar. Most of the exports of Chirana Export-Import a.re payable in 
ITS tlollars so the colnpa.lly is pa.rticularly sensitive to volatility of this currency. The company 
is solving t,liis problem mostly by including certain leeway for the currency fluctua.tions i n  the 
1 , l . i ~ ~  ca,lculat.ions. I-Ieclging possibilities were not esplored so fa.r. 
Gumon Bratislava a.s. 
Introduction 
Ciunlon Bra.tisla,va a.s. is a middle size company producing electrotechnical l~roducts and 
~emil>rocluct,s, especia.lly electrical i~lsulations. The company is loca,ted i n  Rra.tisla,va, tlle capital 
of Slova,kia. 
History, Transformation and Ownership 
C4unlon \va,s originally founded i11 1911. In tlle more recent times, until 1990, C4umon was a part 
of Iia.l>lo Bra.tisla,va a,s one of its three production units. C4umon became an independent state- 
o~vnecl enterprise in 1990. In May 1992, Gumon wa.s transformed into a joint-stoclc company. 
It nTa.s tlie~l primtized in the first wave of the voucher privatization. Although origi~la,lly 97% 
of the shares were sclieduled for the voucher privatiza,tion (3% were obligatorily transferred to 
the Restitution Investment Fund), tlle capital stock of Gumon wa.s a,dditionally increased due 
to revalua,t.ion of its assets (especially land) during 1992. This increase correspo~lded to 49% of 
tllc origina.1 sl~a~rel~olders'  quity (CSIi 57.7 million increase, or from CSIi 117.7 to CSI< 175.4). 
Since this increa.se occurred before the shares from voucher primtization Lvere distribut,ed, the 
entire increase wa.s liept by the state represented by the Fund of Na,tiona,l Propert,y of the Slovak 
Republic. I-Iencc, the ownership structure stemming from the privatization process (1993) a,s 
tvell a,s t,he current situation (referring to the end of 1994) are a,s displa.yed by the Table 8.18: 
Table S.18: Structure of Ownership, Gumon Bratislava a.s. (%) 
C4u1no11 Bratislava a.s. 1993 1994 
Fund of National Property of SR 35.05 3.5.0.5 
Restitution I~lvestme~lt Fund of SR 2.01 2.01 
Investment Funds 29.32 29.49 
Individuals 33.62 33.45 
Thc structure of ownership changed only sliglltly since the privatization. This is also a 
rrflectio~l of the fact that the shares of Gumon have not been traded in large volumes and very 
nft ~ I I .  
Key Figures 
Table 8.19: Key Figures. Ciumon a.s. Bratislava 
Gunloll B~atislava a.s. Unit 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Tu r ~ ~ o v e r  SI<I< mn 11.21. 207..52 216.13 181.47 
C; ross Profit SI<I< mn 18.4.5 -14.21 .5 .11 -21.17 
Total Assets SKI< mn 424.93 400.09 375.34 336.60 
Ecluitj~ SKI< mn 173.65 184.30 179.17 159.23 
Liabilities SIiIi mn 2.5 1.28 215.79 196.17 177.37 
.-\ccounts Receivable S I X  mn 191.05 141.48 112.95 85.96 
lnventorg SKI< mn 64.87 60.69 -59.37 65.88 
Labor Force n.a. n.a. 380 
- 
343 
I'rofit/Turnover '70 11.a. - I  -2 -1 2 
I'rofi t /.Assets % 4 -4 - 1 -6 
Ncl P~ofit /Share S I i  I< 130.86 -81.00 -29.13 1 2 0 . 6 9  
The data for 1990 ancl 1989 are not included because Gumon separated from Iiablo Bratislava 
only in 1990. The data for 1990 are thus not comparable with the data  for later years. 
The loss recorded in 1992-94 occurred primarily due to significant fall-backs in production. 
l l r e  t.olume of pro<luction shrinked bemuse of falling derna,nd a.s well as beca.use of Gumon's 
illability to pay for tlie purchased raw materials. The lack of cash was caused by the refusal of 
C;umon's 11anli to provide additional credits and by large volunles of unpaid claims of Gumon 
against the buj.ers of its products. The development of Gumon's accounts payable and accounts 
r.ecei\,able is recorded in tlie Table 8.20. The high shares of unpaid receivables indicate that the 
financial prol~lems of Guinon were originated to a great esteiit outside tlie company. 
Table 8.20: Development of Receivables and Payables from Business Activities 
Ci union Bratislava a s .  1991 1992 1993 1994 
.+~ccounts Receivable (SICK mil) 191.54 148.20 107.82 77.83 
after maturity 91.7 89.3 87.1 n.a. 
Accou~rts Payable (SIiIC mn)  191.91 165.79 124..54 120.77 
after maturity 91.5 100.0 92.0 n.a. 
The l~rocluction of Gumon further declined also because the producers of raw materials 
were occasionally unable to deliver the contracted materials. Tliese difficulties in  obtaining and 
pa1,ing for the inputs caused that  Gurnon was not able to fulfill certain cleliveries for either the 
tloniestic marliet or esports. 
-411 these factors contribute to the fact that i11 1994 Gumon was operating only a t  about 40% 
of its protluction capacity. The situation improved somewllat i n  early 199.5 when the capacity 
utilization rose to 50% for the first quarter. 
Characteristics of Production 
Tlie 111ain product category of Gumon is electrical insulation materials. This category repre- 
sei~ted 93'X, of the total output in 1992 and 88% in 1994. The insulation materials include 
m u l t i - l ~ e r  insulations (macle of paper, cloth or glass-cloth), insulations for the production of 
flat connectors (macle of paper, cloth or glass-cloth and covered by copper), varnished tapes 
(inacle of paper or cloth) and other products. The remaining prodriction includes pressed plastic 
products, i~npregnated paper and cloth. electrotechnical tools (for work protection) and pressing 
~~racliine tools. 
C;umon is the inoiiopoly producer of electrical insulatiorl materials in  Slovakia and it has a 
cloininant position a t  the Czech market as well (there is one local competing firm in the Czech 
Rt.l>ublic). However, due to opening of the borders in the recent past, C;umon currently faces 
conipetition from foreign producers as well. Moreover, the sales of the products of Gumon a t  
111r clomestic marliet decreased substantially in the make of tlie privatization and transformation 
of Tesla, formerly inajoi. Czechoslovak producer of electronics. 
Export Orieiltation 
T11e import,ance of esports increased recently. The exports partially ma,de up for tlie decline of 
tlie tlomest,ic clemancl. The break-up of the total sa,les is presented in Table 8.21. The sales in 
Cz~clioslova~liia, have the following structure: 63% in the Czech Republic and 37% in Slovakia. 
This relat.ionship has been relatively stable over the last few yews. While total sales declined 
significantly in 1994, esports rose not only in relative terms but also a,bsolutely. 
Ta.ble 8.21: Break-up of Sales, Gumon Bratis1a.w a s .  
C:uinon Bratislava a s .  1992 1993 1994 
Total Sales (SKIi mn) 199.01 203.02 169.62 
Czechoslovakia ( S I X  mn) 151.45 154.90 115.8.5 
Esports (SICIC mn) 47.56 48.12 5:3.'77 
Czechoslovakia~ (%I 76.1 76.3 68.3 
Esports (%I 23.9 23.7 31.7 
Since 1990 \vl~en Gumon l~ecame an independent enterprise, it en~l>hasized irect esporting. 
In 1994, o1il~. $.8'% of tlie esports were carried out through a lllediator (2.1% i n  1992 and 21.1% 
in 19913). Tlie conipa.ny secures tlie esports by its own staff and it does not have currently 
affilia.tions or representations a,broad. The esports to Western countries are usually contracted 
;11111ually. On the otlier hand, tlie demand in the countries of CEE and the former Soviet tinion 
is rather unsta.ble and thus a large portioii of exports is ad hoc. 
Ciunion esl>ort,s predo~nina,ntly to Europea,n countries. More tlmn lia,lf of tlie total esports 
\vent  to (;ermitn\l i n  1994. Tlie most importa.nt destinations are present,ed in  the Ta.l>le 8.22. 
Table 8.22: Destinatiolls of Esports 
(excluding Czech Republic) (96) 
C4union a.s. 1992 1993 1994 
Germany 39.0 34.0 5.5.7 
Hungary 10.0 8.0 10.2 
Switzerland 0.0 4.0 9.1 
U.K. 19.0 17.0 7.2 
.Austria 3.0 4.0 5.6 
Egypt 0.0 4.5 4.4 
Italy 0.0 3.0 2.7 
Greece 6.0 3.0 1.8 
France 0.0 1.0 1.5 
BENELUX 0.0 2.0 0.5 
Denmark 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Romania 3.0 .5.0 0.2 
Other 20.0 14.5 0.6 
I n  the future, the management of the company intends to further increase the sliare of esports 
in total production. Esports should reacli a t  least 33%). However, tlie sliare of es l~or ts  could be 
loivcr if  the t lom~stic delnand increases significantly. Gumon will attempt to Iiecp its position 
at tlir ~ilarliets i n  Western Europe. Gumon plans also to increase esports to Eastern European 
countries and the fornier Soviet Union, provided the payment ability and credibility of local 
enterprises improves. An increase of esports is quite likely with respect to I-Iungary, Romania 
ancl Polanel. 
Productioil for Exports 
Accol.tling to the ~llanagement, tlie quality of Gumon's products is co~llparable with its foreign 
competitors. The prices are in general lower. The main esport commoclities are layered insula- 
ti011 materials. The prices are deternlined separately according to the individual conditions for 
each country and/or buyer. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Thr  esl>ort,s of C4~1non are not restricted by the need of esport license. However, the financial 
posit,ion of C;unlon a.nd lience its ability to produce and esport is adversely affected by the current 
legal regula,t.ion of the due-added  ta.x a,nd customs procedures. When i~riporting raw ma,terials, 
the \'.AT and custolns duties have to be paid immediately. Ho\vever, in case tlie company is 
supposed to receive a. net IT.4T refund, it takes about two months until the refrllld evelltually 
arrives. This lia,pl>ens especially wlien tlie share of exports i n  total output is significant bemuse 
t.lie esl>o~.ts a,re ITAT ese~up t .  Furtliermore, tlie custorns procedures cause delays that rimy not 
alivays he sr~l>stantia,ted. In  effect, tlie disproportion between tlie scliedules of payment a.nd 
rcfuncl of tlie \',AT causes a. need for a,dditional fina,ncing. 
Tlie iilost iiiiporta~iit difficulty fa,ced by Guinon is the lack of cash. Although C;nmon so far 
iie\ler failed to fulfill its responsibilities with respect to  ~ ~ a y i n g  off ba,nk credits, it was unable to 
ol>ta,in new creclits recently. This is also true about export credits; however, C4umon wa,s able to 
use factoring to  finance exports. Gumon also a.pplied for export credits granted by the EBRD, 
l~o\\;e\:er, the recipients of this credit were determined by local ba.nks (not the EBRD itself) and 
Gumon wa,s not selected. 
The la,ck of credits is interrelated with the partia.1 ina.bility of Gumon to make timely pa.y- 
nients to its creclitors (see Section ICey Figures). This results in refusals by its suppliers to 
cleli~rer the in~>uts  necessa,ry for production. Some of tlie suppliers \\rho themselves ha.ve financial 
clifficulties fa.iled to cleliver a.t all. In effect, tlie output of Gumon declined significantly in 1994 
(see Table 8.19) and production of certain products was tempora,rily stopped even though there 
was deina.nd for tlieni. 
Foreign Eilviroilillent for Exports 
Tlie exports of C;unioii a,re not subjected to significant direct restrictions a t  the foreign markets. 
However, the requirements on enviroiinieiit friendliness presented a problem ancl required pur- 
cliases of aclclit,iona,l ~>roduction equipment. This outlay had an a,dverse effect upon the financial 
sit,ua.tion of C4umon clisc~issed above. 
Since it,s fonnding, C;umon a,tternpted to  reduce the number of media,tors a,nd get closer to 
tlie final user. Tlie potentia,l buyers are identified and selectecl through bra.nch specific jorlrnals 
a.ncl ~>ul>lica.tions, interna,tiona.l fa.irs and emba,ssies. C;nmon a,ttenlpted also direct contacting of 
poteiit,ial clients, however, with little success. 
The pa,yments conditioiis are in general 30, 60 or 90 days. C;union is solving the fiiia.ncing of 
this periocl I>y offering discounts based on ea.rly payment a.s well a,s by utilizing bank factoring. 
IInlil<e niany other Slovak enterprises, Gumon was not significantly affected by the demise of 
tlie CME.4. Soviet Union a.nd other Eastern Eur0pea.n countries were not extremely important 
for tlie sales of Gumon. More significant effect followed from tlie split of Czeclioslovakia. New 
atliniiiistra~tive ba,rriers a.rose despite the esta.blis1iment of tlie customs union. Nevertl~eless, tlie 
traditional rela.tionships with old partners continue also until present. 
Henkel Palma s.r.o., Bratislava 
Heiikel Palma s.r.0. is a joint venture founded by Henkel Austria and Palina Tumys a.s. 
Bratislava. Ilenliel Palnia s.r.0. is the leading Slovak producer of detergents ancl tlie compaily is 
also respo~isible for marketing otlier products of Henkel International. According to its annual 
turnover, He~lliel Palina s.r.0. ranked 70th in the TREND T O P  100 cliart of Sloval< enterprises 
(TREND 2.5/95, P. 3C). I-leilliel Palnia s.r.0. is located in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. 
History, Transforlllation and Ownership 
Fouiida,tion of Heilkel Palina wa.s a result of the efforts of Henkel Interna.tiona,l to  penetrate 
the iiia.rliets i ~ i  CEE. Already prior to 1989, Heiikel 1nterna.tioiia~l esta.blis1ied representations 
i11 tlie CEE countries. Tlie represeiltatioiis were responsible for nlarketiilg Henliel's products 
i~iiportecl froill abroad. After tlie liberalization of tlre economies, Heilkel 1nteriia.tional attempted 
t,o esta.blis1i joint velit,ures with local producers. Henkel Pa,l~na was founded in 1991 as a joiiit 
venture bet~veen Henkel Austria., a daughter company of Henkel International, and Palnla Tumys, 
one of tlie lea,ding Czeclioslova.li producers of detergents (a,s well as otlier products). 
C1oopera,tion mitli a domestic producer ena.bled Heilkel Internationa~l t'o better penetra.te tlie 
iiiarliet, a,iid, ~ilost important, to take over establislled products (the effect of t.liis strategy is 
I>c.st reflected i11 the fact that  four years after Heilkel Pal~rla wa,s founded, a.11 original laundry 
tlet,erge~it of Pa,lina Tumys - Palmes - is still the leading brand in Slovaliia,, eve11 though 
Henliel iiit.roduced its own detergents in Slovakia as well). Tlie stake of Helike1 International 
in  fleiiliel Palma is 51% while Palma Tumys holds 49%. Heilkel Palma also took over tlie 
tletergent protloctioii fa,cility of Pa,llila Tumys in Novk Mesto (presently, Pa,lnia Tumys itself is 
iiot ~>roclnciiig detergents). 
See also tlie ca.se study of Palma Tuinys a.s. for a related enterprise. 
Key Figures 
'The 199-4 turnover was SIiII; 1015,G million and the gross profit was SIiIi 134.1 nlillion. The 
tur~iol-er. according to the management, does not fluctuate from year to  year significantly. The 
lal~or force nTa5 250 i11 1994. The shareholders' equity is SIiII; 678 million. 
Note: 'I'lie management did not wish to disclose any additional inforinatioii otlier that tlie 
a I > O V C .  
Characteristics of Production 
'The protluction of Henkel Palma consists of laundry and dish detergents. Ilenkel Palma is 
~>rotiuciiig bot,li t,lie tra,ditioiial brands taken over from Palma. Tumys - for example Palnies 
- a,s well a.s the original bra.nds of Henkel International such as Persil. Nevertheless, the 
I>rancls t,a,ke~i over from Pa.lma Tumys underwent changes in  the production tecllilology since the 
company nras established. 
Besides tlie production of detergents, Henkel Palma is also responsible for distribution of 
other protlucts of Heiikel Iiiternatiolial imported form other member con~pa,nies of tlie Group. 
Tlicse a,re in pa,rticular cosmetics, glues, and other items. Heiikel Palma, was origiiia,lly intended 
lo cover t,lie elit,ire territory of Czeclioslovaliia. After the split of the federa.tion in  1993, Henliel 
Paln~a est~a.blislied a 100%) daughter company in  Pra,gue and still 1ia.s a sigiiifica~it position a.t 
the Clzecli iilarliet. 
I-Ieiiliel Palma enjoys a, dominant positioii in the Slovak market with ctetergeilts a,nd a sig- 
~lifica~it position i11 the Czech market. The market shares are a,bout 40% in Slovakia and 20% 
i n  1 llc Czec.11 Republic. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
'The share of csports ranges between 30%-40% of tlie total turnover. Most of tlie esports are 
suppliecl to  tlie Czecli market since Henkel Palma has been originally intended to cover the 
entire fecleration. Rather sliiall volumes of detergents are also exported to other countries. 
Ne~~ertlleless, tliese esports are limited to the CEE region, especially Poland, Hungary and 
Au5tria. Esports are organized directly, using the member companies of tlie Group. 
Productioil for Exports 
Tlie production of Henkel Palma fully respects the quality standards of Henlie1 International. 
Tlie prices are cleteriiiined in accordance with tlie trade policies of tlie Group. Tliere is no 
relevant difference between the production for the domestic market and exports. 
The impact of tlie foreign partner in tlie joint venture (when compared with tlie situation 
of tlie (letergelit production unit in the past) is especially apparent i n  the ability to esport 
ant1 access to  foreign markets via the Group structures. Tlie partnership also enabled the joint 
\ ~ n t u r e  to  use tlie production technologies of Helike1 International. Finally, financial situation 
n.as affected sr~bstaiitially as well. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Tllc business xtivi t ies a,nd esports of Henkel Palma a.re not, directly restrictecl in Slovakia. 
Nevert~heless, a.11 indirect restriction is presented by the VAT regula.tion, particularly refunding 
of the net VAT claim. Tlie company also feels a.n absence of ally form of government i~ivolvement 
i n  promotion of exports and/or of an active pro-export policy. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
'I'lie esport,s of Heiiliel Pa,lma a,re not subjected to many direct restrictions abroad. Tliere are no 
cluota,s for t,he esports of cletergents in tlie relevalit ~na,rliets aiid the tariffs are about 4% in  tlie 
C:EFTA countries. However, Heiikel Pa.lma presently feels a, rising degree of prot~ectioiiisi~l in  the 
C'EFT,4 couiit,ries; in  pa,rticula.r in Hu1iga.r~ where recently a.n inlport surcharge wa.s introduced. 
Tlie a b i l i t ~  of I-Ie~iliel Palina 1va.s a.lso adversely affected by the fa,ct tha,t Austria. became an 
E l i  iileiiil~er. Tliis puts a.dditiona1 complicatioi~s on esports aiid ~nakes tlie flow of goods lllore 
clifficult. 
I-Ie~iliel Pa.lma is a,lso facing indirect a,dmiiiistra,tive restrictions. This i~icludes especially a, 
recluireiiieiit of rcgistra,tioii of ea,ch product in tlie country of destina,tion. The acl~ninistrative 
procecl~~re implies a,ii a,dditional espeiise and a delay. There are a.lso quite sig~iifica,~it d fferences 
i l l  recluirenrent,~ on product iiiforma,tion sta.ted on the packa,ge. 
Hirocem a.s., Rohoznik 
IIirocem a.s. Rohoznili is one of the  most important producers of cement in Slovakia and the  only 
producer of white cement in former Czecl~oslovakia. According t o  the total turnover, Hirocem 
a.s. ranked 5.5th in 1994 and 69th in 1993 in the TREND T O P  100 chart of Slovali companies 
(TREND 2.5/9.5, P. 3C). Hirocem is located in Rohoznik in itTestern Slovakia. 
History, Transforillatioil and Ownership 
I-Iirocem was a state-owned enterprise until 1992 when it was transformed t o  a joint,-stock com- 
I>any. Tlie company was then privatized by a combination of privatization methods: 30% of 
tlie sliares lvere distributed via t he  voucher privatization and 34..5%1 were later purchased by 
Ilol<lerbank Financiere Glarus AC; - a Swiss company specializing in production of construc- 
tion niaterials. Holderbank was further given the right t o  purchase additional shares until 1996 
up t o  tlie limit of .51% of the total shareholders' equity. The  ownership structure as  of the  end 
of 199-1 is presented in Table 8.23. 
Table 8.23: Ownership Structure, as of end 199-1 (76) 
Holderban k 3 1 
Fliiid of National Property 2 9 
Investment Funds 2 2 
Individuals - I 
Restitution Investment Fund 2 
Key Figures 
Ta,ble 8.24: Iiey Figures, Hirocem a.s. Rohoznili 
Hirocem a.s. Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Turnover 1 n 700 800 1250 1390 1496 
Gross Profit S l i I i  nln 10 30 88 1.53 129 
13rofit/Turnover 76 1.43 3.75 7.OG 10.9s S.65 
Labor Force 1020 874 
Not,e: The inforn1at.ion in this case study stems mainly from reports and 
analyses published in the press. We were not able to obtain sufficient 
information directly from t,he enterprise. The figures for t,urnover ant1 gross 
profit for 1990 and 1991 are rounded and hence only approximate. 
Characteristics of Production 
'Tlic production of Hirocem includes extraction and processing of lin~estone, production of lime 
ant1 especially cement. Hirocem produces three kinds of cement: Portland cement, white cement 
and colored cenient. The  output  also includes some other related products. 
I'ortlantl gray cement accounts for some 80% of the total ou tput ,  Lvliite cement makes up 
lo'%, wliile tlie remaining products account for the rest. Hiroceln is the only producer of white 
cenient in former Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the competition in the  production of 
gray celllent is quite intense as  there are seven producers in Slovakia. In addition, currently the 
lel.el of domestic sales is far below tlie overall capacity of the industry (4 million tons while the  
tlonlestic sales are only 1..5 lnillion tons annually). 
The  competitiveness of Hirocem was threatened by the  increasing energy prices after 1990. 
The conlpan!. therefore undertook substantial investment into production technologies securing 
lower costs. T l ~ e  new facility also allows for using several different fuel liinds so  a s  t o  take 
advantage of nlarliet price fluctuations. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
A great part of tlie ou tput  of Hirocem goes a t  present for esports: the share of esports  is Fj.5- 
60%). Tlie esport  orientation was further strengthened by the o~ igo i~ ig  recession in the Slovak 
construction inclustry, saturation of the domestic market and bad financial situation of the Slovak 
eliter[>rises. T h e  most important esport  markets of Hirocern are Gernia~iy. tlie Netherlands, 
13elgium arid Austria. 
Productioil for Exports 
Hirocem is tlie only producer of white cement in Slovakia. Overall. tlicre are only tliree producers 
of white cement in Europe other than Hirocem. This makes the situation particularly favorable 
for esports  of this commodity. Currently, 80% of the white cement output  is esported ~vliile this 
4 a r c  is 60% in the case of Portland cement. 
Tlie greatest conipetitive strength of Hirocem in exporting t o  Western European countries 
i~ low production costs, in particular low wages and energy costs. 
Doillestic Eilviroili~leilt for Exports 
Tlle esports  of Hirocem are riot presently restricted by Slovak reg~la t~ ions .  
Foreign Eilvironilleilt for Exports 
'The ~~roclucers  ancl esporters of cement in CEE are freque~itly accused of clumping. Tlie rationale 
for this is niainly the fact t ha t  the energy prices are in a greater or s~nal ler  es ten t  still supported 
I >J~  the govern~llents of tliese countries. Tlie antidumping proceclures are often accompanietl by 
( teni l~orary)  restrictions on esports .  
Hydronika a.s., Brat islava 
Introduction 
Ilyclro~lilia a s .  is the leading producer of hydraulic cylinders in former Czechoslovakia. Hy- 
clronika is a n~iddle size company located in Bratislava, the capital of Slovak Republic. 
History, Trailsforillation and Owilership 
liytl~~onika \va,s origi~~a.lly fouiided in 1897. During the post-war period until 1992 it wa.s a state- 
o\vned enterprise. In May 1992, the enterprise was transformed into a joint-stock company. Tlle 
conlpa.ny 1va.s t.lien privatized in the first wave of voucher privatization during 1992. Tlle voucher 
priva.tiza.tio11 was the only method used and 97%; of the shareholders' equity was offered t.o the 
voucher investors wliile 3%' remained in the Restitution Priva.tization Fund. .After the end of 
t , l~e  \mr~cher priva,tizatioii, 11.85% of the sha.res remained undistributed a.nd continued thus t o  
I>e l~eltl by ~11e  Fund of Na,tional Property of the Slovak Republic. I n  addition, the share of the 
FNP \va,s further increased due to a raise in tlle shareholders' equity resulting froin a revaluation 
of t,he co~nl)a,ny's a,ssets. The structure of ownership stemming from the coupon privatization is 
tlisl>la,yetl in Ta.ble 8.2.5. On the other hand, the share of the FNP wa.s decrea.sed later in 1993. 
'l'lre slia,re of the FNP was reduced by SIiIi 50 million (i.e., from SIiIi 498.8 million t o  SKI< 
.I-LS.8 million) t o  co~npensa,te for the losses suffered in 1992. 
Table 8.2.5: Structure of Ownership a,nd its Development (%) 
Hydronika a.s. 1993/~~"993" 1994" 
Funtl of National Propertya 22..5 13.9 13.9 
1111-estment Funds 60.1 66.8 66.9 
Individuals 17.4 19.3 19.3 
"Includes the share of tlie Restitution Investment. Fund; 
b~tt.uct,ure of ownership st,ernming from t,he voucher privat,izat,ion; 
'End of t,he year. 
The 111ost ilnportant owners of Hydronika are investment funtls. Significant stalies are held 
1)). the follo\ving investnlent funds (percentage shares as of end of 1994 in parentheses): PSIPS 
(20.:3'%,). IF Divitlend (lS.T%)), IPF  Ister (16..5%), Tatra kupon fond (-5.6%)) and Agrospol (3.9%). 
Key Figures 
Tal~lc 8.26: Iie). Figures, Hydronika a.s. Bratislava 
Hydronilia a.s. Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Turnover SIiI i  mn 428.48 831.10 197.77 125.79 166.45 
(iross Profit SIiIi mil 14.33 274.95 -104.10 -60.87 -10.77 
r 1 lot 211 :Issets S I I  1 1  752.77 1244.50 969.87 951.88 952.71 
Equity SIiI i  mn 537.48 ,571.77 535.31 466.57 521.67 
Long-Term Liabilities SIiI i  mn n.a. 11 .a. .51.97 20.84 20.84 
Current Liabilities SIiIi mn 215.29 672.73 382.59 464.46 310.20 
L,lbor Force 1777 1324 805 468 420 
l'roflt /Trlrno\.er '% 3 33 -53 4 8 6 
Piofit/Assets % 2 2 2 -11 -6 - 1 
Se t  Profit/Sl~are S I i  I i  n.a. n.a. 208 .72  1 5 1 . 2 1  -22.65 
T l ~ e  clccline in tlie work force in 1991 and 1992 resulted fro111 tlle restructuring of the company 
a5 \it.Il as from organizational changes. The decline of the work force in 1991 for ~ s a i n p l e  i~lcluded 
.I2S enll>lo!,ce5 \vho ceased to  be registered as einployees of Hydronika since certain units had 
Ixen taken out of the company. Furtherniore, in September 1992 a production unit located 
outside of Bratislava, wa.s sold. Tliis 1ia.d an impact upon both work force as well a.s turnover i n  
t I I C  sul~secluent years. These organizational changes alid changes resulting from transformation 
affecteel other figures as well (e.g. total assets). 
Despite rather high accounting profit, the overall financial situation deteriorated in 1991 and 
Hyclronika became insolvent. This was pa.rticularly due to its inability to  collect payments for 
cleliveries of goods to  the former USSR (this transaction was realized, however, based on an 
official agree~iient betiveen the governments of the two countries). The unrecovered claiin was a 
subhtantial one: CSIi 310.,5 million (37.4% of the total 1991 turnover). Further reasons were the 
decline of cloinestic sales tliat started in 1991 and the collapse of exports to  tlie USSR in  and 
after 1992. Finally, some of the domestic buyers of Hydronika's proclucts becanle themselves 
insolvent. 
Table S.27: Selected Financial Indicators, Hydronika a.s. Bratislava 
(SIiIi mn) 
Fillancia1 Situation 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
12ccounts Receivable n.a.. 403.7 385.7 352.1 346.7 
after maturity n.a. 372.9 n.a. 11.a. n.a. 
after maturity, abroad n.a. 294.1 310..5 310..5 310.5 
Accounts Payable 62.1 131.5 1.54.2 3:31.5 3'26.9 
after maturity n.a. 110.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Co~lsolidation Bank 217.4 217.4 
Credits after maturity n.a. 40.0 61.1 43.4 6.5.6 
[Inpaid taxes n.a. 83.1 106.2 65.7 0.2 
Inventories 131.2 133.4 86.8 104.5 116.7 
Due to  tlie critical lack of casli accompanied by a decline in  sales, Hydronika became unable to  
pay due credits ant1 taxes and even trade liabilities. Tliis in  turn further deepened its financial 
~)robleiils since tllc creditors started to  apply sanction charges and sonle suppliers refused to  
provicle any adclitional deliveries. I11 September 1993, Hydroilika was forced to  file for protectioil 
r~ncler the I>ankruptcy I~gislature. In subsequent negotiations with tlie creditors it was agreed 
that tlle payment of due credits and taxes would be postponed until other liabilities are settled 
alltl tlle baillis would reduce the interest rates. The trade liabilities \\ere to  be paid off within 
a fi1.e year period. Finally, all creditors were to refrain fro111 sanctions for unpaid liabilities 
that had arisen i n  and before 1993. In addition, Hydronilia received a long-term loan from tlie 
C'oiisolidation Banli (a state-owned bank established for solving financial probleills of state-run 
ancl previous1 state-run enterprises) in 1993. The volunie of the loan corresponds to 70% of 
the \~olume of t Ile claims in the former Soviet Union. Finally, the Finance Alinistry decided in 
1994 tliat tlle debt resulting from tlle unpaid 1991 incollie tax would be annulled. At present, 
Hyclronilia is able to  fulfill its trade liabilities and is gradually paying off tlle liabilities and 
cietlits froill the past. 
Characteristics of Production 
Tlie inain output of I-Iydronilia is linear hydraulic motors/cylinders. Other activities include 
service and repair of hydraulic cylinders, production of tools and newly introduced production 
of snlall cars for children. The structure of output is displayed in Table 3.28. The company is 
the elominant producer of hydraulic cylinders in former Czecl~osloval~ia. Its market share is 29%) 
n.itli respect to the overall volunle of sales and 42% with respect to  the nuniber of cylinders sold. 
Presently. IIyclronil<a is operating at about 70% of its production capacity. 
Ta,ble 8.28: St,ructure of Output, Hydronika a.s. Bra.tisla,va 
Output Structure Unit 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Hydraulic Cylinders pcs. n.a. 16928 10734 17542 
Hydraulic Cylinders SKI< nin 460.42 189.44 102.72 102.14 
% 97.8 97.0 92.3 92.2 
Tools SIiI< mn 2.04 0.52 1.68 1.22 
% 0.4 0.3 1.5 1.1 
Repairs SKI< 111n 4.53 3.77 4.29 4.63 
7%) 1 .O 1.9 3.9 4.2 
Other Services SIiI< mn 3.80 1.63 2.54 2.79 
% 0.8 0.8 2.3 2.5 
Total Output SI(I( mn 470.80 195.36 111.23 110.77 
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: To ensure comparability, the figures in Table 8.28 relating to  1391 and 1993 
inclucle only the output, of the production facilit,y in Bratislava. Reporting the 
output of t,he production facility in Dunajska Streda could distort the overall 
picture as  the facility was sold in 1992. 
Export Oriei~tation 
I'rior to 1989, about 60% of production of Hydronika was exported to tlie former Soviet Union 
nliile the rest was sold in tlie domestic market. However, the exports to tlie former Soviet 
IInion nearly stopped after the collapse of tlie CMEA due to  absence of an appropriate payinelits 
iuechaiiisn~ as well as lacli of the government coordination. I n  addition, after 1991 tlie domestic 
sales tlecliiied as well. To make up for tlie loss of sales a t  tlie domestic nlarliet and in  the Soviet 
ITnion. Hyclronilia started to pursue an active export policy toward \%'ester11 European countries 
(Table 8.29). 
Table 5.29: Breali-up of Sales and Structure of Exports, Hydronika a.s. Bratislava 
(SIiIi i ~ i ~ i / % ~ )  
Bl.ca,li-up of 
Total Sales 1991 % 1992 % 19913 (rc, 1994 %I 
Tota,l Sa,les 787.73 100.0 123.95 100.0 109.02 100.0 1.52.45 100.0 
Czeclloslovaliia 472.77 60.0 103.56 83.5 95.99 88.0 136.08 89.2 
Slo\.a.liia, n.a,. n.a.. n.a,. n .a,. 63.82 .58..5 8.5.96 56.4 
('zecli R ~ p u  blic 11.a. n.a. 11.a. n.a. 32.17 29..5 FjO.12 32.9 
Esport,s 314.96 40.0 20.39 16..5 13.03 12.0 16.40 10.8 
I3rea.k-up of Exports 1991 % 1992 % 1993 % 1994 % 
Tota,l Exports 314.96 100.0 20.39 100.0 13.03 100.0 16.40 100.0 
Former l 6 S R  
/Russia, 307.53 9 7  0.00 0.0 5.07 38.9 2.08 12.7 
C;er~lla.n?; n.a,. n.a. 14.48 71.0 5.60 42.9 8.67 52.8 
Fra,ncc 1i.a. n.a. 0.12 0.6 0.07 0.5 .5.07 30.9 
.Austria, 11.a. 11.a. 2.13 10.4 1.19 9.1 0.58 3.5 
Ita.ly n.a. n.a. 1.81 8.9 0.10 0.8 0.00 0.0 
Forn~er lFugoslavia 1i.a. n.a. 0.01 0.1 0.14 1.0 0.00 0.0 
Norway 11.a. 1i.a. 1.84 9.0 0.86 6.6 0.00 0.0 
Ot,ller 7.43 2.4 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
Note: To ensure comparability, the figures in Table 8.38 relating to 1991 and 1992 include only the out,put of 
t,lie l>l~otluct~ion facility in Brat,islava. Reporting the output of t.he production facility in Dunajslca Streda 
c-oultl tlist,ort. the overall picture as the facility was sold in 1992. 
C'urrently, direct esporting makes up about 90% of the total esports  while tlie remaining 
10% are esportetl through mediators. Most of the buyers are large enterprises. Tlie espor t s  are 
niainly basetl oil long-term contracts. In the past, however, ad lioc esporting was also used. 
Tlie management sees the main future prospects in increasing esports  t o  the  former Soviet 
lliiioii, i11 particular to  Russia. On the other hand, exports to  iliestern Europe (especially 
C~erniaiiy) ~vill be important in the sliort run - until tlie situation in tlie doillestic rnarket and 
i11 the  for~iier So\.iet Union inlproves. The  long-term possibilities for esports  to  ifrestern Europe 
a le  limited l~ecause the niarket is already saturated. It is hence espected tha t ,  in the  long run, 
lialf of the proclucts will be sold in tlie domestic market (i.e., former Czecl~oslovakia) while the 
other lialf \\rill be esported mainly to  the former Soviet Union. Sucli a structure of ou tput  will 
allow tlie coinpany t o  use its entire production capacity. 
Iii accordance with these espectations, Hydronika inte~ids to  keep and build on its present 
position a t  the Russia~i inarket. In 199.5, the exports to  Russia were espected to  malie up 5% 
of tlie total sales. Tliis sliare is supposed to  increase further in tlie future. To strengthen its 
position a t  tlie Russian market, Hydronika recently founded a joint venture in Russia. The  joint 
1 enture slioulcl Iiave an important effect particularly on facilitating the  paynients for esports .  
Tlie niaiiageinent believes tliat the position a t  tlie Russian marliet gives Hyclronil<a a strategic 
a t l~antage .  I11 tlie future, this advantage could be used either directly by Hydronika or in 
cooperation with a Western producer of related or complementary products. 
TIie position of Hydronika a t  the Czech market is not espectecl to  wealien despite the split 
of tlie federation due to  the fact tha t  tlie products Hydronika esports  there are not otlierwise 
producetl in tlie Czecli Republic. 
Productioil for Exports 
I n  general, the  quality of tlie esported products is good ~vliile the prices are lower by some 
30% than tliose of tlie co~npetiiig products. However, the cluality could be threatened by tlie 
p~eseiit  lo~v level of in\estment into production equipment and technologies. Overall, the  quality 
of esportetl ancl tlo~ilestically sold products do  not differ significantly. Production for exports 
~ o m e t i ~ n e s  iequires ran- materials of higher quality, though. The  profitability of domestically 
w l c l  p1ot1uct.s is higher than in the case of esports  due t o  the greater influence upon prices. This 
l ) cca~~se  of tlie tlominant position of Hydronika a t  the domestic malllet (including tlie Czecli 
RepuI)lic). 
Domestic Environment for Exports 
'Tlic esports  of Hytlronilia are  not subjected t o  esport licenses. I11 general, go\.ernnient policy 
of esport  support a ~ i d  esport  incentives is presently lion-existent. Tliis puts Hydronika t o  a 
tlisadvantageous position relative to  its competitors from countries wliere the national govern- 
Iiients 1ia1.e such policies. Furthermore, the regulation of the VAT implies an additional financial 
recluiremeiit - in general VAT refunding takes several months. Hytlronika also frequently faces 
clifficrilties wlien arranging export credits since the procedure is lengthy and the  interest rates 
are cltiite high. Tlie requirements the banks put on securi~ig the credits are  liigli, too. Finally, 
t Ire productio~i is occasionally hindered by inflexibility on the  side of Hydronika's suppliers of 
ra1v inaterials. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
l'lie esports  of Hytlronika are presently not subjected to  escessive foreign restrictions such 
as  tariffs or quotas. However, some of the Western European competitors receive significant 
\r~l~siclies froin their national governments. This makes it possible for tliem t o  sell their products 
a t  lo~ver prices. Hydronika has not been receiving similar subsidies froill tlie Slovali government 
recently. 
IIyclronilia secures its exports primarily by directly contacting tlie potential buyers. T h e  
~)otential IIuyers are identified a t  international fairs, froni industry-specific publications and 
u j)on recolii~lle~lclatioils of present t rade partners. 
The  ~ ~ a y m e n t s  conditiolls iinply a disproportioii between tlie payment periods on inputs 
(ilnnlecliately or  up t o  14 days after tlie delivery) and exports (in general 30 t o  45 days after the 
cleli~.ery). Hydronika covers this difference by export credits but obtaining them is difficult (see 
a l~ove  section on Domestic Environment for Exports).  
Tlie split of C'zeclioslovakia did not weaken Hydronika's position significantly. Ilowever, the 
paj.nlents arrallgelllelits illlply an additional delay in clearing the payments froni one republic 
to  the other.  
In tlie future, tlie mallagemelit expects an  increase of protectionism in \Vestern Europe. 
This protectionism will likely stem from social problems and intentions t o  protect local markets 
against "low cost imports from CEE". T h e  alternative for Hydronika will tllell be exporting t o  
the former Soviet Union. 
Hyelronilia is presently seeking a foreign partner willing t o  acquire a stake in the company. 
Tlir presence of tlie foreign partner is expected t o  improve Hydronilia's fillancia1 situation and 
its access to  niodern technologies. 
Incheba JSC, Bratislava 
Iiiclieba joint-stock company (JSC) organizes national aiid interna.tiona1 esliibitions and fairs 
a,nd provides services related to pa,rticipation of domestic a.s well as foreign companies a t  fairs 
a,nd eshibit,ions botli in Slovakia. and abroad. Inclieba is a middle size company located in 
13rat,isla.va,, the ca.pita.1 of Slovakia. 
History, Trailsforillation and Owilership 
Iiiclieba was founded in 1971. Tlie purpose of its presence was to support Czechoslovak foreign 
trade by means of organizing fairs and exhibitions as well as providing publicity and advertise- 
~neiit services to domestic enterprises. Tlie services were to be provided botli doinestically and 
a l~road.  
IVliile Inclieba was originally founded as a state-owned enterprise, it was transformed into a 
joint-stocli conipany in 1989. Tlie shareholders of Iiiclieba became Slovak and Czecli enterprises. 
I11 1992, tlie reiiiai~iiiig part of the sliares was privatized through tlie voucher method. Presently, 
ST'%;, of Inclieba's sliares are owned by Slovak enterprises aiid individuals (including 10% owned 
11). its ei~~ployees) while 13% are owned by Czecli enterprises aiid indivicluals. 
Key Figures 
Table 5.:30: Iiey Figures, Incheba JSC 
. <, 
















S Ii Ii 
Characteristics of Productioil 
Tllc services offered by Inclieba JSC include (see a,lso Table 8.32): 
a organizing regular national and international fairs and exhibitions in Bratisla.va as well as 
i n  other cit.ies throughout former Czec1ioslova.kia; 
a organizing company presentations in Slovakia and/or abroacl, including seininars and con- 
feren ces; 
a orga,nizing company participations a t  fairs a.nd esliibitions abroad; 
a organizing present~a.tions of Slovak enterprises a t  selected foreign fa.irs aiid esliibitions (tlie 
presentations are filialiced by tlie Slovak government as a way of supporting esports); 
a tlesign. procluction and installation of company booths aiid esliibitions a t  fairs aiid eslii- 
I~itions: 
a consult i~~g services - selecting appropriate fairs and csliibitions ahroad, reco~un~endatioiis 
on size ailcl type of esliibits, etc.; 
ot l~c r  acti\'ities, such as operating a hotel ancl a restaurant. 
Table 8.31: Structure of Turnover 1992-94 
Turnover Structure (SI\:I\: mn) 1992 % 1993 %I 1994 % 
Total Tul.nover 297.6 100.0 370.0 100.0 3.59.0 100.0 
Fairs and Esliibitions 23Fj.l 79.0 294.8 79.7 288.3 80.3 
cloinestic 199.1 66.9 262.9 71.1 1.59..5 44.4 
a broada 36.0 12.1 31.9 8.6 128.8 3.5.9 
Lea.se of Premises 
Hot,el k Restaura.nt 
Itet,a.il Sales of Cioods 
Other Revenues 1i.a. 1i.a. .5.9 1.6 
- 
"Since 190-1 includes also fairs and exhibitions taking place in the Czech Republic. 
.+Is is also apparent from Table 8.32, the main activity of Inclieba is organizing fairs and 
eshil~itions ant1 relateel services. I11 1994, Inclieba organized 20 fairs and esliibitioiis in Bratislava, 
15 fairs a~icl esliibitions in Prague and two fairs i n  Iiosice (Slovakia). Besides renting tlie 
esliibit area, liiclieba also provides its client with a full range of services such as communication 
ecluipinei~t, production and/or installation of the exhibits, etc. Approxima,tely one-third of tlie 
clients use Incliel>a's services for production and design of tlie exhibits while two-thirds use their 
own staff and resources for this purpose. Tlie main results of the fairs and esliibitions organized 
I)!. Inclicl>a are summarized in Table 8.32. Table 8.33 then brings basic information regarding 
tlie iiiost iiilportant fairs in 1994. 
Taljle 5.32: Overview of Results of Fairs and Esliibitions Orgailizecl by Iiiclieba 
Fairs ancl Esliibitions Unit 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total Revenuc S I<I< 111 11 174.3 235 295 288 
17isi t ors thousands 212.0 483..5 487.5 632.7 
Number of Esliibitors 1482 3101 3367 4051 
Do~nestic Esliibitors 814 1.510 1432 2070 
Foreig~~ Esliil>itors 668 1.59 1 193.5 1981 
Total Rcntetl .Area square meters 36864 6314.5 74580 7966.5 
Doniestic Esliibitors scluare meters 24299 46605 4102.5 47736 
Foreign Esliil~itors square meters 12565 16540 335.55 31929 
Do~uestic Esliil>itors %) 65.9 73.8 55.0 -59.9 
Fol.eigii Eshibitors % 34.1 26.2 4.5.0 40.1 
Tlie iiiost pro~ninent international fair organized by Iilclleba has been the Iriter~iational 
C'l~cmical Fair Inclieba. Tlie Inclieba Fair took place for the first time in 1969. When Incheba 
coiiil>aiiy was established in  1971, the Inclieba Fair was the primary purpose of its esistence. The 
Inclieha Fair was the only international commercial fair specializing in tlie chemical industry 
i n  Europe. T l ~ e  iniportance of the Inclieba Fair was further enhanced by tlie fact that  it was 
tlie main fol.uiii where \Vestern firms could make contacts and negotiate directly with the enter- 
l ) ~ i ~ e s  f ~ o ~ n  tlie CEE countries, and vice versa. However, this role of tlie Inclieba Fair declined 
~ig~~if icant ly  after tlie collapse of tlie socialist regimes in CEE. Tlie opening of tlie borders ancl 
lilje~alization of tlie foreign trade in CEE created new possibilities for firms to riialie contacts 
clirectly. Hence. tlie volume of contracts made a t  the fair declined in 1990 to approsimately half 
of tlie 1959 volume, after having grown quite steadily since the fair was established in 1971. 
0 1 1  tlie other I~aiid, wliile tlie liberalization and economic transition caused a decline in 
i~iiportaiice of tlie Inclieba Fair, a t  tlie same time it created new opportunities in other areas. 
\\'liile i n  1991, Inclicba JSC organized 9 fairs and esliibitions, it organized 24 fairs and esliibitioiis 
i n  1992 ancl 19913, 32 fairs and esliibitions in  1993 and 46 fairs and esliibitions were planned 
f o ~  1995. Tlie effect of tlie economic liberalization upon the activities of Inclieba are well 
clen~onstrated by tlie developments of the recorded profits. While tlie total cumulated profits 
recorcled cluring tlie existence of Incheba in years 1971-1990 were CSIi 69.9 million, this was by 
far excretled by the profits recorded in 1991 (CSIi 147.2 million) and subseque~lt years. 
Tal~le S.33: hlajor International Fairs 0rga.nized by Incheba in 1994 
Eshib. 
Selrctecl Fairs Area % Eslii bitors Countries Subject 
Slovaliiatoul. 4500 4.2 2.56 1 5 Tourism 
Intertecli 2300 2.1 5 8 5 Eilgineering 
C'oneco 11 188 10.3 45.5 12 Construction 
Incheba 7200 6.6 274 19 Chenlical Industry 
Autosalorl 7874 7.3 132 4 Automobiles 
1iitel.national 
Danul>ian Fair 3650 3.4 170 G Consumer Goods 
Slovmedica 3500 3.2 179 15 Medical Products 
C'hristmas 
hlarliet 2800 2.6 220 5 Consumer Goods 
Total 1'394 108293 100.0 4186 
Export Orielltatioll 
Since Inchel~a .JSC is a company operating in the service sector, its exports are specific. Hence, 
exports sllolild be defined as services sold to foreign buyers. The sliare of esports can be best 
clefined as the share of the exhibit area rented to foreign companies (see Table 8.33). This figure 
has been fluctuating between 26% and 4.5% during the last four years. Tlie changes i n  the export 
sliarr are probably iilfluencecl also by differences in the occurrence of certaiil fairs. I11 particular, 
the C'oneco International Fair (construction materials) took place i n  1991 and 1993 but not in 
1992 tvlien the share of esports dropped to 26%. 
Dolllestic Ellvirollllle~lt for Exports 
Due to their specific nature, Incheba's services are not subjected to ally particular form of 
1.egulatioi1 in  Slova.liia,. I11 fact, Incheba receives indirect support froin the Slovak government 
in Llla,t it is commissioned to secure official presentations of tlie S1ova.k Republic and selected 
Slovak companies abroad. However, the funding for this purpose is often not sufficieiltly high 
ant1 tlic undertaliing may actually be not profitable for Iilclleba aft,er all. 
The eco~loinic tra.nsition and an overall liberalization of the economy brought an increase in 
the importa.11ce of fa.irs a.nd eshibitions. New con1pa.nies started to engage i n  organizing fa,ii~s a,nd 
rshibit,ions a,nd the intensity of competition increa.sed. Currently, there is a la.ck of coordination 
among the orga.nizers of various fairs. There is a substantial over1a.p in the specific orientation 
(commotlity ca,t'egory or industry branch) of fairs organized by the particular firms. Moreover, 
the da,t,es of the fairs frecluently collide a,s ~vell - for exa,mple, there were seven different fairs 
aiicl eshibitions in three cities during the same week in June 1994. The time collisions appear 
sometimes to  be a,ctually discretionary. 
Foreign E~lvirolllllellt for Exports 
The lil>eralization of the economy brought an upsurge i n  tlie participation of foreign companies 
at fairs ancl exhibition in Slovaliia and the Czech Republic. At the nlost important international 
fairs (such as C'oneco i n  Bratislava), the foreign exhibitors may account for as much as nearly 
one-half of the total number of eshibitors. The sales of Incheba's services are not significantly 
affect~d by foreign regulations. On the contrary, in some countries the local coiiipanies receive 
sul~siclie~ for participation a t  fairs abroad. This is, for example, the case in Austria where 
tlie Austrian C'hamber of Comrnerce reimburses the local companies for the  cost of renting the  
eshibit area. 
Kablo Bratislava, s.r.0. 
I ial~lo B~atislava s.r.0. is a member of tlie Siemens Group. It produces cables, conductors and 
related proclucts, in particular for use i n  the power industry and teleconinlr~nications. According 
to  its annual turnover, Iiablo Bratislava s.r.0. ranked 69th in 1994 and 97th in 1993 in the 
TREND T O P  100 chart of Slovak companies (TREND 25/95, p. 3C).  The enterprise is located 
in  Bratislaira, tlie capital of Sloirakia. 
History, Trailsforillatioil and Ownership 
Iia,blo Bratisla,va s.r.0. is following up on tlie tradition a.nd production of tlie state enterprise 
Iia,blo Bratisla,va s.p.. However, legally, Iiablo Bratislava s.r.0. is not a direct successor of tlie 
sta,te ent,erprise. Iia,blo Bratislava s.r.0. was founded in December 1991 as a limited liability 
coinl)a,iiy. Tlie only oivner was Oesterreichisclie Iiabelwerke Vienna, Austria, which is a member 
of t,lie Sie~llens Group. I11 1992, I<ablo Bratislava s.r.0. purchased premises and production 
facilities of tlie s tate enterprise 1ia.blo Bratislava s.p. which was a t  that  t'iille renamed Iiabelovna 
s.11. liablo Bra.tislava s.r.0. also took over substantial part of tlie enlployees of Iiabelovna s.p. Tlie 
purchase clid not include all of tlie assets of Iiabelovna s.p., instead, the tra,nsaction covered only 
the lxcniises aiitl production fa.cilities a.t the current address of I<a.blo Bratislava s.r.0. Premises 
a,ncl equipment located a.t other places remained the property of tlie s tate enterprise. I<a,blo 
Bra,t,islava. s.r.0. tlid not talie over the responsibility for tlie liabilities of tlie sta,te enterprise 
either. 1ia.helovna s.p. is currently in tlie process of liquidation. 
Tlie a,ct,ual volume of the investment of tlie Siemens Group into Iia.blo Bra.tislava s.r.0. ( the 
purclia,se a i d  subsecluent purchase of production equipment) wa.s approsinlately SKI< 1.2 billion. 
This investineiit along with purchases of similar enterprises in Runga.ry (Duna Iiiibel Budapest 
a,ncl hla,gya,r Iidhel liliivek Budapest) a.nd Oesterreicl~isclie Iiabelwerlie Vienna. secured Siemens 
a leading position a.t the a b l e  markets of Central Europe. 
Key Figures 
'Table 5.:34: Iiey Figures, Iiablo Bratislava s.r.0. 
Iiablo Bratis1ai.a s.r.0. IJnit 1993 1994 199.5" 1996" 
Turnover SI<Ii mn 825.0.5 1038.28 1827.64 2404.23 
' T ~ I  never nr/ Siemens Groupb % 0.00 10.63 34.0:3 43.26 
Ciross Profit SI<Ii mil - 154.17 -198.00 10.07 90.09 
Total Assets SI<Ii m 11 1084.86 1669.55 1898.78 2023.14 
Ecluitj SI<Ii mn 150.06 239.67 4.58.92 739.98 
Lia bili tips SIiIi mn 934.81 1429.89 1439.86 1283.16 
Labor Force 500 542 524 517 
P I  ofit /Turnover % 1 9  2 4  1 4 
P yofit /Assets % -14 -15 1 4 
Net Profit/Sl~are S I< I< 1233 .33  -9S7.232 338.076 269.252 
"Forecast. 
b .  r ~ ~ r n o \ . e r  realized with ot,her enterprises of the Siemens Group in percent of the t,ot,al turnover. 
Tlie Se t  Profit per Share figure actually refers to  net profit per one-thousand SI<Ii of the 
sliarel~olders' ecluity. The shares of I<ablo Bratislava are not publicly traded. 
Characteristics of Production 
'Tl~c estal~lisliii~ent of Iiablo Bratislava s.r.0. was followed by substantial invest~nents into tlie 
~ ) ~ o t l ~ ~ c t i o r i .  T l ~ i s  iiicludetl purcl~ases of new, modern production equipment a11d technologies as 
\veil as reconstructioii of the esisting equipment and premises. Tlie volume of investment into 
production \\as SI<I< 'TOO illillion during the first two years. As a result, I<ablo Bratislava s.r.0. 
is presently tlie largest producer of cables, conductors and related services i11 Slo\,aliia and one 
of the major producers in former Czeclioslovakia. 
Tlie output of I<ablo Bratislava consists of power cables and conductors as well as accompa- 
11j.ii1g seri.ices such as installing cable systems, maintenance, consulting and project preparation. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Esport orientation of I<ablo Bra,tislava s.r.0. is presently moderate but it is espected to increa,se 
gradually in tlie future (see Table 8.35). As is indicated by Ta.ble 8.35, growing esports will 
allo~v for tlie rapid growth in the total turnover expected for tlie coming yea.rs. While the sales 
in all three ca.t,egories (Slova.kia., Czech Republic and esports) will grow, tlle growth in exports 
\\:ill Ile mucli fa,ster then that  of the otlier two. It is espected, that the ratio between sales in 
Slova,kia a,iicl tlie Czech Republic will remain ratlier stable (approxima,tely 2: l ) .  However, the 
split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 was followed by a (temporary) sta,gna.tion of sales - this could 
11a.ve been a,lso t.lie effect of the transformation and privatization of the power industry, though. 
I<a,blo elljoys substa.ntia,l iuarket shares in both republics: a,round 25% in Slovaliia a,nd 15% in 
t lie Clzecl~ Republic. 
Ta,ble 1.:35: Destinations of Sales (approximate figures), Iiablo Bratislava s.r.0. 
Sales Breali-up 1993 1994 199.5" 1996" 
Total Turnover (SKI< nln) 825.05 1038.28 1827.64 2404.23 
Slovakia (SI<I\; mn) 385.03 41.5.31 609.21 641.13 
('zecli Republic (SIiI< ~ n n )  192..51 207.66 304.61 320.56 
Esports (SKI< inn) 247..52 41Fj.31 913.12 1442.54 
Slovaliia 96 47 40 3 3 2 7 
C'zech Republic % 2 3 2 0 17 13 
Exports 5% 3 0 40 5 0 6 0 
" Forecast. 
Tlie state-o\\~necl predecessor of I<ablo Bratislava s.r.0. directed its esports mainly toward 
[lie countries of t l ~ e  ChlIEA. The orientation changed after the purcllase I>y Siemens. Currently, 
tlie main clestination of exports (excluding the Czecli Republic) is C;ern~aiiy with some 85%) of 
total es l~or ts .  It is follo\ved by Austria with 10%. Tlie shares of otlier countries are insignificant. 
IIo~ve~.er. [lie share of Austria was expected to increase i n  1995 to 30%) of total esports. 
Tlie esport activity of I<ablo Bratislava s.r.0. is to a significant esteilt subjected to coordi- 
llatioii wi t l i i~~  the Siemens Group by using the organizational structure of tlie Group. Never- 
theless, I<ablo's representatives participate actively in negotiations conceriiiiig the conditions of 
the transactions. The main buyers are either power industry enterprises or trailing firms. Tlie 
esport,s a,re ba,secl on long-term contracts that are adjusted annually. 
In t l ~ c  future, I<ablo espects a growth in exports. However, it will attempt to strengthen its 
1,osition i n  the donlestic market (including the Czech Republic) even at  the expense of exports, 
should the opportlinity present itself. The main export markets will remain Germany and 
:\ustria because of the proxinlity as well as the position tlie Siemens Group enjoys there. 
Productioil for Exports 
I11 general. the cluality of the products of Iiablo is a t  tlie same or I~igher level as the quality of 
the conipeting products. The prices are in general lower. There is not a significant difference 
I,etween the products sold a t  the domestic market and exported products. However, esported 
1>iocl1icts are produced so as to coniply with tlie national standards of tlie country of destination. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
T l ~ e  xports of Iiablo Bratislava s.r.0. are not subjected to export licensing. 
Several problem a r e a  implied by the Slovak legislature lia,ve a,n adverse effect upon the 
general fina.ncia,l situation of the compa,ny. In particula.r, I<ablo Bratislava s.r.o., as a. newly 
est,a,blislied enterprise, is affected by the income tax law provisions tliat put restrictions on 
writ.ing off losses in subsequent years. I11 particular, only one loss can be \vritten off a t  a 
given time over a, period of five years a.nd otlier losses incurred during this period ca.nnot be 
cu~nula,tecl a,ncl ivritteii off later. Moreover, previously introduced tax i~icentives for foreign 
in\:estinent were abolished recently. The competitiveness of I<ablo is also a,ffectecl by (relatively) 
high iinport tariffs on raw materials a.ltliough for some of them there is no domestic producer 
in Slovaliia. Finally, the foreign esc1ia.nge regulations cllrrent in 1994-199.5 (limited current 
account convertibility) implied an increase in transaction costs. 
On tlie otlier hand, unlike other S1ova.k enterprises, I<ablo does not ha,ve presently problems 
wit11 respect to obtaining credits with favorable interest rates. This is because of the prestige 
Siemens C;roul> eiijoys as well as because the future prospects of Iiablo. 
Other prol~lems fa,ced by I\'a.blo include difficulties with tlie human fa,ctor (both inside and 
otrt,sicle of tlie company). Furthermore, occasionally there a.re problems with obtaining necessary 
ran  ~na,teria,l inputs. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Presently, the international competition faced by Ihb lo  (as well a,s other enterprises of the 
Sienlens Ciroup) is very intense. Tlie market is composed of a, few large interna~tiona~l holdings. 
Tlie niost importa.nt competitor is Nokia. I n  this environment, Kablo Bra.tislava s.r.0. relies 
primarily on tlie structures of tlie Sienlens Group in securing its exports. 
Iia.blo Bratislava s.r.0. is currently not subjected to a.ny significmt foreign restrictions on its 
exports. This is particularly due to its membership in the Siemens Group. 
The ~>aynleiits periods range from 30 to GO days a,fter clelivery. On the otlier Ilaiid, the 
l~urchases of ra.w ma.teria,l inputs are generally paya,ble immediately. Nevertheless, financing 
t,liis clisproportion does not represent a significant difficulty for 1ia.blo since it is a,ble to  obtain 
s~ifficieiit credits with favora.ble interest rates. 
.A11 a,dditiona,l clifficulty a,rose a,fter the split of Czec1ioslova.kia ill 1993. Besides new adminis- 
t,rative requirenlents it is presently more difficult for Iiablo to pursue financia,l settlements with 
ancl init,ia.te bankruptcies of tlie trade pa,rtners in defa.ult in tlie Czech Republic. Acliieving legal 
sett 1enlent.s in t'lle Czecli Republic is also more difficult and costly. 
The presence of the foreign owner (Siemens Group) had a very significant effect upon the 
fina~tcial sit,ua,tion of Iiablo Bratisla.va s.r.0. (relative to tlie former state enterprise) and its 
genera,l a,l>ility to obtain financing. It also significantly inlproved its access to foreign ma.rliets; 
t>liis impact was not so profound as in the case of financing, though. 
For the future, the ma.na.gement espects a further intensification of co~npetition in the in- 
ternational ma.rliets. This will result in a continuing stagnation or decline of prices during the 
liest few years. The situation will probably eventua.lly lead to several strategic illergers in a. few 
!.cars' time. .4fter this development, the prices will finally increase. 
Kerametal a.s., Brat islava 
liera~neta,l a,.s., Bra,tislava, is a foreign trading company for foreign trade. With the size of its 
sales it belongs to the la,rgest Slova,k enterprises - I(eraineta1 ranked first i n  1993 ancl sixth in 
1993 in t,he TREND T O P  100 c l m t  of slovak companies composed by Slova,k magazine TREND 
(TREND 25/95? p. 3C). Iiemmetal specia.lizes i n  i~ilports and exports of lion-ferrous metals 
ancl semil)roduct~s, metallurgical products, ceramic ma.teria,ls, const.ruct,ion materia,ls, clienlical 
protluct,~, na.tura,l ga,s, machinery a.nd other commodities. About one-1ia.lf of its turnover was 
realizecl in tra,cle \\it11 Russia,. 
History, Trailsforillatioil and Ownership 
I ie~.a~neta l  was established in 1970 a,s a joint-stock foreign trade company. Its original owners 
\\:ere otlier Czeclioslova~k state-ownecl enterprises, a,lthougli Kerarnetal itself wa.s not directly 
olviled by t.he government. Tlie origina,l owners of 1cera.meta.l were predoininant,l,v metallurgical 
ancl industrial enterprises, ba.nks, and other foreign trade companies. 
ITntil 1990, Clzeclioslovak industrial enterprises were not allowed to engage directly in foreign 
t,t,atle activities. Instea.cl, exports and imports were carried out on Ilieir behalf by the so-called 
foreign t,ra,cle ent.erprises with specifically determined commodity struct,ure. I<erametal was 
oile of these foreign trade enterprises specializing i11 metallurgical products, certa.in metals and 
cera,iiiic. ~nateria,ls. 
Iiera,lnetal was not subjected to the privatizatio~~ process a.fter 1991 since it was alrea.dy a 
,joint,-st,ock conlpa,ny ancl most of its owners were themselves privatizecl. Nonetheless, the own- 
c~.shil) struct,ure of 1ierameta.l evolved. Currently, the greatest sta.ke in ICerametal is owned by 
C'ont,ierz C~mbH, Diisseldorf, Germany (Contierz is itself an 80% owned subsidia:ry of ICeram- 
et,a,l). The st,a,l<es of significa.nt shareholders ra,nge from 13.05% to 1.08% and their number is 18. 
I11 a,cldition, sliia,ll sta,lies are owned by individuals a.nd employees of Kerametal. The structure 
of ownership of Iierametal is summarized below in Table 8.3G (tlie figures relate to 1993). 
Table 5.36: Structure of Ownership of Iierametal a.s. (%) 
Iierametal a.s. 1993 1994 
Slovak Enterprises 41.2 41.1 
Czech Enterprises 21.7 21.7 
Foreign Enterprises" 28.1 28.0 
Inclividual 3.5 3..5 
Emplojlees .5 . .5 .5.7 
"Incll~cles German, Swiss and British enterprises. 
Nevertheless. the yea,rs following the collapse of tlie socialist regime in 1989 brought sig- 
i~ifica,nt. cha.iiges also for Iiera.meta1. In 1990, ICerametal, as well as all other foreign trade 
ent,erprises, lvere stripped of tlieir exclusive position in foreign tra,de and lost their prescribed 
colililloclity structure. I n  response to these changes, Iiera.meta1 underwent a tra,nsformation of 
its interna,l orga,nization lea,ding to a trading company comparable with its foreign competitors. 
lierametal has ecluity sta,kes in five enterprises in  tlie following foreign countries: Germany, 
Switzerland, Czech Republic and the USA (two enterprises). The stakes of Iierametal in these 
enterprises ra,nge fro111 67% to 100%. 
Key Figures 
Iicy figure5 r~la t ing to the entire Kerametal Group are summarized in Table 8.37 below. 
Table 8.37: Iiey Figures of Iierametal a.s. Bratislava 
Iieraiiietal a,.s. Unit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Turnovera I i n  1471.10 1913.02 2919.88 1047.94 14933.43 33724.51 










SI\I< mn 1.95 
SIiIi nin 2399.31 
SIiIi inn 223.99 





"The tot,al consolidated turnover of Kerametal a.s. and its daughter companies was SIiIi 38083 rnillion 
(TREND 25/95, 11. 1C). 
" E x r l u d i ~ l ~  e.utrao~.tlinary items. Extraordinary profit is tlisclosed separately because of it,s significant size in 
certain years. 
The increase in tlie volume of the total turnover stems fro111 tlie fact tliat Iierametal became 
resl>oiisible for securing tlie Slovak imports of natural gas after the division of the fetleration in 
109:). Previously. natural gas was imported by Metalimes Prague, a Czech enterprise. 
Tlie sharp increase i11 the total assets and liabilities during 1991 reflects an increase i n  tlie 
accounts receivable and a corresponding increase in the accounts payable. Tlie developmeiits of 
the accounts receivable and payable are summarized in Table 8.38: 
Table 8.38: Developinent of Accounts Receivable and Payable in Iierainetal a.s. 
Iieraiiietal a.s. Unit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
AAccoullts 
Receivable SIiI irnn 760.64 2304.97 6697.04 2527.33 2553.82 2.527.44 
.Accounts 
Pavable SIiIi mil 1986.75 3507.07 -5591.49 2626.53 2206.97 435.21 
Characteristics of Turnover and Orga~lizatioll of Exports 
Tlie activities of Iierametal currently include esports, imports aiid i n  a s~naller estent re-esports 
of' the follo\ving commodities: non-ferrous metals aiid semiproducts, inetallurgical products, 
ceraliiic materials, construction materials, chemical products, natural gas, machinery and other 
commodities. 
Until 1990, tlie sliare of imports i n  the turnover of Kerametal was substantial: some SO%, 
urliile only tlie remaining 20% were made up by esports. Witli the change of the commodity 
structure in tlie following years accompanied by a general decline in imports, tlie shares of 
iliiports and esports became equal in size. 
Il'ith respect to the regional orientation of the trade activities of Iierametal, former Soviet 
Iinioii reinainetl tlie most important origin of imports until present. Tlie inzportance of Russia 
furtlier iiicreasetl after Kerarnetal started to  import natural gas from tliis couiitry in the early 
1990s. In tlie case of esports, tlie volumes of exports to the former CMEA countries and former 
Soviet l~iiioii have bee11 decreasing since the demise of the CMEA. Traditioiial esport countries 
are C;elmaiiy, France and the Benelux countries, less significant are otlier Western European 
countries. C'hina ant1 South American countries. In general, esports of I<erametal involve large 
ii~iiiiber of smaller contracts and many of them are realized more or less 011 an ad lloc basis. 
01.erall. prior to the demise of the CMEA some 80% of the turnover were realized with the CMEA 
countries. IVliile tlie sliare of the former CAIEA countries declined i n  recent years, in 1994 illore 

































I11 the 1992-94 period, TOS Trencin was seriously hit by tlie world recession of the machine 
tool i i ~ d u s t l  as  well as by the effects of the economic transition. The total output (in pieces) 
clroppecl b~ i~earlg 60%) during 1992 while the work force declined by 23%. In 1994, the company's 
ivorh force was only 4 3 %  of the 1991 level. Nevertheless, this developn~eilt seems to  have reached 
the l>ottom of the curve in 1994. In the course of a massive downsizing program, tlie company 
was able to  reduce its production capacity from about 3000 pieces per year to  some 1.500 pieces. 
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Figure 8.2: Development of Procluction of Machine Tools and Work Force (Note: Data  for 1990 
and 1991 include also employees and output of production units that  were taken out froin TOS 
Trencin later i l l  1992.) 
Characteristics of Productioil 
T l ~ e  production of TOS Trencin includes development and production of machine tools and 
forming ~ilaclliiies as well as accessories and spare parts. The main product categories are the 
foIIo\c-iiig: con\~entioiial universal center lathes, CNC center lathes, vertical tilling centers and 
5i~gle-purpose lllacliine tools. 
Export Orientation 
Tlle export orientation of TOS Trencin has been increasing during the recent years (see Table 
5.73). \6'11ile in 1992 over 2.5% of the total sales were supplied for the domestic market (i.e., 
~'zrcl~oslovaliia). this share fell to  only 5.6% in 1994. The main reason for such a development 
ivas the collapse of the clon~estic rlemailcl which TOS Trencin had to  coinpensate by increasing 
the exports. 
Table S.73: Break-up of Total Sales, TOS Trencin 
Breali-up of Sales (pcs.) 1992 % 1993 (ro 
Tota,l Sales 1624 100.0 1516 100.0 
C'zeclioslova lcia 413 25.4 170 11.2 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. 73 4.8 
C'zecli Republic n.a. n.a. 9 7 6.4 
Exports 1211 74.6 1346 88.8 
Direct Exports 696 42.9 590 38.9 
Export? through Strojimport 51.5 31.7 756 49.9 
l i~l t i l  1990, TOS Trencin was exporting indirectly through Strojilnport Prague. After 1990, 
'J'OS Trencin started to  export also directly. The direct and indirect exports are mainly rliffer- 
rut iatccl accorcling to  the different locations. Tlle exports of TOS Trencin were going mainly 
to  developed countries, as well as to  developing couiltries on all continents. nThile the former 
Soviet ITnion and CEE used to be an important export destination prior to 1989, currently ex- 
ports to these regions are small. Nevertheless, since there are tens of tliousands of machine tools 
produced by TOS Trencin currently in use in the countries of former Soviet Union, deliveries of 
spare parts can account for a significant increase of exports to this region in the future. 
Tlie iiiost i~iiportant region for the export of TOS Trencin is Europe. I n  1993, .5.5(ro of total 
exports (excluding the Czech Republic) were directed to Europe. The most iniportant countries 
are Denniarli, Greece, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, United I<ingdoni and Ireland. TOS 
Trenciii esportetl smaller vo l~~mes  also to Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Italy, Turliey and Cyprus. Africa accounted for 18% of total exports in 1993. TOS Trencin 
exported especially to  Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and the Republic of South Africa. The exports 
to South ,-\inerica made up 12% of total exports in 1993 and the most important destinations 
liere Argeiltiiia and Venezuela. The exports to Nortli .4nlerica accounted for 10% of total 
esports. Tlie main market was Mexico while the exports to tlie U.S. and Canada were of 
\nialler ilnportance. Finally, Asia, Australia and New Zealand accounted for 5% of total esports 
i n  1993. Particularly important were esports to People's Republic of China, Thailand, Iran, 
I\rael, tlie I1.A.E. and Saudi Arabia. 
Productioil for Exports 
The quality of tlie machine tools produced by TOS Trencin is good, altliougli it does not reach 
t lie level of the fell1 top producers. Nevertheless, it does exceed the quality level of the average 
~>roducers. The prices reflect the quality Ievel: they are lower than the prices of the most 
iniportant producers but exceed the prices of average competitors. The competitive position of 
TOS Trencin is strongest in  the case of conventional center lathes. 
Tlie q ~ ~ a l i t y  of tlie machine tools of TOS Trencin is also reflected in the fact that  tlie enterprise 
~>rotluces presently several hundreds of machine tools annually in cooperation with Western 
Er~rol~ean firms. These machines are then being sold under tlie name of the foreign partner. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
There are no significant direct restriction of the exports of TOS Trencin i n  Slovakia. Hom- 
p\.er, tlie enterprise sometimes has problems with obtaining inputs since tlie demand for certain 
coiiiinotlities currently esceeds tlie supply in Slovakia. After tlie split of Czeclioslovakia, the 
company also ha\e esperienced administrative problems wlien importing inputs from the Czech 
Republic. 
Foreign Eilviroi~i~~ent for Exports 
Tlie esports of TOS Trencin are not substaiitially limited by direct foreign restrictions such as 
quotas or tariffs. However, especially developing countries sometimes adopt certain protectionist 
nieasures to limit the iinports of certain products. 
The esports are also restricted by the ability of buyers to pay and by requireinelits of longer 
~~a j ,~ i i e i i t  periods (:30 to  90 days). 
The companjr was recently able to obtain tlie IS0 9003 qualit,y certificate which removes a 
significant indirect impediment for esports to the EU. 
Volkswagen Brat islava s.r.0. 
\701hswagen Bratislava s.r.0. is the only producer/assernbler of autoniobiles in Slovakia. It is 
p~esently fully owned b. Volkswagen AG, Germany. Its output consists currently of automo- 
biles (V\V Passat and VW Golf) and automobile transmissions. The size of its sales placed 
\'olks\vagen Bratislava i l l  the second half of the top one-hundred Slovak enterprises in 1993 but 
tllc 1.01urne of sales has had a distinct upward trend since then. iJolltswageii Bratislava is located 
i l l  Bratislava, tlie capital of Slovakia. 
History, Transfori~~ation a d Owilership 
V'oll<swagen Bratislava s.r.0. was founded in  May 1991 as a joint venture between tlie then 
still state-owned BAZ a.s., Bratislava and Volkswagen AG, Germany. BAZ a.s., Bratislava 
is a producer of parts for automobile industry, in particular for the Czech Slioda company. 
i-olks\vagen Bratislava took over the production facility of BAZ in Devinska Novd Ves, a suburb 
of Bratislava. i'olkswagen AG Germany owned originally 80% and BAZ a.s. Bratislava owned 
'LO'%, of tlie equity of the newly established joint venture. Tlie legal form of the venture has been 
a limited liability company. Tlie share of Volkswagen AG Germany later increased to  89.4% aiid 
fillally reached loo'$,. The development of the ownership structure and equity of Volkswagen 
Bratislava is displayed in tlie Table 8.74. 
Ta.ble 8.74: Development of Ownership, Volkswa.gen Bratislava s.r.0. 
Date VW AG BAZ a.s. 
Equity (DEM inn) May 1991 48.0 12.0 
Sliares (%) 80.0 20.0 
Ec~uity (DEM mn) June 1994 96.2 12.0 
Shares (%) 89.4 10.6 
Equity (DEM mn) December 1994 108.2 0.0 
Shares (%) 100.0 0.0 
Tlie top management of \~olkswageii Bratislava is presently doiniiiated by German managers 
fro111 tlle V\I' headcluarters - one of the two esecutive directors aiid sis of tlie seven Level 1 
iliailagers are Ciermans (the only Level 1 manager who is a Slovak is tlie personal director). 
Key Figures 
Tlie key figures for Volkswagen Bratislava s.r.0. are summarized in tlie Table 8.75. 
Table 8.75: Iiey Figures, Volkswagen Bratislava s.r.0. 
\blkswagen BA Unit 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995" 
Sales DEM mn 54.7 83.4 200.0 687 
Output Automobiles pcs. 2 2223 2958 6043 20000 
in it: Passat pcs. 2 2223 2958 5030 4190 
in it: Golf pcs. 0 0 0 1013 15810 
Output Trans~nissio~ls pcs. 0 0 0 46000 186000 
\J'ork Force 112 431 467 SO6 1.597 
S1ia.re of Output  of VW BA in VW AC; Outputb 
Passat, % 0.0005 0.68 1.37 2.41 1.83 
Golf % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 2.06 
"Plan. 
"~r ter~i i lne t l  as the share of the output of Passats and Golfs, respectively, produced by  Volltswagell 
Urati<lava, and the total output of Passats and Golfs, respectively. 
Characteristics of Production 
The structure of production of Volkswagen Bratislava is apparent from tlie Table 8.7.5. Automo- 
biles ma1;e up for about SO% of the total sales in 1995 while the sales of transmissions make up 
tlle remaining 20%. The automobiles as well as transmissions are only assetnbletl in Volkswagen 
Bratislava using imported parts (mostly from Germany and Austria). Nevertheless, as a result 
of substantial investnients into tlie production teclinologies, the degree of on tlie spot processing 
lias been increasing over time. 
Tlie production of automobiles i n  Volkswagen Bratislava started i n  December 1991 when 
the first \'IV Passat Variant had been assembled. Until the end of 1993, more than 10000 
Passats were produced. I n  1994, VW Golf models Syiicro and Variant started to  be assembled 
in Ib l l i s~agel i  Bratislava. It was decided tliat Volkswagen Bratislava will become tlie most 
important producer of VW Golf Syncro in the VW Group. Hence, starting with 1995, the 
number of assembled Golfs will by far exceed the number of Passats. 
Tlie production of autoinobiles was planned to  be 103 per day in 199.5. This is supposed 
to increase gradually in the future to  meet the production capacity of 160 cars per day. The 
procluction of transmissions was planned to  be 800 pieces per day in 1995 ant1 should increase 
to  1,000 pieces per day in 1996. 
Volkswagen Bratislava lias an advantage of relatively advanced production and assembly 
facilities (built already by BAZ) as well as low-cost work force. These two, along with a strategic 
interest in tlie Central European region, were the main factors determining tlie decision of 
\'oll;swagen AC; to  pursue tlie investment in Bratislava. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
The esport orientation of the production of V\V BA is given by the nature of relations within 
the \'\Y Ciroup. The VW headquarters i n  Germany collects orders from distributors in various 
countries. It then prepares specific production orders for the individual factories and coinpanies 
of tlie I 7 I V  Group. Tlius, the esports are primarily determined by the decisions made in the 
\ - I V  lieatlquarters; tlie ability of VIV BA to influence the decisions is limited. Since VW BA is 
the niajor producer of tlie Golf Syncro make within tlie VW Group, illost of the assembled cars 
are supplied for esports. The structure of exports of automobiles is presented in Table 8.76 (tlie 
protluctio~i of transmissions is almost exclusively is for exports). 
\-I\.' BA thus does not organize its esports directly. The volliilles ant1 destinations of es- 
1)oits are tleterniined by tlie VW Group headquarters according to  the orders received from 
tlistributors. 
Productioil for Exports 
Tlie cluality of automobiles assembled in Bratislava is a t  a very good level when compared both 
wit11 the competing products and tlie automobiles produced by other factories of tlie V\V Group. 
The high level of quality is quaranteed by the high degree of manual ~vork (possible because of 
the low costs of labor) and skilled employees. The quality of output has been confirmed by the 
fact tliat \'W BA obtained an I S 0  9002 quality certificate in early 1995. To a significant degree, 
tlie clliality of the output of VW BA is also determined by tlie quality of materials and parts 
imported froill other VIV factories. 
Table 8.76: Structure of Sales of Volkswagen Bratislava s.r.0. 
ITolksaiagen BA 1991 1992 1993 1994 199.5 
Output  Autoniobiles 2 2223 2958 6043 20000 
Slovaliia" 2 2.53 216 32.5 1582 
C'zecli Rey>ul>lic 0 11.a. 202 0 3 1 b 
Ciermany 0 1970 2540 1863 326.5 
Italy 0 0 0 3231 7522 
Netherlands 0 0 0 195 582 
Bel,' elurn 0 0 0 79 0 
France 0 0 0 4 8 1 334 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 3.57.5 
1-1 ustria 0 0 0 0 78 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 248 
('hina 0 0 0 302 1783 
"The 1992 figwe refers to the sales in entire Czechoslovakia. 
"1992 sales in the Czech Republic are included under Slovakia. 
Tlie low costs of labor make it possible to  keep the price of cars assenlblecl in V W  BA a t  
a conlpetitive level. Nevertlieless, the ability of V W  BA t o  pursue an active pricing policy is 
l i~nited. Tlie realization prices are deternlined annually as internal prices valid within tlie V W  
Ciroup. \'\.I.' BA then accrues the net difference between the  costs of imports from V W  AG and 
sales of assembled products t o  V W  AC:. 
Tlie prices of tlie base version of automobiles assembled in V W  BA are lower in the  case 
of cars supplied to the Slovak market than in the case of exports. However, this is mainly 
clue t o  different specificatioli of the base versions (tlie base version in Slovakia does not include 
items such as  .4BS and airbags). Nevertl~eless, the effective profitability for VJV BA is t he  same 
l~rcause  of tlie system of internal prices (see above). 
Donlestic Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
Tlie nlain difficulty faced by VlV BA are administrative problenls \\lit11 the  custonls service 
when iniporting necessary inputs. The  shipment of materials or parts is frequently delayed a t  
the border until tlie problems are explained and removed. The  ~ i i a ~ i a g e m e ~ l t  also complains 
about  the fact tha t  the non-financial portion of the investment of VW AC: (such as  production 
tecli~iologies and equipment) were subjected t o  regular import tariffs. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
The  exports of V W  BA are decided about and administratively secured a t  the level of V W  ACi. 
T h e  sliiprnents of inputs and assembled cars are considered shipments within the V\V Group. 
\'\I! BA received the net difference between the imported inputs and assembled cars, both valued 
at tlie internal prices of the VW Group (see also above). The  difference is payable within 60 
clays. 
Tlie exports of V\Y BA are not exposed t o  significant foreign impediments. 
Tlie presence of a foreign partner (VW AG) had a positive effect on the level of technology 
usecl in the production process. Nevertheless, the  technology existing prior t o  the creation of the 
joint venture was a t  a relatively high level as  well. Tlie effect upon financing was so  far small: 
\'\Y BA has cooperated with do~llestic banks. For the future, it is expectecl t ha t  VW BA will 
s ta r t  t o  talie advantage of credit opportunities of foreign banks. This mill 1)e secured by V W  
.4G. 
T h e  presence of a foreign partner has had a decisive effect on the  quality of management 
ant1 training of the work force. After the joint venture was setup,  VW AC: introduced C4erman 
Ilianagers t o  the top  positions in VlV BA. The  role of German management was also important 
i n  introtlucing the new Quality Management System and obtaining the I S 0  9002 certificate (see 
a150 above). \\.'it11 respect to  training, all employees take part in a three month training program, 
ant1 a nunll~er of them visits also foreign production sites of the VW Group. 
VSZ a.s., Kosice 
\'SZ a.s.. Iiosice is one of the largest Slovak companies - according t o  tlie total turnover it 
ranlied fourth in 1994 and first in 1993 in the TREND T O P  100 cliart of Slovak companies 
coml~osed hy tlie Slovak magazine TREND (TREND 25/95, p. 3C) .  T h e  main activities of VSZ 
arc the following: production of coke, iron, steel and steel products, in particular flat-rolled steel 
5heets. I7SZ llas Ixen tlie largest producer of flat-rolled sheets in former Czecl~oslovakia. I11 
1g9-1. \-SZ ranked 415th among the world's steel producers and 19th in among European steel 
pl.otlucers. I'SZ is located near the second largest Slovak city, Iiosice, i n  Eastern Slovakia. 
History, Transformation and Ownersl~ip 
Tlie construction of VSZ star ted in 1959 and tlie production started in 1960. Tlie site of 
tlie comlmny \vas situated a t  the railway junction of iron ore from tlie Ukra.ine and Russia 
ant1 coal from nortli-east Czech Republic. Originally, it was a state-owned enterprise. As a 
pre-privatiza.tion step, VSZ was transformed into a fully state-owned joint-stoclc compa.ny in 
November 1990, tlius becoming the first company of this legal form in former C~zeclioslovakia. A 
sul~stant ial  part  of VSZ wa.s privatized in 1992 within tlie first wave of large-scale privatization 
using tlie voucher scheme. After completion of voucher privatization, the s ta te  represented by 
the Funcl of National Property remained tlie most important owner with 35.6%. T h e  remaining 
4 a i e s  mere lield by investment funds and individuals: 22.8% by Slovak investment funds, 9.95% 
b> C'zecl~ in\estrnent funds and 29.7% by more than half a million individuals. The  share of 
the Fund of National Property (FNP)  was further reduced in 1994 when it sold 9..52% of total 
~ l ~ a r e s  t o  Llanager s.r.o., a company established by the members of tlie top management of I'SZ 
a.5. In 1995, the F N P  approved the sale of another 10% t o  Hutnhk a s . ,  a joint-stock company 
cstabli~lied 11). the t rade unions of VSZ a s .  Finally, the F N P  eliminated its presence in VSZ 
\\lien it sold tlie remaining 15.2% t o  Ferrimes s.r.0. Kosice in June  199.5. Fe r r i~nes  is owned by 
13ut1iilli a s .  and members of the  new top management of VSZ (in April 1995, tlie Supervisory 
Board replacecl three out  of five members of top managemelit of VSZ a s . ) .  Tlie structure of 
onnersliip as  of December 31, 1993 was as  follows (i.e., before the acquisitions by Hutnilk a s .  
ancl FPI rimes s.r.0.): 
Table S.77: Structure of O\vnership of VSZ a s .  
a.s of 31 December 1993 (5%) 
Fund of National Property of S R  25.0 
Ca.ssoviainvestment ~ . r . o . ~  11.4 
Harvard Capital and Consulting as . "  10.3 
Ma.nager s.r.0. 8.9 
VSZ h,Ietal Trade a s . "  .5.6 
Tatrabanka a s .  3.1 
Restitution Invest~nent Fund 2.9 
VUB as." 2.3 
Credit h/lanagenient Slovakia as .  1.7 
Other  2.S 
Individual Investors 26.0 
"The stake is owned Ily the company itself and/or by 
several investment funds founded by this company. 
During tlie pre-privatization transformation of VSZ in 1992-1993, the company adopted tlie 
so-calletl t\tomization Project transforming VSZ a s .  t o  a holdi~ig-type company. VSZ a s .  tlius 
r~stal~l is l~rt l  se\.en daughter companies (so-called principal companies), all of them being limited 
liability companies fully owned by VSZ a.s. These seven principal companies exercise control 
o\.er another over 1-10 companies wliere VSZ a.s. owns a stake. All production is realized by tlie 
tlat~gllter conipanies and VSZ a s .  only fulfills control and managenlent functions. 
The seven principal tlaugliter companies of VSZ a s .  are: 
\'SZ Ocel, s.r.0. - production of coke, pig iron ancl crude steel, hot rolled and cold rolled 
steel sheets: 
\'SZ Illdustrial s.r.0. - production of engineered steel products such as pipes, radiators, 
etc.: 
\'SZ Iieramilta, s.r.0. - production of lime, ceramic materials for metallurgy, construction 
materials: 
\'SZ ZOS. s.r.0. - trading conlpany exporting most of tlie products of VSZ Group; 
\'SZ Servis, s.r.0. - service activities for other companies of tlie VSZ Ciroup; 
\'SZ Inzinierillg, s.r.0. - engineering and projecting, mainly for other colnpanies of tlie 
\'SZ c:roup; 
\'SZ Informat,ilta, s.r.0. - da ta  processing, information systelns, care for liartlware and 
soft~vare for other companies of the VSZ Group. 
The slia,res of tlie da.ughter co~npanies on total output of VSZ C;roup in 1993 were as follows: 
Table 8.78: Composition of Output of VSZ a..s. 
\iSZ Ocel s.r.0. 93% 
VSZ Industria s.r.0. 4% 
VSZ Keramika s.r.o., others 3% 
Key Figures 
Iiey figures relating to  the VSZ Ciroup are summarized in tlie table below. 
Table S.79: lie? Figures, VSZ a.s. Kosice 
Unit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Turnover SIiIi mn 17634.00 18755.11 44766.83 27363.75 2.5.518.58 29404.27 
Ciross Profit SIiIi mn 1713.00 2906.52 4244.31 1334.50 1904.48 3841.15 
Total .Assets SIiIi mn n.a. 20206.15 32222.85 42823.6.5 43209.55 47952.29 
Ecluity SIiIi mn n.a. 15988.07 17480.76 23.538.96 23493.79 24.539.37 
Long-Term 
Liabilities SIiIi mn n.a. n.a. 2077.91 3289.28 3999.2.5 2942.68 
C'ul.rent 
T,iabilit,ies SliIi mn n.a. 4218.08 12664.18 15995.41 15716.52 20470.24 
.Accounts 
Receivable SIiIi nln n.a. n.a. 8769.56 9158.04 8314.44 10643.15 
Inventory SIiIi mn n.a. n.a. 4485.06 5381.02 3865.08 4871.93 
Steel Output kt n.a. 4394 3877 3597 3768 3805 
Labor Force n.a. 25952 2460 1 27290 25624 25242 
Profit 
Turnover % 9.71 1.5.50 9.48 4.88 7.46 13.06 
.Assets %I n.a. 14.38 13.17 3.12 4.41 8.01 
Turnover 
/Assets '% 11.a. 92.82 138.93 63.90 -59.06 61.32 
Net Profit 
/Share SIiIi n.a. n.a. 1.52..5 19.7 30.3 84.7 
Note: According to the managernent, VSZ is a t  present on the lirr~its of its output capacity. The capacity 
cannot be significantly increased in the short run. 
Characteristics of Production 
The main output item of VSZ Ciroup are flat-rolled steel sheets produced by VSZ Ocel s.r.0. The 
output of other daughter companies is primarily for use within the VSZ Ciroup. The structure 
of sales of the daughter cornpanies in 1993 was as follows: 
Table 8.80: St,ructure of Sales of VSZ Group (%) 
\'SZ G r o u ~ ~  Structure of Sales, 1993 
Cloln pa.11~: VSZ Slovakia Esports Tota.1 
VSZ Indust ria s.r.0. 43.4 20.7 35.9 100.0 
\-SZ Iieralnil<a s.r.0. 76.1 23.2 0.7 100.0 
\-SZ Inziniering s.r.0. 85.2 14.8 100.0 
\'SZ Sen '1s ' S.S.O. 64.0 36.0 100.0 
\-SZ Inforlnatika s.r.0. 92.5 7.5 100.0 
Notes: Sales of VSZ Ocel s.r.0. are only for use outside of VSZ Group. 
VSZ ZOS s.r.0. is a trading conlpany without own production activities. 
Bemuse of its inlportailce for tlie total sales of the VSZ Group (output of VSZ Ocel s.r.o., 
~vhich is preclomina,ntly rolled products, makes up 93% of the total output of VSZ Group, see 
Table 8.78), the best information is available regarding the flat-rolled products. Hence, we will 
oft,eli consicler only tliis group of products in our analyses below. The coniposition of the output 
of flat.-rollecl proclucts lias been as follows: 
Tal,le 8.81: St rr~cture of Output of Rolled Products - Developnlent 
VSZ a.s. Iiosice Rolled Products - Structure of O u t ~ u t  
Article (tli. tons) 1990 % 1991 % 1992 % 1993 % 
Hot-Rolled Sheets 1278.0 31.7 1415.0 48.5 1539.0 49.3 1595.5 48.1 
Cold-RolledSlieets1051.0 26.1 887.0 30.4 1092.0 34.9 1002.0 30.2 
Coated Materials 497.0 12.3 345.0 11.8 409.0 13.1 374.0 11.3 
Slabs 1201.0 29.8 269.0 9.2 85.0 2.7 348.5 10.5 
Total 4027.0 100.0 2916.0 100.0 3125.0 100.0 3320.0 100.0 
The iiiain difference bet\veen particular products is tlie level of processing. In general, tlie 
least sopliisticatecl products are slabs, followed by hot-rolled slieets, cold-rolled slieets and coated 
materials as tlie most sophisticated products. Each product is an output of a certain stage of 
~~rotluctioii and can be either used in tlie following stage or soltl outside the company as a final 
product (tlie abo\.e figures relate only to the products sold). 
Since 1-SZ imports the raw materials primarily from Russia and Ukraine, stability of its 
j>loduction is to some degree threatened by the instability and unreliability of its suppliers. 
Ne\.ertlieless, tlie company plans to continue importing the inputs from tlie CIS due to lower 
I,I ices. 
Tlie future position and competitiveness of VSZ could be affected by tlie outcome of its 
ticipation in the construction and utilization of tlie "I<rivoy Rog Estraction and Processing 
C'o1ii1,les (I iREPC)" in Dolinsl;a, Ukraine. Tlie KREPC was a joint project of tlie governments 
of several CMEA countries to  secure new sources of iron ore. The multilateral agreement was 
signet1 i n  1983 and construction started in 1987. Tlie shares of tlie individual countries were 
as follows: 1T.S.S.R. 46.3%, Romania 26.7%, Czeclioslovakia 13.7%, Bulgaria 8.5% and East 
Ciermany 1.SY). Tlie Czeclioslovak government sold its share (nominal value of CSIi 10.86 
I~illion) to  VSZ i n  December 1992. VSZ thus took over the liability to complete the Czeclioslovali 
part in accordance with tlie original contract; the degree of completion is currently 60% to 
70%). I n  eschai~ge, VSZ was supposed to  receive 17 million tons of processed iron ore over 10 
!.ears (origiually intended to  start in 1994). This delivery is regarded as the payment for the 
l~articil~ation a t  and financing of tlie construction of the I iREPC by VSZ. However, VSZ still 
r ~ ~ e t l s  to ol>tain credits of SIiIi 7.5 billion to  finance the completion. Presently, tlie company is 
negotiating with several foreign banks and the Slovak goveriiment regarding the credit coliclitions 
autl possibilities of a government guarantee. The ability of VSZ to obtain the credits \vill be 
critical for the successful co~npletioii of its part. Upon materialization of tlie tleliveries, VSZ will 
gain a strategic source of inexpensive pre-processed iron ore. 
Export Orieiltation 
The esport orientation of VSZ a.s. has been increasing since 1989 (see Table 8.82). Tlie main 
reason for such a sharp increase in tlie share of exports was the collapse of domestic demand 
cluriiig 1991. This was a consequence of starting economic transition in Czechoslovakia. The 
~tlost imp01 tant reasons for tlie decline in the domestic demand were the following: end of central 
~)laiining of protluction and allocation, liberalization of prices, devaluation of currency, restrictive 
~~~acroeconomic policy, tight credit and high interest rate and, finally, growing inter-enterprise 
payment arrears. Tlie sliare of sales in the Czech Republic has declined from 5O.G% in 1990 to 
15.1% in 1994. Tliis was partly due to the general decline of sales in former Czeclioslovakia as 
\yell as clue to the split of tlie federation in 1993. 
'rable 8.82: Export Orientation, Rolled Products (%) 
\'SZ a.s. 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
C'zeclioslova liia 64.0 64.3 42.4 32.9 28.8 30.9 
Slovaliia n.a. 13.7 14.8 14.1 11.13 15.8 
Czech Republic n.a. 50.6 27.6 18.8 17.5 15.1 
Exports 36.0 35.7 57.6 67.1 71.2 69.1 
The tlestinations of esports changed dramatically as well. For example, a t  the beginning of 
1990. .58.:3%, of tlie negotiated export contracts were to be realized with the socialist countries 
\vliile 41.7% of the contracts were witli the non-socialist countries. However, only 3.5.7% of 
the actual esports went to the socialist countries during January through November 1990 and 
tlie rest were realized witli the lion-socialist countries. This reorientation continued also i n  the 
subseqrient years. The main reasons for such a major reorientation of exports were the following: 
collapse of the C'hlEA, economic difficulties in the former socialist countries, war in Yugoslavia 
(implying also difficulties with transportation on the Danube) and gradual disintegration of the 
Soviet l~n ion .  To avoid the economic effects of the falling denlalid a t  the traditional markets, 
1-SZ a.s. started to pursue an active export strategy oriented toward the developed countries. 
The regional structure of exports of VSZ a.s. in 1993 is given in tlie Table 8.83. Table 8.84 
presents ten nlost iinportant destinations of the output of VSZ Group, including the domestic 
market. 
Table 8.83: Regional Structure of Sales of VSZ a.s., 
Flat Rolled Products 
VSZ a.s. Iiosice 1993 1994 
Destination of Sales (kt)  (%) (kt)  ('36) 
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"Includes also exports to the new EU members: Aust.ria, 
Sweden and Finland. 
Table S.84: T l ~ e  Ten Most 1mporta.nt Destinations of Output of VSZ Group (all products) 
\iSZ a s .  The Ten Most 1mporta.nt Destinations of Output 
1992 1993 1994 
No. Country (lit) (%) Country (kt) (%) Country (kt)  (m) 


































Note: Tile Iwealt-up of the total sales in 1991 was the following: Czech Republic 873.8 kt ,  Slovaltia 467.9 k t  
ant1 exports 1'320.1 kt.  
lriitil 1990, procluction, exports and destinatioils were determined centrally by tlie govern- 
iiieiit, aiicl \-SZ was obliged to export through a mediator Ferromet Prague. Since 1990, VSZ 
liad beell exporting directly. The move to direct exporting was made necessary by the increasing 
iiiabilit)~ of Ferromet to secure sufficient volumes of exports. Altliough this change was accom- 
panied by certain negative effects (difficulties with finding buyers and obtaining information, 
etc.),  eventually it had a distinct positive effect upoil the level of exports of VSZ (see Table 
S.82). 
111 .April 1991, a tlaugliter company VSZ ZOS s.r.0. was created to organize the export 
activities. C'urreiitly, VSZ ZOS is respoilsible for most of the exports of VSZ Group. Honrever, 
exports of rollecl products to the Czech Republic and Poland are organized by \iSZ Ocel s.r.0. 
IiSZ ZOS has been using different ways of organizatioil of exports in different territories: in the 
liey niarkets, \'SZ ZOS is using its own foreign representatioiis or joint ventures which have an 
pxclusi\,itj. i l l  their respective territory. In 1994, VSZ ZOS had foreign representations in Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Ukraine and Russia as well as joint ventures i n  
.Austria, S~vitzerlancl, Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and the U.I\;. I11 other markets, such as 
Scaiicliiiavian countries. Spain and Turkey, it is cooperating with domestic agents who sell their 
products for commission. In the more remote markets VSZ ZOS is cooperating with established 
ii~tcriiatioiial traclii~g companies wlio also provide export financing ailcl service. Tliis is the case 
wit11 South-East Asia, tlie Americas and the Far East. Finally, in the remaining niarkets, exports 
of the I'SZ Group are realized by other daughter compailies of VSZ a s .  whose activities are 
coortlinatetl by VSZ ZOS. 
Production for Exports 
Tlie product structure of exports of VSZ a.s. in 1992 and 1993 is given in tlle Table 8.85. Tlie 
increasing share of less sophisticated products (slabs and hot-rolled sheets) is due to the greater 
export ba,rriers for the exports of more sophisticated products (cold-rolled slleet,s) in tlie EU. 
Table 8.8.5: Product Structure of Exports of VSZ a.s. (%) 
VSZ a.s. Iiosice 
Rolled Products - Structure of Exports 
Article: 1992 1993 
Hot-Rolled Sheets .56.00 57.00 
Cold-Rolled Sheets 36.00 28.00 
C:oa.tecl h,la.terials 7.00 7.00 
Slabs 1 .OO 8.00 
Tot a.1 100.00 100.00 
Tlie protluction for exports is not significantly different from the production for the domestic 
~narliet. Nevertlieless, VSZ needs to  apply different sets of recognized quality standards when 
esporting to different markets. However, the quality of the output is, according to the manage- 
iiient of the company, a t  the level of their western competitors. The company is proud of having 
received a nu~iiber of internationally recognized quality certificates and introducing quality man- 
agement system according to  the I S 0  9000 standard. The price strategy is oriented a t  achieving 
a niore favorable price/quality/service combination than the competition. The particular prices 
arc. cletcrniinecl according to  tlie situation a t  each market. Hence, the prices a t  different markets 
are frequently different, as is also the profitability of the exported products. 
The \JSZ1s medium and long-term export strategy emphasizes orientation a t  its "natural 
territories", i.e., the countries of Western and Central Europe. This would reduce the company's 
transportation costs and thus increase its profitability. It would also enable greater co~itrol 
o\,er the esports and service. Tlie company intends to  continue building stronger and closer 
relationships \vith the end users so as to  offer them higher value added products. This would 
reduce the numl~er of mediators and strengthen tlie company's position a t  tlie "natural markets". 
1-SZ would a150 like to see tlie share of relatively more sopliisticated products such as coated 
~naterials to increase, liowever, tliis will also depend on the future level of quotas and other 
restrictions in the EU. 
\'SZ cloes liot espect any significant improvement witli respect to its esports to the CIS. The 
economic alid political situation will likely remain unstable and the foreign partners unreliable. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The government,al regula,tion of exporting has been liberalized substantially in the course of 
econo~iiic refor~iis~ in pa.rticular during 1990. 
Since 1990, t,lie restrictions on foreign trade activities have been mostly removed. Escept for 
certain commodities (such as weapons), no export license is required by the Slovak authorities. 
The ta.s s!~stem, in  particular the Value Added Tax, presents a financial burden upon enter- 
prises wit li a high share of exports, which is also the case of VSZ. The company pays tlie VAT 
i l l  tlle prices of inputs but the exported products are not subjected to  the VAT. This can result 
ill a net liability of t.lie s tate toward VSZ. In this case, it takes several ~nontlls until the VAT is 
refuntled to  t.lie con1 pa,ny. 
Credit financing for exports is quite difficult to obtain in Slovakia., and the interest ra,te is 
\.cry liigli \vllen comparetl internationally. This is being solved i n  two ways in VSZ: by using 
services of foreign (Western) ba.nks and by requiring prompt payments from mediators and own 
foreign affilia.tion. Tlie company would like to see a more active government policy a.imed a t  
improving credit and insurance a.vailability for exports. 
Foreign Eilviroilillent for Exports 
rlie signing of the .Association Agreement witli the EU enabled VSZ to  increase its esports to  tliis 
region. nevertlieless, a quota system mas imposed in 1992. Tlie cluotas allow regularly an annual 
esport increase of 20%. Tlie cluotas in the EU were valid only until the end of 199.5. However, 
there mas a possibility t ha t  they will be extended also into the future. The  quotas  t o  the EU, as  
[re11 as similar cluotas i l l  Hungary, presented the most significant foreign regulations impeding 
exports of VSZ. This resulted in temporary reorientation from the "traditional marliets" t o  the  
1110re remote markets such as  the USA or Thailand. 
Aclclitiol~al financial burden for VSZ is represented by the  different payment conditions for 
inputs and exports. The  conditions of payment grant the buyer frequently as  many as  180 days 
t o  mal<e the payments. This increases the need for and the cost of financing esports  on the 
side of \'SZ. \Vliere this is the case, VSZ often uses a strong international trading company as  
a ~ilecliator wliicli call make the payment promptly. 
I~nreliability of t rade partners present a problem in certain regions, in particular the CIS. 
I n  this case, \'SZ requires a guaranteed payment or a payment in advance. 
I11 the future, management of VSZ liopes for a positive development of the import restrictions 
in the EU: the current quota system was supposed t o  expire in 1995. Tlie managers of VSZ 
expect, Iiowever, t ha t  the  world steel market will be marked with a stagnation or  recession in 
the future years. Future economic and political developments in the CIS are very unclear at the  
nioluelit, in case of an improvement VSZ could increase the volume of its exports t o  this market. 
On t l ~ e  otllcr hand, VSZ expects t ha t  investment into production teclinologies in Eastern Europe 
a~icl the CIS will bring about a more intense competition especially among the  less sophisticated 
p~oduc t s .  VSZ therefore intends t o  keep increasing the share of more sophisticated products in 
its procluction and exports. 
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Tal)le 9.1 Profiles of the companies covered in the survey 
Owner- Legal Export /sales 
C.'on~pany Sector 
1. PeTr Foot.wear 
2. SaIir Tires 
3 .  SlLj Furniture and 
unrelated trade 
4 LihIa hIetal 
products 
5. hIeLj Food and 
trade of food 
G ZlMa C'osn~etics 
7. 1EIir Electric 
~ne te rs  
8. TTOV Textiles 
ship" statusb SizeC 
So JCS L 
S o JSC L 
M JSC L 
So JSC L 
P JSC L 
M JSC M 
P JSC L 
So JSC hl 
ratio (%I) hlain markets 
92 USA, Germany, 
1 t aly, Russia 
81 Austria, Germany, Italy 
Hungary, Net herIands 
65 Russia, USA, Italy, 
Hungary, Gerrnany 
44 LVestern Europe (94%) 
6 Germany. Croatia, 
Ukraine, Italy, Austria 
43 Austria, Germany, 
Switzerlantl, EC-Europe 
90 Germany, W.  Europe, 
S. America, Asia 
-- 
I I Germany, Italy 
9. SvhIa Textiles So JSC M 8 1 USA, Germany, Italy 
10. LeLj Pllarma- P JSC L 66 USA, Croatia, Poland 
ceuticals Russia, Canada, Czech R. 
11. SvIia Textiles P JSC M 60 Germany, Austria, Italy 
12. St.Iia Furniture M JSC M 45 Germany, Czech R., 
Hungary, Scandinavia 
1.3. TrIia  Electrorlics P LLC S 40 Hungary, Germany, 
Czech R.. Finland 
14. Feh,la hlachinery, P LLC S 10 Gelmany 
metal ecluip. 
15. ErLj Furniture, P LLC S 100 Germany, Switzerland, 
\vooden Italy. Austria. Japan 
accessories 
16. HeDo Chemicals So JSC hl 50 Russia, Hungary, Poland, 
Belarus R ,  Czech R. 
17. IioLj Food P JSC M 28 Spain, Austria, Germany 
processing Switzerlarld, Russia 
18. 1n.Ja Impregnated So JSC h,I 57 Netherlands, Germany, 
t ext.iles Poland, Russia, Croatia 
19. 'I'oDo Text.iles for So JSC hl 40 Croatia, Russia, Pola~ld 
llealtll and 
hygiene 
20. SZLj St,eelworks St JSC L 5 5 Germany, Italy, USA, 
Austria, Croatia 
21. 'I'DRu Cllernicals St,hf JSC M 65 Germany, Austria, Italy 
LI - So = Social, P = Private, hl = hlixed, St = State. 
''.Js(:: = Joint-st,ocli company, LLC = Limited-liability company. 
''L = Large (>1,000 employees), hI = Medium-sized (50-1,000 employees), S = Small (<50 employees). 
Enterprise PeTr 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
Estal)lislied i11 1903 this enterprise produces and sells footwear 2 Million pieces per year. Cur- 
l.eiit1~~ it eniploys 2.000 worliers. In 1988 enlployment was .5,500 but the company lost its shops 
i11 Croatia and otlicr former republics of Yugoslavia. Recently, one sector Lvas separated in its 
owit inclepcndent enterprise. 
Basic Data ( i n  blillion DEM unless otherwise noted) 
1988 1994 
Nunlber of Employees 5500 2000 
Value of capital 2 6 40 
Turnover 9 5 130 
Profit 8 6 
credits/capital (ratio) 1.2 0.7 
Esport/production (%) 64 92 
:lmong tratlitioiial esport nlarkets are tlie USA (in  1995 2.5%,, in 1988 50'5, of all esports) ,  
C~erman!. (from 21% i11 1988 tlie share increased to 45% i n  1995), Russia (from 27% i11 1988 
tlecreasetl to 9'A in  199.5). Italy (12% in 199.5, up from nil i n  1988). 
This enterprise is still 100% in social owilership but is well on tlie way to  be privatized. It 
ol~taincd first confirmation for privatization in February 1995 and second confirmation ( to start  
tlie process) in June 1995. According to  privatization plan the planned ownership structure is: 
7.7'2 of tlie shares will go to  tlie Reimbursement Fund, 7.7% to  the Pension Fund, 1.5..5% to  tlie 
Det.elopment Funtl of Slovenia, 15..5% will go insider owners with voucliers, 30.9% will be bought 
I)!, internal buy-out ant1 22.8% are reserved for former private owners after de-nationalization 
talies place. 
Export Orientat ion 
C \ p o ~  t nas  a1n.aj.s an important part of sales in  the firm. At tlie sarne time tlie sliare of import 
ill s~~pp l i c s  increased from 75% i n  1991 to 79% i n  1994. Tlie inajor target countries were already 
~uentioned above; i11 atldition, tlie sliare of Croatia and Macedonia increased from 1% i11 1992 
to G'X i11 1995. I11 imports of raw materials Italy is first with GO% share, followed by Germany 
(15'/:), tlie ITS.4 ( l O % r ) ,  Austria (.5%i) and others. 
Tlic sliare of iiitlircct esport through intermediaries was 27% i11 1988 and 33% i n  1989, but 
tlecreased to  20%) il l  1991 aiid is planned to  be only 9% in 1995. All iinports are direct. 
Tlie firm has long term cooperation contracts with Afis and Rockport, its main buyers. Tliey 
cieate together new models depending 011 market research and collecting orders. While i n  1988 
.jO% of production Lvas based on own development of models and 50% of the proclucts were 
createtl b3. I~uyers' ideas, i n  1994 ow11 creation increased to 59% and in 1995 it is expected to 
increase to  (j:3'X,. 'The import partners and the materials to  be imported depend upon the choice 
of tlie shoe nlotlels to be produced and the best offer the company can get to buy materials. 
The strateg.  for the future is to sell about 85% of output in foreign and 1.5% in domestic 
iiiarlicts. Tlie inaterials will be bought according to  the best offer. The firm's products are 
iri tlie upper initltlle quality group. The con~petitive strength of tlie colnpany is strong R k D ,  
t\ Ilicli enables quicli aclaptation to  tlie new fasliioii trends. Its advantages are also adequate 
locatioii (close to  buyers aiid suppliers). Tlie ability of tlie fast production of sillall series will 
I I ~  a tlecisive elenleiit to survive on European markets, while tlie large series are illoviiig towards 
tlie European East aiid the Far East (cheaper labor force). The goal for the future is to  sliorten 
tlie reaction tiiiie and to  increase specialization with the emphasis on liigher quality and comfort 
of the prodllc~d footwear. 
Procluction esclusively for clomestic market is impossible due to  its small size. Production 
fbr tlomestic market uses tlle same macliines, equipment and other factors as production for 
csport.  The quality is equal for both markets. Ecoiionly of scale is t,lie reasoll for selling the 
same illode1 011 both, clonlestic and foreign markets. Profits, however, are somewhat higher on 
tloi~lest~ic than on foreign markets. The reason is a well developed own network of retail stores 
oil tloillestic market and not the difference in selling prices. 
Doillestic Eilviroilineilt for Exports 
Grades for clonlestic conditions for exports were given by the factory ma,iiagement (in tlie ra,nge 
from 1 = inadequate to 5 = excellent conditions). These grades are: for permissions t o  export 
a,ii<l import = ,5, for tax incentives = 1, for subsidies for export = 1,  for availability of credits 
for export procluct~ion = 4 (interest rates are = 2) ,  for availability of gnarantees = 2. As labor 
intensive producer tlie company is over-burdened with social security contributions. Neither the 
escliange rate nor interest rate are considered adequate. 
For the fashion progra'm of the firm the supply of inputs in the doillestic market is of ina.de- 
eluate quality. But, there is 110 problem to  get inputs from a,broad. 
The st,a.t,e has intlirect inlpa.ct on tlie company t hrougli eschange ra,te policy (tlie eschange 
rate of clomestic currency is too high), the tax policy (liigli burden) and tlirougll the customs 
policy. The intensity of relations with the government aclministra,tion is irreleva~lt for tlie busi- 
iless. All c1ea.l~ are stricken a t  the international fairs or on the occasion when the buyers visit 
tlie company. But Slovenia remained a highly risky area for business pa.rtners clue to  the war i n  
~.icinity. Sonle of business contacts with foreign buyers were kept dive only due to  good personal 
~.ela.t.ions a,nd acqua,intances. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The firm ha.s a long term production cooperation contra,ct with AFIS (from 1969), Rockport 
(from 1980). contra,cts with Renetton (1991), Portland (1992), Roinanini (1994), while i n  trading 
\\-it11 Russia t,liere is a.n intermedia.ry conipany called I<OTO. The competitors abroad are froin 
Italy, C4ermany7 Spain, Portuga,l a.nd the Fa.r East. The firm has been present in tlie Footwea,r 
Fair in Duesseldorf continuously since 1975. 
The infol.ma~tioii a,bout foreign markets a,re obtained from foreign business partners (buyers 
of foot,~\:ear a,iltl suppliers of ranr ma,terials), fa.shion designers, througll visits to  different fairs, 
and froill professiona~l journals. 
Tlle iinpact of interna.tiona.1 economic relations of Slovenia on the compa,nyls results is direct 
tllrough ta,riffs ancl cluota,s a i d  indirect througli quality standards, dumpiilg regula.tions, liealtli 
sta,~lcla.rds etc. Payment conditions a.re crucial in  striking deals with foreign buyers. Most of the 
foreigners pa,y by SWIFT in 40-70 days after the customs operation is concluded. Tlle firm is 
pa,ying its suppliers i l l  30-90 da,ys after imported goods pass the customs. 
Tlle coopera.tion agreement of Slovenia with tlie EU a,nd the a.ssociation agreement, which 
follo~vs, will bring certain security for the firm, as it opera.tes predominantly 011 the EU ma.rl\-et. 
Tlle liinits of quotas were not fully utilized in recent years thus giving the factory a possibility 
to  espand further its exports to  the EU. 
Enterprise SaKr 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
'Tlie enterprise Salir was established in 1920. Today it lias 3900 employees and exports 314 of 
its ~>rocluction. Just  recently, some difficulties emerged caused by recession in the world market 
of car-tires. 
In 1966 a long-term cooperation contract was signed with Semperit which evolved into a 
joint irenture i n  1972. Privatization of the firm started in 1994 and was to be concluded in 1995. 
'She espectetl structure of owners a t  the conclusion of privatizatioil was: 
10% - t l ~ e  Pension Fund 
lo'%l - the Reimbursement Fund 
:38..5%, - shareholders from public exchange of shares for voucliers 
21..5%) - insider owners 
20%) - tlie Development Fund. 
The i i~ost  in~por tant  products of the firm are tires of all sorts. Besides tliat factory produces 
tliffercnt protlucts from rubber, clay, artificial leather, etc. Alnlost 87% of products are produced 
according to  international I S 0  9000 standards. 
The firm is organized in five factories plus in sections of trade, infrastructure, mai~itet~ance 
ant1 services. The conlpany already established several trade companies-subsidiaries abroad, i.e., 
in C;erinany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, Czech Republic and in all former Yugoslav republics. 
I n  the periocl 1985-1994 the annual average growth rates of tlie coliipa uy \\.ere: 
production 1.1%; 
n~lmber of einployed decreased by 1.7%; 
productivity 2.7%; 
In\~estments \\.ere i n  1994 18.8 hlilliori USD. The company is capital intensi\~e with 70%) of 
;issets being fisetl assets. The self-reliance of company is shown by the cliaracteristic tliat 70% 
of all liabilities are equity. The gross profit rate in 1994 was 9.9%). Tlic capital was in 1985 192 
hIi l l io~~ DEhI, while in 1994 already 300 Million DEM. The profit before taxes was negative in 
10sS (losses), but it reachetl 0.6 Million DEM in 1994. While 13.5%1 of the liabilities in 1994 
\ \err  credits ant1 86.5% equity (in the framework of social ownersliip) the share of the equity 
increased in 1994 to  93.9%. 
Export Orieiltation 
Exports increased froin 4.5 Million USD in 198.5 to 151 Million USD in  1994. 'l'lie sliare of export 
i n  sales increased froill 36.4% in 1988 to  81.2%) in the first 5 months of 1995, the share of imports 
in  supplies increased in tlie same period from 76.5% to 97%). 
The strategy is to  increase the sliare of exports to  90% and to  increase production. Products 
supplied for doinestic and foreign markets are equal, but around '20%-30% lower sales price is 
acliievctl on foreign markets. 
There is a plan to  bring a foreign strategic partner i n  after privatization is accomplished. 
The conipany lost almost all Yugoslav market and needed to  redirect its sales patterns. The 
plan is to  estend domestic trade network and, a t  the same tinie, to  penetrate East European 
countries and, probable, the LTSA. 
Large buyers of products are from Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
Tlle materials imported come from Thailand, Germany, Russia, Belgium, Turkey, Austria and 
Italy. 
About TO%, of trading goes through intermediaries. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
C'olnl)etitiol~ is strong but tlle company increases its retail t rade netlvork a t  horne. Significantly 
loner prices are achieved abroad than a t  home. Tlie crucial inputs are imported: these are 
special type rubber wliich is not produced a t  home or better quality materials. Reliance on own 
financing makes the company less dependable on domestic credits ancl government regulation. 
Foreigil Environi~~ent and Exports 
In  the fielcl of tires competition on international markets is immense so  cooperation wit11 strong 
international partners (Semperit and probably one more strategic investor i n  the future) is 
nrcessa ry. 
hlediators are  taking too much profit from the company; this is why further development of 
sul~sidiaries and trading companies abroad is a strategic goal for the company. 
The  company is regularly informed about  the development on foreign markets tl irougl~ par- 
ticipation a t  international fairs and by following the appropriate literature. 
T h e  prospects for future espansion are in East European markets and ,  besides LI7estern 
Europe such non-European markets where the company is not yet present. 
Foreign regulations are not prohibitive for the company and the cluotas given t o  Slovenia in 
t I I P  cooperation agreenlent wit11 the EU are not yet fully eshausted. IVhen the rest of former 
E-~~gosla\.  republics will also s t a r t  using this quota tlle situation for SaIir  will worsen. 
Enterprise SlLj 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
The company was established in 1948. I t  is active in trade, engineering, and production predom- 
inantly in nooclen industry. The number of employees decreased from 2,368 in 1988 to 81.5 in 
199-1 \\.it11 an additional 30G.50 people employed abroad. The main products used to be furniture 
and moode~i products, but from 1991 it also covers imported cars; recently the company nego- 
tiated a major capital cooperation with the AT and T from the USA \vhicli shows its intention 
to enter into the telecommu~lication industry. 
The enterprise was in social ownership until 1990. That year it was restructured into mixed 
o\vnership with limited liability. At the end of 1993 preparations for privatization began and 
it Lvas expected to be completetl i11 1995. Public sales of shares and exchange for vouchers was 
one of planned ways of privatization. Early 1995 98% of the conlpany was social capital, 0.8% 
capital was owned by an Austrian bank and 0.8% lield by the company itself. 
Export Orientation 
In 1988! aniong exporting destinations first was Russia, followed by Italy, tlie USA, Hunga,ry, 
Germa.ny, Austria a.nd tlie UAE; that  ranking did not change until 1993. Aniong the countries 
tvliere inlports originated were Germany, Russia, Austria, Italy, Hungary; in 1991 South Iiorea 
I>eca.me the most important partner (import of cars). 
111 total turnover (which decreased from 1267 Million USD in 1983 to 32.5 Million USD in 
1993) tlie value of foreign trade decreased from 540 to  1.56 blillion USD, while the value of 
exports decrea.sed from 275 to 93 Million USD. 
Tra,ding used t o  make up 42% of turnover in 1988, but increased to 48% in 1994. Instead 
of prinla,rily exporting (mostly furniture), the enterprise beca,me predol~~iiiantly an importing 
compa,ny (mostly focusing on ca,r imports). 
Tlie stra.tegic goal is to  have .50%:50% division between foreign a,nd dolnestic markets, where 
e s p o r t . ~  shoulcl I)e twice the size of ilnports. Profitability on domestic ~na~rket  is twice the 
profitability on foreign markets. 
Tlie competitive a.dvantage of this company are its reta.il networl<, stability, constant pres- 
?rice, ada.pta,bility. Products produced for foreign markets have to be more a.nd more ta.ilored 
to iridividual custoniers a.nd for that  reason they differ fro111 domestic products. 
Donlestic Ellvirollllleilt and Exports 
Doniestic conditions for exports are characterized with the gra,de 3 (a,verage). According to  the 
nla lla,gers of t,he corn pany tlie most important problems are: 
a unfa.vorable exchange rate between USD and Tolar; 
a too high interest ra.tes; 
a non-selective conditions for credits for imports of products and materials not availa.ble 
from tlomestic production; 
a non-harnionized taxes and customs with tlie EU. 
Tlie company has no problems with material imports because its main activity is trade. Help 
a n c l  support of tlie state administration in large export projects would be desirable and is in fact 
frequently ret~uested by the foreign partner (in the form of guarantees, iliternational agreements, 
ctc.).  
Foreign Eilviroili~~ei~t and Exports 
Tlie inforlnation for operative business abroad are obtained witli the representative and business 
~~e twor l i  of tlie conlpany abroad. hlarketing research is based on primary and secondary sources 
in printed and electronic media. The global information are continuously up-dated in tlie frame- 
worli of profit units, representative offices and factories, while detailed new information is put 
together for newly introduced projects (new markets, new products, new activities). 
Tlie competition in furniture market is strong and is becoming even stronger. Tlie problem 
for this coinpany is cheap labor i n  the Far East Countries and higher quality in Scandinavian 
countries. 
The mecliators allroad are not willing to  sell tlie product of tlie company under tlle company's 
])rand name. 
Risks in the furniture business are large, because trends are changing quiclily and ability to 
adapt (reaction time) is a very important factor. 
Tlie loss of Yugoslav market had several negative implications for tlie company. A large 
part of sales were just eliminated, but, a t  the same time, tlie company also lost its retail trade 
i~e t \~or l i  i n  this market. It was overtaken in Serbia and Montenegro without compensation. At 
the same tiine, illany factories, whose products were sold abroad tlirough SlLj, were situated 
i n  other republics of former Yugoslavia and after separation from Yugoslavia these business 
coiltacts were totally interrupted. SlLj was anlong tlie ones wliicli were tlie most damaged by 
tlie separation of Slovenia and interruption of economic flows witli former Yugoslav republics. 
Most of the relations with foreign partners are 011 contractual basis, while a t  llonle compe- 
tition fro111 tlie individual imports and small shops represent big problems. 
Main coinpetitors are other producers of furniture from former Yugoslavia, Italy, Russia, and 
Czech Republic. 
Tlie payments conditions are not good due to  vicinity of war and lacli of own trade mark. 
Tlie increased country risk due to  tlie Yugoslav war is a damaging factor for the esports of this 
company. 
The coo~>eration and association agreement between Slovenia and the EU had no impact on 
company's esports and iinports and it should remain so in the future. 
Enterprise LiMa 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
,7 1 lic enterprise was establislied in 1946 based on manufacturing tools aiid finished metal goods 
as well as some iuetal semi-products. It had 2,135 employees in 1988 and has 1,369 enlployees 
i l l  199.5 (first quarter). The book value of assets was 471 Million DEhl in 1989, but declined to  
107 Llillioii DELI in 1994. 
Tliis is a large husiness system, consisting of 7 enterprises. LiMa is in the process of ownersliip 
restructuring. Tlie program for privatizatioil was given to the relevant state agency for approval 
at tlie end of 1994. In the rniddle of it was still 100% in social ownership; no foreign owner was 
associated with this company. 
Tlie structure of production is the following: 35% of copper products, 39% of armatures for 
I~atl~rooins,  15% of different steel products, and 11% of radiators. 
Total sales xvere 13 blillion DEM in 1988, but 90 Millioil DEM in 1994. Escept for 1991 and 
1993 tlie coinpany esperienced small losses, not profit. 
Export Orientat ion 
'l'lie shaic of esport in total sales increased from 20% in 1988 to  44% in 1994 (escluding former 
Yugoslav marliets). Tlie share of import in total supplies was 10% in 1988, increased to  31% 
in 1993 ancl fell to 13%) a t  tlie beginiliilg of 199.5. The domestic market can not absorb the full 
cal~acitj, production of this company, but foreign markets remain un-conquered, partly due to 
~~c~ahnesses  in inarhetiiig. 
I11 198s clo~nestic marliet represented 40% of sales, other Yugoslav markets 4O'A and foreign 
niarliets 20'i:. In 1994 doillestic inarliet represents 46%, inarlcets of foriner Yugoslavia 10%, and 
foreign illarliets 44%. 
The regional orientation of exports was the following: 
111 19SS: 73'X Lvas \Vestern Europe, 9% Eastern Europe, 8% the USA and Canada, 10% other 
coiivertil>le esport inarliets . 
111 1994: 91% \Vestern Europe, 4% the USA and Canada, 2% Eastern Europe, 3% other. 
-4louiid .50% of esports are made directly, 50% t l~roug!~ intermediators. Some of the esports 
ale made on the basis of contractual cooperation. The business relations with the foreign 
~partiiers differ from procluct to product: certain products are generic and foieign distributors 
ale lleeclecl for tlieii marlieting. Other esport includes specific products for Iinown customer. 
The loss of forilier Yugoslav niarliet was painful for this company. Firstly, it can sell substaii- 
tially le5s on tlie Yugoslav market. Secondly, the rude copper was imported from Serbia and sold 
further on marliets abroad with a large profit margin. Now this kind of business ceased to esist 
anel the copper factory is still in big trouble. The change of the former Yugoslav market, which 
iiot only had absorbed majority of production but also had helped financing esports, brought 
losses to tliis compaiiy. Profitability in export is nluch lower than a t  home. 
Do~llestic Ellvirolllllellt and Exports 
[2\.aluatioii of cloiliestic environment for this coinpaily by the illailagers of tlie company is tlie 
lollowing: esport/import pernlissions - good, t a s  system - average, subsidies for export - 
I>acl. esport credits - not satisfactory, guarantees - average. 
The niajor im~>ediinent for obtaining the necessary inputs is lack of worliing capital. 
The state lias a large indirect impact on esport performalice through tlie eschange rate 
policy. But special relations with administratioil are irrelevant. 
Domestic corn~>etitioii s weak, but products from abroad are strong competitors on domestic 
~iiarliets. Tlie smallness of domestic market for specialized products requires the company to 
cspand its csports in the future. 
Conipetitive advantages of tliis company in exports are: lower prices, good personal con- 
tacts witli smaller partners (which do not have stronger organizational ties witli domestic large 
producers themselves) . 
Foreign Environment and Exports 
\\.'it11 nlost of foreign partners the company has contractual relations, some of wliich last more 
tliaii 20 gears. Former cooperation agreements were abandoned. 
The strongest foreign coinpetitors abroad are enterprises with similar production program. 
Far East countries have too large transportation costs to  be competitive, while the quality of 
solile East European producers is still not satisfactory for Western markets. Competitors a t  
lio~ne are also domestic retailers, some of them used to be managers of tliis company before 
(this slo~vs the appropriate regulation of competition). 
The most iinportant information the company uses daily is report on ivorld prices of met- 
als. Conll>an~. is present i n  trade fairs, but its market research is unfortunately much smaller 
than it used to  be. Tlie usual way to  collect information is fro111 magazines and international 
fairs. Personal co~itacts  are also important and the computer network helps to  obtain relevant 
inforniation about markets, products and suppliers of raw materials. 
I11 esporting business tlie company requires payments in 90 days and tlie payments conditions 
are very iruportant in decision about exporting or not. 
LIntil now, the cooperation agreement between Slovenia and tlie EU did not have special 
iiiipact 011 esports of tlie company, but the prepared association agreement was expected t o  
have important influence. It would enable larger sales in the EU countries, but a t  the same time 
the conlpetition on domestic market will increase. 
Tlie strategic direction of tlie company will be t o  penetrate newly Central and Eastern 
Europe ancl to  espand esports in tlie West. 
Enterprise MeLj 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
Tlie coliipany producing and trading with food was established in present iiew form in 1991, but 
esists from the 1950s as trade corporation in  social ownership. Just recently it was registered 
as a privately owned enterprise with majority ownership by enlployees, their relatives, retired 
norkers aricl tlie general public (shares offered through public offering). 
Production and sales include agricultural products and other products of foot1 industry. 
They are protluced by some factories of tliis corporation (such as oil, iiieat, vegetables ancl 
fruits, coffee. baker's ware. milk and inilk products, iiista~it cocoa products, etc.),  or they are 
products of other companies. Several agriculture cooperatives are connected witli tlie concern 
on contractual basis. 
To penetrate East European markets intermediaries who have close contacts witli tlie country 
of tlestination are used since they are able to  obtain better conditions and more secure payments. 
For instance. a merchant of Romanian origin who has his company in  Switzerland is used as 
intermediary for esports of food of MeLj to  Romania. 
Tlie structure of turnover in 1994 was the following: 
ietail tratle .5.5 % 
\\ liolesalc trade 24% 
~nanufacturing 14%) 
agriculture -5 % 
catel ing 1% 
ot l ie~ services 1%. 
Basic Figures 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Ein ploj7ees 19770 19472 17871 16519 13433 12772 12041 
('apital (hlio DEAl) 960 726 8.5 1 9.58 
Turnover (AIio DEM) 2647 1834 17.52 1882 
Profit (7'0) : 1 8 14 18 .5 
Tratlitioiial foreign markets were in 1994: Germany (19%), Croatia (18%,), Uliraine (12%), 
i-lustria (9'X)). Italy (8%)) and other 27 countries (34%). 
The pri\ratizatioii process included the follocving steps: in 1992 the social capital was trans- 
ferret1 fro111 enterprises to  tlie corporation (concentration). I11 1993 the enterprises were evaluated 
aiid the opening balance was established. In 1994 the corporation obtained approval for its pri- 
\atization plan from the Privatization Agency. Public sale of some shares was realized in 199.5 
'1nd the enterprise cvas established as privately owned wholly domestic corporatio~i n  tlie second 
half of 199.5. 
The corporation consists of nine related companies, connected with capital shares. The 
niotller company is made up of five separate joint-stock companies. In addition, three subsidiaries 
\yere establishetl in cooperation with foreign investors. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
C'urrently the revenues from exports represent 6% of total sales. Trading companies, however, 
are usually not big exporters in  Slovenia. The retail network of this largest trading company 
of Slovenia consists of over 1,300 shops across the country. Over 17% of export goes througll 
the company's (laughter companies abroad, tlie remaining part through partners \vitIi long-run 
coiiiiectioi~~. One quarter of the esports are occasional deals. 
The conipanj. plans to  develop a retail network in the targeted foreign countries, such as 
C'entral ancl Eastern Europe, other border countries, Balkans and some states of the former 
So\ iet Union. 
'rhe competitive advantage of MeLj is good quality of its goods and services, establislied 
I)usiness linlis, ancl its openness to all markets. Son~et i~nes  tlie quality of products is too high 
for tlie price tliejr achieve on foreign markets in Eastern Europe. Prices achieved a t  home are 
20'5:)-:30% higher than prices abroad. 
Goods for foreign and domestic markets are of the same quality. Sometimes pacliing and 
sul~stance is adjusted to doinestic standards. 
Doillestic Eilviroilineilt for Exports 
T l ~ c  iilanagers of MeLj gave tlie following grades for obstacles in clon~estic environment for 
export: ~~ermissions to esport or import: vefy good; esport incentives and promotion: good; 
crctlit availability: satisfactory; guarantees: very good. 
The conlpaily encounters only small obstacles to its esport-import (for i~istance in tlie case of 
products lilie sugar), but this is solved in negotiations with the aclministration. Adininistration 
has no special influence tlie business of tlie company a t  all. 
Tlle s~ilall size of Slovene market remains the major obstacle for developinent of the corpo- 
ration, since the production capacities of MeLj are much larger than tlle absorl~tion capabilities 
of tlie Slovene marliet. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
'I'lie company has a long term contractual cooperation with tlle majority of its foreign partners. 
hlajor conlpetitors on foreign markets are producers from tlie East European countries. 
hlost of tlle information needed on developments in foreign inarkets is obtained from publi- 
cations of different specialized institutions, through ow11 representative offices ancl firms abroad 
as well as through Slovene diplomatic representations abroad. 
The international position of Slovenia has a significant direct iilfluence (tariffs, quotas) as well 
as  indirect influence on the company's performance and behavior. At tlie same time, payment 
conclitions play an important role in choosing foreign partners. Tlle cooperation agreement 
had and the association agreenieiit will have an inlportant impact on the esport pattern of tlle 
company because the entry barriers for this company on selected foreign marliets are lowered 
with these agreements. 
The company has practically the only remaining large chain of shops all over Slovenia. 
.According to the intentions tlie company would remain i n  iilajority Slovene ownership. It is 
the espericuce of soine East European countries, that tlie large trading coinpanies \vliich were 
o\ertaken 11). foreign nlultinationals subsequently closed their doors for donlestic producers as 
suppliers. The joint venture established in Slovenia between hleLj and an Austrian partner. 
11oivei.er. is selling over 60% of Slovene products and uses all the infrastructural support of its 
Slovenian niotlier company. 
Enterprise ZlMa 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
The orga~niza,tion of tliis enterprise, engaged in production of detergents a,nd cosmetics, wa.s 
ra,dically changed 011 July 1, 1990, when a foreign multinational becaiiie a ina,jority owner. I11 
1988 tlie compa.ny had 1,338 employees. However, since that  time there ha.s been a constant 
retluction i11 employinent. I11 1994 there was 621 employees. At tlie end of 1994, tlie \ d u e  of the 
capital ua.s 4.4 billion tolar. It is very difficult to determine the value of capita.1 back in 1988, 
since hyper-inflation existed before a.nd during the yea,rs of transition. 
I11 1988, the e~lt~erprise exported 12% of its products to  foreign ma.rkets. In 1994 only 57% of 
it,s products were sold to tlie domestic market. Sa,les volume decreased during this time period 
hecause of transitional pressures. Profits during this time period initia.11~ were lower, although 
i n  tlle follotving yea,rs profits increased substantially. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Tlie capacity of concern is around 60 thousand tons of products, but tlie Slovene market can 
allsorb only about 25-28 thousand tons. Export is therefore a must. 
Forcign sales \{,ere volatile during the observation periocl because of transitional uncertainty. 
.411 increase in foreign sales was due to new distribution channels introduced by tlie foreign 
otvuer and lienr coinpetitors emerged in the domestic market. 
Iinport of inputs originate from tlie foreign company that  acquired tlie enterprise. Original 
exports were inaiiily sent to  Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and tlie countries of Central and 
Easter11 Europe. Iinports inainly originate froin Germany, Austria, Italy, and Slovakia. 
Tlic eiiterprise inainly exports its own products and licensed products, but occasioiially 
exports are tailor made for specific clients. 80% of products exported to  foreign inarltets consist 
cosiiletics and 20%) is detergents. 
Tlie enterprise's export strategy is to export all products tliat are not successful i11 tlie 
tloinestic ~narket .  
Tllere exists 110 difference between products ear-marked for the doinestic and foreign markets. 
Tlie profitability of exports is lower tlian tliat of products sold 011 the domestic market. In 
atltlition, tlie ~>roduction of products for tlie domestic market does not support tlie production 
of export products. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Tlie ma.na.gers of tlie company eva.luate tlie conditions for imports ant1 exports fa.ir. Hotvever, 
there a,re 110 governinent incentives for exports. Tlie different guarantees for tlie import ancl 
export market a.re neither favorable or harmful. 
Slovenia.'s EXIM ba.nl; is willing to cover exports with guarantees in safe countries (i.e., in 
tlie West) tt~hicli is in fact not needed, but it does not cover highly risky exports ( to  African 
couiitries, for instance) which would be desirable. 
Tliere a,re 110 obstacles to obta'in tlie necessary inputs for production from abroad. The 
tlifficult rela.tionship between Macedonia and Slovenia has a lia,rmful effect 011 enterprise's exports 
and i i i i~~or t s  froill tliis country; which trade with Macedonia11 partners was quite substantial 
before the split, of Yugoslavia. 
The illa,iiagers of tlle company would like to  see stable doinestic legisla~tion wit11 longer validity 
periotl tlian recently. Togetlier with stable general economic a,nd political conditions tliis can 
improve country risk and thus ease the business relations of company wit11 foreigii pa,rtiiers. 
Foreign E ~ l v i r o ~ l ~ l l e ~ l t  for Exports 
This enterprise is majority owned by a foreign collcern and as one of its units uses its trade 
network in selling trade mark product of the multinational company. For its ow11 product 
11rogram (ow11 trade-marks) the Slovenian company's own trade network is used. 
Tlie enterprise has only a one year contracts with its distributors. Its competitors are 
~>owerful corporations of the cosmetics and detergent market like Proctor aud Gamble and 
nilevel.. 
The enterprise receives information concerning tlie foreign markets tlirougli its ow11 offices 
and representatives, and through the network of the mother company, through offices of otlier 
Sloveile firms, personal contacts, specialized literature, magazines, persolla1 contacts, and ow11 
research. 
The enterprise was riot affected by the EU cooperation agreement. Tlie association agree- 
ment will equalize the position of Slovene producers with some otlier producers and signing the 
association agreement liberalizes both exports and imports. 
Enterprise IEKr 
Basic I i ~ f o r i ~ ~ a t i o i ~  
The company \ \as established after World War I1 as one of the enterprises of a larger corporation. 
The large corporation was dissolved a t  tlie beginning of 1990s and IEIir started successfully on 
its orvn. 
Tlie enterprise is the fourth largest producer of meters for electric energy in Europe. In 1994 
i t  ~>roclucetl over 1.8 Llillion meters (counters) of different types. The yearly rate of groivtli of 
~>lotluction froni 1990 on was 13.8%, while the number of employees increased by 7.4% yearly. 
T l~us .  tlie ).early productivity increase was 6.4%. 
Basic Performance Indicators 
(in h4illion DEM unless otherwise noted) 
Revenue 





Number of employees 
Investment 
O\.er 90% of the production is exported. Tlie company has a 25%) market share on the 
C;e[ ~ n a n  ~uarliet.  
Tlie inductive nleters of this enterprise are spread in all parts of the world, including Western 
Europe (where of total production is sold), Africa (2%), Asia (7%), Soutll America (8%) 
and Oceania. 10% of the products are sold in former \'ugoslav republics. 
Tlie electronic counters produced by tlie IEIir are recently making their way to  the world 
~ ~ ~ a l l i e t s .  Tlie conipany already obtained IS0  9001 standard and is able to  aclapt production to 
\Vestern standarcls. 
The enterprise was anlong the first larger Slovene enterprises in  concluding privatization in 
1994. Tllus, tlie on.nership structure in the middle of 199.5 was the following: 
a (iO'%, of the shares belonged to present and former elnployees; 
a lo%, - Reiml~ursernent Fund; 
a 10%) - Pension Fund; 
1057, - Investment Company ICBM Infond; 
a 10%) - Investment Company Iirona. 
Export Orientation 
The enterprise's strategy of i~lternationalization is realized by the establishment of joint ventures 
aljroatl. IEIir already established its enterprises i n  Germany, Russia and prepares to  establish 
tlieln i n  Croatia, Italy, India and hlalaysia. 
The loss of the former Yugoslav market meant a decrease in sales on this ~narliet from 3.5 
llillion DEM in 1991 to  20 Million DEM in 1994. 
90'2 of total production is exported, partly directly, but most of it is sold in  foreign markets 
t Illougli clifferent clistributors and sales agents. All products exported are of the company's own 
protluction. BO-70%, of esports go to  the EU. 
Sales (in Mio DEM.l 1993 1994 
a t  home 
abroad 
total 
Licenses of IEIir are sold to partners in Spain, Tunisia, Malaysia, Argentina and Colombia. 
hIore tliaii -5%) of revenues are already obtained by selling licenses and parts to  these partners. 
Tlie company's strategic plan for the future includes further internationalization of produc- 
tion ancl glol~alization of marketing thus retaining shares in esisting inarkets and conquering 
new inarkets. 
Competitive advantages of the company are: quality, 5-10% lower prices than local producers 
in the \Vest offer. Profitability a t  home and abroad are approximately the same in illore recent 
period. 
Quality of products for domestic and foreign markets is the same, escept for some differences 
in standards and the necessity to  adjust the product to the environment (such as to  the protection 
against tropical heat). 
Donlestic Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
A major negative factor impacting the esport performance of the company is the appreciation 
of' clolilestic currency. Tliere is no special problem with esport conditions at  home, escept 
for guarantees, wliich are difficult to obtain. The domestic Esiln bank is too small, insurance 
companies are not willing to insure exports. Acreditives and sales on open account are usually 
used. 
The activity of the government administration is not affecting the performance of the com- 
pany, but tlie general positive econonlic and political cliillate a t  home 11% been beneficial for 
the esporting business. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
Foreign partners are either buyers (with discount price), intermediaries (with provision) or agents 
(with agent provision). Contracts for larger quantities are achieved i n  public tenders. Tliere is, 
llon.ever, little security that  the foreign buyer will choose the same producer every year. 
C'oinpetitors are large multinationals specialized i n  the production of measuring instruments 
for electricity. Further international integration i n  this industry is in process. This development 
will leacl to the sllrinliage of esport opportunities for IEI<r wliich is inclependent, and can be 
consiclered snlall by word standard in this industry. 
The sales chain of the company should be decreased to improve competitiveness. Tlie pres- 
sure to lower prices is strong for products of lower quality (inductive meters) due to  lower labor 
costs in some competitor countries. The response will be establisliment of better purcliasing 
nletliocls to obtain cheaper raw materials, rationalization of production and relocation of labor 
intensive production into countries with cheaper labor. 
Simultaneously tlie structure of production will be changed in favor of more complex and 
sopliisticatecl products, i.e., electronic meters and comples electronic systems of counters. 
The entry of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the EU helped to decrease import duties in 
soiile esport clestinations (for instance an 18% duty in Finland was abolished). 
Sources of information about foreign inarkets are: local partners, publications, fairs, and 
on 11 research and development team. 
A niajor clomestic problem for the expansion of the company is the obstacles by tlie Slovene 
aclministration to  establish Slovene subsidiaries abroad. This kind of espansion \vill be more 
aiicl more necessary for the Slovene companies. But the whole procedure is iiot well defined, 
tlie cliscretionary power of administration is too large. According to  the managers of IEIir the 
licen\ing procedure and conditions should be given by law, and if fulfilled, registratio11 sliould 
Ile automatic. 
Enterprise TTOV 
'The enterprise active in textile industry was established as a private joint-stock company in 1993 
from a formerly socially owned ent~rprise.  Its productio~i consists of socks (4.5.3 h'lillion pairs 
per .\-ear), suits (300 thousand pieces per year) and textile accessories. 
Traditional export markets are Germany (between 76% and 79% of sales), Netherlands (only 
in 1994, 10%) while do~nestic Slovene marliet absorbs between 20%) and 22% of production. 
Ba.sic Performallce Information (in Million of SIT unless otherwise stated) 
I~itlicator 19SS 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Number of employees 862 903 871 S84 959 1015 900 
Capital 1.3 28.7 52.4 239.S 479.2 77S.2 910.7 
Credits/omn capital (%) 12 42 6 9 44 2 6 16 11 
Sales 1.6 23.4 89.2 256.5 821.S 1202.7 1212.0 
1'1 ofits 0.3 5.9 - 5.2 - - - 
Export i n  sales (%,) 78 77 76 74 79 7 7 v- I I 
l~npor t s  in purchases (76) 1.5 16 7 2 34 4 7 5 6 6 2 
The enterprise is fully owned by tlo~llestic owners and it is in  the process of privatization in 
199.5. Starting point for this process is: 93% of social ownership, 6.6% o\vnersllip of Development 
F~l l l~ l .  
Export Orieiltatioil 
Alajor foreign partners are private middle size enterprises in Germany and Italy (exports) and 
in Italy ant1 Austria (imports). The majority of exports is conducted directly. Only small share 
of i111110rts goes througl~ import companies such as Unites and Adites fro111 Ljubljana. 
The strategic goal is to  decrease the share of exports and increase the share of the domestic 
marliet. 111 exports the share of job work is intended to  be reduced. 
Presently there is a little export of non-company products; its share should increase in the 
future. 
Products for tlie domestic and foreign market are of exactly tlie same quality. There is a 
~xofitability difference between the domestic and foreign markets which is around 10%. This 
~ ~ I O I L - S  that cross-financing is present to a certain extent. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
The grades that the managers of the company gave to tlie domestic conditions for exports and 
i~liports \vllen bve aslied for evaluation are the following (from 1 = unsatisfactory, 2 = satisfactory; 
:3 = good; 4 = very good, 5 = excellent): 
Export Import 
Permissions for esport,  import 4 3 
Tas  system 4 3 
Incentives for export, import 1 - 
Credit availability 4 2 
Guarantees availability 4 3 
The enterprise TTOV does not meet any obstacle in importing raw materials and receives a 
prefere~itial t r e a t ~ n e ~ i t  for imported inputs intended for production for esport.  
State regulation has no inlpact upon the company's decision whether or not to export, but in -  
fluences to  a certain degree its decision on imports. Good relations with the state administration 
arc frequently helpful in  the realization of the company's export-import businesses. 
Foreign Environ~~lent  for Exports 
C'ooperation with foreign partners is on contractual basis and with the largest foreign partner 
esists since 1972. 
Tlie liiajor competitors are producers of similar products i n  Germany, wliere majority of 
company's production is esported. The information about foreign markets are obtained through 
the C'lianiber of Commerce and from busiliess partners abroad. This information is frequently 
uptlatetl. 
Regartling i~ifluence of Slovenia's iliternational relations to trade activities of tlie company 
the only ol~stacle comes from import tariffs and quotas. 
The pay~llelit conditions are more used for selection of foreign partners in imports than in 
esports. The usual payment period for export is 30 days, for imports 60-90 days. 
Tlie cooperation agreement between tlie EU and Slovenia did not have a significant influence 
011 the clioice of targeted markets for exports. The association agreement will help increasing 
tlie amount of production that  the company intends to esport directly. 
Enterprise SvMa 
This enterprise 1va.s established in 1946. Its productio~i consists mostly of textile goods. Their 
hul>staiice is acetate, polyester, polyamide, wool, vyscosis and cotton. 
Esport is clirected towards wl~olesalers. 90% of export goes through direct contacts, 10% 
wit11 the hell, of intermediaries (the companies IBN and UTX froin Ljubljana). The esport is 
ma.inly ow11 proclucts and only sometimes labor services. 
The slia.re of productioil which is exported increased constantly over the observa.tion period 
from I)clo~v 'LO?, in 1988 to 80% in 1994. 
I'crformance Inclicators 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Employees 708 696 65 1 548 486 487 491 
Capital (bIillion DENI) 12.9 13.4 20.9 14.2 12.8 20.9 22.5 
Sales (in 1000 meters) 8718 8047 6641 6620 6076 6980 7448 
Profit rate ('%) 0.2 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0 
Inclel~teclness ('51) 5.8 3.3 6.6 2.2 1.4 5.5 5.3 
Esport share (5%) 18.9 28.4 39.3 49.4 66.5 79..5 81.4 
The company is still in social ownership and is on the way to be privatized. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Esport is supplied to all highly competitive Western markets. 
There is a worldwide recession i n  testile production ancl tliat is observed i11 tlie company's 
performance too. 
Products for foreign markets and for domestic markets are of the same quality. The prof- 
itability of sales i n  domestic and foreign markets differ. The ratio is 2:l. Thus, procluction for 
clomestic market (a market tliat can not absorb all the production) supports esports. 
Dist,rihution of Sales ( i n  % of total sales) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Gerinany 19.6 1.5.6 3.5..5 12.4 18.7 
Frai~ce 8.9 .5.5 2.4 5.2 .5.4 
ltaly 6.7 14.5 4..5 13.1 10.9 
USA 4.1 12.9 17.4 40.2 32.5 
Other foreign 0.2 5.5 1.2 8.6 10.7 
Domestic marliet 60.5 46.0 39.0 20.5 21.8 
Losing the former Yugoslav marliet was painful for this company, but, it started to reorient 
I>usiness from ex-Yugoslavia to  foreign markets even before the break-up of Yugoslavia., so that  
acljustment problems were smaller than otherwise would have been. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
:\ccording to the managers of the company imports of testiles to Slovenia are over-liberalized. 
The t a s  burden for the company in this labor intensive industry is too heavy and the currently 
ii~trocluced small subsidy for labor intensive industries will help a little. Esport incentives have 
not esisted until now. The situatioil with respect to availability of credits for esports and 
ilnports is rerj. good for this company and availability of insurance scllenies is escellent. 
No obstacles esist to obtaining inputs needed for productioii for esport. Preferential treat- 
inent (relief of custom duties) exists for inputs intended for production for esport. 
The state administration has no influence on the choice concerning esport. No special 
relations esist wit11 the state administration, but on the long run they could be helpful for 
(.sport. 
Foreigil Environment for Exports 
The company has a long term contractual relationship wit11 most of foreign partners. Major  
co~npeti tors  al~roacl are large companies producing printed testiles particularly in  C;ermany. 
Czech Republic, and Turliey. 
Information about  development on foreign markets is obtained through specialized literature, 
from agents and intermediaries abroad, through direct contacts and participation on fairs abroad. 
Slovenia's foreign relations d o  not influence the export-import performance of the  company. 
Present coo~>eration agreement and the coming association agreement with the EU remained 
without special influence on the company's esport  and import performance as quotas for metric 
testile esport  of Slovenia t o  the EU have not been entirely utilized. 
P a y n ~ e n t  coilditions are not an  important determinant of a choice of esport  or import.  All 
billy are paid in 30-60 clay periods. 
Enterprise LeLj 
General Characteristics of the Enterprise 
LeLj was formed i n  1946. It lias matured into one of tlie largest and most successful companies 
in  Slovenia (gii.iiig around 2% of all manufacturing of Slovenia), operating in tlie pharmaceutical 
ilidustry. Besides pliarinaceutical products (78% of production) otlier five smaller categories of 
ploclucts are: oi,er-the-counter drugs (3%), cosmetics (8%), veterinary drugs and animal feed 
(5'4)) tleiital products atid diagnostic agents (5%)). Tlie company owns a liotel (1%). I t  acquired 
oier 300 patents i11 Slovenia and abroad. LeLj is ranked 130th among tlie 8,000 pharmaceutical 
conipanies ivorldwide. 
7'his joint stocl; company was first among Slovenia's largest conipanies privatized partly 
through public offering of shares. Its present ownership structure consists of four blocks: s tate 
ant1 investment funds (37%), employees and management (25%), citizens (32%), otliers (G%). 
Besicles its tlonlestic production units tlie company has 7 offices and 10 subsidiaries abroad, 
niostly i n  C'entral, Southern and Eastern Europe. LeLj has strong business connections in mar- 
1,ctiiig 11~11; pliai~maceuticals in North America, Western Europe and Japan. Among companies 
,il)roatl four are i l l  former Yugoslavia, while tlie others in Switzerland, Poland, C'zecli Republic, 
Russia, Nigeria. Austria ant1 Pakistan. Representative offices are in tlie USA, Russia, IJkraine, 
Polaiitl, Czecli Republic and France. 
Aillong doiiiestic competitors there is one similar factory and one sillaller factory, tlie latter 
cstablislietl as joint venture with Germany company Bayer. 
Basic Data (in Million USD u~iless otherwise noted) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
r\ssets 148 164 2 48 2 74 
C'apital 11 1 131 183 193 
Nunibel of eiiiplo~.ees 2464 2347 2169 2240 
Total Revenue 166 204 279 275 208 17.5 23.5 
cos t s  121 138 189 179 139 
Salaries 19 3 1 4 5 3 8 27 4 1 5 0 
Ueprecia tioii 8 2 0 19 2 3 2 2 23 2 8 
Thses 9 15 13 15 10 
Net Income 9 3 10 20 12 8 2 3 
Invest illelits 2 6 3 5 
Esports 117 1G'i 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Tlte l~iarket structure of sales in 1992 was the following: 29% Slovenia, 10% Poland, 4% Germaliy, 
2% Japan. .55% otlier foreign countries. 
Tra.de Pattern, in % 
Domestic market 16 30 33 30 
Other Foreign 39 38 45 53 
- 
Tlie sliare of R&D in Sales 7 10 10 11 
Regioiiall~., i11 1992 70%) of sales were esports, among them: Central and Eastern Europe 
15(/:, fornier Soiviet Union countries 11%), developed countries 23%, Croatia 11%. South Eastern 
Lr~rope 7%) and developing countries 3%. 
I n  1994 tlie compa.ny succeeded in entering the USA marliet, wliich immediately beca,me its 
largest foreign market (42 Million USD). This wa,s the result of tlie registration of one drug, 
Cimetidine. i n  tliis nia.rket. In 1994 70% of tlie 167 Million USD export wa.s realized in  the US. 
In the prepa.ration of tlie investment protection agreement between tlie USA ant1 Slovenia the 
US authorities wa,nted to include a retroactive protection of American patents in phar~riaceuticals 
from 1986 (similar request wa,s a,ccepted by the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic a,nd Hungary). 
In tliis ca,se it was rejected, tliougli, after Slovenia proved that  tlie quality of its industrial 
property I>rotection had l>een according to tlie new regulations that the US wa,nted to apply. 
By 1994 ma,jor foreign ~iiarliets ranlied by country were: the USA, C,!roa,tia, Pola.nd, Rus- 
sia,  hla,cedonia, Ca,nada, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Serbia, C4ermany1 Slovaliia~, Great Britain, 
1-Iungary and Pa.kistan. 
Foreign part,ners different for different product groups: they are local importers, producers 
of pharmaceuticals (for raw materials), dealers, whole salers and retailers (for cosmetics). 
l i i~ports  of raw materials are made directly, domestic supplies iiiclude only packages. 
hlajor tra.tle partners are: ow11 enterprises in Eastern and Central Europe, distributors in 
tlist,ribution chain, a.nd local importers a,nd a,gents. 
The conlpa.ny sells its ow11 products, but some products are manufactured under license. The 
t.ec1inologica~l ha,lance of payments of the company is still negative, but it is improving quiclily. 
Tlie compa,iiy is ea.ger to  increa,se the export of capital by establishing its conlpa.nies (facto- 
ries) al,roa,tl. The present legislature in Slovenia, however, is not liberal a.nd it takes a long time 
t,o get permission. 
The stra,tegy is t,o establish its own sales network abroad for several rea.sons. One is to secure 
existing ma.rliet share or increase it. Second is to move the ma.rlieting function to the factories 
a.broatl. It is very iinporta,nt to deal directly with clients on the spot and to be close to the 
~na,rliet nl~icli i n  tlie ca,se of p1ia.rinaceuticals means tlie individual doctors. 
The strategy of the firm is to expand the productioil and exports of generic pliarn~aceuticals. 
Development of a new drug costs today around 300 Million USD and takes several years. LeLj, 
~vitli R&D expenditures of 1/10 of that amount, can not afford such development. Thus, tlie 
conipa.ny can be efficient in generic drugs and a t  the same time it will have to int'ensify strategic 
allia,nces. This wa,y the sopliistica,ted barriers to enter \Vestern ~ilarkets coultl be removed. 
Domestic Environment for Exports (and Imports) 
.4ccortling to the mallagers of the company tlie domestic marliet is over-liberalized to imports 
of ~>l~arniac~ut ica ls .  Reciprocity in dealing with Western countries is needed. Also, price dispar- 
ities occi~i ,  \\ liere foreign companies sell drugs in Slovenia at  much higher prices than in other 
countries thus redirecting a larger s l~are  of the budget intended for pl~armaceuticals into their 
l>ocliets. (A11 empirically proved general rule is that each country spends 1% of its GDP on 
~>liarmaceuticals.) 
Tlie major competitive strength of production are: wider assortment; good knowledge of the 
marliet (especially in Central Eastern Europe where the company is present over 20 years and 
t l~us  has a competitive advantage over Western companies; strong R k D  department; tradition. 
Products for export differ from products for domestic use only if special requests (standards) 
froill tlie iniporting country need to be fulfilled. 
The profitability is related to products not to countries. Exports enable production in larger 
clua~itities thus tlecreasing the share of fixed costs in total costs and making production of certain 
protlucts 11iore profitable. For that reason production for export in fact supports productioil for 
tloinestic market. 
There is no problem with permissions to export or import. Government incentives do not 
exist. except for recent relief from social security contributions. For a capital intensive company 
lilie LeLj tliis support will remain modest. Credits are easily available due to rating A of 
tlie colnpally. According to tlie managers of tlie company when issuing guarantees against 
co~llnlercial rislis the Esim bank should require less docunlents and speed the procedure. 
For specific products sucli as drugs it is relevant to have good cooperation ~vith the govern- 
~nen t .  LeLj sorneti~nes helps organizing visits of health ministers of foreign countries to Slovenia 
ant1 helps to prepare documents related to further cooperation between countries in the medical 
fieltl. 
Foreign Eilvirolllllellt for Exports 
Tlie inajor contacts with foreign partners are through contracts and through licenses bought 
ant1 sold. 
The market of pllarmaceuticals is worldwide; regional limitations are practically impossible. 
Sources of information about tlie market are: own i~iformation tlocumentation, online inter- 
net, o~vn  library, and information from partners. 
Slovenia is still in the process of adopting the law on production ant1 tlistribution of phar- 
maceuticals since the old Yugoslav legislation is inadequate. For that reason Slovenia is not yet 
member of inlportant international organizations and conventions. Due to this the inspections 
lclatecl to registration of drugs in foreign countries is very costly and takes time. International 
harnionization in this field is still a t  the initial stage. 
Tlie payments conditions have become less important because with decreasing inflation aiid 
t Irus more stable escliange rate and lower interest rates risks are smaller, in case there is a delay 
i11 paylnents. 
Botli tlie cooperation and tlie association agreement with the EU have certain impact by 
lowering entrance barriers for tlie co~npany's exports. 
Strategic partnership in tlie field will not be built by this company througli capital connec- 
tions, but as cooperation in special fields such as R&D, marketing, production aiid distribution. 
Tliat way costs can be reduced for all partners in cooperation. For capital investments foreign 
partners arc not neecled by this company. 
Enterprise SvKa 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
This companji nras established before World War 11, but reestablished as socially owned company 
in manufacturing of textiles the war. The company produces towels, bathing coats, ties and 
similar testile products. 
In 199.5 tlie colupany was concluding the process of privatization i n  which .5l'% property 
I~ecame iiisicler owlled (by n.orkers, managers and retired workers; 98% of workers and 70% 
of retiree1 workers of tlie coliipaliy eschanged their vouchers for shares in tlie company). The 
remaining part of the shares was given to the state funds (close to 40%) and 10% is sold to 
the public (vouchers for sliares). The strategy is to buy-back some of tlle sliares later a t  the 
stock escliange or from the state funds, so that  majority ownership remains within tlie company. 
Only 1% of the factory was intended to  be given to former owners in the form of shares or cash 
payments. 
The most I~ooming years for the coinpaily were late 198Os, when 2.5% of production was sold 
at I~ome, .5O'i/c, in the rest of Yugoslavia and 25'% abroad. T l ~ e  recessioil in testile industry in the 
n.orlcl and the loss of the Yugoslav market were major reasons for downsizing aiid restructuring 
of the factory. 
Ba.sic Data 
(in Millioil DEM unless otherwise noted) 
1988 1994 
Number of enlployees 861 ,570 
Turnover 47.5 28.4 
towels 26.1 17.8 
clothing, ready-made 8.0 6.1 
silk products 13.4 4..5 
domestic market 9.7 9.7 
Yugoslav market 30.4 2.2 







The only \vajr for tlie company to  survive was to expand esports and further penetrate foreigu 
~iiarkets, especially in developed Western Europe. But the testile industry is i n  recession and 
foreign competition increased strongly. 
There are three major groups of foreign partners. First are hotels, hospitals and laundry- 
liouses (leasing of towels). Second, the company has a long-term business cooperation with sollle 
factories i n  Cer~ i i a~ ly  whicl~ are producers and sellers a t  the same time so that  they sell this 
company's products as their own products. The third group of partners are large supermarkets 
(QlIELLE, I\II\A). 
iZ major prol~lem is tlie espensive labor force which is crucial for tlie labor intensive pro- 
cluction in  testiles. Tlie average yearly labor costs per worker in this compaily are around 18 
tliousand DEM, in Germany three tiines higher, but in tlie nearest competitor in Central Eu- 
rope, Hungary, a t  least 30%-40% lower. For that  reason job work is moving from Gerinany 
tlirough Austria and Slovenia to  Hungary (and other Central European countries) but its final 
destination will be first Eastern Europe (Balkan, former Soviet Union) and later eve11 further 
-14a or Africa. Cheap labor, already existing fised assets (empty factory buildings) and rel- 
atiively uiicoiiiplicated production process are reasons for this development. Therefore, textile 
coiiipanies in Slovenia witli a large amount of job work are in big trouble. 
Tlie competitive advantages of this company are: flesibility (small series), t l e s ig~~  and high 
quality, fast response. Reaction time of the conipaliy is 6-8 weeks for delivery after an order is 
ieceivetl. wliicl~ is faster than in most larger firms in this industry. 
Espolt ing i ts  GO% of production with a positive t rade balance (exports double imports) 
the cornpan!. is sensitive t o  escliange rate movements. However, despite real appreciation of 
tloniestic culrcncy in the last two years iiic~easing the relatively cheaper iiiiports of materials 
can not be a long-term solution from a macro-economic poilit of view. 
hIajor competitors a t  home are two other companies. This could mean a oligopolistic struc- 
t u ~ e  in the domestic market,  but tlie quickly growing liberalized (in fact over-liberalized) imports 
a le  causing problems t o  domestic producers. Wliat is requested from tlie managers of this com- 
pany, is recipiocity treatment from the government when allowing foreign textile producers and 
5ellers t o  Slovenia's market. 
LIajor destiilations for esport  are: Germany (SO%), Austria ( l o%) ,  Italy and tlie Netlier- 
lands. Aliiiost all exports (9.5%) and imports (98%) are arranged directly without intermediaries. 
Alajor competitors abroad are Turkey, Portugal and to  lesser e s t e ~ i t  (clue t o  lower cluality and 
\lower reaction) Brazil and Pakistan. 
The  future strategy of the compaily is t o  retain its present cluaiitity of productioi~, but to  
illcrease the value added through higher quality and highly processed pioductioii. It riieans 
increased cluality, iiiiproved assortment, s tep into higher price categories, affirmation of own 
trade-mail, (I'eronique, which is already well established in soine boutiques in \Vestern Europe). 
rrllc tlesi~ecl future structure of sales is: two tliird of sales in foreign a i ~ d  one tliird in the 
tloiliestic ~narl iet .  If conditions improve in former Yugoslavia, 50T1 of sales will be directed t o  
foreign cor~ntries,  25% t o  former Yugoslavia and 25% will be sold at home. 
Recently investments in the size of 4 Million DEM were made witli tlie support of domestic 
l>anli credits. Foreign credits looked cheaper a t  the first siglit (looking just a t  the  interest rates),  
I ~ u t  hey required additional payments for manipulation costs, costs of guarantees and opening 
of acretlitives would have made the  total costs of foreign creclit liigher. 
Tlic prices reachetl on German market are about 25% lower than piices reaclied by well 
c\tablislled Gernlan firms in t ha t  market. 
Pioducts for esport  are tailored to  the standards of couiitry of destination. Products  for 
iicli collsuiiiers a le  of the saine quality a t  home and abroad, but products for lower income 
tonsuiners a le  of lower cluality if sold a t  home. Especially former tlie Yugoslav inarbet requires 
5pecial protlucts of special lower quality and cheap design. 
Espoi t s  on average do  not bring any profit a t  the moment. Prices reaclied in exports are 
loner than a t  home by 30% in towels, by 5%-10% in bathing coats. 
Inventoiies are practically eliminated, all production is directly related to  orders, which is 
in connection with the importance of fashion design in these products. 
Do~llestic Eilvirolllllellt for Exports 
l larket  is liberalized, in imports even too much. The  existirig quotas in the EU are not yet 
full!. r~tilizetl by Slovene producers and exporters. The  financial stimulation by the government 
tl irougl~ the relief of social security contribution for net esporters is welcomed by the company. 
It is necessary, however, t o  make this incentive automatic, by law, and not discretional. Tlie 
automatic regulation will fasten the  iiicome stream aiid decrease political interventions in the 
ecollolll~'. 
The  clonlestic EsIm bank (Slovenska izvozna dru iba)  currently does not sul>port espor t s  of 
(oiisunier gootls I~ycredits or guarantees but ,  according t o  the managers of SvI\a. it should. 
Tliere are 110 obstacles t o  obtaining appropriate domestic or  imported inputs. 
Trade liberalization of Slovenia is considered to be gone in some sectors (especially consumer 
gootls) too far: not only borders have become open, entry was liberalized ailel registration for 
clo~ilestic importers became also totally liberalized. Reciprocity treatment in foreign markets 
ivas not required ant1 that  should be corrected in the negotiations of the goverilinent with foreign 
countries. 
The nlanagers of the company think that  there is too much state intervention in the Slovene 
economy. Subventions of different types are increasing the burden on budget, tlius requiring in- 
creased tax rates. The final effect is selective support. But historical experience of ex-Yugoslavia 
iilclicates that  in  Slovenia only the formerly state-supported industries cause problems today. 
C'om~>anies of tlle textile iildustry definitely do not belong to them. 
Foreign Ei~viroi~ineilt for Exports 
Protection for textile industry is present in the EU to preserve jobs. Slovenia should require 
reciprocity treatment i n  textiles in the concluded free trade agreements with the Visegrad group 
countries. 
Tlle major type of cooperation with partners are regular yearly contracts. 
Llajor sources of information are: market research abroad, presence 011 fairs, orders and 
inforination froin foreign partners. 
C'ooperation agreement with tlie EU helped the Slovenian textile industry. Until recently 
iliost of the cluotas of former Yugoslavia could be used by Sloveile companies as textile production 
in other parts of foriner Yugoslavia almost collapsed. When Austria entered the EU inlport cluties 
(of 14%) for the company's exports to Austria were eliminated thus improving the competitive 
~>osition of the company i n  this market. The same happened in Scandinavia, but tlie mal-ket is 
smaller and nlore specific. 
The association agreement with the EU will not cause inajor changes for tlie company because 
Slovenia is a small country and there will always be a niche in the EU market allowed for Slovene 
textile producers. 
The payment period is shorter abroad (30-60 days) than a t  liome (60-90 days) ancl delays 
are around 1.5 days abroad, 30-60 days a t  home. 
Tlie company does not look for a majority foreign strategic partner. but minority foreign 
ownershil> could be imaged. Oiie of the major reasons for this strategy is fact that  tlie social 
prol>leins connected witli cutting number of enlployees (already cut by one third) are clealt with 
liiricll more care by tlomestic (inside) owners than by foreigners. 
Enterprise StKa 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
The enterprise was established in 1904. In 1990 it was transformed from socially owned enterprise 
into an enterprise in mixed (foreign and domestic) ownership. It is 97% socially owned ancl 3% 
pri~ately owned. I11 the future, besides some restitutioli claims about 40% of sharers will go to 
different f l~nds  ant1 a t  least 40% will be owned by insiders. 
The protluction program includes furniture specialized for offices. The change from mass 
production to specialization to individual orders is currently taking place. The well-known 
designers of the company helped to establish its trade mark and tlie recognizable style of office 
furniture of tlie company. The company controls around 60% of the domestic market. Major 
tlolnestic competitors are four domestic companies with 27% domestic market share and foreign 
protlucers wit11 1:3'%, share. 
The colnoally has subsidiaries a t  home and abroad. There are sis  companies in Slovenia 
(\\lit11 sllops i n  larger cities), four in former Yugoslavia, four in C4ermany, and one in Hungary 
and t lie Czech Republic each. 
Recession ant1 separation from Yugoslavia caused disinvestment thus decreasing tlie number 
of c~nl>lo!.ees from 1.400 to 900 \vitli the optimal size being in fact closer to ,500. 
Basic Statistics 
(in NIillion DEM unless otherwise notecl) 
1992 1993 1994 
N U ~ I  ber of en1 ployees 962 910 
Capital 6 2 
Turnover 20 37 .56 
Export Orientation 
111 tlie total turnover 4.5% of revenues come from exports. 
ILIajor Sources of Income i n  1994 
Total Share of Exports 
(Million DEM) % 
\l'ood 1 6 8 
\l'ooden chairs 8 42 
Steel chairs 9 4 0 
Office flirniture 17..5 5 0 
ALU ecluipment 3 0 
Shop equipment 4 2 
Engineering and services 12 50 
hlajor tloniestic buyers are: furniture and wood trading companies and banks \vhich equipped 
their preinises by this factory' furniture. hlajor foreign buyers i n  1994 were: ELIiA - Germany, 
\'OIiO - Ciermany, Spilker - Germany, Iilco Trade - Russia and Held - Germany. Major export 
markets are Cierniany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, tlie Netherlands, and Scandinavia. 
I n  the office furniture the strongest competitors are from Italy, C4erniany and from Scandi- 
navia. LTnlike these competitors, StI ia is still not able to sell its own trade iilarli on Western 
~ ~ ~ a r k e t s ,  so tliat the majority of exports is curreiitly inade by selling to tlle colnpany \'OIiO in 
Ger~naiiy. 
I n  engineering, !Vest Europeans are still too expensive to be competitors, while East Euro- 
peans are not jret competitive i n  quality (due to lack of skills and tradition). 
Tile competitive atlvantages of this company are: low price, good financing conditions, short 
period of deliver!.. long period of guarantees, established service for repairs, punctual fulfillmeilt 
of contracts. complete service. Other advantages of tlie conlpany are: tradition, trade mark 
(only a t  lionie and in  Eastern Europe), skilled labor force, geograpl~ical position, ecological 
anareness, good organizatioli of tlie company. 
hlost of tlie raw materials are bought a t  home; only small cluantities of special wood are 
imp01 ted. 
Tlie future strategy of the company includes furtlier investment and espansion into new fields 
(production of chairs for niovies and different arenas, including total engineering), espansion of 
olvn tracle network a t  home and abroad, specialization in small series ancl inclividual production, 
increasing tlie share of engineering. Tlie development strateg? of the enterprise is based on 
furtlier penetration to new markets, cost rationalization, standardization of production with 
5niall selies. supplelnenting production with trade, engineering and other services. 
The priority markets in the future are Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and tlie states 
of former Soviet Union. If the situation is normalized, former Yugoslav nlarkets will become 
relevant too. In the West, only market niches are available for this company as larger markets 
are closed for new entrants. Further cooperation witli present partners is envisaged. 
Prices reaclied on domestic market are around 20% higher than prices on foreign markets. 
Doillestic Environillent for Exports 
Tlie paper work (documents) necessary to export and import is too large. No special problenls 
esist witli regards to availability of credits or guarantees. 
Tlie nlajor probleni i11 esports is tlie exchange rate's real appreciation. But, tlie conlpany 
also needs to eliminate its i~iterllal weaknesses. A rehabilitation program witli the help of foreign 
PHARE financed consultants is under way and the strategy is in preparation. 
The government regulation has no impact on the company's decisions on esports and no 
special relations witli the state administration are necessary for concluding esport businesses. 
Foreign Eilvironilleilt for Exports 
hlajor problems in  obtaining foreign raw materials, goods and services are delays in deliveries, 
in paynients as well as quality conlplaints. 
The relation witli foreign partners are based on yearly contracts witliout any stronger coop- 
eration agreements. 
Llajor colnpetitors on foreign nlarkets are appearing currently from Eastern Europe and .Asia. 
In  the past, procluction was mainly in large series and massive programs were predominant. This 
1,intl of production cloes not require skilled labor and tradition. Here, the competition from tlie 
Eastern Europe and Asia is becoming too strong. 
T l ~ e  source of information about foreign markets are fairs, tlie usual professional literature 
ant1 catalogues. 
Tlle cooperation agreement until now and the association agreement witli the EIJ in tlie 
future mill not influence tlie company's esport plans very much. Generally speaking Slovenia's 
country r id ,  is still very high thus having a negative impact on the company's esports to tlie 
\Yest. 
Enterprise TrKa 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
Tlie company \vas establislied i n  1948 and was socially owned until the early 1990s. Its insti- 
tutional structure changed through time according to  changes i n  legislation. The production 
was sold to  the army (30%), to  Serbia (40%) and to the rest of former Yugoslavia (30%). After 
tlie separatiol~ of Slovenia most of markets were lost and that prompted big changes i n  the 
conipany. ,4 rel~al>ilitation program was introduced with a new management, inaugurated in 
1992. .All c ap i~a l  was transferred to  the Developinent Fund of Slovenia which supported the 
reliabilitation program. Since 1.5 Million DEM of capital 1.3.5 Million DELI were debts a debt 
restructuring program took place. 
Number of elnployees decreased to  one third of tlle former level, productivity increased and 
tlie company ~nanaged to enter Western markets. The company was divided to two independent 
companies, the new conipany producing satellite dishes. I n  December 1993 the rehabilitation 
program was forlnally completed by privatization in which 80% of the company was bought by 
\even managers. and the remaining 20% by workers. 
Plesently tliis is a limited liability company engaged i n  manufacturing. Three major products 
are: buttons (30'/rl), fibreglass semi-products (25%) and electric isolation materials (4.5%). 
hlajor strength of the conlpany is skill of workers, established client basis slid quality of prod- 
ucts. hlajor prol>lerns are small domestic market for the specific products and partly obsolete 
technology. 
Almost 90'Al of turnover comes from manufacturing and 10% from trade. The profitability 
of activities is structured the same way. 
The company is financed partly by tlle Development Fund and partly by banks. 
J3asic Statistics (hlillion ECU unless otherwise noted) 
1988 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Number of employees 300 150 120 G O  5 7 
Turnover 1.8 1.6 1 .8 
Capital 1 
Profit loss loss 0.04 
Export Orientation 
In 1990 100%, of production was sold in the domestic (Yugoslav) market. I n  1993 40%) was 
esportetl. one cluarter of it to  Eastern Europe, three quarters to  Western Europe. 
blain customers are manufacturers (90%) and retailers (10%). 
Competition in the industry is moderate. Major competitors come fro111 abroad and are 
small private enterprises. TrI<a can be rated as being among the better half of the companies 
in its industry. Among major advantages of TrI<a compared to  the competition are: excellent 
organization (cluick response to  demand), skilled worlcers and know-how. 
The strategic plan is to espand production slo\vly with the investment coming from private 
sources and from own profit and with slowly increasing number of employees. 
Prices obtained on foreign markets are Fj%)-lO% lower than prices a t  I~olne. However, only 
1i.it1i penetrating foreign markets can the company reach larger series thus achieving more op- 
tillial economy of scale where average total costs are lower and production remains profitable 
even \\..it11 lower selling price. 
.Al>out 3.5%) of fil>reglass production and 60% of electric isolatioll tilaterials are directed to  
esports, wl~ile buttons are sold only on domestic market. 
In esports the company has contacts with dealers as exclusive distributors in several coun- 
tries. inclurling South Africa and Finland. Other exporting destinations include Hungary, Ger- 
man!. C'zech Republic. Major competitors are producers i n  Italy, France, Spain ancl C:ernlany. 
Doillestic Eilvirolllllellt for Exports 
Tlicre is no problem with permissions for exports or imports. The company lias access to credits 
from baiil<s after its credit rating has improved recently. 
Country risk of Sloveiiia represents an obstacle for smaller exporters and especially importers 
of materials on foreign markets. Thus, contrary to larger Slovene conlpanies in the industry this 
conlpany can not obtain ail open account with large German producers like Bayer, although the 
I~usiness cooperation lasts already over 20 years. In Italy the situation is better. 
Tlie state adnlinistration has no impact on the coinpa~ly's decisioil whether or not to export. 
However, personal contacts are important for such businesses u~liich are related to military 
ecluipinent, telecomn~unications, etc. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
,4lthough there is only regular contractual relation with foreign partners, for a sinall coinpany like 
tlii5. personal contacts and confidence are very important which has developed into friendship. 
At lioine, there is no competition to the conlpany except for the production of buttons, which 
are consuincr proclucts. 
hlajor sources of market information are foreign dealers and representatives, fairs, hired 
agents who find potential customers for the company's specific products. 
Country risk (lower rating of Slovenia due to its newly estal>lislied independence and vicinity 
of war) llas posed a significant problem for the company, especially since it produces and sells 
strategic materials. Only a couple of years ago for every product imported a special certificate 
was reclue5ted by the foreign partner indicating that the material will not be used for armament. 
The cooperation agreement with the EIT helped the company i n  exports to the EU. Upon 
presenting tlie certificate of origin the importers of this conlpany's products were exempted of 
pa! ing customs duties in their home countries, which gave the company competitive edge against 
other co~llpanies from the Central Europe. With signing of the association agreement with the 
EL' tlie reciprocity approach could worsen tlie position of this company on the domestic markets. 
.4ccortling to the managers of tlie company, wlien signing the free trade agreements with the 
\.isegrbcl group countries Slovenia did not take into account the interest of small conlpanies like 
this. Thus the proclucts of TrI<a usually remain in the group of products, for \vhich customs 
hariiclrs will be lifted only gradually, not immediately. 
Regarding a big foreign strategic partner which could invest into the company, the rnanage- 
11ient is alvare of the experience that  this is frequently tlie way to penetrate the domestic ( in  
this case Slovene) inarket for such a big company. But, if, for instance, Siemens is allowed to 
becollie a n~ajority owner in the company, the company could sell the products of Siemens and 
also enter t l ~ e  Ciernian market. After losing the Eastern markets, for many producers in Central 
and Eastern Europe this is the only way to survive. 
Enterprise FeMa 
General Characteristics 
r 3  I l ~ e  nterprise \vas established as limited liability conlpany in 1990 by its present owner who 
is 01-er 30 years already a private craftsman. I11 1964 tliis craftsman founded a shop producing 
spare parts for car repair. In 1977 the production program was clianged into nzetal altering and 
in 1980 the production of industrial absorbing machines was added. I11 1990, tlie new company 
\\.as created to undertal<e all tlie marketing and trading activities for the already established 
factor!.. A4tltlitionallyl tlie colnpaiiy became representative for imported garage a n d  industrial 
tloors, plumber macliines and machine-power saws for metals. Tlie company is 100% owned by 
tlie founder and his family. 
Ba,sic Da.ta (Million ECU unless otherwise noted) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995/lst half 
Number of e~llployees 2 4 13 
Tu rliover 0.35 0.6 0.7 0.5 
C'apital 0.001 
Profits 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.02 
:Ill tlie investiiients are financed from own profits. 
Major strengtli of the company is its cautious strategy of expansion, innovations, ma.rketing, 
good organization, know-how and good business ties. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
The company was initially oriented towards tlie domestic nlarket and later added imports of 
tloors ant1 other products and thus became exclusive representative for a German company. But, 
with imports tlie initiative came from tlie foreign partners to start  exporting goods as a way to 
pa!, for foreign mercliandise. 
Presently, exports still count for only about 10% of the turnover. They include special 
ecluipnient produced in tlie company on order by German individual buyers. hZajor clients are 
I\-liolesalel*~ and inanufacturers (small family businesses) in the West, except for the large door 
~iianufacturer for ~110111 tliis company is representative in Slovenia. 
Generic products are cheaper produced in Germany due to large series so only specific prod- 
ucts (metal saws) are produced i n  FeMa. The replacement of Fehla's deliveries with supplies 
from the C'zecli Republic was not successful for the German buyer because of tlie poor quality 
ant1 late tleliveries by the Czech partner. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Export orientation is very new in tlie company. In tlie first half of 1995 around 10% of revenues 
\\ere earned from exports. 
A11 foreign trade is made directly without intermediaries. Tlie exporting merchandise include 
elements for saws and otlier metal equipment. 
Tlie strategy of the enterprise is to modernize slowly technology with increasing share of 
export ~vliicli, however, will not become a dominant orientation. Technical innovation, already 
uiatle, woold increase value added in exports. 
Tlie conipetitive strengtli of tlie company lies i n  quick reaction time, quality, on-time delivery 
ant1 lino~v-how; despite liiglier prices tlian by Czech producers this conipany is lionoretl by tlie 
C4er1iian orders. The profitability is higher in exports tlian a t  home, if small series (inclividual 
orders of elements for larger machines) are concerned. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Tlic iniport duties for products imported by this company are considered by the managers of 
tlie company too high. The present regime, when this company is requested to issue a certificate 
tleclariiig tliat certain product is not produced in Slovenia (the product \vliicli is i n  fact part of 
tlie protluction program of this company) for other small businesses to  be able to import this 
product ~vithout custom duties, seems to be obsolete, unfair and could be misused very easily 
le;ltliiig to iiionopolistic position of some domestic producers of tlie eql~ipment. 
Goveriiinent subsidies for export do not exist. Credits are too espensive and the company 
relies allnost totally on its own capital. Only recently some banks are inclucled i n  tlie sales 
piograril of the company giving consumer credits to  buyers. 
hlajor obstacle to trade is domestic customs procedure, which is much more con~plicated, 
time coiisurning and cost-occurring than tlie Austrian procedure, for instance. 
Tlie uncertainty connected with the espected introduction of the new Law 011 Customs Rates 
of Slovenia in 1996 was painful for the company. Not knowing its substance made planning 
iiiiports difficult. 
C;erniaii importers do not pay special import duties for the products wliicli are esported 
l'lolil thiy conipany wliile the Slovene company paid a 17% import duty in 1995. 
External Eilviroilillent for Exports 
Tlie relation ~vitli foreign partner is based on contracts, for small series. I11 addition, however, 
personal contacts and friendly relationship is of utmost importance. The foreign partner would 
like to  up-grade tlie relationship by investing into new equipment in this company, but the 
Slovene owner prefers to remain its own boss. 
hfajor conlpetitors a t  home are 10-12 producers (importers and fitters) of garage doors. 
Abroad, competitors are domestic small producers in Gernlany and but also in tlie Czecli Re- 
public. A general prii~ciple is to have more than one buyer or supplier to decrease dependence. 
Inforination about foreign markets are obtained from foreign partners, from business meet- 
ings, fairs, escliaiige of workers (to acquire specialization i11 foreign factories) aiid company's 
OIL ii business conference every second year. 
Tlie iiidepeiidence of Slovenia had a positive impact on the business of FeMa (German 
partners liave not been ~villing to  establish business relations with companies in Croatia due to 
t lie war conclitions). 
-411 payments are made in 60 days without special guarantees, urhich is a sign of credibility 
established tlirougll a long-run business and private partnership. 
Enterprise ErLj 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
Tliis firm was established in 1990 as an off-spring of a larger socially owned company. There 
\\ere no problems in estal~lishing tlle company: registration took less than one month. 
It is limitecl liability company, owned 93% by its president and 7% by tlle designer in the 
firm. In production it uses tlie services of a furniture company (which employs handicapped 
peol~le) tliat was bound to  be liquidated, but now it is very successful in realizing icleas of the 
ErLj comlIany. 
ErLj is eilgagetl in creating, manufacturing, organizing and selling esclusive wooden products 
nrliich are useful in every living space of people. It is one of the fastest growing green field 
clynamic coml~anies in Slovenia with a strong know-how potential and its own trade mark. 
The firm started with classic service carts on wheels, the procluct which was in fact transferred 
froni tlie socially owned conlpany in which the present principal owner was previously managing 
its ~~iocI~ictioii.  Toda!, ErLj produces 2.5 different types of service carts. Products are of wood, 
n it11 an eiilplrasis on natural materials (metal, stone, glass). Products are biologically acceptable 
and sold under own trade mark with Slovene certificate. 
hla jor reasons for success are high skill of employees, marketing and quality. Competitive 
aclvantages are: originality, quality, design, professional business relations. The sources of in- 
~.estment are own profit ant1 recently bank credit. 5% of turnover ancl profit comes from trade, 
l.5(Xj froni other services, SO% from sales of products. The company finds the present profit t a s  
rates too high. Tas  incenti\.es for small dynamic businesses do not exist and general attitude of 
tllc s tate i n  support of tliese businesses is negative: they are neglected by the state,  although 
they \vould need certain services and advises (especially in the financial field) for which they 
can not tlevelop their own clepartrllents (due to  their small size, lack of economy of scale). 
Some Basic Sta.tistics 
1990 1994 
Number of employees 3 5 
Turnover (Million ECU) 1 5 
Cirowth rate of turnover (%) 50 .5O 
Profit (Million ECU) 0.07 0.1.5 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Iintil 1101~ all protll~cts were sold on foreign markets: 90% in Western Europe (Germany, Switzer- 
lantl, Italy, Austria, Denmarli). lo',% in other cleveloped countries (Japan and Australia). In 1995 
the company openecl a special boutique in Ljubljana where besides own lligll cluality products 
it planned to  sell sillall furniture of a well known Italian designer as an esclusive representative 
for Slovenia. 
All trade is arranged directly. Major customers are wllolesalers (8.5%), retailers (10%) and 
final consumers (.5%). ~ ~ l l l o l l g  suppliers 80% are domestic, 15% come from the EU and 5% from 
other \Yestern Europe (particularly special materials). 
Competition is not very strong because the trade company sells its own designed product. 
 among co~ilpetitors there are medium size and large private companies. 
The colnpany plans to  invest 100-500 tllousand ECU i11 the future and to  espand its business 
al~roacl (within tlie present regional pattern), as well as starting business also a t  home. If the few 
~iiajor  ol>stacles. were removed by the state, it would enable a quick espansion of the company 
t l t~e to  tlie esclusive products it is selling. The major problem is to  get control over the business 
11 Iiich still tlepencls on the producer - the furniture company, which is still socially owned. The 
[ I I C \ L ' ~ ~ ~  owner, lio~vever, is reluctant to  sell the furniture company to  ErLj because the furniture 
conipaiij. started to  earn lligli profits already froin the present arrangement. 
Donlestic Ellvironmellt for Exports 
Tlie enviroiinieiit is not considered favorable. While there is no need for perlllissioii of any kind 
there is no financial stimulation for company from the state either, credits can not be obtained 
fro111 banks on preferential terms, and tliere is a lack of guarantees. 
Tlie company lias no problem obtaining inputs so that  preferential treatment for export in 
tliis regard is not needed. 
The state regulation has no impact on decision whether or not to export ancl no special 
relatioils are needed with the administration to  export. In fact, the company is iieglectecl by tlie 
state ancl that  feeling is commonly shared by all small fast growing companies. 
Foreign Ellvirolllllellt for Exports 
Regu1a.r co~itractua,l relations are developed with foreign partners. Foreign partners sllow interest 
t,o invest aiicl become co-owners of ErLj, but strategically tliis is not needed by the company 
a,ncl cont,rol by t,lie origiiia,l domestic founder remains the future stmtegy. 
Foreigil compa,nies try to  steel the new ideas introduced by this company (this is true even for 
coml>a.nies fro111 Italy, the bedrock of furniture design). Beca.use of tliis develop~nent cooperation 
\\.it11 patent lanryers a.nd witli the Slovene Patent Agency is a,lready well developed. Slovene 
legislation in this field is still we& and the country is still not the member of tlie relevant 
iiit~ernationa,l agreements which would enable easier procedures in protection own Slovene trade 
iiia,rlis. 
Sources of information about foreign markets are several. PVith that  regard, it is releva,nt to  
recognize tha t  the company is more a trend setter (all the time bringing newly designed products 
on \Yestern 1iiarliet.s which a.re widely accepted) than trend follower. Tlle iiifor~natioii colnes 
froin direct contacts wit11 clients, regular participation in major furniture fa.irs in Europe and 
froill tlie M'orlcl Trade Center network. 
In FVestern Europe the preferential treatment of Slovenia according to  coopera,tioii the agree- 
oient witli tlie EU was favorable for tlie company's esports since tliere are no more quota,s 
a pplic~cl. 
Pa,yment li~nita.tions do not play a releva,nt role. Due to  quality of its products the company 
get payments in 1.5 clays upon delivery. Acreditives are established only for the first time 
cleliveries to  ne\v clients. Only in Italy is the situation less favorable: due t o  overall fina,licial 
clisorcler, acreditives are usual. Personal contacts remains a very importa,nt guicla,nce in choosing 
partners for business. 
Enterprise HeDo 
General Characteristics 
This is one of the largest cliemical factories in Sloveiiia a i d  the economic leader in its town. 
IIcDo was established 75 years ago. 
The coml>aiiy is still in social ownership, but already in tlie process of privatization. 
Presently it is organized as a liolding with three basic factories which are proclucers of auto- 
lacli, starcli (raw nmaterial for paper and paints), aiid oil, respectively. 
Basic Data 1985 1989 1995 2000 
(forecast) ( ~ l a n )  
Nuinber of employees 850 1020 850 600 
Turnover (Million DEM) 75 120 9 0 11.5 
Crisis in tlie paper industry in Slovenia (liquidation or selling of con~pa,nies to  majority 
foreign on~iiers) clecrea,sed sigliificantly the demand for starch tlius making capacity utilization 
smaller in HeDo. 
Export Orientation 
C!ompany wa,s less a.ffected by the loss of Yugoslav market tlia,n the rest of Slovene industry 
clue to its perma.nent cooperation with German partners wliose license lias been used by the 
compa,iiy. 
Tlie esport orientation is as follows: 
Esport Orientation (%) 
Factory Sliare in Production (%) Esport/Production (%) 
lacli 70 6 8 
sta.rc11 20 2 0 
oil 10 10 
I11 aggregate, esport is around 50% of production, wliile imports are over 50% of purchases. 
Tlie coinpany is a net importer. 
LIajor esport destiiiations differ according to the different products. Thus, for lacli and 
auto-lacli tlie niaiii esport markets are Russia, Belarus and Uliraine. Other destinations are: 
Hungary, Poland. the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. 
HeDo is in the process of opening enterprises of mised ownership in the VisegrSd countries. It 
was the losing of the foriller Yugoslav market that  led to entering new marliets in Eastern Europe. 
A11 entire trade network was built for that  purpose. At the same time large producers from 
outsicle Europe have entered European international market recently tlius increasing competition 
for tliis coinpany. 
To Ile competitive foreign distributors or compaiiy representatives are necessary. 
Tlie esport of HeDo includes know-how, own products and some products produced under 
license sucli as lack for wood. 
Tlie future strategy in production of lack includes liiglier level of ecological awareness (more 
nater  and less bitumen in content). Strategic destinations for this company in the future could 
I>e -Africa aiid tlie Near East. The optimal size for these producers in the world is about 100-times 
tlie size of tliis factor]., ~vliicli is already not so small by Slovenia's stanclarcls. 
The competitive edge of tliis company is traditional partnersliip aiid linowledge of the market. 
l;iio~v-how. raw materials aiid personal contacts. The essential materials for paints aiid lack 
\l~oulcl Ile l>rotlucecl i11 tlic factory in Slovenia, wliile tlie filial i l l is  slioulcl be producecl in factories 
situateel in esportiiig markets. 
Products for domestic a,nd foreign market are the same. The colnpa,ny alrea.dy obtained a.n 
IS0 9001 certificate for its main products. 
Profitability i n  domestic market is higher than in foreign nmrkets above all due to the la.ck 
of ow11 net.wor1; abroad. Provisions given to distributors are very 1a.rge. For that  reason, the 
company intends to  have its own representatives abroad i n  the ~ n a j o r  export markets. 
Domestic Eilviroilmel~t for Exports 
Except for certificates required by importing countries about the origin and content of the prod- 
ucts no other ~~ermissions are required. The certificates are required because sonle of substances, 
a s  elements of paints and lacl;, are not allowed in some countries to be imported. 
There is no problem with access to credits as the enterprise in fact coiltrols a larger bank. 
State regulation has no impact on the business of the company and special relations with 
the state atlministration do not exist and are not needed. Still, costs of state administration are 
considerecl too high as far as paper work is concerned. 
External Eilviroilmeilt for Exports 
Foreign pa,rtners a,re connected with this company through product licenses and longer term 
contracts. 
Currently a. sepa.ra,te joint venture company is being esta~blished in Sloveilia by HeDo together 
wit11 the major C:ernlan pa,rtner of the company. 
Information on foreign n~a.rkets are obtained from publicatio~ls (own tlocunlent,ation center), 
partners, and from fairs. 
Tlie interna~tional position of Slovenia has no special influence on the activit,y of the company, 
a s  Slovenia.'~ separation and proclamation of independe~lce did not change significantly relations 
ivit,I~ foreign pa.rtners. This is because of the size of HeDo and its tra.ditionally professiona,l 
I~usiness contact, which exists already for deca,des. 
C!oopera.tion and association agreement with the EU have no special impact on factory's 
I~usiness rela.tions either. 
Enterprise KoLj 
Basic Characteristics 
The food processilig enterprise was established in 1908 with 40 workers and 200 tons of yearly 
~~roduct ion.  Its peak size was in 1987 with 1,491 employees and 33,584 tons of products. In 
1994 it Ilacl 810 employees producing 20,574 tons of products. 
LIajor products include: culinary products (36% of production), food for children (9%), 
s\veets (20%,), processed vegetables (7%), beverage (2%), powders (7%), reproduction materials 
(9%,), esclusive distribution of foreign licensed products (9%). 
Separation from es-Yugoslavia meant a new beginning for the company: its production was 
almost halved in 1992 and tlie number of workers drastically reduced by one third. 
Presently the inajor problems the company faces are: too small domestic market with very 
Ion protection froin imports, difficulties in penetrating Western markets, and unstable Eastern 
n~arliets. Still, tlie company achieved 8.3% profit rate in 1994 and 8.5 Millio~i DEM profit before 
tas .  
Pri\ratization in 1994 was made through internal distribution of shares and through public 
sale of shares for voucliers. The owners of the company are: employees and retired employees 
~vitli fanlilies (34.2%), funds and investment companies (36.8%), public a t  large (28.6%) and 
former private owners (0.4%). 
Tlie company consists of 5 production units (factories) situated all aroulid Slovenia and 11 
connected enterprises (5 of t h e ~ n  i n  Slovenia, and tlie others in es-Yugoslavia, Germany and 
Polantl). 
Basic Data. (in Million DEM unless otherwise noted) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1993 
Nuniber of employees 1491 986 860 810 
Assets 9 7 100 
O\vn Capital 12 8 
Sales (tons) 29.9 27.0 26.0 20.7 21 .8 23.0 
Sales 169 196 168 103 9 2 102 
Profit after T a s  6.5 6.8 
Export Orientation 
'The sliare of esports is ~~reseii t ly 28% and it is increasing constantly in the last eight years. Tlie 
sliare of i~lll>orts i11 all purchases is around 60%. It meaus that  the company is net importer. 
Raw inaterials, obtained from Serbia before, are now substituted by purchases from Hungary. 
Market Structure of Sales in 1994, % 
domestic 72.2 
es-Yugoslavia 15.2 
other e x ~ o r t  12.6 
Es l~or t s  are directed towards 25 foreign countries. The major esporting destinations are: 
Sl~ain,  .Austria. Ciermany and Switzerland in the West (wliere results in 1994 were above es- 
l~ectatioiis) and Russia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic in the East (where results were below 
espectatio~ls). The Yugoslav market absorbed 60% of production before collapse of Yugoslavia; 
~io\\l its sliare fell below 20%. Tlie largest foreign market is Russia (over one third of all esports).  
Trade deals are made through subsidiaries and long term partners (in C4ermany1 Spain, 
.Austria for instance). In  some cases they are exclusive distributors in  other cases not. Long 
tern1 cooperation agreements are fewer recently than they were in tlie past. 
Strategy of tlie company is different for each market. Rationalization will continue; clomestic, 
iiiore competitive inarket will be tlie prime target, but esports will increase, too. A long-term 
penetration to  tlie Russian market is envisaged. The major break tlirougli \vould be to  find 
a product which could be sold in Western Europe. Just job work can iiot be a strategic goal 
I~ecause Slo\.ene labor costs are too high to be competitive in inass production. 
hIajor competitors abroad are large international corporations in tliis field and do~llestic 
~>ioclucers, especially Austrians, Italians and Czech. By now the East European market is 
already covered by su1)sidiaries of n~ultinationals. 
Tlie co~lipetitive advantage of company is tlie good quality of its products relative to  price. 
The problem is tliat tlie purchasing of raw materials is more difficult for tliis company than 
for \Vestern coinpetitors. At the same time, quantities purchased and produced are smaller than 
I)y coillpetitors in the West (lack of economy of scale). 
Sources of information about foreign markets are mostly partners, studies made by big 
companies, own network abroad. 
.As for clifferences between products made for the domestic market and for exports there is 
no clear pattern. 
I11 production of chewing gums, for instance, there is no difference between products sold for 
tlie domestic and the foreign market, while the sweets need to  be atljustecl to  specific taste in 
almost each country. 
Profitability of sales a t  home is seven times higher than it is for sales abroad. Therefore, 
esport is still a residual from the profitability point of view. 
Donlestic Eilvirollilleilt for Export 
Permissions in  the forin of certificates are required by Slovene autliorities for foot1 exports. 
Financial incentives for exports did not exist until recently. Tliis changed i11 199.56 when the 
colnpany started competing for government money distributed anloilg esporters. Tliere is no 
~)rol>lem with access to  credits (except for high interest rate), while guarantees are ol>tained olily 
occasionally from insurance companies. 
Paynleilts conditions in the \Vest are regular (continuous cooperation with open account); 
in the East with increasing volumes tlie payment risks increase, too. 
Regartling protection, tlie managers of tlie company assert, tliat a t  least reciprocity u i s - h i s  
i ~ n l ~ o r t s  entering Slovene markets sliould be maintained. The esisting free trade agreements 
clo iiot cover all products of the compaily. Tlie so called peasants lobby protects only primary 
1)roducers of food, iiot secondary producers, such as I<oLj. 
Tlie ~nanageiiieiit of the company believes that the treatment of food processing industry 
I N  the aclliiiiiistratioii i n  Slovenia is not adequate; too much help is given to  foreigners while 
~~ei ie t ra t ing  tlle Slo\leiie iiiarliet and to primary producers (agriculture) \vhile negotiating terms 
oi free tracle agreeiiients and too little to  food processing industries. 
I n  aclclitioii tlie soiiietirnes ignorant position of tlie administratioii towards markets in former 
\17ugoslav republics call iiot be justified either. 
Foreign Environment for Export 
hIajor colilpetitors are multinational companies (with enormous investments in marketing their 
~)roclucts). Aillong smaller firms in sweets Korea, Lebanese, Brazilian, and even Austrian firms 
are becoming quite co~llpetitive with lower or only sliglitly higher costs of labor than of Slovenia. 
It ivould be iinportant to  get good concessions in  a future trade agreement with Russia. 
Foreign coillpetitors would like to  penetrate Slovenia and all food industry is in the process 
ol'integration in Europe and tlie world as a whole. But, if foreigners will take over tliis company. 
o i ~ e  of tlie consequences would be closing the company and thus creating monopolistic position 
for tlle foreign coillpetitor in the domestic market. 
Enterprise InJa 
Characteristics of the Enterprise 
The enterprise was established in 1920s. It was reorgallizecl in 1994 as a holding company 
\vhich includes five independent companies. The main products are testiles, camping equipment 
(tents), impregnated linen for protection from the sun, curtains, suits and other clothes, mar- 
keting ant1 other services. Recently the company espanded its own retail network by opening 
pigilt sliops i n  Slovenia. 
Basic Data. (Million DEM unless otlier~vise noted) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Number of elllployees 713 651 582 588 
Assets 7 1 76 
Revenue 15 20 2 2 2 7 
Profit -5 -1 0.2 0.1 
Share of of self-financing 0.88 0.92 0.84 
Esport/Revenues 0.588 0.546 0.567 
Esport/Import 1.8 2.0 2.2 
This lioltling is in social onlnership and in the process of privatization. First consensus for 
privatization pla11 from the State Privatization Agency was espected in the lllitldle of 199.5. 
.-lccorcling to the plans, 40% of shares will go to the state Funds, 7% to previous private owners, 
\\ liilc the remaining 53% will go through internal buy-out. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
The company usetl to be almost 100% oriented towards production of military equipment for 
the es-Yugoslav army. The technology was adapted to large series of production for only 1 or 2 
large l~ujrers. \Vith the collapse of Yugoslavia for company to survive it was essential to  increase 
tratle with already esisting foreign partners as well as to find new partners. 
Esport represents SO'% of sales. The company covers around 12% of the European market 
of special materials for tents. 
Proclucts for domestic and foreign markets are the same. Donlestic sales include different 
testiles for the house. Profits are about five times higher than profits fronl esporting materials 
for tents. Tlie profit collies fro111 production of basic materials. 
C;eographic destinations of exports are the Netherlands (high culture of camping), Germany, 
and all \\'estern Europe. Esporting is started to Poland and Russia, and to es-Yugoslav re- 
publics, such as Croatia. 
Foreign buyers are snlaller wl~olesalers. Two joint venture contracts were signed with part- 
ners i n  Netherlands; these are small family companies wit11 10-15 employees ~vh ic l~  organize 
~)lotluction antl sales. They purchase products (different kind of testiles) fro111 InJa by prescrib- 
ing design, materials and quantities. The Dutch companies use their own trade mark. 
Tlie company has two strategic options. First, it will become strong in the tecl~nological 
sense. That  requires large alnount of investments in equipment and know-how; buying licenses 
antl then production in small series of specific testiles. Second, they could retain mass production 
i n  large series for a yet unknown buyer, increase the automatization of production, further 
decrease the number of en~ployees. In choosing first option company has problenls witli financing 
tlie inl-est~nents wliich are needed. 
The conipetitive advantage of the company is its trade mark, tradition (72 years of esistence), 
5tricter ecologic criteria than West European standards. 
hlajor foreign competitors are domestic producers in Western C'ountries antl producers of 
tlie Eastern Enlope. Conlpared to the latter, InJa produces higher quality products. but witli 
lligller costs and prices. 
Doillestic Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Export permissions are not requested, except for EUR-1 form, wliicli needs to accompany exports 
to tlie ELI to indicate the origin of the merchandise. Company is applying for subsidies for net 
exporters. a facility introduced by the Slovene government in 199.5. Investment credits which 
ivor~ld be necessary to modernize tlie factory, are difficult to  obtain and are too expensive. 
Obtaining guarantees requires collateral or some other type of protection, wliicli is expensive, 
too. 
Tlie major obstacle in obtaining the proper inputs for export are low quality of tradepersons 
i n  the company. These traders are unable to import the cheapest materials. 
Llntil now the state administration was of a little help for exports, but recently it started 
ivitli some support. Different ministries inform tlie company about projects a t  lio~ile or abroad 
i n  wliicli tlie products of InJa (tents, protective coverage of buildings) could be included. 
Foreign Eilviroilineilt for Exports 
Uoniestic competitors are some Slovene companies producing curtains. Competitors abroad are 
two large companies in Germany and Italian producers of similar specific products. 
Information about foreign markets comes from foreign partners (in the form of specified 
orders), tlirougli personal contacts (participation in fairs helps to make the first contact). Conl- 
pany obtained support in the form of service of a UI.; co~lsulting company financed by the 
PHARE program. 
Both, Slovenia's present cooperation and future association agreement with the EU are 
ivitliout i~npact  on tlie company's business. 
Foreign direct investment into tlie company (eve11 over 51% ownership) is ol>served as accept- 
able possibility, if its intention \vould be to expand production and enter new markets. However, 
if tlie intention of such investment would be to close the company and thus to  eliminate the 
Slovene co~iipetitor, such investment could not be accepted. 
Enterprise ToDo 
Characteristics of the Eilterprise 
The co~npany's share in the Sloveile textile industry is 4%. It produces specific products related 
to Iiealth, inedical activity aiid hygiene. 
The coiiipaiiy has 789 employees (65% of these are women) with the average age of 35 years. 
Tlie iiuiilber of enlployees was 1,045 in 1991. The aliiiual revenue of the coinpaily is around 4 
Billioli SIT (-50 LIillioii DELl), 40% of it is earned on foreign markets. Iilveiitories are 900 Million 
SIT, all credits 200 Million SIT (only 10% of all financial sources), claiills against debtors are 
20 Llillion SIT. Profit was 3 Million DEM in 1992, 1 Million DEM in 1993. The value of assets 
according to opening balance a t  the beginning of 1993 was 3.5 Billion SIT (60 Million DEM).  
Tecliiiology is relatively old (write-offs are up to  80% of the book value), but it is difficult to  
iilocleriiize iiilmediately due to  the strongly diversified production program. 
Tlie nlaiii products consists of gauze (cotton wool), sanitary-bancls, swadclliiig-clotl~es, medic- 
inal plastics and otlier sanitary products. Despite a strong competition within tlie country and 
cspecially fro111 abroad, the company's market share a t  home is still very liigh, between 16% and 
80% clepending on the product. This is above the average for Europeaii countries and should be 
relatecl to  goocl quality and reputation, modest prices, but also to  tlie sinall aiid less attractive 
Slovene market for foreigners. 
Coilipetitioii is the strongest from the domestic company Paloma and foreigii multinationals: 
Proctor and C4amble, Joliiison and Johnson, as well as Moelnlycke. 
.About half of input materials are bought on domestic market from textile factories. 
The company is in the process of privatization which will include tlie public sale of shares 
u p  to  the value of 10 Million DEM, which is 27.5% of the value of assets, according to  opening 
Ibalaiice. 
Export Orieiltatioil 
Export represents currently 35%-40% of sales. 
The coinpany is in the process of market reorientation from the strong presence on former 
l~ugoslav nlarket, which is more or less lost, to  conquering new markets. Tlie ex-Yugoslav market 
usecl to  account for 50%) of all sales. Compared to  the situation five years ago the number of 
eiiiployees and the value (and volume) of production and sales is presently still 25% smaller. 
The average capacity utilization is 75%. 
Tlie strategic plaii is to  increase production with tlie current nuillber of workers aiid to  enter 
lieu inarkets with modernized products and witli own trade mark (two trade inarks already 
exist). The plan is to  increase total assets in the period 1994-1997 by 25%. 
IVliile in the past export was only residual and necessary to  earn foreign exchange needed 
foi iiilport of raw materials, presently export is a necessity to survive. 
Nen niarhets include Visegrdd countries, some successor republics of the Soviet Union; West- 
ern Europe reillailis still a relevant partner, albeit in small diversified quantities. Thus, among 
export destiiiatioiis are Croatia (17%), other ex-Yugoslavia ( I%) ,  and other countries (17% of 
total sales). Especially quickly increasing market is Ukraine. 
Basecl on the economy of scale the optimum size of a company in this industry is about 3-5 
tinies larger witli 10-times larger turnover than that  of ToDo a t  present. 
Foreigii partners are wholesalers (distributors) and sometimes directly producers and retail- 
cis. Coillpetitors 011 foreigii market are the same as in doinestic market: large international 
corporations. Tlie company has about 300-400 business partners. 
The possible geographical radius for the distribution of the products of tlie conlpaily is 
d l o ~ ~ l i d  1.000 selllare kilometers, because of significance of transportation cost in total costs. 
Expoitecl products are from own production, only some are products of otlier companies, 
~vliicli are packed for retail sales. 
Tlie managers of tlie coinpaliy assert that in respect to  competitive imports there should be 
reciprocity treatment and better control against tax evasion control by sinall importers on the 
Slovene market. 
Tlle coiiipetitive advantage of ToDo is its willingness to undertake higher risk on new marliets 
than tlie \Yestern con~petitors are willing to do; adaptability to buyer's wislies, lower prices and 
I~cttcr quality (compared to the Eastern European producers). 
Products for domestic and foreign market are the same, except wlle~i special orders are made 
I)!. foreigners. 
T l ~ e  profitability among markets tliffer significantly: if profit achieved on products soltl on 
Slovene n~arket  is 100'70, on Croatia's iiiarket it is 70% and in export to other countries it is 
.jO'X. 
Doillestic Eilviroilllle~lt for Export 
Tlie o11l!l tlocurnent required for exports is certificate of tlie Ministry for Health. Credits are 
ol>taiiietl from internal savings of employees. 
Special contacts with tlie state ad~llinistration do not esist. Doinestic regulation has 110 
impact on esport performance, except for tlie support scheine for net exporters, which was 
i~itrotlr~cetl i11 199Tj. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Inf'orma~tion a,l)out foreign markets are obtained tl~rougli agents, partners, representative offices, 
fairs, publications, symposiums. 
Tlie free tra.de agreements witli Visegrdd group opened these markets for tlie compa,ny (by 
lowering tlie import duties). Austria's entrance into the EU lowered duties for esports to Austria. 
(by 8%)) .  
-According to tlie ma.na,gers of tlie coinpaliy ca,pital investments into tlie company from abroad 
can be imagined, since it could help bringing its products to the world market. In the ea,rly sta,ge 
of t r ans i t io~~  tlie social element wa.s important, a.nd t1ia.t wa.s solved by priva,tizing for domestic 
olvners, but i n  t.he future foreign owners could help tlie espaiisioii of tlie compa.ny. 
Enterprise S Z L ~  
Characteristics of the Corporatioil 
i l l 1  Slovene steelworl<s are integrated in one corporation (concern) presently ullcler state owner- 
ship. They were in deep crises a t  the beginning of 1992, but presently their economic performance 
is improving significantly. This is due to rehabilitation moves by government (including financial 
relief), int,ernal reorganization and better prospects on the worlcl market for steel. 
-411 proclucts are rnacle on IS0  9000 a'nd IS0 9001 standard ba,sis. Renault, ,41itli, Peugeot and 
Fia,t production quality certificates were a.lready obtained. Most of the production technology 
is liiatle a,t home. 
This concern consists of 16 modern production and 9 service companies. Steel production has 
,400 years t,ra,dition in Slovenia. Major areas of procluction are: metallurgy, ca,sting, machinery 
production a,ntl services. These factories are scattered all around Slovenia. There are two met- 
a,llurgica,l companies (for flat and for long steel products), 2 foundries, 10 ma.chine construction 
ant1 processing companies, 6 service companies and 5 trade and production service companies. 
Tlle total number of employees a t  present time is 9,369. 
The foreign tmde network consists of trade offices and compa,nies in  Austria, Ita,ly, Hunga,ry, 
the USA! S\\~itzerla.ntl a.nd Russia. 
.A11 the concern \zra.s nationalized in 1991 according to the restructuring progra,m. Until the 
e ~ ~ c l  of 1994 the concern wa.s organized a,s limited compa.ny. From the beginning of 199.5 it is 
a joint-st,ock company in state ownership. It has already privatized some service compa,nies. 
The red  priva.t,ization rema,ins the future a.genda. It is expected that  in the future process of 
[,ri\~at.iza.tion the sta,te will keep a large share, banks will enter a.s owners, some insider ownership 
\\.ill be alloivetl and strategic investors could come in  from developed countries. 
Ra.sic Data 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1st half 
Number of einployees 18882 9305 
.4sset,s (klio. DEM) 1100 
Production (steel, th. tons) 34s 414 218 
T0ta.l sales (Mio. DEM) 49 1 550 
Esport (Mio. DEM) 280 350 
Gross \ia.lue Atldecl (Mio. DEM) 3.5.5 228 
Losses (as (3, of revenues) 1 :3 7 
in hlio. DEhl 25 
Export Orientat ion 
Export Structure by Geographical Destination, '%I 
(a.) EU 7 8 
of which: Germany 33 
Italy 2 1 
Austria 10 
0 t her 14 
(b) USA 12 
(c) Ex-Yugoslavia 5 
(d) Rest of the World 5 
Outside partners are either subsidiaries or representative offices so that  most of trade is made 
tlirectly witl~out tlistributors. 
Strategy ancl prospects in the period 1995-2000 include: 
production of 435 tliousand tons of higher quality steel; 
i11crea.se of sales i n  199.5 by 2'2% and in 2000 by 58% compared to 1994 figures thus rea.cliing 
860 Million DEM. The share of esport sllould increase froin 5.5% to 69%, wliich nleans 
that  ea.rnings from export should allnost double in the future five-yea.r period. 
Profital~ility of esports is approximately the same as of domestic sales. Reorientation towards 
~~iocluction of steel of higher quality was an important move to increase competitiveness. Other 
conlpetitive advantages are: just-in-time delivery, quality, price (3% lower prices than prices of 
tlonlestic producers in the West). 
fiIajor competitors are LVestern steelworks for higher quality products and Eastern steelworks 
for lower quality steel. 
The Slovene steel industry and izietallurgy was anlong the less developed in former Yugoslavia 
(higher quality steel production was concelltrated in the South of former \r7ugoslavia). Therefore. 
rrllabilitatioii includes restructuring the protluction program i11 the direction of higher quality 
proclucts. 
Doillestic Eilvironilleilt for Export 
Slo\~enia's steel industry was treated preferentially by the sta'te after the collapse of es-Yugo- 
sla,via. Credits are available, but also guarantees are needed. Foreign countries do not treat 
Slovenia, as a t,ota.lly safe area. Therefore they require guara,ntees from Slovene banlis \vitli high 
reputation. 
Foreign Eilvironilleilt for Export 
(;ellera1 basis for business are yearly contracts which are specified regarding prices ei,ery three 
lllolltlls. 
It is important to produce special steel for individual customers, because that  way the 
costumer is clependeiit upon producer. There are about 1s sorts of steel produced in this 
concern. 
hlajor sources for information about foreign markets are the foreign trade iietwork of the 
concern, thougli menlbership in large steel associations, own institute for steel, publications, etc. 
Pa~.nie~l ts  conditions are an iinportant factor in deciding about esport. Usual payment 
1,criocl is 4.5560 clays. No special guarantees are required from buyers n-it11 gootl history. Froill 
other clients, aclvaiice paynlents or acreditives are requested. 
I t  is vrrJr difficult to diversify the foreign marliets further: one possibility is to  increase 
t l ~ e  s l~a re  of the USA. Penetration to the Russian market is limitecl by tlle al~ility of Russian 
custonlers to pay regularly and by the lack of financial discipline. 
Enterprise TDRu 
Characteristics of the Corporation 
This laige company is engaged in  the basic chemical industry. It is establislied as a holding 
company. Originally it was established a t  tlie end of World War I, i n  1918, as one of the first 
electrocheinical factories in  Europe. Its foundatioil was related to  the opening an electric power 
plant nearb~.. 
Tlie production prograni of tlie liolding includes many commodities, generic items of homo- 
geneous cluality produced all around tlie world. 
Tlie most important of the several companies of tlie liolding is its nietallurgical company. 
AIajor products of tliis firm are: mass ferro-alloys (calcium-silicon, ferrosilicon, ferroclirome), 
comples alloys (nodulizers, inoculants, cored wire), calcium carbide and filter dust. Among the 
other companies very important is the one dealing with gas production. 
After tlie collapse of Yugoslavia tlie holding fell into big trouble due to its former intensive 
orientation towards the Yugoslav market where it was the only producer of calciuill carbide. The 
Slo1,ene market can absorb only 2-3 tliousand tons of semi-products of tlie holding company, 
while it5 capacities amount to 25 thousand tons. Tlie only short run solution was to  go under 
state protection, to  commence rehabilitation and then to  be sold (privatized). Thus, the liolding 
company tvas talien over by Slovenia's Development Fund and put under rehabilitation. 
As the reliabilitation program is approaching its end the individual parts of the holding 
coilipany are privatized through sales. Thus the gas producing company was sold to  a German 
coinpany. Another company was sold to  Austrian investors. Altogether about one fourth of 
(lie liolding is presently in  foreign ownership. This arrangement solved not only tlie problem of 
these two colnpanies but also helped to  find new partners for the other parts of tlie liolding. 
Number of employees i n  the largest company of the holding (the lnetallurgical company) is 
~xesently aroulicl 700. 
It is envisaged tliat total l~oldiiig will be divided into several independent entities. Even the 
foreign tracle service department of the liolding is registering now as an independent limited lia- 
I)ilit\. coiiipaiiy witli 16 employees and is expected to  be privatized tlirougli internal management 
I)uy-out. It iiiteiicls to  retain export-import services for all companies of the former holding. 
Export Orieiltation 
I n  the coinplete liolcling tlie share of esports in  sales is 65%. 
AIajor destination of esports is Western Europe. Due to  tlie low specific value of heavy 
ant1 \.oluii~iiious senii-products the geographic range for trade is limited to  Central and Western 
Europe. AIajor partners are wliolesalers in Germany, Italy, and Austria. 
Due to  large oscillations in the prices and deniancl of iron manufacturing it was necessary to  
cliversify the production program. The present strategy also includes upgrading the production 
and thus ~)rod~lcing more complete products (modulators). 
Tlie colnpetitive advantage of the holding is quality, tradition and image, just-in-time pro- 
cluction and competitive prices. 
Products nianufactured for export do not differ from products for domestic market (all are 
liomogeneous senii-products). 
Due to  coniplete liberalization of imports the prices on Slovenia's market fell, thus equalizing 
p~ofitability of cloiiiestic sales with esports. Presently it is still possible to use tlie "import for 
csport" scheme to import raw materials without paying import tases. But, tliis will change with 
acloptioii of tlie lienr Customs Law and tlie Law on Custoni Tariffs i l i  Slovenia a t  the beginning 
of 1996. -4ccorcling to the management the new custoins duties should be diversified inore in 
detail than the present cluties. 
Doillestic Eilviroili~~eilt for Exports 
Tliere is no iieecl for any permission in esports and imports of tliis holding, escept for tlie above 
mentionecl certificates used for exemption from import duties. 
AS inost of other exporters, this liolding has also applied for tlie government's social security 
contribution subsidy, iiitroduced by the Parliament i n  the Spring 199.5. This is the first and 
l~iltil iio\\l tlie only financial stimulation for exporters. 
C'ieclits are available for tlie liolding, but the interest rates are considered too high. Guar- 
antees are usually not used, because most of the partners are i n  cooperation wit11 tlie liolding 
already for a long time. Tlie payments conditions are more strict for new partners. 
Tlie iiiost important influence of state regulation is felt tlirougli the escliarige rate policy 
(tlie prohlem with appreciation of domestic currency). 
Tlie government aclmi~iistration is more active lately in helping to  organize preliminary 
I~usiness meetings with potential foreign buyers. According to  tlie managers of the company the 
current promotion of Slovenia is not well organized and it is too much dispersed. 
In  199.5 tlie government iiitroduced a special 5% tax for export services, wliicli is against all 
intentions to  restructure Slovenia's economy towards liiglier share of services in GDP. 
Foreign Eilviroililleilt for Exports 
Tlre lioldiiig company maintains longer term business contracts with most of tlie foreign partners 
i n  ivhicli only the price is adapted to the current market developments. 
\Vliile there is still no competition a t  home, competitors on foreign niarl<ets come from 
1Sd5tern Europe (Russia, Poland, and Romania), where the price of electric energy is still very 
lo\\ aild also froiii Latin America. 
Alost infoimation on foreign markets are obtained from fairs, yearly meetings of producers 
of fei roalloys, and from the specialized professional journals. 
Slovenia's approacliing CEFTA has been without effect on tlie performance of tlie holding 
I~ecause tliese niarhets are not interesting for TDRu. The cooperation agreement and association 
agieeiiieiit ivitli tlie EU helped to receive higher quotas to esport to tlie EU countries. There 
ib still a possibility (applied sometimes by tlie Italian authorities) to challenge tlie clo~nestic 
co~iteiit of l>ioclucts esported from Slovenia, and so block supplies, although tlie ilnportecl raw 
materials go through a complete reproduction i n  factory's furnaces i n  Slovenia. 
10 RUSSIA 
Vladimir Drebentsov 
TVorld Bank Ofice,  Moscoto 
General Explanatory Notes 
Tlie a,uthor carried out a survey on the activities of tell specialized Russian foreign trade compa- 
nies that hat1 ilitelisive trade relations with suppliers from ChIEA countries prior to 1991. The 
a,bl>reviation EESEs refers to sis  East European sma.11 economies (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania,, Slovakia, and Slovenia) or their predecessors (i.e., Bulga.ria., Czecliosloval<ia, 
Hungary, Roniania, a.nd Yugosla.via.). 
Da,ta in t,liis clia.[>ter wa.s collected by the autlior and ca.nnot be associa.ted with the World 
Ba,nli. 
AVTOTORGPROMIMPORT 
I. C 'onl l~ai i~ . '~  leading imports from EESEs in  1988: 
autoniatic metal cutting lines for agricultural machinery plants; natural gas filling stations; 
garage equipnzent; warehouse equipment; metal-cutting and forging/pressing machine tools 
for agricultural nlacliinery plants. 
2. Main EESE partners in 1988: 
I3ulgaria. Hungary. Ron1 ania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia. 
3. Sliare of conipany's imports from EESEs in its total imports i n  1988: 
o\.erall - 40%. including: automatic metal cutting lines for agricultural nlacllinery plants 
- I'L'i:: natural gas filling stations - 8%; garage equipment - 12%; warehouse equipment 
- 4'i;: ~netal-cutting and forging/pressing machine tools for agricultural inacllinery plants 
- 4 % .  
4. C'onipan.v's leading imports from EESEs i n  1994: 
nletal cutting iilacliiiie tools for agricultural macliinery plants ($1.8 mn froin Rump- 
\'ugoslavia); coiilponents for electric stoves ($2.6 mn from Slovenia). 
.5. Maiii EESE partners in 1994: 
Rump-Yugoslavia. Slovenia. 
(I. Share of c o n l p a l ~ ~ ~ ' s  i npor ts  from EESEs in its total imports i11 1994: 
overall - l it%. i~~cluding:  autoinatic rnetal cutting lines for agricultural niachinery plants 
- 4'X; coiiipoiieiits for electric stoves - 2%. 
7 .  \\'hat suppliers liave substituted for former inlports from EESEs: 
German ancl Russian enterprises. 
8 .  Sl~a.re of iniports from EESEs based on intergovernnlental agreements in company's total 
imports from EESEs: 
i n  1988 - 100%; in 1994 - 0%. 
9. hIaili types of payments for imports from EESEs: 
i l l  19SS - incasso. intergo\~eriimental clearing; i n  1994 - bank letter of credit. 
10. >\I-ailalilit! of credit lilies for imports from EESEs i n  1994: 
none. 
11. C'oinpaiiy's payment arrears for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
nolie. 
12. C'oiiipany's payment axrears on credits for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
there were no credits. 
13. .~\\railal,ility of insurance for iillports from EESEs in 1994: 
insurance was available. 
14. Dela!,s i n  supply under import contracts wit11 EESEs' firms: 
i n  19S8 - nioderate; i11 1994 - moderate. 
15. C'oiilpaiiy ~naiiagers' evaluation of imports from EESEs (using five grades scale, wit11 five 
I~eing tlie top rate) : 
Overall - 3; 
iilcluding: 
C'ompatil~ility ~vith equipment used by your company/your clients - 5; 
Quality - 3 (better tlian Russian, lower tlian Western); 
Price - 4 (1998), 3 (1994); 
On111 or licensed brand name/trade inark - 5; 
hlarketing - 5; 
iiiclutling: 
Participation in fairs/esliibitions - 5; 
..\dvertising - 3; 
Reliability of delivery on time - 3; 
Aftersale service - 4; 
.A~.ailability of credit lines from exportiiig countries - 0; 
Insurance - 5; 
Trust 011 tlie part of Russian customers - 3; 
Efficiciicy of interinediaries from EESEs - 0; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by tlie company - 1; 
Prospects for iiicreasiilg imports from EESEs by other importers of same products - 
1 (main reasons: Russian enterprises liave started to produce required goods, prices on 
imports from EESEs are well above those on Western imports - for tliis very reason Volga 
Tractor Factory, for instance, lias completely switched to imports fro111 tlie \Vest). 
16. Prospects for ~.esuini~ig coinpany's imports from EESEs a t  1988 level: 
iiiipossible \vitllout centralized state financing. 
17. Prospects for increasing company's imports from EESEs from current low level: 
this just does not make sense. 
1s. Role of various factors in decreasing imports from EESEs: 
CLIE.4 break-up - decisive; 
Elin~iiiation of centralized imports - decisive; 
Aholitio~i of the former payment system - decisive. 
19. Single niost important reason for collapse of trade with EESEs: 
Eliniinatioil of government budget fina.ncing. 
IMPEX, - Subsidiary of "KRASNYI PROLETARII" 
Machinery Factory 
I .  Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1988: 
laser cutting press (one); universal cutting machine tools; automatic machinery compleses; 
components/spare parts for robotic complexes. 
2.  IIain EESE partners in 1988: 
Bulgaria. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia. 
3. Sliare of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1988: 
overall - 90%; including: laser cutting press; universal cutting machine tools - 3%; 
autoinatic machinery co~nplexes - 46%; cornponents/spare parts for robotic complexes 
- .50%1. 
4. Con1pa.ny's leading imports from EESEs in 1994: 
no itiiports esisted. 
5. I~Iain EESE pa,rtners in 1993: 
llone. 
6. Share of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports i11 1993: 
overall - 0%). 
7 .  \.\.'hat suppliers have substituted for former imports from EESEs: 
Russian enterprises. 
S. Share of imports from EESEs based on intergovernmental agreements in company's total 
imports from EESEs: 
in 1958 - 100%1; in 1993 - 0%. 
9. h,Iain types of payments for imports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - on delivery; in 1994 - none. 
10. Availability of credit lines for imports frorn EESEs in 1993: 
none. 
11. C'ompany's payment arrears for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
none. 
12. Conl]>any's ~>ayment  arrears on credits for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
there were no imports. 
13. AAvailal)ilit~. of insurance for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
there were no imports. 
14. Delays in supply under import contracts with EESEs' firms: 
in 1988 - no tlelays; in 1993 - there were 110 imports. 
1.5. Company managers' evaluation of imports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
I~eing the top rate): 
O\,erall - 4 (Bulgaria and Romania - 2); 
includi~lg: 
C'oii~[~atibility with equipment used by your company/your clients - 4 (although machin- 
ery for imports was produced using company's owl1 blueprints); 
Quality - -1; 
Price - 4;  
O ~ v n  or licensed brand nameltrade inark - lack of established trade mark lias not affected 
iinports froin EESEs; 
hlarlieting - 0 (in 19SS it was not required because everything was sliippecl under inter- 
governmental agreements, in 1994 it was lacked due to absence of ties); 
inclnding: 
Participation in  fairs/esliibitions - 4; 
Aclvertising - 1; 
Reliability of delivery 011 time - 4; 
Aftersale service - 4; 
clvailability of credit lines from exporting countries - 0; 
Insurance - 5 ;  
Trust 011 the part of Russian customers - 4 (Czeclioslovakia - -5, Bulgaria - 3) ;  
Efficiency of intermediaries from EESEs - 0 (see note to marlieting); 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by the company - 4 (but only in case of 
political changes in Russia); 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by other importers of same products - 4 
(sallie as above). 
16. Prospects for resuming company's imports from EESEs a t  1955 level: 
inlpossible ivitliout resuming company's exports to these countries to tlie same level. 
I T .  Prospects for increasing company's imports from EESEs from current low level: 
inipossible \vithout government subsiclies. 
LS. Role of various fa.ctors in decreasing imports from EESEs: 
CYVIEQ~ break-up - decisive; 
Eliminat~ion of centra.lized imports - insignificant; 
.4bolition of tlie former payment system - considerable. 
19. Single most important reason for collapse of trade with EESEs: 
Lacli of company's exports to the region. 
MASHPRIBORINTORG 
1. Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1988: 
co~nmunicatiou equipment; radio equipment; consumer electronics components; special 
co~nmunication equipment (military/police); special communication equipment (for gov- 
ernment use). 
2. blain EESE partners in 1988: 
Bulgaria, Hunga.ry, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia. 
3 .  S1ia.re of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1988: 
o\:era,ll - SO'%; including: communication equipment - 40; ra.dio equipment - 25; con- 
suiner electronics components - 5; special communication equipment (military) - 5 ;  
special comniunication equipment (for government use) - 5. 
-1. Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1994: 
coliiniu~iication equipment; consumer electronics components; special conlmunication 
ecluipment (milita.ry/police); foodstuffs and consumer goods. 
5. hlain EESE pa.rtners in 1994: 
Bulgaria. Hungary, C;zecli Republic. 
6. Share of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1993: 
overall - 3.5%,, including: coinmunication equipment - .5; consumer electronics com- 
ponents - 15; special communication equipment (military/police) - 5; foodstuffs and 
consulller goocls - 5. 
7 .  IVliat suppliers have substituted for former imports from EESEs: 
Russian enterprises and companies from Germany and Lithuania. 
8. Share of inlports from EESEs based on intergovernmenta.1 agreements in  company's total 
iniports from EESEs: 
in 1985 - 50-90%): in 1994 - 0%. 
9. AIain types of payments for imports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - intergovernmental clearing, on delivery, full prepayment; in 1994 - full pre- 
payrne~~t .  partial prepayment. 
10. A\.ailability of credit lines for imports from EESEs in  1994: 
none (due to high lending rates). 
11. C'oiii~-'any's payment arrears for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
none. 
12. Company's payment arrears on credits for imports from EESEs i n  1994: 
there were no credits. 
13. .-\\.ailability of insurance for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
\\.as available. 
14. De1a.y~ in supply under import contracts with EESEs' firms: 
in 19S8 - moclerate; in 1994 - no delays. 
1.5. C'oml~any ~nanagers' evaluation of imports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
I~eing the top rate): 
Overall - 4 (Bulgaria - 3, Czech Republic - 4, Hungary - 5) ;  
including: 
C'oiiipatibility with equipment used by your compaiiy/your clients - 4 (Hungary - 5 ) ;  
Quality - 4 (Hungary - 5); 
Price - 4; 
Ow11 or  licensed brand name/trade mark - 4 (Hungary - 5 ) ;  
Marketing - 3 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic - 4) ;  
including: 
Participation in fairs/esliibitions - 3 ;  
Advertising - 3 ;  
Reliability of delivery on time - 3 (1988), 4 (1994); 
Aftersale service - n.a. 
..l\vailability of credit lines from exporting countries - 0; 
Insurance - 5 ;  
Trust on tlie par t  of Russian customers - 4; 
Efficiency of intermediaries from EESEs - 1; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by the conlpany - 2 (due t o  political insta- 
l~i l i ty) ;  
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by other importers of same products - 2 
(till ccoiio~nic recovery takes place). 
16. Dcsira.hility of resuming company's imports from EESEs a t  1988 level: 
would be desirable. 
1 I. Prospects for increasing con~pany's  imports from EESEs from current low level: 
iillpossible without government subsidies. 
I S .  Role of various factors i n  decreasing imports from EESEs: 
CMEA break-up - decisive; 
Elimination of centralized iillports - decisive; 
.Abolition of tlie fornler payment system - insignificant. 
19. Single most importa.nt reason for collapse of t rade with EESEs: 
Break-clown of established ties due  t o  CMEA break-up. 
PROMMASHIMPORT 
I .  C'oiii~>ai~y's leading in~por ts  from EESEs in 1988: 
ecluipnient for wootl-residue panels production; equipment for saw wood production; equip- 
ment for brick ~~roduct ion;  equipment for concrete blocks procluction. 
2. IZain EESE partners in 1988: 
Bulgaria, Czechosloval;ia, Yugoslavia. 
3. Share of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1988: 
01.erall - SO%,, including: equipnient for wood-residue panels ~~roduction aiicl equipment 
for saw ~vootl procluctioil - 2.5%; equipment for brick production and ecluipinent for 
concrete blocks production - 20%. 
-1. Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1994: 
cannetl ~.egetal~les ( ole imports from EESEs). 
.5. AIain EESE partners in 1994: 
Bulgaria. 
(j. Sliare of coni~>any's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1994: 
Overall - 2%,, including: canned vegetables - 2% ($ 2 mn). 
7 .  IVhat suppliers have substituted for former imports from EESEs: 
~nterp~. ises  from Finland. 
S. Share of i~ul)orts froin EESEs based on intergoverrinierital agreements in company's total 
iiliports from EESEs: 
i n  19SS - 100%); in 1994 - 0%. 
9. P\/lain types of payments for imports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - intergovernmental clearing, on delivery; in 1994 - full prepayment. 
10. i\\:ailal>ility of credit lines for imports froin EESEs in 1994: 
n.a. 
11. C'ompan!.'~ payillelit arrears for inlports froin EESEs i n  1994: 
11011e. 
12. C'o~npan~.'s payinelit arrears on credits for imports from EESEs i n  1994: 
tltere were 110 credits. 
13. .41.ailal1ility of insurance for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
n.a. 
14. Dela!.s in supply under import contracts \vitli EESEs' firms: 
i11 1985 - ~lloclerate (about 8-10% of contract volume); in 1994 - 110 delays. 
15. C'ompaiiy nlanagers' evaluation of inlports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
I~eing the top rate): 
Overall - :3 (Czeclioslovakia - 4); 
including: 
C'ompatil~ility with ec1uipment used by your company/your clients - 1i.a. (coinpatibility 
has not been required, for inlports consisted of complete processing coinplexes); 
Quality - 3 (Czechoslovakia - 4) ;  
Piice - 4 (SO% of imports froin EESEs have been priced I~elow world level, which has 
been consistent wit11 their inferior quality); 
0 ~ ~ 1 1  or licensed brand name/trade ~ilark - 3; 
hlarlietiiig - 1i.a. (it has not been required); 
inclucling: 
Participation in fairs/exliibitions -- 5; 
1Zclvertising - 1; 
Reliability of delivery on time - 3 (1988); 
Aftersale service - 4-5; 
.Availability of credit lines from exporting countries - 1i.a. (they have not been required 
because of intergovernmental clearing); 
Insurance - 5; 
Trust 011 the part of Russian customers -e 3 (Czechoslovakia - 4); 
Efficiency of intermediaries from EESEs - 4-5; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by tlie company - 1; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by other importers of sanle products - 1 
(with tlie esception of foodstuffs). 
16. Desirability of resuming company's imports froin EESEs a t  1988 level: 
n.ould be desirable only with old meclianisnis in  place, otlier\vise, Western imports are 
illore desirable. 
17. Prospects for increasing company's itnports from EESEs from current low level: 
iinpossil~le without government subsidies. 
IS. Role of various factors in decreasing inlports froin EESEs: 
Ch4EA break-up - decisive; 
Eliminatioi~ of centralized imports - considerable; 
A4bolitioii of the former payment system - considerable. 
19. Single most inlportant reason for collapse of trade with EESEs: 
Break-clowi~ of established ties due to CMEA break-up. 
VNESHTEKHNIKA 
I .  Company's lea.ding imports from EESEs in 1983: 
comput,ers; software; machine tools; technologies for heart/vessels medicines production; 
nledical equipment. 
2. Main EESE partners in  1988: 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovaliia, Hungary. 
3. Sha,re of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1988: 
overall - SO%, including: computers - 50%; software, machine tools, teclinologies for 
heart/vessels medicines production and medica,l equipment - 25%. 
4. Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1994: 
forli-lift vehicles; electric switches; canned vegetables. 
5. hlain EESE par t l~ers  in 1994: 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia. 
6. Share of company's imports from EESEs in its total in-lports in 1994: 
overall - 30-40%. including: fork-lift vehicles and electric switches - .5% ($0.6 mn and 
$0.1 nln, respectively); canned vegetables - 30% ($1 111n). 
7 .  I T h a . t  suppliers ha.ve substituted for former imports from EESEs: 
enterprises from the USA, Germany, and Japan. 
8. Share of imports from EESEs b a e d  on intergovernmental agreements in company's total  
imports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - 60%; in 1991 -- 0%. 
9. hlain types of payments for imports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - intergovernmental clearing, on delivery; in 1991 - barter (fork-lift vehicles 
from Bulgaria), partial prepayment. 
10. Availabilit,~ of credit lines for imports fro111 EESEs in 1994: 
llOI1C. 
11. Company's pa,yment arrears for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
nolle. 
12. C'oml~anp's payment arrears on credits for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
there were no credits. 
13. -4vailal>ility of insurance for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
imports were insured by suppliers. 
14. Delays in supply under import contracts with EESEs' firms: 
in 1988 - no delays; in 1994 - no delays. 
1.5. Company managers' evaluation of imports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
being the top  rate): 
Overall - 3 (foodstuffs from Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria - 4, high-tech goods - 
2-3) : 
including: 
Compatibility with equipment used by your company/your clients - 2: 
Quality - 3 (same as with overall); 
Price - 4 (usually imports from EESEs are overpriced relative t o  their inferior quality); 
Own or licensed brand nanleltrade mark - 3; 
LIarlieting - 3; 
including: 
Participation in fairs/esliibitions - 5 ;  
.Advertising - 3; 
Reliability of delivery on time - 4;  
:\fte~.sale service - 4; 
,Availability of creclit lines from exporting countries - available fro111 \Vestern Europe only; 
Insurance - .5; 
Trust on the part of Russian customers - 3; 
Efficiency of intermediaries frorn EESEs - 4-5; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by the company -- 4 (yet this relatively high 
rate colrcerns iinports of foodstuffs only); 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by otlier importers of same products - 3 
(same as above) . 
16.  Desira.bilit,y of resuming company's imports froin EESEs at  1988 level: 
it, cloes ~ ~ o t  make sense. 
17. Prospects for increa,sing company's iinports from EESEs from current lo\\: level: 
we could, b l ~ t  it just does not ina,ke sense. 
18. Role of various factors in decreasing imports from EESEs: 
C:MEA breal<-up - decisive; 
Elimination of centralized imports - coilsiderable (it has primarily affected structure of 
iinports); 
Abolition of the former payment system - considerable (yet old payment systeill has been 
artificial, so its abolition has been a positive factor). 
19. Siiigle most important reason for collapse of trade with EESEs: 
Inferior coinpetitivetless of imports froin EESEs relative to Illestern ones. 
POLYOT-IMPEX - Subsidiary of POLYOT 
Watch Manufacturer 
1. Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1988: 
paints for printing houses ($ 3 mn from Hungary); machine tools ($3 mn from Czechoslo- 
vakia); advertising pamphlets. 
2. Alain EESE pa.rtners in 1988: 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. 
: 3 .  Share of company's inlports from EESEs i n  its total inil>orts in 1988: 
overall - 3%). 
4. Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1994: 
paints for printing houses ($ 1.5 mn from Hungary) 
5. AIain EESE partners in 1994: 
Hungary. 
6. Sllare of compa.ny's imports from EESEs in its total imports in  1994: 
overall - close to O%,. 
7. \$'hat suppliers have substituted for former imports from EESEs: 
enterprises from Germany and Switzerland. 
S .  Share of imports from EESEs based on intergovernmental agreements i l l  company's total 
imports from EESEs: 
in  1988 - O%,; in 1994 - 0%. 
9. Main types of payments for imports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - on delivery; in 1994 - full prepayment. 
10. Availability of credit lines for imports from EESEs in 1993: 
11011e. 
11. Company's paynlent arrears for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
none. 
12. C'onlpany's pa.yment arrears on credits for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
there were no cretlits. 
13. ."Lvailability of insurance for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
i~npor ts  were insured by suppliers. 
1-1. Delays in  supply under import contracts with EESEs' firms: 
i n  1988 - no delays; in  1994 - no delays. 
15. Company managers' evaluation of imports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
being the top rate): 
Overall - 2 (machine tools - 4, paints - 3); 
including: 
C'olnpatil~ility with equipment used by your company/your clients - 4 ;  
Quality -- 4 (same as with overall); 
Price - 4 (with the esception of imports from Hungary n~hich have been overpriced); 
Own or licensed brand name/trade mark - 5; 
hlarlieting - 4; 
illclrlcling: 
Participation in fairs/eshibitions - 4; 
.Ad\,ertising - 3; 
Reliability of delit-ery on time - 3 (same as with overall); 
Aftersale service - has been absent; 
.4\.ailability of credit lilies from exporting countries - have not esisted; 
Insurance - .5; 
Trust on the part of Russian customers - 4; 
Efficienc~ of interniediaries from EESEs - have been absent; 
Prospects for increasing iniports from EESEs by the company - 1; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by other importers of same proclucts - 4 
(s~uall sllipinents of light machine tools, paints, components for watches). 
10;. Desira.l>ility of resuming company's imports from EESEs a t  1988 level: 
it does not make sense (with the esception of limited groups of products). 
17. Prospects for increasing company's imports from EESEs from current lorn level: 
impossible. 
18. Role of various factors in decreasing imports from EESEs: 
C'AIEA I~reak-up - none; 
Elinlination of centralized imports - decisive (and should be evaluated positively); 
Al~olition of the former payillelit systeill - decisive. 
19. Single   no st important reasoil for collapse of trade with EESEs: 
inferior cluality of imports from EESEs relative to  \Vestern ones, combined with higher 
prices. 
MASHINOIMPORT 
1. C'o~i~pa~i!.'s leading imports from EESEs in 1988: 
cralles; fork-lift veliicles; equipment for oil refining; pumps and compressors; equipment 
for po\ver generation. 
2. L1ai11 EESE partners in 1989: 
Bulgaria ($841.5 mn). Czechoslo\lakia ($207 n i n ) ,  Hungary ($93 mn). Roniania ($461.3 
nin), \r7ugoslavia ($0.2 ~ n n ) .  
:3 .  Sliare of conipany's imports from EESEs in  its total imports i n  1988: 
overall - SO-SO%,. 
4. Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1994: 
ecluipment for oil refining. 
5. hIain EESE partners in 1994: 
Bulgaria ($0.2 mn),  Czech Republic ($0.8 mn), Hungary ($0.1 rnn) , Run1 p-Yugoslavia 
($14.7 liill). 
6. Sliare of co~npany's iniports from EESEs i n  its total imports in 1994: 
overall - less tlian 5%). 
7 .  I'l'hat suppliers Iiave sr~bstituted for former imports from EESEs: 
conipanies fro111 Germany, USA, Japan, Italy. 
S. Share of i1~11)orts from EESEs based on intergoverri~nental agreements in company's total 
i1111)orts fro111 EESEs: 
in 1955 - 95%; i n  1994 - 0%. 
9. hiain types of paynlents for imports from EESEs: 
i n  1988 - accrual: in 1994 - barter. 
10. Availability of credit lines for inlports from EESEs in 1994: 
11011e. 
11. C'onipany's payment arrears for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
moderate arrears. 
12. C'onipa~v's payment arrears on  credit,^ for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
t liere \Irere no credits. 
IS. Availability of insurance for inlports from EESEs in 1994: 
none. 
1-1. Delays i n  supply under import contracts witli EESEs' firms: 
in 1988 - no delays; in 1994 - no de1a.y~. 
15. C'on~pany ~nanagers' evaluation of imports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
being the top rate): 
Overall - 2 (cranes - 4. compressors and fork-lift vehicles - 3);  
inclutling: 
C'o~iipatil,ility witli equipment used by your company/your clients - 4: 
Quality - 4 (sanie as witli overall); 
Price - 4; 
0\vn or licensed brand na~ne/trade mark - 4; 
ILIarlietiiig - 3; 
including: 
Participation in fairs/esliibitions - 4; 
Advertising - 3; 
Reliability of delivery on time - 4; 
Aftersale service - 3; 
.41railability of credit lines from exporting countries - have not esisted; 
Insurance - 4;  
Trust on the part of Russian customers - 4; 
Efficient\. of intermediaries from EESEs - have been absent; 
Prospects for increasi~ig imports from EESEs by the company - 1; 
Prospects for increasing inlports from EESEs by other importers of sanie products - 3. 
16. Desirability of resuming company's imports from EESEs a t  1985 level: 
it does not ~na,lie sense because of inferior quality. 
I T .  Prospects for increasing company's imports from EESEs from current low level: 
impossible without government subsidies. 
IS. Role of various factors in decreasing imports from EESEs: 
C'hIE-A I~reali-up - decisive; 
Eliniination of centralized imports - decisive; 
Abolition of the former payment systenl - decisive. 
19. Single most i~ilportant reason for collapse of trade ~vith EESEs: 
Switching to ~>ayments in hard currency. 
VNESHSTROIIMPORT 
1. C'ompany's leading imports from EESEs in 1988: 
construction of oil/gas pipelines; construction; restoration of historic sites; fruitlvegetable 
warehouses: construction materials. 
2. Main EESE partners in 1988: 
Bulgaria. C'zeclioslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia. 
3. S1ia.re of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1988: 
overa.11 - 60-70%. 
4. Company's leading imports from EESEs in 1994: 
construction of oil/gas pipelines; construction; construction materials. 
.5. bIa.in EESE partners in 1994: 
Bulga.ria., C!zecli Republic, Rump-Yugosla.via, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
(j. Share of colnpa,ny's imports from EESEs in its tota,l inlports in 1993: 
overa.11 - less tlia,n 2.4%. 
7 .  \Vliat suppliers have substituted for former imports from EESEs: 
nolie. 
8 .  Slla,re of imports from EESEs based on intergovernmental agreements i n  company's tota,l 
iniports from EESEs: 
in  1988 - 80%; in 1994 - 100%. 
9. Plla.in types of pa.yments for imports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - a,ccrual; in  1994 - a.ccrua,l, pa.rtia1 prepayment. 
10. Availability of credit lines for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
none. 
11. C'onipa.ny's payment arrears for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
none. 
12. C'onipany's l ~ a y ~ n e n t  arrears on credits for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
there were no credits. 
13. .Availability of insurance for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
\\as a\.ailable. 
14. Dela,ys i n  supply under import contracts with EESEs' firms: 
in 1988 -- moderate delays; in 1994 - moderate delays. 
15. Conipany managers evaluation of imports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
being the top rate): 
Overall - 4 (restoration and constr~lction materials - -5); 
including: 
C'onipatil>ility with equipment used by your company/your clients - not required; 
Quality - 4 (same as with overall); 
Price - 5 (with the esception of overpriced imports from Hungary); 
Own or licelised brand narneltrade inark - 4; 
hlarketing - 3; 
inclucling: 
Participation in fairslexhibitions - 2; 
.Atlvertising - 3; 
Reliabilitjl of delivery on time - 4; 
ilftersale service - 5 ;  
i-\vailability of credit lines from exporting countries - have not esisted; 
Insurance - -5; 
Trust on the part of Russian customers - 1; 
Efficieilcy of i~iternlediaries from EESEs - -5 (formal ones a t  trade missions); 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by the company - 4; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by otlier importers of same products - 5 .  
l b .  Desirability of resuming company's imports from EESEs a t  1988 level: 
no tlefinite answer. 
17. Prospects for increasing company's imports from EESEs from current low level: 
impossible witllout goveriiment subsidies. 
1s. Role of \.arious factors in decreasing imports froin EESEs: 
C'MEA break-up - considerable; 
Elimination of centralized imports - decisive; 
of the foriiler payment system - insignificant. 
19. Single most importa.nt reason for collapse of trade with EESEs: 
La.ck of int,erest among our clients that  are currently tiglit on money. 
STANKOIMPORT 
I .  C;onlpany1s leading irnports from EESEs in 1988: 
nlaclline tools for metal work; pressing-forging equipment; automatic metal processing 
lines; intlustrial robots; industrial hand tools; measuring equipment. 
2. hlain EESE partners in 1988: 
Bulgaria (S'rr,), Czechoslovakia (14%), Roinania (S'ru), Yugoslavia (lG%). 
3. Share of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1988: 
overall - 40%. 
4. C!ompany's leading imports from EESEs in 1994: 
consumer goods. 
5.  hfain EESE pa.rtners in 1994 (total imports $76.7 mn): 
Hungary (0.009% of total company's imports),  Czech Republic (0.02% of total company's 
iinports), Romania - coiisumer goods (1% of total company's imports).  
6. Sllare of company's imports from EESEs in its total imports in 1994: 
overall - 1%). 
7. YVhat suppliers have substituted for former imports from EESEs: 
companies from the USA, Germany, Japan ,  Italy. 
S. Share of imports from EESEs based on intergovernmental agreements in company's total 
imports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - 100%; in 1994 - 0%. 
9. hiIain types of payments for imports from EESEs: 
in 19SS - on delivery, intergovernmental clearing; in 1994 - partial prepayment. 
10. Ava,ila.bility of credit lines for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
available froni Western countries only. 
11. C'oinpany's payment arrears for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
iloile. 
12. C'ompany's payment a.rrears on credits for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
there were no credits. 
13. Availability of insurance for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
1va.s a.vaila,ble froin Ingosstrakh, yet no compensa.tion wa.s a.va.ilable for the company, even 
if shipnients got lost/damaged. 
14. Delays in supply under import contracts with EESEs' firms: 
i n  1988 - moderate delays; in 1994 - none. 
15. C'ompany managers' evaluation of imports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
being the top rate): 
Overall - i1.a.; 
inclucling: 
C'ompatibility ivitli equipment used by your company/your clients - 5; 
Qualit!. - S (Yugoslavia - 4); 
Price - .5: 
01vn or licensed brand name/trade mark - (Bulgaria, Ro~nan ia  - 3, C'zecl~oslovakia, 
f igoslavia - 4) ;  
hIarlietiiig - 5 (due t o  mo~iopolistic structure of tlie market);  
including: 
Participation in fairs/exhibitions - 5 (1988), 2 (1994); 
t2clvertising - 3 (1988), 2 (1994); 
Reliability of delivery on time - 4; 
Aftersale service - 1 (have been almost non-existent); 
Availability of credit lines from exporting countries - have never existed, and are not 
currently available; 
Insurance - 1; 
Trust 011 tlie part of Russian customers - 3; 
Efficiency of intermediaries from EESEs - 1; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by tlie company - 1; 
Prospects for increasing imports from EESEs by other importers of same products - 1. 
16. Desirability of resuming company's imports from EESEs a t  1988 level: 
no clefinite answer. 
17. Prospects for iiicreasirig company's imports from EESEs from current low level: 
impossible without government subsidies. 
IS. Role of various factors in decreasing imports from EESEs: 
C'LlEX break-up - decisive; 
Elimination of centralized imports - decisive; 
Abolition of the former payment system - decisive. 
19. Single niost iiilportant reason for collapse of trade with EESEs: 
Lack of funds both 011 tlie part  of tlie government a,nd clients. 
ELECTROINTORG Ltd. 
1. C'ornpanj.'~ leading ilnports from EESEs in 1988: 
comp~~te r s ;  computer components. 
2. Main EESE partners in 1988: 
Bulgaria. 
13. Share of conipany's imports from EESEs in  its total imports i n  1988: 
overa.11 - n.a. 
4. Company's leading imports from EESEs i n  1994: 
11one. 
5. hlain EESE partners i n  1994: 
none. 
6 .  Share of company's imports from EESEs in  its total imports in 1993: 
overall - 0%. 
7 .  \\.'hat suppliers have substituted for former imports froin EESEs: 
companies from the USA and Italy. 
8. Share of inlports from EESEs based on intergovernmental agreements in company's total 
inlports from EESEs: 
in 1988 - loo%,: i n  1994 - 0%. 
9. Alain types of payments for imports from EESEs: 
i l l  1988 - on delivery; in 1994 - none. 
10. Availability of credit lines for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
none. 
11. Company's payillent arrears for imports from EESEs in  1994: 
none. 
12. C'olnpany's payment arrears on credits for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
there were no credits. 
13. r-l~.ailal>ility of insurance for imports from EESEs in 1994: 
n.a. 
14. Delays in supply under import contracts with EESEs' firms: 
in 1988 - moderate; in 1994 - none. 
1.5. Company managers' evaluation of iillports from EESEs (using five grades scale, with five 
being tlie top rate): 
o\.erall - n.a.; 
illcluding: 
C'onipatibility ~vi th  ecluipment used by your company/your clients - 3; 
Quality - 2; 
Price - 5; 
Own or licensed bl.and name/trade mark - 2; 
hlarlieting - 2: 
including: 
Partici[~ation i n  fairs/eshibitions - 3; 
ilclvertising - 2; 
Reliability of delivery 011 time - 3; 
Aftersale service - 3-; 
.4vailability of credit lines from exporting countries - 1; 
Insurance - 1; 
Trust 011 the part of Russian customers - 0; 
Efficiency of intermediaries from EESEs - 0; 
Prospects for increasing i~llports from EESEs by the company - 1; 
Prospects for increasing i~llports from EESEs by other i~nporters of sanle products - 1. 
16. Desirability of resuming company's imports from EESEs a t  1988 level: 
coinpletely undesirable. 
17. Prospects for increasing company's imports from EESEs from current low level: 
i~npossible without government subsidies. 
IS. Role of various factors in decreasing imports from EESEs: 
CL'lE-+I break-up - insignificant; 
Eli~nination of centralized imports - insignificant; 
Abolition of the former payment system - insignificant. 
19. Single   no st importa.nt reason for collapse of trade with EESEs: 
Elimina,tion of COCOM restrictions on trade with Russia. 
